Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Phillips

HARRELL, J. The three appeals presently before the Court were argued (and are decided) together because of a single legal question they share: whether the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (hereinafter, ‘WSSC” or “the Commission”) qualifies as a “person” under Maryland Code, Article 49B, 1 § 42(a) 2 ⁶¹¹ (hereinafter, § 42(a)), and, therefore, is subject to actions for employment discrimination brought by its employees or ex-employees for violations of anti-discrimination ordinances enacted by Prince George’s County. In each case, a former employee of WSSC brought an action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against the Commission, pursuant to § 42(a), alleging that WSSC engaged in race-based employment discrimination in violation of Prince George’s County Code (“PGCC”) §§ 2-186 3 and 2-222. 4 In response, WSSC maintained that, because it is a State agency or instrumentality, it is not considered a “person” for purposes of § 42(a) and, as such, may not be sued for employment discrimination ⁶¹² pursuant to that section. For reasons we shall explain, we hold that, for purposes of § 42(a), WSSC is a “person,” and, therefore, may be sued for employment discrimination under § 42(a) for violations of the anti-discrimination provisions of the Prince George’s County Code. FACTS Because the question with which we are confronted in these cases is purely a legal one, we set forth only briefly sufficient factual backgrounds underlying each action to give context.

Shaaron Phillips In 2003, Shaaron Phillips, an African-American female who served as leader of WSSC’s Small, Local, and Minority Business Enterprise Group, approached her general manager “to discuss harassment and racial discrimination she was experiencing at WSSC.” After she was unable to have her concerns resolved satisfactorily, Phillips filed, on 16 June 2003, complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), the Maryland Commission on Human Rights, and the Prince George’s County Human Rights Commission. The complaints identified a number of Caucasian WSSC employees who held similar positions to Phillips, but who received higher pay than she did. After the EEOC denied her claims, Phillips 5 filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, on 22 June 2004, a civil action against WSSC alleging various claims of unlawful retaliation and pay discrimination based on race and national origin. Of note to the present appeal, Phillips’s complaint charged WSSC with engaging in discriminatory retaliation in violation of § 42(a) and PGCC §§ 2-186 and 2-222 by failing to give Phillips a performance evaluation, and attendant merit pay increase in 2003. 6 In response, WSSC filed a motion to ⁶¹³ dismiss Phillips’s complaint, contending, among other things, that the claim asserted by Phillips pursuant to § 42(a) and PGCC §§ 2-186 and 2-222 could not be maintained because the General Assembly’s use of the term “person” in § 42(a) demonstrated its intent that § 42(a) not apply to State agencies, a club to which, WSSC argued, it belonged.

Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322(c), the trial court converted WSSC’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. On 18 January 2005, in a written order and opinion, the trial court denied WSSC’s motion for summary judgment, holding that, although WSSC was a State agency, it nevertheless qualified as a “person” under § 42(a), subject to actions for employment discrimination brought pursuant to § 42(a) for violations of PGCC §§ 2-186 and 2-222. While the retaliation-grounded suit was pending in the Circuit Court, on 31 January 2005, Phillips’s employment was terminated by WSSC. 7 Phillips challenged her termination in an administrative proceeding, but the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) of the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings presiding over the appeal found that WSSC’s termination of Phillips was justified and denied Phillips relief. Phillips appealed the ALJ’s ruling to the Circuit Court, which affirmed the administrative decision.

Upon further appeal, the Court ⁶¹⁴ of Special Appeals upheld the ALJ’s ruling that WSSC’s termination of Phillips was justified. Following the administrative proceedings and subsequent appeals process arising from her termination, Phillips amended her existing retaliation complaint to include claims for unlawful termination, in violation of § 42(a) and the Prince George’s County Code, and common law wrongful discharge. Upon WSSC’s motion, the termination-based causes of action were dismissed by the Circuit Court prior to trial on the grounds that, because the ALJ ruled that WSSC had lawful cause to terminate Phillips, the doctrine of res judicata barred any further termination-based claims asserted by Phillips. As such, only Phillips’s retaliation-based claim remained.

After a nine-day trial 1 '-brr that' claim in December 2006, the jury returned a verdict of $16, 483.16 in favor of Phillips, finding that WSSC engaged in discriminatory retaliation in violation of § 42(a) and PGCC § § 2-186 and 2-222. In addition, the trial court awarded Phillips attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $60,242.50. Phillips appealed timely the triai court’s dismissal of her termination-based claims to the Court of Special Appeals. WSSC cross-appealed, arguing that § 42(a) does not apply against State agencies and instrumentalities such as WSSC, and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment on Phillips’s claim for retaliation premised upon § 42(a).

In its 19 March 2009 unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on Phillips’s termination-based claims, finding that the ALJ’s decision established that there were non-discriminatory reasons for Phillips’s termination and that the reasons accepted by the ALJ were supported by the evidence. Therefore, the court held, WSSC was entitled to summary judgment on Phillips’s termination-based claims. 8 Regarding WSSC’s cross-appeal, the ⁶¹⁵ intermediate appellate court again affirmed the Circuit Court, holding that, based on its view of the statutory scheme of Article 49B as a whole and WSSC’s nature as a “unique,” albeit a State, agency, the General Assembly intended for § 42(a) to apply to WSSC as a “person.” On 19 May 2009, WSSC filed with this Court a petition for writ of certiorari, which, on 21 August 2009, we granted, 410 Md. 165 , 978 A.2d 245 (2009). In our grant of certiorari, we directed, in coordination with the related cases then pending before us (and decided in this opinion), that Phillips and WSSC address the following three questions: (1) Whether the term “person,” as it is used in Md.Code, Article 49B, § 42, includes the State of Maryland? (2) If so, is the WSSC an agency or. instrumentality of the State for those purposes?

(3) If not, is the WSSC a unique entity that should be considered a “person,” within the meaning of Md.Code, Art. 49B, § 42, even if the State, in general, is not included within the meaning of that term? James K Sillers James K. Sillers, a Caucasian male, was employed by WSSC from 1975 until 2007. Sillers rose through the ranks of the Commission staff, starting as a general laborer and ultimately becoming Group Leader for Wastewater Collections Systems. According to Sillers, on or around 27 March 2006, he was demoted from his position as Group Leader for Wastewater Collections Systems to a new position as a Program Administrator.

In response, Sillers filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that his demotion was the result of “enormous pressure ... to have white employees removed from management positions and replaced with minorities.” Sillers elaborated that “WSSC has altered its racial demographics and intentionally forced or encouraged numerous white employees to retire or resign, replacing them with minority employees.” On 13 March 2007, the EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that WSSC had engaged in race-based dis ⁶¹⁶ crimination against Sillers and, on 20 August 2007, issued Sillers a right to sue letter. Subsequent to the EEOC’s issuance of the right to sue letter, Sillers retired from the WSSC because, according to him, “his working conditions and work environment had become intolerable.” Following his retirement from WSSC, Sillers filed suit against the Commission in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, basing his claim upon violations of § 42(a) and PGCC §§ 2-186 and 2-222. In response, WSSC moved to dismiss Sillers’s complaint, asserting the same grounds for dismissal as in Phillips, namely, that the term “person” as it is used in § 42(a) does not include State agencies, such as WSSC. In addition, WSSC contended that PGCC §§ 2-186 and 2-222, if applied to the Commission through § 42(a), constitute unconstitutional public general laws with improper extra-territorial effect because, if a judgment in Prince George’s County were to be rendered against it, WSSC has the statutory authority to satisfy the judgment by levying taxes upon citizens of Montgomery County.

Agreeing with WSSC, the Circuit Court dismissed Sillers’s complaint. Sillers noted timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On 19 December 2008, while the appeal was pending in that court, we issued a writ of certiorari, on our initiative, 406 Md. 744 , 962 A.2d 371 (2008), to consider the issue framed by Sillers, namely, “[wjhether or not the Circuit Court erred in holding that the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, which is a State agency, is not subject to civil action under Md.Code, Art. 49B, § 42.” Subsequent to oral argument on 5 June 2009, we ordered the parties to rebrief and reargue the case based on the three issues which we ordered the parties in Phillips to address, noted supra. Allen W. Cartwright, Jr. Allen W. Cartwright, Jr., an African-American male, was an employee of WSSC for more than six years.

Beginning in February 2004, Cartwright served as Chief of Customer Care, a position responsible for overseeing WSSC’s Infrastructure Maintenance and Customer Service Departments. ⁶¹⁷ According to Cartwright, in September 2005, a supervisor asked him to transfer back to being Chief of Mission Support, a position he occupied earlier in his career at WSSC, because the General Manager of WSSC “did not want African-Americans in management positions.” Following his refusal to accept the demotion, Cartwright was terminated from WSSC on 3 October 2005. In response to his termination, on 6 September 2006, Cartwright filed, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, a complaint against WSSC premised upon violations of § 42(a) and PGCC §§ 2-186 and 2-222. WSSC filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment on substantially the same grounds as those asserted in its motions to dismiss Sillers’s complaint and for summary judgment on Phillips’s retaliation complaint, namely, that § 42(a) did not apply to WSSC because WSSC is a State agency and not a “person.” After initially denying WSSC’s motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the Circuit Court granted WSSC’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s denial of summary judgment. Upon reconsideration, the Circuit Court, on 16 July 2008, granted WSSC’s motion for summary judgment, agreeing with WSSC’s premise that “WSSC is not a person under the provisions of Article 49B § 42.” In the alternative, the court held that any interpretation of § 42(a) to include WSSC would imbue the underlying County Code provisions with improper extraterritorial impact, rendering them unconstitutional general laws.

Cartwright noted timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. While the appeal was pending in that court, we issued a writ of certiorari, on our initiative, 406 Md. 744 , 962 A.2d 371 (2008), in order to consider whether the use of the term “person” in § 42(a) includes State agencies, such as WSSC. Because Sillers’s and Cartwright’s appeals presented the same legal question, we consolidated them for argument upon motion of the parties. As noted supra, following initial oral argument, we ordered the parties to rebrief and reargue the appeal to address the three questions we directed be addressed in Phillips. ⁶¹⁸ STANDARDS OF REVIEW “[W]here an order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, our Court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’.... ” Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 , 907 A.2d 175, 184 (2006).

With regard to the motion to dismiss entered by the Circuit Court in Sillers, the standard of review is well settled: “ ‘[B]ecause we must deem the facts to be true, our task is confined to determining whether the trial court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss.’ ” McDaniel v. Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 400 Md. 75, 83 , 926 A.2d 757, 762 (2007) (quoting Debbas v. Nelson, 389 Md. 364, 372 , 885 A.2d 802, 807 (2005)); Fioretti v. Md. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 351 Md. 66, 71-72 , 716 A.2d 258, 261 (1998). Similarly, with regard to the relevant summary judgments entered by the Circuit Court in Phillips and Cartwright, the standard of review is also clear: “The trial court properly grants summary judgment ... ‘if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Tyma v. Montgomery County, 369 Md. 497, 503-04 , 801 A.2d 148, 152 (2002) (quoting Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 675-76 , 766 A.2d 617, 624-25 (2001)).

Thus, in each of the appeals presently before the Court, “our sole task is to determine whether the trial court was legally correct.” Murphy v. Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525, 530-31 , 697 A.2d 861, 864 (1997). PERTINENT PRINCIPLES OF SOUND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION In Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 987 A.2d 18 (2010), we recently outlined the well-established canons governing the process of sound statutory interpretation, stating: The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature. A court’s primary goal in interpreting statutory language is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be ⁶¹⁹ accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision under scrutiny. To ascertain the intent of the General Assembly, we begin with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute.

If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction. We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with “forced or subtle interpretations” that limit or extend its application. We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confíne strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.

We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope. Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. ⁶²⁰ In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense. Lockshin, 412 Md. at 274-78 , 987 A.2d at 28-29 (internal citations omitted).

In addition to these canons, it is a basic and longstanding principle of sound statutory interpretation that the State is not deemed to be bound by an enactment of the General Assembly unless the enactment specifically names the State or manifests a clear and indisputable intention that the State is to be bound. Floyd v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 407 Md. 461, 488 , 966 A.2d 900, 916 (2009); Atlantic Golf, Ltd. P’ship v. Md. Econ. Dev. Corp., 377 Md. 115, 126-27 , 832 A.2d 207, 214 (2003); Glascock v. Balt.

County, 321 Md. 118, 121 , 581 A.2d 822, 824 (1990); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 314 Md. 131, 137 , 550 A.2d 69, 72 (1988); Mayor and City Council of Balt. v. State, 281 Md. 217, 223 , 378 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1977).

Supplementing the foregoing for present purposes, remedial statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of claimants “to suppress the evil and advance the remedy.” Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 495 , 914 A.2d 735, 750-51 (2007); Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 383 Md. 527, 544 , 860 A.2d 909, 919 (2004); Marsheck v. Bd. of Trs. of the Fire & Police Employees’ Ret. Sys., 358 Md. 393, 403 , 749 A.2d 774, 779 (2000); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256 , 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Harrison v. John F. Pilli & Sons, Inc., 321 Md. 336, 341 , 582 A.2d 1231, 1234 (1990). Finally, a construction of a provision which casts doubt on its constitutionality should be avoided.

Harryman v. State, 359 Md. 492, 509 , 754 A.2d 1018, 1028 (2000); Bd. of Educ. v. Prince George’s County Educators’ Ass’n, Inc., 309 Md. 85, 97 , 522 A.2d 931, 937 (1987). ⁶²¹ THE PARTIES’ GENERAL CONTENTIONS Section 42(a) creates a civil, private cause of action for persons subjected to acts of discrimination prohibited by the County Codes of Montgomery, Prince George’s, and Howard Counties only. As noted supra, at the time the present actions commenced, § 42(a) provided: Authorized.—In Montgomery County, Prince George’s County, and Howard County, in accordance with this subtitle, a person who is subjected to an act of discrimination prohibited by the county code may bring and maintain a civil action against the person who committed the alleged discriminatory act for damages, injunctive relief, or other civil relief. § 42(a). At issue in the present case is whether WSSC properly may be considered a “person” subject to suits brought pursuant to § 42(a). According to WSSC, it does not qualify as a “person” subject to actions for employment discrimination brought pursuant to § 42(a) and county anti-discrimination ordinances.

The Commission maintains that, under well-established rules of construction, the term “person” in a statute ordinarily does not include the State or its agencies and instrumentalities unless the statute provides specifically otherwise. WSSC notes first the obvious, that § 42(a) does not refer specifically to the State as a “person.” As such, according to WSSC, the State and its agencies and instrumentalities are not “persons” and, thus, as a State agency, WSSC is not a proper object for an employment discrimination suit under § 42(a). In addition, WSSC maintains that, if the Court were to determine that WSSC is a “unique” agency, rather than a more traditional State agency, it is nevertheless immune from suit under § 42(a) because nothing in § 42(a) suggests that the General Assembly intended for the section to apply to “unique” agencies. Finally, WSSC argues that the application of PGCC § § 2-186 and 2-222 to it through § 42(a) would imbue im ⁶²² properly the County Code provisions with extra-territorial effect and render them unconstitutional general laws. 9 In countering WSSC’s contentions, Phillips, Sillers, and Cartwright submit that the term “person,” as it is used in § 42(a), includes the State.

In urging the Court to adopt their interpretation of § 42(a), they cite certain definitions contained in § 15, which, they maintain, indicate that the General Assembly intended for the term “person” to include the State. Thus, in light of the rule of statutory construction that instructs a court to interpret similar, related statutes in harmony with each other, Phillips, Sillers, and Cartwright contend that the same definition of “person” should apply to § 42(a). Therefore, in their view, because the term “person” in § 42(a) includes the State, WSSC, a State agency or instrumentality, is subject to suits brought pursuant to that provision. In the alternative, they maintain that, even if § 42(a) does not apply to State agencies generally, WSSC’s unique characteristics qualify it nevertheless as a “person” under § 42(a).

ANALYSIS A. The Term “Person” in § 42(a) is Ambiguous We have long recognized that, in general, the term “person” in a statute does not include the State and its agencies and instrumentalities. Unnamed Physician v. Comm’n on Med. Discipline, 285 Md. 1, 12 , 400 A.2d 396, 402 (1979); State Comm’n on Human Relations v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 280 Md. 35, 38-39 , 371 A.2d 645, 647 (1977); Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399, 408 , 354 A.2d 817, 822 (1976); Mayor and City Council of Balt. v. Balt. Gas & Elec.

Co., 232 Md. 123, 135 , 192 A.2d 87, 93-94 (1963); ⁶²³ Huffman v. State Rds. Comm’n, 152 Md. 566, 584 , 137 A. 358, 365 (1927). We have noted additionally, however, that the State and its agencies and instrumentalities may fall within the purview of the term “person” where such an intention is manifest. Unnamed Physician, 285 Md. at 12 , 400 A.2d at 402 ; Comm’n on Human Relations, 280 Md. at 39 , 371 A.2d at 647 ; Harden, 277 Md. at 408 , 354 A.2d at 822 ; Balt.

Gas & Elec. Co., 232 Md. at 135 , 192 A.2d at 93-94 ; Huffman, 152 Md. at 584 , 137 A. at 365 . Whether the State should be considered as encompassed by the term “person” depends upon the “legislative environment” surrounding the use of term “person,” and, in reaching a conclusion on the issue, a reviewing court should look to the “subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute.” United States v. Coumantaros, 165 F.Supp. 695, 697 (D.Md.1958). Section 42(a) attempts no definition of the term “person.” As such, under the general rule stated supra, the general assumption would be that the State and its agencies and instrumentalities are not subject to suits brought pursuant to § 42(a).

We are mindful, however, of another canon of statutory construction, one that directs a reviewing court to interpret statutory provisions that are in pari materia (in other words, that deal with the same subject matter) consistently with each other. Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 673 , 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995) (“When we are called upon to interpret two statutes that involve the same subject matter, have a common purpose, and form part of the same system, we read them in pari materia and construe them harmoniously.”); Unnamed Physician, 285 Md. at 10 , 400 A.2d at 401 ; Police Comm’r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 418 , 379 A.2d 1007, 1011 (1977). Relying on this canon of statutory interpretation, Phillips, Sillers, and Cartwright direct our attention to the definitions contained in § 15 of Article 49B generally, which, in their view, suggest that the General Assembly intended for the term “person,” as it is used in Article 49B, to include the State ⁶²⁴ and its agencies and instrumentalities. WSSC, on the other hand, contends that the definitions contained in § 15 are inapplicable to § 42(a) because § 15 rests in the subtitle of Article 49B entitled “Discrimination in Employment,” whereas § 42(a) is contained within a separate subtitle entitled “Civil Actions-Violations of County Discrimination Laws” and states explicitly that its definitions are “for the purposes of this subtitle.” We reject WSSC’s contention.

Although § 15 is contained within a different subtitle of Article 49B than § 42(a) and states that its definitions are confined to that subtitle, because both § 15 and § 42(a) nonetheless concern specifically discrimination in employment, we find it is appropriate, as part of our duty to construe harmoniously statutes that are in pari materia, to refer to the definitions contained in § 15 for guidance in the interpretation of the language used in § 42(a). Section 15, entitled “Definitions,” provides in pertinent part: For purposes of this subtitle: (a) Person.—The term “person” includes one or more individuals, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers. § 15(a). 10 From that definition, it may appear that governmental agencies, such as WSSC, do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of § 42(a). Section 15, however, provides additional definitions that cast doubt on such a final conclusion: (b) Employer.—The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry or business who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, ⁶²⁵ and any agent of such a person; such term does include the State of Maryland to the extent as may be provided in this article but such term does not include a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. (e) Employee.—The term “employee” means an individual employed by an employer, except that “employee” does not include any person elected to public office or any person chosen by the officer to be on the officer’s personnel staff, or an appointee in the policymaking level or an immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.

The exception set forth in the preceding sentence does not include employees subject to the State or local civil service laws. § 15(b) and (e) (emphasis added). 11 As we see, the definition of “employer” contained in § 15(b) provides that an “employer” is a “person,” and that “such term does include the State of Maryland.” § 15(b). As such, two competing interpretations arise: (1) that the State is an “employer,” which, in turn, is necessarily a “person,” the position urged by Phillips, Sillers, and Cartwright; and, (2) that although an “employer” is a “person” under § 15(b), the use of a semi-colon in the definition suggests that the State is included separately as an “employer,” not linked to the definition of “employer” as a “person,” the interpretation urged by WSSC. Confronted with both seemingly reasonable interpretations, it appears ambiguous whether the General Assembly intended for the State to be included in the term “person.” Regarding the definition of “employee” contained in § 15(e), we noted, in Commission on Human Relations, that, although the definition of “person” in § 15(a) does not explicitly include ⁶²⁶ the State and its agencies and instrumentalities, § 15(e) “has the effect of creating an ambiguity in [§ 15] as a whole” with regard to whether the State falls within the class of employers covered by Article 49B and subject to the Commission on Human Relation’s investigatory powers. 280 Md. at 41 , 371 A.2d at 648 . In resolving the ambiguity, we noted that the General Assembly, in adding § 15(e), was attempting to conform Maryland’s fair employee practices legislation to its federal counterpart, which included political subdivisions within its coverage.

Id. at 42, 371 A.2d at 648 . In addition, we observed that “the last sentence of [§ 15(e) ] has no function or meaning other than as part of a statutory scheme which includes the employees of local subdivisions within its protective ambit.” Id. In order to further the purpose of the statute and to avoid a construction that would render much of the language of § 15(e) mere surplusage, we held that, “since its employees are protected by Art. 49B, [§ 15(e) ], the City of Baltimore is subject to the investigatory authority of the commission in regard to the fair employment practices laws of this State.” Id. at 43, 371 A.2d at 649 . Although we found in Commission on Human Relations that political subdivisions of the State were subject to the provisions of Article 49B permitting the Commission on Human Relations to investigate claims of alleged employment discrimination, our holding in that case fails to establish conclusively that the General Assembly, in enacting § 42(a), intended for the scope of coverage which is applicable to investigations by the Commission on Human Relations to apply similarly to private actions brought in court against political subdivisions.

Such a conclusion is buttressed by the fact that one of the significant underpinnings of our holding in Commission on Human Relations was the clearly expressed desire of the General Assembly to have § 15 conform to its federal counterpart. That rationale is not apposite, however, to the present cases because § 42(a) has no federal equivalent. As such, in light of the ambiguity remaining in the term “person,” as it is used in § 42(a), we turn to an examination of the legislative history of the statute for guidance. ⁶²⁷ B. The Legislative History and Purpose of § 42(a) As observed by the Court of Special Appeals in Phillips, § 42(a) had its genesis in a Montgomery County ordinance, namely, Montgomery County Code (“MCC”) § 27-20(a), 12 which authorized a private civil cause of action against individuals for employment discrimination occurring within the County. 13 In McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12 , 570 A.2d 834 (1990), we considered whether Montgomery County’s enactment of