Jones v. Hubbard

CATHELL, Judge. On November 8, 1994, petitioners agreed to sell the property described as 10693 Chesterfield Forest Road, Millington, Maryland to respondent for $100,000.00. On March 7, 1996, respondent filed an action against petitioners in the Circuit Court for Kent County to recover for breach of contract arising out of that real estate transaction. The case came before the circuit court for a hearing on the merits on February 13, 1997.

Prior to trial that day, the trial judge rendered a judgment pursuant to the parties’ consent in favor of respondent in the amount of $5,000.00 with a proviso that it could be settled upon the payment of $2,550.00 within thirty days. The judgment was indexed and recorded. ⁵¹⁸ The thirtieth day fell on Saturday, March 15, 1997. In a handwritten memo dated March 10, 1997, petitioners advised respondent that they would pay the judgment on Monday, March 17, 1997 with a cashier’s check. On March 17, the thirty-second day, petitioners presented respondent with a cashier’s check for $2,500.00 and $50.00 cash and requested that respondent mark the judgment “released and satisfied.” Respondent refused to file an Order of Satisfaction arguing that the $2,550.00 should have been paid by March 15, 1997, even though that day was a Saturday.

On April 3, 1997, respondent filed a Petition for Deposition in Aid of Enforcement of Judgment. Petitioners filed an answer to that petition on April 8, 1997, and filed a Motion for Injunction, claiming that they had effectively paid within the thirty-day requirement because, pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Article 94, section 2 and Maryland Rule l-203(a), they had until March 17, 1997, to satisfy the judgment at the discounted rate. The circuit court denied this motion and on May 5, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Amend or Revise the Judgment, which was also denied. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court, holding that the discount provision did not constitute a court order.

We granted a writ of certiorari to consider whether the trial court properly ruled that the parties’ agreement to discount a judgment for payment within thirty days was not governed by Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Article 1, section 36 1 and Maryland Rule l-203(a), and the due date for payment, therefore, was not extended by virtue of falling on a Saturday. We hold that the trial court erred, that the agreement to discount the judgment was a court order governed by Maryland Rules l-203(a) and l-202(n), and the due date for payment was extended by virtue of falling on a Saturday. ⁵¹⁹ Accordingly, we reverse. We shall not reach the applicability of Article 1, section 36. I. Discussion and Analysis The threshold issue is whether the discount provision was a court order governed by the relevant provisions.

To make this determination, we need to analyze three distinct questions of law: (1) whether the trial court rendered a final judgment; (2) if a final judgment was rendered, whether it included the discount provision; and (3), if a final judgment, which included the discount provision, was rendered, whether and how Maryland Rule l-203(a) would affect the due date for payment of the judgment. A. Consent Judgments There are two rules of court which are determinative as to whether the trial court rendered a judgment in this particular case. Maryland Rule l-202(n) defines judgment as “any order of court final in its nature entered pursuant to these rules.” Accordingly, a judgment is an order of court. Additionally, at the time this judgment was rendered, Maryland Rule 2-601 (1997) 2 prescribed the manner in which a judgment must be entered as follows: (a) When Entered.—Upon a general verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court allowing recovery only of costs or a specified amount of money or denying all relief, the clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment, unless the court orders otherwise.

Upon a special verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court granting other relief, the clerk shall enter the judgment as directed by the court. Unless the court orders otherwise, entry of the judgment shall not be delayed pending a determination of the amount of costs. ⁵²⁰ (b) Method of Entry—Date of Judgment.—The clerk shall enter a judgment by making a record of it in writing on the file jacket, or on a docket within the file, or in a docket book, according to the practice of each court, and shall record the actual date of the entry. That date shall be the date of the judgment. (c) Recording and Indexing.—Promptly after entry, the clerk shall record and index the judgment, except a judgment denying all relief without costs, in the judgment records of the court.

This Court has previously interpreted the interplay between these two rules as follows: Read in conjunction, Rule l-202(m)[ 3 ] and Rule 2-60[ 4 ] make clear that two acts must occur for an action by a court to be deemed the granting of a judgment: the court must render a final order and the order must be entered on the docket by the clerk. These two required acts—rendition of a judgment by the court and entry of the judgment by the clerk—are discrete occurrences. Rendition of judgment is the judicial act by which the court settles and declares the decision of the law on the matters at issue. In other words, rendition is the court’s pronouncement, by spoken word in open court or by written order filed with the clerk, of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication.

The second act required under Maryland law—the clerk’s entry of the judgment on the docket—is the purely ministerial act by means of which permanent evidence of the judicial act of rendering the judgment is made a record of the court. See Doehring v. Wagner, 311 Md. 272 , 533 A.2d 1300 (1987); Corey v. Carback, 201 Md. 389 , 94 A.2d 629 (1953). ⁵²¹ A judgment is therefore not granted until it is both properly rendered and properly entered. Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 710 , 646 A.2d 365, 370 (1994); see also Claibourne v. Willis, 347 Md. 684, 690 , 702 A.2d 293, 296 (1997); Board of Liquor License Comm’rs v. Fells Point Cafe, Inc., 344 Md. 120, 127-28 , 685 A.2d 772, 775 (1996). In the case sub judice, both of these requirements were met when the court rendered a consent judgment in favor of respondent and the clerk recorded the judgment on the docket and indexed it. “ ‘Rendition of judgment is ... the court’s pronouncement, by spoken word in open court or by written order filed with the clerk, of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication.’ ” Fells Point Cafe, 344 Md. at 128 , 685 A.2d at 775 (quoting Davis, 335 Md. at 710 , 646 A.2d at 370 ).

In Parkington Apartments, Inc. v. Cordish, 296 Md. 143, 149 , 460 A.2d 52, 55 (1983), this Court said: Black’s Lato Dictionary 1165 (5th ed.1979)[ 5 ] is instructive as to what the General Assembly may have contemplated when it used the term “rendition of judgment”: “Rendition of a judgment is effected when trial court in open court declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue, and it is distinguishable from ‘entry of judgment,’ which is a purely ministerial act by which the judgment is made of record and preserved. Ex parte Gnesoulis, Tex.Civ.App., 525 S.W.2d 205, 209 [ (1975) ]. A judgment is rendered as of date on which trial judge declares in open court his decision on matters submitted to him for adjudication, and oral pronouncement by the court of its decision is sufficient for ‘rendition of judgment’. Farr v. McKinzie, Tex.Civ.App., 477 S.W.2d 672, 676 [ (1972) ]. ⁵²² “The rendition of judgment is the pronouncement of the court of its conclusions and decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication; a judgment may be rendered either orally in open court or by memorandum filed with the clerk.

Travelers Express Co., Inc. v. Winters, Tex.Civ.App. 488 S.W.2d 890, 892 [(1972), overturned on other grounds by Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.1976) ]. ‘Rendition’ of judgment is distinguishable from its ‘entry’ in the records. Rehm v. Fishman, Mo.App., 395 S.W.2d 251, 255 [ (1965) ]. See Entering judgment.” Several courts in other jurisdictions define “rendition of judgment” consistent with this interpretation. Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 909 F.Supp. 1224, 1238 (N.D.Iowa 1991) (“[A] judgment is rendered ‘when it is announced, or when the judge signs an enrolled judgment order ....’”) (quoting World Teacher Seminar v. Iowa Dist.

Ct., 406 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Iowa 1987)); Gorum v. Samuel, 274 Ala. 690 , 151 So.2d 393, 396 (1963) (“ ‘When a judgment is pronounced in open court, it is rendered and the clerk could '... enter it on the minutes at any time during that term ....’”) (quoting DuPree v. Hart, 242 Ala. 690, 693 , 8 So.2d 183, 186 (1942)); Willmon v. Arizona, 16 Ariz.App. 323, 324 , 493 P.2d 125, 126 (1972) (“Judgment is complete and valid when orally pronounced in open court and entered in the minutes without anything further or any written judgment.”); Second Injury Fund v. Lupachino, 45 Conn.App. 324, 337 , 695 A.2d 1072, 1080 (1997) (“ ‘A judgment is in fact rendered in a cause tried to the court when the trial judge officially announces his decision orally in open court, or, out of court, signifies orally or in a writing filed with the clerk in his official capacity the decision pronounced by him ....’”) (quoting Zoning Comm’n v. Fairfield Resources Management, Inc., 41 Conn.App. 89, 102 , 674 A.2d 1335, 1342 (1996)); Gorzik Corp. v. Mosman, 315 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Mo.1958) (“ ‘Rendition’ is a judicial act; entering is a ministerial act. The judgment is rendered when it is ordered by the court; it is entered when it is spread on the docket.”); Stimpson Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. ⁵²³ Pam Trading Corp., 98 N.C.App. 543, 553 , 392 S.E.2d 128, 134 (1990) (“A judgment is ‘rendered’ when it is announced or declared in open court.”); Phillips v. Phillips, 556 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Okla.1976) (“A judgment is ‘rendered’ when pronounced by the court.”); McCown v. Quillin, 48 Tenn.App. 162, 169-70 , 344 S.W.2d 576, 580 (1960) (“ ‘Rendered’ means expressed or announced in a conclusive manner and with decisive effect, certainly so when at the same time notation of it is made on a judgment docket, or other more or less permanent memorandum record.... ”); Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291, 295 , 257 S.W.2d 289, 291 (1953) (“ ‘The judgment of a court is what the court pronounces. Its rendition is [a] judicial act.... Its entry is a ministerial act ....’” (quoting Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 494 , 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (1912))), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. Hernandez, 155 Tex. 249 , 285 S.W.2d 184 (1956); Keim v. Anderson, 943 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tex.App.1997) (“Judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk. [It] is distinguishable from the entry of judgment, which is a purely ministerial act by which judgment is made of record and preserved.”).

A final order was rendered by the trial judge when he decisively announced in open court: Judgement in favor of the Plaintiff Selbe Hubbard, against Defendant Oliver Jones and Mattie B. Jones, in the amount of $5,000.00. And then the docket should reflect that judgment m[a]y be satisfied by payment of $2,550.00 within 30 days. “The value of a simple docket entry which ... make[s] clear to everyone the disposition of each and every claim in a case cannot be overemphasized.” Fells Point Cafe, 344 Md. at 133 , 685 A.2d at 778 (1996) (quoting Estep v. Georgetown Leather Design, 320 Md. 277, 287 , 577 A.2d 78, 82 (1990)). Black’s Law Dictionary 554 (7th ed.1999) currently defines “entry of judgment” as “[t]he ministerial recording of a court’s final decision, usu. by noting it in a judgment book or civil docket.” ⁵²⁴ Entry of the judgment on the docket serves to make a permanent record in the court. See Fells Point Cafe, 344 Md. at 128 , 685 A.2d at 775 ; Davis, 335 Md. at 710 , 646 A.2d at 370 .

A permanent record of the judgment was created when the clerk placed it on the docket as entry number 13: Matter passed for settlement. Court directed judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Selbe Hubbard and against Oliver Jones and Mattie B. Jones in the amount of $5,000.00. Judgment can be settled upon payment of $2,5[5]0.00 within 30 days. Both required acts described in Davis have been satisfied.

A judgment, however, will only be considered rendered by a court if it has clearly indicated that the issue submitted has been adjudicated completely and it has reached a final decision on the matter. As this Court previously stated: “If a ruling of the court is to constitute a final judgment, it must have at least three attributes: (1) it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy, (2) unless the court properly acts pursuant to Md. Rule 2-602(b), it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties, and (3) the clerk must make a proper record of it in accordance with Md. Rule 2-601.” Fells Point Cafe, 344 Md. at 129 , 685 A.2d at 776 (1996) (quoting Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41 , 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989)). In the case sub judice, all three of these attributes have been satisfied. First, the trial court’s ruling was an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy.

Second, it adjudicated all claims against all parties. Third, the clerk made a proper record of it in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-601. This Court concluded in Davis, 335 Md. at 711 , 646 A.2d at 370 : [T]he trial court’s ruling must be “an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy.” Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41 , 566 A.2d at 773 ; see also Anthony v. Clark, 335 Md. 579 , 644 A.2d 1070 [ (1994) ]. There are, however, no formal requirements regarding the rendition of a judgment.

See, e.g., United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 534 , 64 S.Ct. ⁵²⁵ 359, 361, 88 L.Ed. 290, 292 (1944). As one court has observed, “[t]here are no hard and fast rules for determining what is a judgment.” Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 323 F.2d 114, 115 (6th Cir.1963). Rather, whether a judgment has been rendered in a particular case is an inquiry that must be made on a case-by-case basis and which focuses upon the actions and statements of the court. [Second alteration in original] As illustrated, supra, the requirements for the rendering of a judgment were satisfied by the trial court. If the court had not properly rendered a final judgment, this agreement would have been a settlement agreement.

A settlement agreement is not a final judgment. Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213-15 , 406 A.2d 922, 925-26 (1979); see also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Equitable Bank, 77 Md.App. 320, 328 , 550 A.2d 407, 411 (1988); Ramsey, Inc. v. Davis, 66 Md.App. 717, 725 , 505 A.2d 899, 903 , cert. denied, 306 Md. 514 , 510 A.2d 260 (1986). The Court of Special Appeals has distinguished between these two related entities: Although a settlement order resembles a final judgment, it is not the same. A settlement agreement is a contract which the parties enter into “for the settlement of a previously existing claim by a substituted performance.” When this agreement is entered with the court, it is termed a settlement order; however, it is not a court order.

Rather, it is a compromise between the parties, which they submit to the court to stay the proceedings in the case. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 77 Md.App. at 328 , 550 A.2d at 411 (quoting Mitchell Properties, Inc. v. Real Estate Title Co., 62 Md.App. 473, 482 , 490 A.2d 271 (1985)). When parties agree to settlement terms in the presence of the court and ask the court to render a judgment based on that settlement agreement and the court renders a judgment on the settlement, the agreement becomes a final judgment. Montgomery County v. Revere Nat’l Corp., 341 Md. 366, 378 , 671 A.2d 1, 7 (1996) (“Thus, an order entered on a docket pursuant to Rule 2-601, and having the effect of terminating the case ... is a final judgment.”).

Chertkof v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co., 251 Md. ⁵²⁶ 544, 549, 248 A.2d 373, 376 (1968); see also Mitchell Properties, 62 Md.App. at 483 , 490 A.2d at 276 (“If the court reduces the settlement order to a money judgment, it becomes a final judgment to the extent the underlying agreement address[es] the respective claims of the parties.”). A court judgment makes the settlement agreement a judicial act. When parties endorse a judicial decree entered pursuant to a settlement agreement, “a critical element [is added] to [the] contractual act: judicial conclusiveness.” Kirsner v. Fleischmann, 261 Md. 164, 170 , 274 A.2d 339, 343 (1971); see also Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md.App. 359, 361 , 370 A.2d 577, 579 (1977) (“[A] consent decree adds a critical element to the contractual act— judicial conclusiveness.”). Looking at the actions and statements of the trial court, we conclude that there was a judgment rendered in this case.

When the trial court reduced the proposed agreement to a consent judgment, it became a final judgment and an order of the court. We now turn our analysis on whether a consent judgment is to be treated any differently than any other form of judgment. We start with an interpretation of Rule 2-612. 6 As we said in State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311 (1998): We begin our analysis with the canons of statutory construction that are also generally applicable in respect to rule construction. See State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 79 , 702 A.2d 723, 728 (1997) ...; In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94 , 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994)....

We have said that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the statute. Marriot[Marriott] Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. ⁵²⁷ 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380 , 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater[Tidewater/Havre de Grace Inc.] v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344 , 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256 , 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693 , 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35 , 660 A.2d at 429 ; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92 , 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136 , 141 A.2d 734 (1958). Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent.

Marriot[Marriott] Employees, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 458; Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414 , 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968). This Court recently stated that “statutory language is not read in isolation, but ‘in light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.’ ” Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380 , 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185 , 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)). To this end, [w]hen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed.... We may and often must consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,” including a bill’s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case. ⁵²⁸ ... [I]n State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327 , 524 A.2d 51 (1987), ... [although we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaning—what Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as “the legislative scheme.” [Id. at] 344-45, 524 A.2d at 59 .

We identified that scheme or purpose after an extensive review of the context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984, which had effected major changes in Art. 27, § 297. That context included, among other things, a bill request form, prior legislation, a legislative committee report, a bill title, related statutes and amendments to the bill. See also Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381 , 524 A.2d 77 (1987), in which we considered legislative history (a committee report) to assist in construing legislation that we did not identify as ambiguous or of uncertain meaning. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15 , 525 A.2d at 632-33 (some citations omitted).

Id. at 717-19, 720 A.2d at 315-16 (alterations in original). Looking at the unambiguous wording of Maryland Rules l-202(n), 2-601 and 2-612, as well as the minutes from the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules Committee) meetings, it is evident that a consent judgment is a judgment and an order of court. Its only distinction is that it is a judgment that a court enters at the request of the parties. Minutes from the Rules Committee meetings give insight to the intent behind the rules governing consent judgments: “[A] consent judgment ... must dispose of all claims in the action.... [A]n order adjudicating less than all of the claims is not a judgment----” Minutes of the Rules Committee, at 31 (Oct. 17, 1981). “The proposed amendment ] [is] designed to establish a bright line test for entry of judgment----” Minutes of the Rules Committee (Sept. 13-14, 1985).

Both statements permit the implication that a consent judgment is a judgment. There is no indication that the Rules Committee, or this Court, intended a consent judgment to be anything other than a final judgment. ⁵²⁹ Generally, we hold that consent judgments should be treated in the same fashion as any other form of judgment. The rationale is simple: A judgment is a judgment, regardless of whether it was