Breslin v. Powell

HARRELL, J. We wander here once more into the minefield of interpreting the Healthcare Malpractice Claims Act (“HCMCA”) and its requirement that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action file a proper Certificate of Merit (“Certificate”). 1 In several ²⁶⁹ cases considering whether certain Certificates failed to meet the requirements of Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol., 2010 Supp.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), § 3-2A-04, we held that “the language of the [HCMCA] is clear and its meaning unambiguous.” Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 581 , 911 A.2d 427, 437 (2006). We shall stick to our guns in that regard as we consider the requirements of a Certificate in CJ § 3-2A-04, adopted in 1986, in conjunction with the requirements of CJ § 3-2A-02, 2 added in 2004. Jeffery Breslin, M.D. (“Dr. Breslin” or “Petitioner”), attacks a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the earlier grant of summary judgment by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in his favor.

The intermediate appellate court held that filing a Certificate of an expert that does not meet the requirements of CJ § 3-2A-02 requires dismissal, without prejudice, of the underlying claim, rather than the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. According to the Court of Special Appeals, in the event of failure to meet any of the requirements for the Certificate, regardless of the provision of the HCMCA where the specific requirements appear, therefore, dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate remedy. Petitioner claims before us that the plain language of CJ § 3-2A-02 allows for summary judgment as proper relief ²⁷⁰ because CJ § 3-2A-02 does not provide explicitly a remedy for failure to meet its requirements, but states explicitly that the Maryland Rules apply to the HCMCA (Md. Rule 2-501 provides for summary judgment). Accordingly, as the argument goes, because Respondent’s attesting expert, Ronald Burt, M.D.

(“Dr. Burt”), an anesthesiologist, was not qualified to attest to the standard of care breached allegedly by Dr. Breslin, a vascular surgeon, pursuant to CJ § 3-2A-02, summary judgment was a proper disposition of the case. Finally, Petitioner claims that the Court of Special Appeals’s decision is inconsistent with the legislative purpose behind the need for a Certificate, which is to “weed out” frivolous medical malpractice claims. We hold that, for reasons to be explained more fully infra, the plain language of the HCMCA, reading §§ 3-2A-02 and 3-2A-04 together, is clear, and requires dismissal without prejudice of the underlying claim for the filing of a non-compliant Certificate, regardless of the particular qualification or requirement the Certificate or its attestor fails to meet. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Jackie D. Powell 3 was admitted to Good Samaritan Hospital on 31 October 2002 for a hepatorenal arterial bypass procedure. 4 Monford Wolf, M.D. (“Dr. Wolf’), a board-certified anesthesiologist, administered epidural anesthesia to Mr. Powell for the procedure while Dr. Breslin, a board-certified ²⁷¹ vascular surgeon, performed the procedure. Mr. Powell suffered an ischemic spinal cord injury, secondary to an epidural hematoma, 5 as a result of the administration of the epidural anesthesia. Subsequent to the spinal cord injury, Mr. Powell developed paralysis from the waist down, which, according to Powell, caused ultimately Mr. Powell’s death on 8 March 2004.

Powell claims that Dr. Breslin deviated negligently from the standard of care by failing properly post-operatively to recognize and respond to decedent’s complaints of leg pain and numbness. Allegations against various other defendants were based on failing properly to: (1) evaluate pre-operatively the decedent as a candidate for epidural anesthesia; (2) place an epidural needle and catheter in decedent’s back; and (3) monitor and document the physiological effects of epidural anesthesia and catheter placement during the peri-operative period. The present litigation, inspired by the death of Mr. Powell, originated on 30 July 2004 as a Health Claims Arbitration Proceeding pursuant to CJ § 3-2A-03. In conjunction with the claim, Powell filed with the Health Care Alternative Dispute Resolution Office (“HCADRO”) 6 a Certificate, 7 and served notice of intent to waive arbitration and transfer the action to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The original ²⁷² complaint in the Circuit Court, filed in October 2004, named as defendants: Dr. Wolf; his professional association, Hunt Valley Anesthesia Associates, P.A.; and Good Samaritan Hospital of Maryland, Inc. (“Good Samaritan Hospital”). The complaint alleged a survival claim sounding in negligence, as well as a wrongful death claim. Approximately one month later, in November 2004, Powell filed a First Amended Complaint, adding counts against Good Samaritan Hospital. On 5 August 2005, Powell filed an Amended Statement of Claim with the HCADRO, adding as defendants Dr. Breslin and his professional association.

A new Certificate accompanied this filing, which attested to departures from the standard of care by “Jeffery Breslin, M.D., ... Drs. Kremen, Breslin & Fraiman, P.A., and Good Samaritan Hospital, Inc.” Attested to by Ronald Burt, M.D. (“Dr. Burt”), a board-certified anesthesiologist, pursuant to CJ § 3-2A-02, the new Certificate stated, “I ... certify that I have had clinical experience, provided consultation relating to the clinical practice, and [f\ or taught medicine in the field of Anesthesiology and/or the related field of general surgery, within five (5) years of the date of the ... acts or omissions giving rise to this claim.” Powell filed subsequently a notice to waive arbitration and, on 25 August 2005, filed a Second Amended Complaint in the Circuit Court, adding a survival claim sounding in negligence, as well as a wrongful death claim against Dr. Breslin and his professional association.

After several attempts by the defense, beginning in March 2006, to depose Dr. Burt, his deposition was taken on 6 September 2006. 8 At the deposition, Dr. Burt was asked about his qualifications to testify and certify as to the standard ²⁷³ of care for a vascular surgeon. The pertinent portion of the transcript revealed the following exchanges: [Defense Counsel]: Is it fair to say that you don’t hold yourself out as an expert in the field of vascular surgery? [Dr. Burt]: That’s right. [Defense Counsel]: Do you hold yourself out as an expert in the field of general surgery? [Dr. Burt]: No. [Defense Counsel]: Is the only field which you hold yourself out as an expert anesthesiology? [Dr. Burt]: Exactly. [Defense Counsel]: With respect to the training that a vascular surgeon may or may not have regarding diagnosing epidural hematomas, would you defer to a vascular surgeon to offer testimony as to what, if any, training a vascular surgeon should have in that issue? [Dr. Burt]: Yes. [Defense Counsel]: And with respect to the ability of a vascular surgeon to diagnose an epidural hematoma, based on their training, would you again defer to the expertise of a vascular surgeon on that issue? [Dr. Burt]: Yes, I would. In light of the foregoing deposition revelation, Dr. Breslin filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment 9 on the grounds that Powell failed to comply with the requirements of CJ § 3-2A-02, mandating generally that any expert who attests in a Certificate to a departure from the standards of care on the part of a health care provider must be board-certified and have clinical, consulting, or teaching experience in the health care provider’s specialty. ²⁷⁴ Powell tendered three arguments why the action should not be dismissed, despite Dr. Burt’s admission in deposition that he was unqualified to attest to the ability of a vascular surgeon to detect an epidural hematoma and, thus, was not qualified to attest to the standard of care of a vascular surgeon and the alleged breach thereof. 10 First, the action originated in July 2004, one year before the amendment to CJ § 3-2A-02 was enacted that added required qualifications of an expert attesting to the standard of care in a Certificate. See CJ § 3-2A-02(c)(2)(i) (“This paragraph applies to a claim or action filed on or after January 1, 2005.”).

As this argument goes, the substance of the original claim was not changed by adding Dr. Breslin as a defendant; therefore, the more stringent requirements should not apply. The second argument Powell offered was that there is an overlap between the two disciplines— vascular surgery and anesthesiology—that should allow Dr. Burt to attest to and testify regarding the treatment required for an epidural hematoma. To this end, Dr. Breslin’s expert witness, Dr. Gary Ruben, testified in deposition (following Dr. Burt’s deposition) that vascular surgeons and anesthesiologists alike possess the knowledge and ability to diagnose a spinal hematoma. Moreover, Dr. Ruben, a vascular surgeon, was intended to be offered by the defense at trial as an expert with regard to the standard of care and treatment rendered by both Dr. Breslin and Dr. Wolf.

Finally, Powell noted that he had secured a general surgeon who was prepared to testify at deposition and/or trial (and who also signed a Certificate) attesting to the departures from the standard of care by Dr. Breslin. The Circuit Court, unpersuaded by Powell’s arguments, granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Breslin, explaining that, “[the] legislative directive, coupled with the Court of Appeals’ signal that the [L]egislature’s directives are to be ²⁷⁵ strictly applied, convinces this Court that with the passage of the [HCMCA], Dr. Burt is not qualified to attest to the alleged breach of the post-operative standard of care of Dr. Breslin.” Powell filed a Motion to Reconsider 11 on the grounds that the appropriate remedy for filing a Certificate that does not meet the applicable standards is dismissal without prejudice, and granting summary judgment “amounts to a dismissal with prejudice.” The Circuit Court denied this motion. Powell followed with a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc, which, in essence, raised the same arguments as the reconsideration motion. In denying this motion, the Circuit Court explained that: [T]he fact that § 3-2A-04 contains both substantive and procedural requirements does not lead this court to conclude that § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i), requiring dismissal without prejudice, applies any time a party fails to meet any prescribed procedural or technical requirements for filing a certificate, whether contained in § 3-2A-02 or § 3-2A-04.

A court could dismiss a plaintiffs claim without prejudice for failing to meet the requirements in § 3-2A-02. However, the consequence would be that a plaintiff could continue to come back to the court countless times to try its luck with a different health care provider.... The effect on a defendant, in time and expense, would be unnecessarily burdensome and would defeat the very reason the [Legislature ²⁷⁶ enacted the statute: to weed out non-meritorious claims and to reduce the costs of litigation. (Citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted.) Powell noted timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

In a reported opinion, Powell v. Breslin, 195 Md. App. 340 , 6 A.3d 360 (2010), the intermediate appellate court reversed the Circuit Court’s judgment, explaining that: We see no logic in the suggestion that an expert’s failure to satisfy the requirements regarding clinical experience and areas of specialty certification required by CJ § 3-2A-02(c)(2)(ii) should be treated differently than an expert’s failure to satisfy the requirement of the 20 percent rule, or the requirement that a certifying expert may not be a party or an employee or partner of a party delineated in C J § 3-2A-04(b), or, for that matter, any of the requirements as to the form and filing of a certificate. To adopt such an approach would be an endorsement of an interpretation of the statute which imposes inconsistent sanctions for the filing of noncompliant certificates that are deficient based upon the requirements in different sections of the Act. No such dichotomy is expressly included in the language of the Act, and we decline the opportunity to judicially impose such a distinction. In our interpretation of the plain language of the statute, we conclude that the sanction for the failure to submit a fully compliant certificate—whether the failure is in form, content or qualifications of the attesting expert—is dismissal without prejudice.

See CJ § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i)(1). Powell, 195 Md.App. at 355 , 6 A.3d at 368-69 . Dr. Breslin filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted, Breslin v. Powell, 418 Md. 190 , 13 A.3d 798 (2011), to consider, in our own words: 12 ²⁷⁷ Whether, in a medical malpractice case where a party files a certificate signed by an expert who does not meet the qualifications set forth in CJ § 3-2A-02(c)(2)(ii), CJ § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i)(1) mandates dismissal without prejudice, regardless of whether the case is pending in the HCADRO or the Circuit Court at the time of the revelation? STANDARD OF REVIEW This case presents a question of statutory interpretation, and therefore, we review the trial court’s disposition through summary judgment under a non-deferential standard of review. 13 See, e.g., Walter v. Gunter, 367 Md. 386, 392 , 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2001) (“[Wjhere the order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a [non-deferential] standard of review.”).

The task of this Court, therefore, is to “ ‘determine whether the [Circuit Court’s decision] was legally correct.’ ” See Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Phillips, 413 Md. 606, 618 , 994 A.2d 411, 419 (2010) (quoting Murphy v. Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525, 530-31, 697 A.2d 861, 864 (1997)). ²⁷⁸ DISCUSSION I. The Family Tree of the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act Over the past four decades, the Maryland marketplace has undergone three major medical liability insurance “crises,” each of which engendered legislative responses changing the statutory scheme regulating medical malpractice suits. See Final Report, November 2004 Governor’s Task Force on Medical Malpractice and Health Care Access, at 7 [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://images.ibsys. com/2004/1125/3949201.pdf. A. The First Crisis: 1974-1983 In 1974, reacting to the upwardly spiraling cost of servicing medical malpractice insurance policies, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (“St. Paul”) notified the Maryland Medical and Chirugical Faculty (“MedChi”), the leading professional organization of doctors in the State, that St. Paul would not allow doctors to renew insurance coverage plans that expired as of 1 January 1975.

See Terry L. Trimble, The Maryland Survey: 1994-1995: Recent Development: The Maryland, General Assembly: Torts, 55 Md. L.Rev. 893, 895 (1996); Kevin G. Quinn, The Health Care Malpractice Claims Statute: Maryland’s Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 10 U. Balt. L.Rev. 74, 77 (1980). St. Paul, at the time providing medical malpractice insurance to approximately eighty-five percent of physicians based in Maryland, explained its withdrawal as caused by a deficit of nearly ten-million dollars in providing medical malpractice insurance in Maryland at the then-current rates. See Quinn, supra, at 77.

The company was unable to offset these massive losses, assertedly because the Insurance Commissioner of Maryland had refused its prior requested rate increase. 14 See Trimble, supra, at 895; Quinn, supra, at 77. ²⁷⁹ Although the trial court’s order mandating that St. Paul renew all applications and outstanding policies at current rates was overturned eventually by this Court, the General Assembly used the time while the litigation was ongoing to respond to the crisis. See Trimble, supra, at 895. In its 1975 legislative session, the General Assembly created the Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society of Maryland (“Medical Mutual”), a physician-owned mutual insurance company, in response to St. Paul’s threatened exit from the Maryland medical malpractice insurance market. See Md.Code (1957, 1972 Repl.Vol., 1977 Cum.Supp.), Art. 48A, §§ 548-56; Task Force Report, supra, at 7.

The creation of Medical Mutual, however, was merely a bridge to greater relief in the 1976 session. In 1976, the General Assembly sought to treat more effectively the malaise that was ailing the medical malpractice insurance market. See Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 527 , 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002) (“The General Assembly understood that the collapse of the malpractice insurance market was rooted, to some extent in the manner in which malpractice claims arose and were resolved, and ... considered a variety of proposals designed to deal with those underlying issues.”). ²⁸⁰ The General Assembly passed the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, HCMCA, in 1976 to alter the manner in which malpractice claims were brought and resolved. See Witte, 369 Md. at 526 , 801 A.2d at 165 ; see also Quinn, supra, at 81.

The HCMCA modified the existing medium in three main ways: (1) it created the Health Claims Arbitration Office “to facilitate and expedite the resolution of malpractice claims”; (2) it created, through an arbitration panel, an exclusive arbitration procedure for resolving all claims over $5,000; and (3) it provided that the arbitration panel’s award would not be binding and all awards could be rejected and recourse had thereafter to traditional judicial actions and remedies. See Quinn, supra, at 81. Over the next two years, much litigation ensued, challenging the constitutionality of the HCMCA and causing the arbitration scheme not to take effect until 1978, when the Court upheld ultimately as constitutional the HCMCA in Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 313-14 , 385 A.2d 57, 80 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 , 99 S.Ct. 60 , 58 L.Ed.2d 97 (1978). 15 See Witte, 369 Md. at 528 , 801 A.2d at 166 (“The arbitration scheme was essentially ²⁸¹ placed ‘on ice’ for about two years while challenges to its legality worked their way through the courts.”). Though different aspects of the HCMCA were challenged in several cases in 1980, in both state and federal courts, 16 the arbitration process seemed to staunch the bleeding of the first medical malpractice insurance crisis.

See id. B. The Second Crisis: 1983-late 1990s Less than ten years after the first medical malpractice insurance crisis, in 1983, the General Assembly recognized, by adopting Senate Joint Resolution 14, that the State was in the midst of its second malpractice insurance “crisis,” as the cost of malpractice insurance had increased ten-fold since the first “crisis.” See Witte, 369 Md. at 528 , 801 A.2d at 166 ; see also S.J. Res. 14, 1983 Md. Laws J. Res. 9. In 1984, Senate Bill 16 presented several recommended changes to tort doctrines and the manner in which malpractice claims were processed. See Witte, 369 Md. at 529 , 801 A.2d at 167 .

This Bill, among its proposed changes, included a requirement of a “certificate [of] a ‘qualified expert’ attesting to a departure from the standards of care or informed consent,” to be filed within ninety days of filing the claim, and that the “qualified expert” selected may not receive more than fifty percent of his or her income from testifying in malpractice cases. Id. Although the Bill did not pass, its demise spawned, like a mushroom from decay, the creation of a task force whose purpose was to investigate trends in medical malpractice claims. Id.

In December 1985, the task force reported to the General Assembly that, since ²⁸² 1984, medical malpractice liability insurance premiums increased, depending on the medical specialty and hospital involved, between thirty and 250 percent. See Debbas v. Nelson, 389 Md. 364, 378 , 885 A.2d 802, 811 (2005); Task Force Report, supra, at 7. In 1986, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 559, which made several amendments to the HCMCA in response to the task force report. See Ch. 640 of the Acts of 1986; Witte, 369 Md. at 531 , 801 A.2d at 168 .

Several provisions aimed to reduce total amounts paid by insurers on claims or judgments—(1) a “cap” was placed on non-economic tort damages at $350,000; (2) a reduction of damages was allowed if the plaintiff received benefits from a collateral source (i.e., health or disability insurance); and (3) the statute of limitations was decreased for a minor to bring a claim. 17 See Task Force Report, supra, at 7; Trimble, supra, at 898; see also CJ § 3-2A-05(h). Additionally, Senate Bill 559 amended provisions of the HCMCA relating to the use of experts in medical malpractice cases. As proposed initially in S.B. 16 (1984), the arbitration process was changed to require the filing of a qualified expert certificate and to mandate that such an attesting expert receive no more than fifty percent of his or her income directly from testimony in personal injury cases. 18 See Witte, ²⁸³ 369 Md. at 530 , 801 A.2d at 168 ; see also Bill Analysis of S.B. 559, at 6 (1986). This Bill enacted also a provision incorporating the Maryland Rules of Procedure to “all practice and procedure issues arising under the [HCMCA],” in an attempt to “codify the existing practice regarding the applicability of the Maryland Rules to arbitration proceedings.” Committee Report on S.B. 559, at 2 (1986).

The originally-proposed S.B. 559 was amended prior to its passage, changing the language “shall be dismissed” to read “shall be dismissed without prejudice.” See Conference Committee Amendments to S.B. 559, at 2 (1986) (emphasis added). Although we could find no clear legislative history explaining further the origin of this amendment, the amendment clarified any ambiguity regarding whether a claim would be dismissed, with or without prejudice, for failure to file a Certificate. At common law, prior to the 1986 amendment to the HCMCA, a claimant was not required to file a certificate of a qualified expert and no similarly-stringent qualifications were placed on the testifying expert in medical malpractice actions. See Walzer, 395 Md. at 577 , 911 A.2d at 435 (“We acknowledge that, at common law, prior to the General Assembly’s enactment of the [HCMCA], a claimant was not required to file a certificate of qualified expert in a medical malpractice case.”); Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 171 , 367 A.2d 472, 475 (1977) (“[W]e have never treated expert medical testimony any dif ²⁸⁴ ferently than other types of expert testimony.”).

In adding such requirements, the certificate requirement is in derogation of the common law, 19 intended to place additional requirements on a claimant. See Carroll v. Konits, 400 Md. 167, 179 , 929 A.2d 19, 26 (2007) (“By enacting the 1986 amendment, the General Assembly determined that ... in order to maintain an action against a health care provider, a plaintiff is required to file a Certificate and an attesting expert’s report in addition to filing a complaint.”); Walzer, 395 Md. at 577 , 911 A.2d at 435 (“[T]he statutory language is clear and evidences the Legislature’s intent to change the common law.”). The purpose of this departure from the common law has been stated several times by our appellate courts as reflecting the General Assembly’s desire to “weed out” non-meritorious medical malpractice claims. See Carroll, 400 Md. at 207 , 929 A.2d at 43 (“The purpose of the statute is to weed out non-meritorious claims.”); Walzer, 395 Md. at 582 , 911 A.2d at 438 (“[T]he General Assembly enacted the [HCMCA] for purposes of weeding out non-meritorious claims and to reduce the costs of litigation.”); Debbas v. Nelson, 389 Md. at 378 , 885 A.2d at 811 (“[T]he requirement of [the Certificate] ... was intended to eliminate excessive damages and reduce the frequency of claims, and ... has been considered as serving a gatekeeping function.”).

Further, in the final report of the Governor’s ²⁸⁵ 2004 Task Force on Medical Malpractice and Health Care Access stated in its recommendations that: This certifícate requirement ensures that a health care provider who is not a party has reviewed the claim. It helps ensure that completely spurious claims do not go forward. It also provides a mechanism for the Board of Physicians to receive notice of a claim. Task Force Report, supra, at 81.

C. The Third Crisis: Early 2000s The third medical malpractice insurance “crisis” followed a near twenty-year period of relative stability. Throughout the late 1980s and continuing into the 1990s, the medical malpractice insurance market remained fairly stable. See Task Force Report, supra, at 7. The most relevant change to the HCMCA during this period came during the 1995 legislative session when the General Assembly enacted a bill permitting waiver by either party of the entire arbitration process.

See Ch. 582 of the Acts of 1995, codified as Md.Code (1974, 2002 Repl.Vol.), CJ § 3-2A-06B; see also Debbas, 389 Md. at 380-81 , 885 A.2d at 812 . This relative stability in the market led to “fiercely competitive pricing on premiums,” and “[pjrofitability was made possible by slow claims growth coupled with favorable economic conditions.” Task Force Report, supra, at 7. In 1999, however, medial malpractice premium rates increased dramatically throughout the country. See id.

Maryland physicians and hospitals felt the effects of these increases in premiums in the early 2000s, with only four insurers providing malpractice insurance to the entirety of the State’s physicians and hospitals, after ten insurers abandoned the State beginning in 1995. See Task Force Report, supra, at 7-8. In 2004, the General Assembly called a special legislative session to address the latest medical malpractice insurance crisis and enacted several changes to the HCMCA. Most relevant to the present case, the 2004 amendments added qualifications for the expert attesting in the Certificate or testifying before the arbitration panel or court regarding the ²⁸⁶ compliance with, or departure from, the standard of care by the defendant.

The amended CJ § 3—2A—02(c)(2)(ii) states: 1. In addition to any other qualifications, a health care provider who attests in a certificate of a qualified expert or testifies in relation to a proceeding before a panel or court concerning a defendant’s compliance with or departure from standards of care: A. Shall have had clinical experience, provided consultation relating to clinical practice, or taught medicine in the defendant’s specialty or a related field of health care, or in the field of health care in which the defendant provided care or treatment to the plaintiff, within 5 years of the date of the alleged act or omission giving rise to the cause of action.... The legislative history illuminating the purpose of this amendment is scant. In his letter vetoing the proposed House Bill 2 of 2004, which was adopted over the veto, then-Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr. stated that the provisions dealing with expert witnesses were intended to “prevent the prevalent use of ‘hired gun’ experts who do not practice medicine but instead have become experts for hire.” Letter from Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., Governor, to Michael Busch, Speaker of the House of Delegates, at 8 (10 Jan. 2005).

With this “family” history of the HCMCA in mind, we turn to the present case.

II

Statutory Construction When undertaking an exercise in statutory interpretation, as in the present case, the goal is to “ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Mayor and Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor and Town Council of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316 , 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006). In attempting to discern the intent of the Legislature, courts “look first to the plain language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning.” State Dep’t of Assessments and Taxation v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 348 Md. 2, 13 , 702 A.2d 690, 696 (1997). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will ²⁸⁷ give effect to the plain meaning of the statute and no further sleuthing of statutory interpretation is needed. See Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 445 , 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997) (“When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language.”); Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987) (“Sometimes the language in question will be so clearly consistent with apparent purpose ... that further research will be unnecessary.”).

If the sense of the statute is either unclear or ambiguous under the plain meaning magnifying glass, courts will look for other clues—e.g., the construction of the statute, the relation of the statute to other laws in a legislative scheme, the legislative history, and the general purpose and intent of the statute. See Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998) (“If ... the meaning of the plain language is ambiguous or unclear, we seek to discern legislative intent from surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history, prior case law, and the purposes on which the statutory framework was based.”). It is well-settled that a court must read a statute in the context of its statutory scheme, ensuring that “no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory,” and that any illogical or unreasonable interpretation is avoided. Mayor of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316 , 896 A.2d at 1045 ; see also Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 302-03 , 783 A.2d 667, 671 (2001) (“[Statutes on the same subject are to be read together and harmonized to the extent possible, reading them so as to avoid rendering either of them, or any portion, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nugatory.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Additionally, “ ‘[statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed, and it is not to be presumed that the [Legislature by creating statutory assaults intended to make any alteration in the common law other than what has been specified and plainly pronounced.’ ” Walzer, 395 Md. at 573-74 , 911 A.2d at 433 (quoting Gleaton v. State, 235 Md. 271, 277 , 201 A.2d 353, 356 (1964)). With this in mind, courts may consider with caution the cannon of ²⁸⁸ construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning “to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative,” Black’s Law Dictionary 661 (9th ed.2009). See Kirkwood v. Provident Sav. Bank of Baltimore, 205 Md. 48, 55 , 106 A.2d 103, 107 (1954) (“[This maxim] should be used with caution, and should never be applied to override the manifest intention of the Legislature or a provision of the Constitution.”).

That that narrow interpretation is applicable to statutes purporting to repeal the common law does not mean that a court will refuse to give effect to a statute abrogating the common law that was intended clearly by the Legislature. See Witte, 369 Md. at 533 , 801 A.2d at 169 (“Most statutes ... change the common law, so that principle necessarily bends when there is a clear legislative intent to make a change.”). Section 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i) provides: [A] claim or action filed after July 1, 1986, shall be dismissed, without prejudice, if the claimant or plaintiff fails to file a certificate of a qualified expert with the Director attesting to departure from standards of care, and that the departure from standards of care is the proximate cause of the alleged injury, within 90 days from the date of the complaint. Later provisions of CJ § 3-2A-04(b) provide requirements for the Certificate and the “qualified expert” attesting to the Certificate: (4) A health care provider who attests in a certificate of a qualified expert or who testifies in relation to a proceeding before an arbitration panel or a court concerning compliance with or departure from standards of care may not devote annually more than 20 percent of the expert’s professional activities to activities that directly involve testimony in personal injury claims.

(7) For purposes of the certification requirements of this subsection for any claim or action filed on or after July 1, 1989: ²⁸⁹ (i) A party may not serve as a party’s expert; and (ii) The certificate may not be signed by: 1. A party; 2. An employee or partner of a party; or 3. An employee or stockholder of any professional corporation of which the party is a stockholder.

As noted above, CJ § 3-2A-04(b)(l)(i) requires that a claimant or plaintiff with a medical malpractice case file a certificate from a qualified expert; the sanction for failing to file a certificate of a qualified expert is dismissal without prejudice of the “claim or action.” This provision was added to the HCMCA in 1986. In 2004, the Legislature added additional qualifications for the attesting expert in CJ § 3-2A-02 with the knowledge that the section added in 1986 already required dismissal without prejudice for failure to file a proper Certificate. See Bd. of Educ. of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63 , 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982) (“The General Assembly is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the policy of the prior law.”). The additional qualifications for the Certificate added in 2004 are found in CJ § 3-2A-02(c)(2)(ii), which provides that: 1.

In addition to any other qualifications, a health care provider who attests in a certificate of a qualified expert or testifies in relation to a proceeding before a panel or court concerning a defendant’s compliance with or departure from standards of care: A. Shall have had clinical experience, provided consultation relating to clinical practice, or taught medicine in the defendant’s specialty or a related field of health care, or in the field of health care in which the defendant provided care or treatment to the plaintiff, within 5 years of the date of the alleged act or omission giving rise to the cause of action.... ²⁹⁰ (Emphasis added.) The use of the words “in addition to any other qualifications” in CJ § 3-2A-02(c)(2)(ii) shows clearly and unambiguously that the Legislature intended the qualifications in CJ § 3-2A-02 and CJ § 3-2A-04 to be read together. The various qualifications for attesting experts, in both CJ § 3-2A-02 and CJ § 3-2A-04, are all necessary in order to have a proper Certificate. Therefore, because the two provisions act in tandem, filing a Certificate of an unqualified expert, in contravention of CJ § 3-2A-02, mandates dismissal without prejudice of the claim or action, as provided in CJ § 3-2A-04. 20 ²⁹¹ Dr. Breslin alleges that the plain language of the HCMCA allows for the grant of summary judgment when an unqualified expert is exposed (after a claim reaches the courts) because CJ § 3-2A-04(b)(2) and CJ § 3-2A-02(d) both refer to the “liability” of the defendant, which, according to Dr. Breslin, “clearly implies summary judgment,” while CJ § 3-2A-04(b)(1) makes no mention of liability and mandates dismissal only when no certificate is filed at all. 21 Section 3-2A- ²⁹² 04(b)(1)(i) states that a claim “shall be dismissed, without prejudice, if the claimant or plaintiff fails to file a certificate of qualified expert with the Director.... ” (Emphasis added.) Dr. Breslin posits that the only way possible by which a claimant or plaintiff could “fail to file” a certificate is if the claimant or plaintiff does not file a certificate at all. That is, filing a Certificate signed by an unqualified expert, according to Dr. Breslin, does not constitute a “failure to file,” and, therefore, CJ § 3-2A-04, requiring dismissal without prejudice, does not apply and summary judgment becomes a proper remedy.

This argument, however, found no favor in