Bennett v. Harford County

Jacob Bennett v. Harford County, Maryland, No. 38, September Term, 2022. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – ELIGIBILITY TO BE A HARFORD COUNTY COUNCIL MEMBER Section 207 of the Harford County Charter, which prevents a Council member from holding employment in the government of the State, Harford County, or any municipality within Harford County, does not preclude a teacher employed by the Harford County Board of Education from simultaneously serving as a member of the Harford County Council. Finding Charter § 207 ambiguous concerning whether it applies to employees of the Board, the Court applied a canon of construction favoring candidate eligibility to resolve the ambiguity. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT – INCOMPATIBLE POSITIONS The doctrine of incompatible positions does not preclude a teacher employed by the Harford County Board of Education from simultaneously serving as a member of the Harford County Council.

Circuit Court for Harford County Case No. C-12-CV-22-000857 IN THE SUPREME COURT Argued: April 4, 2023 OF MARYLAND* No. 38 September Term, 2022 ______________________________________ JACOB BENNETT v. HARFORD COUNTY, MARYLAND ______________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Fader, C.J. Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Gould, J., dissents. Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State ______________________________________ Government Article) this document is authentic. 2024.04.26 Filed: August 30, 2023 11:49:00 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk * At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. Jacob Bennett, the appellant, and Harford County, Maryland (the “County”), the appellee, dispute whether Mr. Bennett is barred from serving as a member of the Harford County Council (the “Council”) because of his employment as a schoolteacher by the Harford County Board of Education (the “Board”).

In the November 2022 general election, Mr. Bennett was elected to the Council. Soon after, a dispute arose between Mr. Bennett and the County concerning whether he is precluded from serving simultaneously as a member of the Council and as an employee of the Board by either: (1) Section 207 of the Harford County Charter (the “Charter”), which prohibits a Council member from holding, among other things, “employment in the government of the State of Maryland[ or] Harford County”; or (2) the common law doctrine of incompatible positions. We hold that neither Charter § 207 nor the doctrine of incompatible positions bars Mr. Bennett from simultaneously serving as a member of the Council and an employee of the Board. First, Charter § 207 does not preclude Mr. Bennett from serving on the Council because his employer, the Board, does not have the character of either a State or County government entity in the context presented.

County boards of education can have the character of State, county, hybrid, or independent entities. Which character applies to a particular situation depends on context and applicable statutory and regulatory provisions. As applied in the context of Charter § 207, a county board of education does not have a particular character as State, county, hybrid, or independent entity. We therefore turn to our canons of statutory interpretation to discern the legislative intent underlying the provision.

Because the language of § 207 is ambiguous and legislative history clarifies only part of that ambiguity, we employ a canon of statutory interpretation favoring candidate eligibility. We ultimately conclude that, for purposes of the applicability of § 207, the Board is an independent entity, neither State nor County, and that § 207 therefore does not preclude Mr. Bennett from simultaneously serving as a member of the Council and an employee of the Board. Second, the doctrine of incompatible positions does not preclude Mr. Bennett’s simultaneous service on the Council and as an employee of the Board because there is no present or prospective conflict of interest between the positions; neither position has a level of supervisory power over the other or the ability to hire, fire, or set the salary of the other; and none of the functions of the offices are “inherently inconsistent and repugnant.” Hetrich v. County Comm’rs of Anne Arundel County, 222 Md. 304, 308 (1960) (quoting Lilly v. Jones, 158 Md. 260, 266 (1930)). The Council’s limited roles with respect to the budget and membership of the Board are too attenuated from Mr. Bennett’s position as a teacher to implicate the doctrine.

For those reasons, in a per curiam order issued following oral argument, we held that Mr. Bennett was not barred from serving on the Council while remaining a schoolteacher employed by the Board, reversed the contrary order and declaratory judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County, and remanded the case with instructions to that court to enter a declaratory judgment in accord with our order. Bennett v. Harford County, 483 Md. 414 (2023) (per curiam). We now explain the basis for that order. 2 BACKGROUND A. The Harford County Charter and the Council Harford County is governed by the terms of a charter adopted by the eligible voters of the County in November 1972. See Maryland Manual 1973-1974, at 589 (Morris L. Radoff & Frank F. White, Jr., eds., 1974).

The legislative branch of the County government is the seven-member Council. Harford County Charter § 201. Six members of the Council must, at the time of their elections, reside in one of the County’s six Council districts. Id. § 204.

The seventh, who serves as Council President, is elected at large. Id. Members are elected for four-year terms on the same schedule as the election of state officers. Id. §§ 204, 206.

To be qualified to serve as a Council member, a candidate must “have been a resident and a qualified voter of the County for at least two years immediately preceding election or appointment,” and (other than the Council President) “a resident of the Council district from which elected or appointed.” Id. § 207. While serving on the Council, a “member shall not hold any other office of profit or employment in the government of the State of Maryland, Harford County, or any municipality within Harford County, except a position held by virtue of being a Council member.” Id. Members are further ineligible during their term “for appointment to any County office or position carrying compensation” other than Council member or the County Executive. Id. 3 This dispute centers on the prohibition in Charter § 207 against a member holding “employment in the government of the State of Maryland[ or] Harford County” while serving on the Council.1 B. Factual Background Before the circuit court, the parties stipulated to the following facts, among others.

Mr. Bennett is a teacher in the Harford County Public Schools, employed by the Board. For the 2022-2023 school year, Mr. Bennett was under contract with the Board to teach wherever the Superintendent of the Harford County Public Schools assigned him. In the November 2022 General Election, the voters of Harford County Council District F elected Mr. Bennett to serve as the Council member representing that district. Mr. Bennett intends to work as a teacher in Harford County Public Schools while simultaneously serving as a Council member.

Mr. Bennett is paid by the Board. As a teacher, Mr. Bennett participates in the State retirement system, with funding that comes from the County. The Board receives substantial funding from the State, some of which comes from federal programs, and the County. Annually, the Board submits a proposed budget to the County Executive and the Council.

Since 1972, the County Executive and the Council have fully funded the Board’s proposed budget only four times, three of which were the last three fiscal years. Each year, the Council meets with Board representatives, considers the Board’s proposed budget and any proposed cuts to it, and usually approves in part and 1 As no party contends that the Board could be considered a government entity within a “municipality in Harford County,” we do not consider that part of Charter § 207. 4 denies in part the proposal. The Council also considers and acts on Board requests to transfer funds in the Board’s budget between major categories. In making its funding decisions, the Council allocates County funds among the various agencies and units of government that receive funds from it, including several non-County entities.2 The Board is the largest recipient of County operating budget funds.

Annually, the Council approves the allocation of County revenues to the Board, which the Board uses to pay for textbooks and classroom supplies; information and communication technology; a fleet of vehicles; and the salaries of its personnel, including teachers. The Council also approves the allocation of County revenues to the Board to pay for debt service on bonds issued to fund Board facilities, as well as to fund construction of and improvements to Board facilities. Mr. Bennett’s compensation as a member of the Council would be $49,000 per year. C. Procedural Background About one month after Mr. Bennett’s election, the County filed this action.

In its complaint, the County sought a declaratory judgment that Mr. Bennett was not qualified to serve on the Council while employed by the Board, as well as an injunction barring him from serving on the Council. Before the circuit court, the County argued that the Board was either a State or a County agency and that, in either case, Mr. Bennett’s employment with the Board rendered him unqualified to serve on the Council pursuant to Charter § 207 2 Among the non-County agencies that receive funding from the County, as approved by the Council, are the Sheriff and Sheriff’s office, the Harford County Health Department, circuit court personnel, State’s Attorney’s Office personnel, and the Harford Soil Conservation District. 5 and the doctrine of incompatible positions. Mr. Bennett contended that the Board was neither a State nor a County agency and, therefore, he was not precluded from serving on the Council. Mr. Bennett counterclaimed for injunctive, declaratory, and mandamus relief to force the County to permit him to serve on the Council.

In February 2023, after a hearing, the circuit court ruled for the County. The court concluded that because the controversy arose from the Council’s required input on the Board’s annual budget, and budgetary issues are local in nature, the Board should be treated as a County entity for purposes of Charter § 207. The court noted that even if the Board were instead treated as a State agency, “the result [would] remain[] the same.” The court accordingly entered a declaratory judgment and order in which it: (1) declared that Charter § 207 “applies to public school teachers employed by the Harford County Board of Education”; (2) declared that Mr. Bennett, due to his employment with the Harford County Board of Education, “is not qualified to be a member of the Harford County Council”; (3) ordered Mr. Bennett to “cure his lack of qualification . . . by terminating his employment with the Harford County Board of Education”; and (4) enjoined Mr. Bennett from acting as a member of the Council “unless and until he cures his lack of qualification[.]” Mr. Bennett filed a notice of appeal with the Appellate Court of Maryland,3 and petitioned for a writ of certiorari to this Court before action was taken by the Appellate 3 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. 6 Court.

This Court granted Mr. Bennett’s petition and the parties’ joint petition for expedited proceedings on March 6, 2023. Bennett v. Harford County, 483 Md. 264 (2023). On April 5, 2023, following oral argument, we issued a per curiam order reversing the circuit court and declaring that neither Charter § 207 nor the doctrine of incompatible positions precludes Mr. Bennett from serving on the Council while employed as a teacher by the Board. Bennett, 483 Md. at 416 .

We therefore remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to enter: (1) a declaratory judgment that Mr. Bennett is qualified to serve as a member of the Harford County Council while being employed as a teacher by the Harford County Board of Education; and (2) any injunctive relief that may be necessary and appropriate to implement and enforce that declaratory relief. Id. We now explain the basis for our order. DISCUSSION The interpretation of a provision of a county charter is a legal question, which we review without deference.

Prince George’s County v. Thurston, 479 Md. 575, 585 (2022). The application of the doctrine of incompatible positions to undisputed facts is also a question of law, which we again review without deference. See Uthus v. Valley Mill Camp, Inc., 472 Md. 378, 385 (2021). I. CHARTER § 207 Charter § 207 prohibits an individual from serving as a Council member if, among other things, the individual is employed by the State of Maryland or the County.

Mr. Bennett is employed by the Board. The dispositive question is thus whether the Board, for purposes of the application of § 207, is a State entity, a County entity, or neither. The 7 answer is not straightforward. Statutes treat county boards of education as State entities for some purposes, County entities for others, and hybrid or independent entities for yet others.

Our decisional law reflects that the character of county boards of education changes depending on the context in which an issue arises. We therefore begin with an exploration of the role of county boards of education as they relate to the State and the County. A. The Statutory Scheme Article VIII, § 1 of the Constitution of Maryland requires the General Assembly to “establish throughout the State a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools,” and to “provide by taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance.” The framework the General Assembly has created for that system of free public schools is contained in the Education Article (2022 Repl.). Title 2 of the Education Article establishes the State Department of Education as a principal department of the State government, with the State Board of Education (the “State Board”) serving as head of the department.

Educ. §§ 2-101, 2-102. The State Board, which consists of 13 regular members and one student member, id. § 2-202(a), is charged broadly with “[d]etermin[ing] the elementary and secondary educational policies of this State,” and “[c]aus[ing] to be carried out those provisions of this article that are within its jurisdiction,” id. § 2-205(b)(1) & (2). The State Board appoints a state superintendent, who serves as the chief executive, secretary, and treasurer of the State Board and is charged with “[c]arry[ing] out the educational policies of the State Board.” Id. §§ 2-204(c)(1); 2-302(a); 2-303(c)(1). Through the state superintendent, the State Board “exercise[s] general control and 8 supervision over the public schools and educational interests of this State” and “establish[es] basic policy and guidelines for the program of instruction for the public schools.” Id. § 2-205(g)(2) & (h)(1).

The State Board is authorized to “adopt bylaws, rules, and regulations for the administration of the public schools,” id. § 2-205(c); prepare and send to the Governor, after certification by the state superintendent, “the annual State public school budget,” which includes State aid to counties, id. § 2-205(j); “explain the true intent and meaning of the provisions of” the Education Article that are within its jurisdiction and the bylaws, rules, and regulations it adopts, id. § 2-205(e)(1); and “decide all controversies and disputes under these provisions,” id. § 2-205(e)(2). This Court has described the State Board’s broad authority “as a visitatorial power of such comprehensive character as to invest [it] with the last word on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public education.” Donlon v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 460 Md. 62, 81 (2018) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s County v. Waeldner, 298 Md. 354, 360 (1984)). Title 3 of the Education Article establishes “a county board of education,” co-extensive with the geographical boundaries of each county in the State, “for each county school system.” Educ. §§ 3-102, 3-103.

State law governs the size, composition, and manner of selection of the members of each county board of education. See generally id. §§ 3-105–3-1405. In Harford County, the Board consists of six elected members: one from each Council district; three members appointed by the County Executive, subject to the advice and consent of the Council; the county superintendent of schools (ex officio); and one student member. Id. § 3-6A-01(b), (c) & (d).

In the event of a vacancy of an 9 elected member of the Board, the Council is to appoint a qualified individual to serve for the remainder of the term. Id. § 3-6A-01(f)(1). County boards of education are responsible for “educational matters that affect the counties.” Id. § 4-101(a). Each county board of education is responsible for selecting a county superintendent, who is to serve as “the executive officer, secretary, and treasurer of the county board.” Id. § 4-102; see also id. §§ 4-204, 4-205 (setting forth the powers and duties of county superintendents).

Upon the written recommendation of the county superintendent, each county board is responsible for appointing and setting the salaries of “all principals, teachers, and other certificated and noncertificated personnel.” Id. § 4-103. Under State law, county boards are required, among other things, to carry out applicable provisions of the Education Article “and the bylaws, rules, regulations, and policies of the State Board”; maintain throughout their jurisdiction “a reasonably uniform system of public schools that is designed to provide quality education and equal educational opportunity for all children”; “determine . . . the educational policies of the county school system”; and promulgate “bylaws, rules, and regulations not inconsistent with State law, for the conduct and management of the county public schools.” Id. § 4-108. To carry out those duties, county boards may establish public schools that, if approved by the state superintendent, “become[] a part of the State program of public education.” Id. § 4-109. Each county board of education must prepare and submit an annual budget “[s]ubject to the rules and regulations of the State Board and with the advice of the county superintendent.” Id. § 5-101(a)(1).

Although budgets are submitted to county governments, the contents and process for the submission, review, and approval of annual 10 budgets is prescribed by State law, which sets out in detail the categories that must be included in the budget for receipts and expenses. Id. § 5-101(b). Notably for our purposes, all “[i]nstructional salaries,” including the salaries of all teachers, aides, psychological personnel, guidance counselors, and library personnel, constitute a single subcategory of a county board’s budget. Id. § 5-101(b)(2)(iii).

In counties with a county executive and council, such as the County, budgets are due at least 45 days before the date for levying local taxes. Id. § 5-102(b). The county executive is first charged with identifying in writing categories of the budget to deny or reduce “and the reason for the denial or reduction.” Id. § 5-102(c)(2). The budget then goes to the county council, which may “restore any denial or reduction made by the county executive.” Id. § 5-102(c)(3).

The budget must include at least the minimum amount of funding required by a formula set forth in § 5-2354 of the Education Article. Id. § 5-103(a). If a county council does not ultimately approve the full amount requested by a county board, the county board must submit to the council, “within 30 days after the adoption of the budget, a report indicating how the alterations to the budget will be implemented, accompanied by reasonable supporting detail and analysis.” Id. § 5-103(c)(2). The county council is then obligated to levy property taxes that, together with other available revenue, “will produce the amounts necessary to meet the appropriations made in the approved annual budget of the county board.” Id. § 5-104(a).

During a budget year, a county board may transfer funds within major budget categories on its own, but must obtain the county 4 Section 5-103(a) of the Education Article references § 5-202(d)(1)(i), but § 5-202 was renumbered to § 5-235 in 2021. 2021 Md. Laws ch. 36. 11 council’s approval to transfer funds between major budget categories. Id. § 5-105(b)(1) & (2). County boards are responsible for employing individuals necessary to the operation of the public schools in the county, but they may not hire anyone as a county superintendent, supervisor, principal, or teacher unless the individual is eligible to be issued a certificate by the state superintendent. Id. §§ 6-101, 6-201(a)(1).

The county superintendent is responsible for nominating, for the county board’s approval, all professional assistants in the county superintendent’s office and all principals, teachers, and other certificated personnel. Id. § 6-201(b)(1). The county superintendent is also responsible for the assignment, transfer, and recommendation for promotion of those personnel. Id. § 6-201(b)(2).

On recommendation of the county superintendent, a county board may suspend or dismiss a teacher on specified grounds. Id. § 6-202(a). An appeal from such a decision may be made to the State Board. Id. § 6-202(a)(4).

As shown by the discussion above, county boards of education are: (1) integral parts of the State system of public education, which is established and thoroughly regulated by State law and ultimately presided over by the State Board; (2) organized, selected, and funded in significant part on a county level, although through a process grounded in State law; and (3) in many respects, distinct in their operations from both State and county entities. The unique status of county boards is reflected in other statutes as well. For example, tort claims against State entities, including the State Board, and related immunity for State personnel, are governed by the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md. Code Ann., State 12 Gov’t §§ 12-101–12-110 (2021 Repl.; 2022 Supp.) & Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522 (2020 Repl.); and tort claims against local government entities, including all counties and Baltimore City, and related protections for their employees, are governed by the Local Government Tort Claims Act, Cts. &.

Jud. Proc. §§ 5-301–5-304. But tort claims against county school boards, including the Board, and protections for their members and employees, are governed by a separate tort claim and immunity regime applicable only to county boards of education. See id. § 5-518; see also Neal v. Balt.

City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 467 Md. 399, 422-24 (2020) (contrasting approaches taken under the Maryland Tort Claims Act and Local Government Tort Claims Act with Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 5-518). For purposes of tort claims handling, indemnification, and protection of personnel, county school boards are thus treated both separately and differently from both State entities and local government entities. Maryland’s Public Ethics Law also treats State entities, county entities, and county school boards separately.

The Maryland Public Ethics Law contains provisions addressing conflicts of interest, financial disclosures, and lobbying that apply generally to State officials and employees. See Md. Code Ann., Gen’l Provs. §§ 5-101–5-716 (2019 Repl.; 2022 Supp.). Separately, “each county and each municipal corporation” is required to enact its own regulations governing the public ethics of local officials that, although similar to those applicable to State officials and employees, may be modified to be more relevant “in that jurisdiction.” Id. §§ 5-807–5-810. And separately still, county school boards are required to adopt regulations governing the ethics of their own members and, if they choose, their officials and employees, that, although similar to the State provisions, may 13 be modified to be more relevant in “that school system.” Id. §§ 5-815–5-818.

Other statutes that distinguish between the State and the various governmental entities within it also further distinguish between counties and county boards of education, among other subdivisions. See, e.g., id. § 4-101(j) (defining a “political subdivision” of the State, for purposes of the Maryland Public Information Act, to include a county, a municipal corporation, an unincorporated town, a school district, or a special district); State Gov’t § 10-1301(f)(2) (defining “unit,” as applicable to non-State entities, as including “a county, municipality, bi-county, regional, or multicounty agency, county board of education, public corporation or authority, or any other political subdivision of the State”).5 B. Treatment of County School Boards in Caselaw Reflecting the complexity of the character of county school boards laid out in the Maryland Code, this Court has not adopted a uniform determination of the character of such boards for all purposes. Instead, we have recognized that their character can vary based on context. We recently traced the evolution of our caselaw in this area in determining whether a county school board is part of the executive branch of the State 5 Provisions of the Harford County Code similarly treat the Board as an entity separate from the County and the State.

See, e.g., Harford County Code § 235-7(A)(1)(d) (“The applicant shall also state how many channels, what facilities and what services shall be provided free of charge to the County, the school systems and the public[.]”); id. § 235-10(F) (“On the County and educational channels, the company shall carry or cablecast such programming as designated by the County or its designated representative and the school system or its designated representative, respectively.”); id. § 68-8 (“The government of the county, the County Board of Education and the Board of Trustees of the Harford Community College are hereby exempted from the provisions of this chapter.”). 14 government for purposes of the State’s Whistleblower Protection Law in Donlon v. Montgomery County Public Schools, 460 Md. 62 (2018). In Donlon, we rejected the petitioner’s contention that county school boards are State agencies for all purposes. Id. at 79 . We acknowledged that several of our prior opinions had “referred to county boards of education as State entities in a variety of contexts,” but concluded that “none [we]re consequential to the present case,” both because the conclusory statements at issue were made in dicta and because they were not explained.

Id. We also observed that courts had uniformly determined that county school boards are State agencies for purposes of sovereign immunity.6 Id. at 80-81 . However, we also noted that it was possible for an entity to “qualify as a State agency for some purposes, while being classified as a local agency for other purposes.” Id. at 83 (quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Phillips, 413 Md. 606, 632 (2010)).7 Looking to our more recent 6 See, e.g., Lee-Thomas v. Prince George’s County Pub.

Schs., 666 F.3d 244 , 248-49 n.5 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing state and federal decisions recognizing that Maryland’s county school boards are “instrumentalities of the State” for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes); Jones v. Frederick County Bd. of Educ., 689 F. Supp. 535, 538 (D. Md. 1988) (holding, in the context of an employment discrimination claim, that a county school board member, superintendent, and school principal, when employed by a county school board, are state officials protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity); Bd. of Educ. of Balt. County v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 205-06 (2009) (stating, in connection with sovereign immunity, that this Court has “long considered county school boards to be State agencies”); Norville v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 160 Md. App. 12, 62 (2004) (concluding that a county school board was “an arm of the State” and so protected by sovereign immunity), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ. v. Norville, 390 Md. 93 (2005). 7 In Phillips, in the course of concluding that the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission was a local entity for certain purposes, we determined that the Commission “is a ‘hybrid’ entity, which defies simple and definitive categorization as either a ‘State’ or 15 cases, including Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Board of Education, 358 Md. 129 (2000) and Beka Industries, Inc. v. Worcester County Board of Education, 419 Md. 194 (2011), we concluded in Donlon that county boards of education are agencies whose character can vary based on context. We first summarized our decision in Chesapeake Charter, in which we “elaborated . . . on the hybrid nature of county school boards of education.” Donlon, 460 Md. at 83 .

The issue in Chesapeake Charter was whether the Anne Arundel County Board of Education is subject to the State’s General Procurement Law and, therefore, to the jurisdiction of the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals. Id. (discussing Chesapeake Charter, 358 Md. at 134 ). In resolving that question, we explained that county school boards “are generally regarded as State agencies because they are part of the State public education system, are subject to extensive supervision and control by the State Board of Education, and exercise a State function[.]” Donlon, 460 Md. at 83 -84 (quoting Chesapeake Charter, 358 Md. at 139-40 ).

Nonetheless, we noted that “from a budgetary and structural perspective, [county school boards] are local in character.” Id. Indeed, we observed that “in terms of their composition, jurisdiction, funding, and focus, [county school boards] clearly have a local flavor[.]” Donlon, 460 Md. at 84 (quoting Chesapeake Charter, 358 Md. at 135-36 ). We also found it notable that county school boards “retain unique autonomy aspects, irrespective of the [State Board]’s authority,” that weighed ‘local’ agency or instrumentality for any and all purposes.” 413 Md. at 630 (citation omitted). 16 against concluding that they were part of the State procurement system. Donlon, 460 Md. at 85-86 .

Ultimately, in the context presented in Chesapeake Charter, we concluded that “the county board’s school bus contracts were not subject to the General Procurement Law because the board did not fall within the purview of the statute.” Id. at 86 . We held that “from a budgetary and structural perspective,” county boards “are local in character[,]” and they do not comprise “‘divisions of or units within’ the State government.” Id. (quoting Chesapeake Charter, 358 Md. at 139 ). We next turned to our decision in Beka, which the petitioner in Donlon argued had limited our holding in Chesapeake Charter.

We disagreed. Donlon, 460 Md. at 87 . The relevant issue in Beka “was whether a county board of education retained its right to sovereign immunity asserted in defense to a breach of contract action under [State Government] § 12-201.” Id. We concluded that our decision in Chesapeake Charter “did not foreclose, in Beka, a different analysis and holding” for purposes of the application of a sovereign immunity waiver.

Id. at 87-88. We therefore “reiterated that, for purposes of Eleventh Amendment/sovereign immunity analysis, local boards of education are entities of State government.” Id. at 88. The different answers provided in Chesapeake Charter and Beka concerning whether the county school boards at issue were units of State government resulted from the different contexts in which the questions arose. See id.

In turning to the facts of Donlon, we observed that “sovereign immunity [wa]s extraneous to the purpose and legislative history of the [Whistleblower Protection Law].” Id. After noting “the local flavor of a county board of education’s budgeting process,” 17 which was central to the outcome of Chesapeake Charter, we observed that “[t]he blend of State, local, and independent characteristics of a county board extends beyond local budgetary concerns,” and that “[p]ersonnel matters are inherently local at their inception.” Id. at 90. Dissecting the relevant provisions of the Education Article, we specifically noted the special authority of county school boards—“distinct from [the State Board]”—over personnel matters and discipline. Id. at 91.

Because the Whistleblower Protection Law is a law concerning personnel matters and discipline that is limited in its application only to State employees, we concluded that it was “not expansive enough . . . to cover under its umbrella county boards and their school teachers[.]” Id. at 94. We therefore held “that a county board of education is not an entity of the State . . . for purposes of the [Whistleblower Protection Law].”8 Id. at 96. As clarified in Donlon, county school boards do not have the same character for all purposes. To the contrary, they have a “blend of State, local, and independent characteristics,” id. at 90, that, depending on context, could result in a determination that they are of a State, local, or independent character for a particular purpose.

Which character prevails depends on an investigation of the particular context and the 8 In Donlon, we went on to observe that during the pendency of that litigation, the General Assembly had expanded whistleblower protection to employees of county school boards, but chose to do so by enacting a new whistleblower protection law applicable only to county school boards, rather than by expanding or clarifying the reach of the State Whistleblower Protection Law. 460 Md. at 97-102 . That is yet another example of the General Assembly treating county boards of education separately from both State and county entities. 18 characteristics of county school boards that are relevant to that context. With that understanding, we turn to the present dispute. C. The Character of the Board for Purposes of Charter § 207 Charter § 207 establishes the qualifications to be a member of the Council.

One of those requirements is that the individual may not “hold . . . employment in the government of the State of Maryland[ or] Harford County.” We must therefore determine whether the Board is of State, county, or independent character in the context of employment with the Board serving as a qualification for public office in the County. The circuit court concluded that the Board is a County agency for purposes of Charter § 207 because “the issues springing from the controversy here are born from the Board’s budget and the Council’s role in the Board’s budget.” Observing that this Court in Chesapeake Charter had concluded that county school board budgetary issues are local in nature, the circuit court determined that the Board was a County agency for purposes of Charter § 207. If Charter § 207 were a budgetary provision, we would agree with the circuit court’s reasoning. But it is not.

Charter § 207 establishes qualifications to hold office as a member of the Council, none of which are either expressly or implicitly tied to budget considerations. They appear in the middle of Article II of the Harford County Charter, which is titled “Legislative Branch” and contains provisions relating to the personnel, powers, duties, and operations of the Council. Provisions of the Charter relating to the budget are found in Article V, titled “Budget and Finance.” Our focus must therefore be 19 on the character of the Board for purposes of employment with it serving as a qualification (or, here, disqualification) for public office. In relevant part, Charter § 207 bases an individual’s qualification to become a member of the Council on the individual’s status as an employee (or not) of certain governments, untethered from any role or function of those governments.

Where applicable, the limitation thus applies equally to all employees of the State, the County, or any municipality within the County, regardless of the roles those employees perform or whether their positions are in any way related to any business before the Council. The limitation applies equally to an administrative assistant employed by the Maryland Department of Labor, a laborer employed by the State Highway Administration, an inspector with the Harford County Liquor Control Board, and the Director of Finance of the Town of Bel Air. In Chesapeake Charter, Beka, and Donlon, our analyses turned on the character of the role or function of the county board as it pertained to the issue in dispute: procurement matters, sovereign immunity, and personnel matters, respectively. But where affiliation with the county board is itself the purported disqualification, there is no applicable role or function of the county board to be analyzed to determine whether it is State, county, or independent in character.

If Charter § 207 applies to county boards of education, it does so irrespective of the character of their operation in any particular area. Because there is no necessary character of a county school board for purposes of determining whether its employees are eligible to serve in the government of a different governmental entity, we are ultimately confronted with a question of statutory 20 interpretation: whether the framers of the Harford County Charter intended Charter § 207 to render employees of the Board ineligible to serve simultaneously on the Council. To resolve that question, we turn to our canons of statutory construction, which “apply with equal force to the interpretation of a charter provision.” Prince George’s County v. Thurston, 479 Md. 575, 586 (2022). As we set forth earlier this term: “Our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature and we begin that exercise by reviewing the statutory language itself.” [Comptroller v.] Citicorp[ Int’l Commc’ns, Inc.], 389 Md. 156, 165 [(2005)] (quotations omitted).

We read the plain meaning of the language of the statute “as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 376 (2021) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 25-26 (2013) (internal quotations omitted)). “Additionally, we neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.” Wheeling, 473 Md. at 376 -77