Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City v. Fells Point Cafe, Inc.

CHASANOW, Judge. In this case, we are called upon to decide whether the Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City possessed the authority to impose restrictions on an individual license with the consent of the licensee and whether additional restrictions may be imposed on the license thereafter as a sanction for violating the consented to restrictions. For the following reasons, we answer the first question in the affirma ¹²³ tive and the second question in the negative. We also hold, as a preliminary matter, that the Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal.

I. The facts in this case are as follows. On November 4, 1993, a hearing was held by the Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City (“the Board”) on an application to transfer the ownership of a liquor license to the Licensees 1 and to modify the restrictions that had been placed on the license. The restrictions had been placed on the license as a result of protracted conflict between the previous license holders and the neighborhood residents over the operation of a club called the Sanctuary. The Fells Point Homeowners’ Association (“the FPHA”), an organization of neighborhood residents, initially opposed the transfer of the license to the Licensees, most likely because they feared another club like the Sanctuary.

In an effort to convince the FPHA not to oppose the transfer of the license, the Licensees agreed to have certain conditions placed on their operations that would make the establishment more compatible with neighborhood living. The FPHA agreed not to oppose the transfer of the license at the November 4, 1993 hearing in exchange for the concessions by the Licensees. At the November 4, 1993 hearing, the Licensees argued that the Board should transfer the license because the Licensees and the FPHA had “entered into a written agreement which set[ ] forth restrictions on the [IJicense which [met] the needs of both sides.” The Licensees requested that the written agreement dated November 4, 1993 be incorporated into the license “as a restriction.” The restrictions in the agreement included what kinds of music and other entertainment were prohibited, under what conditions dancing would be allowed, what percentage of revenue had to be derived from the sale of food and specific restrictions on the sale of beer, wine and ¹²⁴ liquor. Before the Board would agree to the transfer, however, it questioned the prospective Licensees extensively and sought assurances that the premises would be operated as a restaurant and not as a nightclub or bar.

It appears from the transcript of the November 4, 1993 hearing that the Board had had some problems with the establishment formerly known as the Sanctuary, which was a nightclub, and that the license was only transferred because the Licensees had expressly agreed that the premises would be used as a restaurant. 2 The Board granted the application to transfer the license subject to the restrictions set forth in the agreement and on the license. The face of the license contains the following restriction: “Must operate in line with the conditions set forth in the agreement with the Fells Point Homeowners Association, the agreement dated November 4,1993.” On December 1, 1994, a public hearing was held by the Board to determine, among other things, whether the Licensees had violated the restrictions contained in the November 4, 1993 agreement. 3 At the hearing, the Licensees moved to dismiss the charges against them on the ground that the November 4, 1993 agreement was binding on the community and the Licensees only and was not enforceable by the Board. The Licensees asserted that, as to the Board, the restrictions in the agreement were “null and void.” The Board argued that it did have the power to restrict an individual license and that it had been doing so for many years, whenever it believed that such restrictions would be in the best interests of the community. ¹²⁵ The Board concluded that the November 4, 1993 agreement had been accepted by the Licensees and the FPHA and that the Board had accepted the agreement as a binding restriction on the license. The Board also stated that it had the authority, under Article 2B, to impose such restrictions.

After finding that the Licensees had violated many of the restrictions in the agreement and that the premises were being used primarily as a nightclub or bar, the Board imposed the following, additional restrictions, effective December 8, 1994: no live entertainment, no D.J., no dancing, no exotic entertainment. The Licensees sought judicial review of the Board’s decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and obtained a stay of the Board’s Order. The Board and several interested individuals 4 (collectively “the Petitioners”) responded to the Licensees’ petition. A hearing was held on May 15,1995 before the Honorable Hilary D. Caplan.

Judge Caplan found that the Board lacked statutory authority to impose any restrictions on a license not expressly provided for in Article 2B and he stated: “the decision of the Board of Liquor License Commissioners is hereby reversed.... ” The Judge asked counsel to prepare an order to that effect. An order was prepared and was signed by Judge Caplan on May 17, 1995. The order stated that the decision of the Board was “REVERSED for the reasons articulated by the Court in its oral ruling from the bench and in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion attached hereto.” 5 The Order was docketed on the same day; the docket entry read: “ORDER OF COURT THAT THE DECISION OF THE BOARD IS REVERSED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS (CAPLAN, J).” On May 23, 1995 and May 25, 1995, the Board and the interested individuals, respectively, filed motions for reconsideration. The Licensees filed a motion in opposition to the ¹²⁶ motions for reconsideration on June 8, 1995.

Judge Caplan held a hearing on the motions on June 16, 1995. After arguments on the motions concluded, Judge Caplan gave the parties ten days to present any additional materials for consideration on the motions. He told the parties to expect his ruling “sometime by the middle of July.” Later in the day, on June 16,1995, the Board and the interested individuals, apparently believing that an appeal had to be filed within 30 days of the May 17, 1995 docket entry, filed notices of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. On July 19, 1995, Judge Caplan filed a Memorandum Decision and Order, which restated his conclusion that the Board lacked authority to impose restrictions on the license and which implicitly disposed of the outstanding motions.

The Licensees filed, in the Court of Special Appeals, a Motion to Dismiss the appeals of the Board and the individual appellants on the grounds that they failed to note timely appeals pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-202(a). The Court of Special Appeals denied the motion on September 26, 1995. We granted a writ of certiorari, on December 19, 1995, before the case could be reviewed on its merits by the Court of Special Appeals in order to consider the important issues raised by the appeal. In their brief to this Court, the Licensees have again moved to have the Petitioners’ appeals dismissed on the grounds that they were not timely.

II

The threshold issue that we must address is whether the Petitioners filed timely notices of appeal. A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the entry of the judgment or order from which an appeal is to be taken. Maryland Rule 8-202(a). The Licensees argue that when the Petitioners filed their notices of appeal, on June 16, 1995, in response to the Order docketed May 17, 1995, there was no final judgment from which an appeal could be taken.

The Licensees argue that a final judgment was entered in the circuit court on July 19, 1995, the date that Judge Caplan filed the Memorandum Decision and Order. The Licensees assert ¹²⁷ that because the Petitioners did not file additional notices of appeal within 30 days after the entry of the Memorandum Decision, their opportunity for appellate review expired. The Petitioners filed a response to the Licensees’ motion in which they argued that Judge Caplan rendered a judgment on May 15, 1995, which became final when the order was signed and entered on the docket on May 17, 1995. The appellants argue that their appeal, filed on June 16, 1995, was timely because it was filed on the thirtieth day after the final judgment was entered.

We agree, and we hold that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted a final judgment, from which the Petitioners could appeal, on May 17, 1995. The Maryland Rules define a judgment as “any order of court final in its nature entered pursuant to these rules.” Maryland Rule l-202(m). Maryland Rule 2-601 prescribes the manner in which a judgment must be entered: “(a) When Entered.—Upon a general verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court allowing recovery only of costs or a specified amount of money or denying all relief, the clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment, unless the court orders otherwise. Upon a special verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court granting other relief, the clerk shall enter the judgment as directed by the court.

Unless the court orders otherwise, entry of the judgment shall not be delayed pending a determination of the amount of costs, (b) Method of Entry—Date of Judgment.—The clerk shall enter a judgment by making a record of it in writing on the file jacket, or on a docket within the file, or in a docket book, according to the practice of each court, and shall record the actual date of entry. That date shall be the date of the judgment.” Maryland Rule 2—601(a), (b). Rule l-202(m) and Rule 2-601, taken together, “make clear that two acts must occur for an action by a court to be deemed the granting of a judgment: the court must render a final order and the order must be entered on the docket by the clerk.” Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 710 , 646 ¹²⁸ A.2d 365, 370 (1994). Once both steps have occurred, rendition and entry, a judgment has been created.

Id. “Rendition of judgment is ... the court’s pronouncement, by spoken word in open court or by written order filed with the clerk, of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication.” Id. The entry of a judgment is the “purely ministerial act” of placing a judgment in the permanent record of a court. Id. Whether a judgment has been rendered is a determination that must be made on a case by case basis and that “turns on whether the court indicated clearly that it had fully adjudicated the issue submitted and had reached a final decision on the matter at that time.” Davis, 335 Md. at 710-11 , 646 A.2d at 370 .

A reviewing court will focus on the words spoken and the actions taken in the lower court to make such a determination. Davis, 335 Md. at 711 , 646 A.2d at 371 . On May 15, 1995, Judge Caplan stated: “So the decision of the Board of Liquor Commissioners is hereby reversed, and costs will be paid by the Board. Thank you.” These words clearly indicate that the court “had fully adjudicated the issue submitted and had reached a final decision on the matter at that time.” Furthermore, Judge Caplan twice referred to the appeal to the Court of Special Appeals that he knew was imminent.' In reference to his reversal of the Board, Judge Caplan said of the Court of Special Appeals: “If I am wrong, they will correct me.” In response to a question from Licensees’ counsel regarding restrictions on the license, Judge Caplan responded: “I am not going to lift them until ... the Court of Special Appeals has spoken.

I am at this juncture reversing the Board.” We think the Petitioners could justifiably conclude that Judge Caplan reached a final decision and rendered a judgment. The order signed by the court on May 17, 1995 was entered on the docket the same day. The docket for May 17, 1995, reads as follows: “ORDER OF COURT THAT THE DECISION OF THE BOARD IS REVERSED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS (CAPLAN, J).” In the margin next to those words is the abbreviation “CLOS,” the clerk’s ¹²⁹ notation that the case was closed on that day. Thus it appeared from the docket entries that there was a final judgment on May 17, 1995, when the decision that was rendered by the circuit court was entered on the docket.

Whether a party may appeal a judgment of a court depends on whether that judgment is “final.” Maryland Code (1995 Repl.Vol), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 12-301. “If a ruling of the court is to constitute a final judgment, it must have at least three attributes: (1) it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy, (2) unless the court properly acts pursuant to Md. Rule 2-602(b), it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties, and (3) the clerk must make a proper record of it in accordance with Md. Rule 2-601.” Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989). The Licensees argue that the first Rohrbeck requirement is lacking and, therefore, that this appeal must be dismissed. The Licensees argue that it was impossible for Judge Caplan to issue a final disposition on May 15, 1995. In support of their argument, the Licensees point to Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 2B, § 16-101(e)(4)(i), 6 which states: “If the court reverses the action of the local licensing board it shall file with the papers a written statement of the reasons.” Based on the plain language of that statute, the Licensees argue, Judge Caplan could not render a final judgment until he filed a written statement of the reasons for his reversal of the Board.

The Licensees argue that Judge Caplan did not satisfy the requirements of § 16-101(e)(4)(i) until July 19, 1995, when he filed the Memorandum Decision and Order, and that the appeals filed by the Petitioners before that date were ineffective. No additional notice of appeal was filed by either Petitioner within 30 days after July 19,1995. ¹³⁰ The Licensees focus on the following language as proof that Judge Caplan did not intend to render “an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy” on May 15, 1995: “[BOARD’S COUNSEL]: * * * And when this, court reverses the board, it is required to do so by written memorandum. THE COURT: Yes, So I’ll get the—the memorandum will be submitted. I mean, the order will be submitted to me.

The memorandum will be basically adopting the arguments that I have heard on their side of the memorandum that they have. And I will do it in short form, because I think it is rather long in its body. But the court will do so.” They argue that because Judge Caplan intended to write a memorandum, his disposition of the action was not “unqualified.” In some instances, however, an oral statement dictated by the judge on the record to the court reporter satisfies the requirement of a written statement. In Smith v. State, 306 Md. 1, 11 , 506 A.2d 1165, 1170 (1986), this Court applied and interpreted the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).

Morrissey and Gagnon held that a probationer is denied due process of law if his or her probation is revoked without a written statement explaining the reasons therefore and the evidence relied on. The purposes behind the written statement are to help “insure accurate fact finding with respect to any alleged violation and [to] provide[ ] an adequate basis for review to determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported by the evidence.” Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14 , 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2259 , 85 L.Ed.2d 636, 644 (1985). In Smith , a defendant’s probation was revoked without a written statement of the reasons. We said, however, that the written statement requirement of Morrissey and Gagnon could “be satisfied by the trial judge dictating the reasons for revoking probation, on the record, to the court reporter or ¹³¹ other authorized medium of court reporting.” Smith, 306 Md. at 11 n. 3, 506 A.2d at 1170 n. 3; see also Soden v. State, 71 Md.App. 1 , 6 n. 4, 523 A.2d 1015 , 1017 n. 4 (1987) (extending Smith to include colloquy between counsel and judge on the record as oral statement which satisfies written statement requirement).

A dictation, on the record, of the reasons for revoking probation fulfills the function of the written statement. In Thomas v. State, 99 Md.App. 47 , 635 A.2d 71 , cert. denied, 334 Md. 632 , 640 A.2d 1133 (1994), the Court of Special Appeals interpreted Maryland Rule P3b, which states, in part: “Where a direct contempt is committed, the court shall sign a written order to that effect.” Maryland Rule P3b. The purpose of the written order requirement is to enable a reviewing court “to determine by an inspection of the record, whether a contempt has been committed and whether the court had jurisdiction to punish it.” Jones v. State, 32 Md.App. 490, 497 , 362 A.2d 660, 664 (1976). In Thomas , the defendant had been held in direct contempt of the circuit court, but no written order was made evidencing the contempt judgment. 99 Md.App. at 51 , 635 A.2d at 73 .

Although the judgment was vacated for failing to comply with all of the Rule’s requirements, the Court of Special Appeals said that dictating “findings sufficient to constitute a basis for a criminal contempt judgment” to a court reporter satisfied the written order requirement of Rule P3b. Thomas, 99 Md.App. at 56 , 635 A.2d at 75 . Again, dictating findings on the record serves the purposes behind the written order requirement. In this case, shortly before Judge Caplan stated that he was reversing the decision of the Board, he dictated the reasons that he was doing so to the court reporter on the record.

He said: “I am convinced that [the Licensees’ attorney] is correct in his analysis that this is an enabling statute, and that the powers that are explicitly stated do not refer, as they argue to the restrictions that are part of the enabling statute. ¹³² And that this is not necessarily implicit. And I believe the 10-501(b) exception that was created by the legislature speaks to this, and tells us what the legislature is thinking. And Baines [v. Board of Liquor License, 100 Md.App. 136 , 640 A.2d 232 (1994)], on the other side, tells us what I think the Court of Special Appeals is thinking.” A primary purpose behind the written statement requirement of § 16-101(e)(4)(i) is to enable an appellate court to determine the grounds upon which a decision of the Board was reversed and whether sufficient evidence existed for such a reversal. We think that Judge Caplan’s complete explanation on the record satisfies this purpose.

Furthermore, Judge Caplan’s words regarding the preparation of a memorandum are not necessarily inconsistent with an intention to render “an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy.” Instead, Judge Caplan’s words may indicate that he considered the memorandum to be a mere formality, intended only to memorialize the grounds for the decision that he rendered on May 15,1995. In Rohrbeck, supra, we also said the following about the finality of a judgment: “we now make clear that, whenever the court ... indicates that a written order embodying the decision is to follow, a final judgment does not arise prior to the signing and filing of the anticipated order unless (1) the court subsequently decides not to require the order and directs the entry of judgment in some other appropriate manner or (2) the order is intended to be collateral to the judgment.” 318 Md. at 42 , 566 A.2d at 774 . The instant case can be distinguished from Rohrbeck because what is at issue here is Judge Caplan’s indication that a written memorandum was to follow the decision, not a written order. The written order reversing the Board that Judge