Moore v. Miley

HARRELL, Judge. When we took this case from the Court of Special Appeals before that court could consider it, 1 we had the best of ⁶⁶⁵ intentions. The statute in question, Maryland Code (1998 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Cts. & Jud. Proc.

Article, § 3-8A-07 (Retention, termination, or waiver of [juvenile] jurisdiction), 2 suggested interesting legal and policy questions concerning the contours bounding the juvenile justice and the adult criminal justice schemes in Maryland. Unfortunately, although our decision in the instant case may cast some light on the application of the pertinent statute in limited circumstances, more questions remain than are answered here. The unexplored areas seem worthy of timely legislative clarification. Section 3-8A-07 provides, in relevant part: § 3-8A-07.

Retention, termination, or waiver of jurisdiction. (a) Duration.—If the court obtains jurisdiction over a child under this subtitle, that jurisdiction continues until that' person reaches 21 years of age unless terminated sooner. (b) Offenses committed after age of 18.—This section does not affect the jurisdiction of other courts over a person who commits an offense after the person reaches the age of 18. (c) Termination. —Unless otherwise ordered by the couH, the court’s jurisdiction is terminated over a person who has reached 18 when he is convicted of a crime ....

(emphasis added). 3 How this statute applies to the facts of the present case will be explained. We encourage the Legisla ⁶⁶⁶ ture to consider at its earliest opportunity how it should apply to other foreseeable scenarios. I. Tyrone Moore, 4 Appellant, first entered Maryland’s juvenile justice system on 23 July 1998 when the State’s Attorney for Montgomery County filed a delinquency petition charging Moore, then fifteen years old, 5 with misconduct amounting to first degree rape and related delinquent acts alleged to have occurred on 20 March 1998. The District Court of Maryland, sitting in Montgomery County as a juvenile court at the time, found Moore to be a delinquent child and committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”) for placement at the Charles Hickey School.

The juvenile court placed Moore on probation on 14 September 1999. On 18 January 2001, the juvenile court committed Moore to the DJJ for placement at the Family Advocacy Service Program and ordered his participation in the Electronic Home Monitoring Program. Moore’s eighteenth birthday occurred on 12 March 2001. The DJJ petitioned the juvenile court on 19 July 2001 to revoke Moore’s probation alleging that “Tyrone went AWOL ⁶⁶⁷ from the Family Advocacy Program on July 17, 2001, and has not been seen since.” At an emergency hearing on 17 August 2001, the juvenile court issued a juvenile warrant for a writ of attachment of Moore.

The court received from the DJJ another petition for revocation of probation on 19 September 2001 reiterating the allegations made in the earlier petition and adding that “Tyrone has not contacted his Juvenile counselor since July 20, 2001.” The writ of attachment was served on Appellant on 17 September 2001. As a result of his misconduct during the execution of the juvenile court’s writ, Moore was charged as an adult in the District Court with resisting arrest. He pled guilty to the charge on 2 November 2001, and was sentenced to eighteen months incarceration and a $500.00 fine, both suspended, 6 and placed on supervised probation for one year. The juvenile court then held an emergency hearing on 5 November 2001 regarding the status of Moore’s probation in the juvenile case.

At that hearing, Moore’s counsel moved to dismiss the petition for revocation of probation, arguing that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction had been terminated on 2 November 2001 by operation of law as a result of Moore’s conviction, as an adult, for resisting arrest. The court denied the motion to dismiss 7 and ordered that Moore be detained at ⁶⁶⁸ the Alfred D. Noyes Children’s Center pending a violation of probation hearing. Moore filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on the basis that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction had been terminated by Moore’s conviction as an adult. The petition was denied without a hearing on 19 November 2001, and Moore took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals on 26 November 2001.

On 20 December 2001, a violation of probation hearing was held in the juvenile court where, once again, Moore’s counsel moved to dismiss the petition for revocation of probation on the basis that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction had terminated. The juvenile court judge denied the motion to dismiss, found that Moore was in violation of his probation, and ordered that his detention at the Noyes Center be continued pending his return to the Hickey School. Moore filed with the Court of Special Appeals a notice of appeal on 26 December 2001 from the juvenile court’s order of 20 December 2001. Subsequently, on 28 December 2001, Moore also filed an application for leave to appeal from that order.

The Court of Special Appeals consolidated the appeal and application for leave to appeal as a single application for leave to appeal. The newly consolidated application for leave to appeal was granted and the case was transferred to the court’s regular docket. We granted certiorari on our own initiative.

II

Appellant contended in his brief that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction terminated by operation of law, under § 3-8A-07, when Appellant, who had attained previously his eighteenth birthday, was convicted in the District Court of the crime of resisting arrest. Appellant maintained that the language of ⁶⁶⁹ the statute clearly states that when two conditions are satisfied—(1) the person turns eighteen, and (2) the person, after turning eighteen, is convicted of a crime—the juvenile court’s jurisdiction is terminated by operation of law “unless otherwise ordered” by the juvenile court. Any actions taken by that court subsequent to the 2 November 2001 conviction, he claimed, were extra-judicial acts exceeding the juvenile court’s authority. Accordingly, the court did not have jurisdiction to revoke Appellant’s probation or re-commit him to the DJJ for placement in the Hickey School.

At oral argument, Appellant urged that the language of subsection (c) of the statute, providing the “[ujnless otherwise ordered by the [juvenile] court” exception, could be satisfied only by an order entered prior to the criminal conviction. This must be so, he continued, because once juvenile jurisdiction is terminated by the entry of a criminal conviction it can not be restored by an order of the divested juvenile court. Moreover, such an order, he stated, must contain an express determination by the juvenile court of its intent to continue its jurisdiction notwithstanding the possibility of conviction of the adult criminal charge. Appellant also contended that, even if the juvenile court does not know of the criminal proceeding, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction nonetheless automatically terminates upon entry of the conviction.

Thus, despite the absence from the statute of a mechanism for providing notice to the juvenile court of a pending criminal charge prior to conviction, the juvenile court must issue the saving order prior to conviction. To permit otherwise, Appellant argued, would render subsection (c) meaningless. Appellant suggested various ways and means that a juvenile court could be made aware in timely fashion of a pending adult charge in order that discretion could be exercised intelligently under the statute. 8 In the present case, Appellant asserts that the Office of the State’s Attorney for Montgomery County, which was responsi ⁶⁷⁰ ble for prosecuting Appellant for resisting arrest, had the opportunity, which it failed to take, to contact the DJJ to determine its wishes and, if appropriate, seek a collateral and timely order from the juvenile court asking it to retain jurisdiction over Appellant before Appellant’s plea was accepted and the criminal conviction entered. Appellant denies that the “unless otherwise ordered”. provision of § 3-8A-07(c) was satisfied by the juvenile warrant/writ of attachment issued by the juvenile court 9 prior to Appellant’s arrest on the criminal charge.

Appellant minimizes the significance of the juvenile court’s writ here, noting that, for purposes of the Juvenile Causes Act, “[i]t is clear that jurisdiction and custody are separate and distinct.” In re Johanna F., 284 Md. 643, 651 , 399 A.2d 245, 249 (1979). The language of the writ, contends Appellant, merely orders that Appellant be taken into custody and detained pending a hearing, and that the writ be lodged as a detainer for his continued detention if he is detained or committed for another offense. There was no indication in the language of the writ as to whether the juvenile court contemplated retaining jurisdiction in the event of a possible conviction on the particular criminal charge involved in this case. Appellant argues, therefore, that there is no “order” contained in the writ reserving jurisdiction as contemplated by § 3-8A-07(c).

The State (“Appellees”) 10 contends that the juvenile court retained its jurisdiction over Appellant by its 17 August 2001 writ and related actions. Appellees assert that the juvenile court was not divested of its jurisdiction over Appellant and, therefore, the Circuit Court in the habeas action and the juvenile court properly rejected Appellant’s claims. ⁶⁷¹ Appellees link the language of subsection (c) and the language of the 17 August 2001 writ to conclude that the juvenile court correctly held that the juvenile warrant, the writ of attachment, is an order by the Court, intending to exercise the Court’s jurisdiction, commanding that he be taken into custody for having been AWOL and at the same time there was an outstanding petition for violation of probation. I think that is otherwise ordering by the Court. The writ, Appellees urge, was an order re-asserting the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over Appellant within the meaning of § 3-8A-07(c).

Appellees seek to undermine Appellant’s reliance on In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306 , 783 A.2d 673 (2001) and In re Johanna F., 284 Md. 643 , 399 A.2d 245 (1979). Franklin P. held that once the juvenile court divested itself of jurisdiction by granting a motion to waive the case to the adult criminal court, the juvenile court lacked the power to reconsider its action and divest the criminal court of jurisdiction. In contrast, Appellees maintain that in the present matter the juvenile court, by issuing the writ of attachment that led to Appellant’s arrest and resultant criminal charge, clearly exercised and re-asserted its jurisdiction and indicated its intention to continue its jurisdiction over Appellant at least for purposes of the alleged probation violations. Appellees also fault Appellant’s reliance on Johanna F., which examined the juvenile court’s custody upon the expiration of an order for the custody of the juvenile.

This Court held there that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, obtained by the petition, adjudication, and determination of delinquency, remained unaffected by the lapse of a subsequent juvenile custody order. Section 3-8A-07(a) permits the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to continue until the person reaches twenty-one years old, “unless terminated sooner.” In the present matter, Appellees argue, “it is equally clear that the juvenile court properly concluded that its jurisdiction continued.” The amalgam of the juvenile court’s writ of attachment and the ⁶⁷² various emergency hearings amounted to the juvenile court “otherwise ordering]” that the criminal conviction did not terminate juvenile jurisdiction. Finally, Appellees urge that it was “incumbent upon the juvenile court, pursuant to § 3-8A-02(b),” 11 to “liberally construe” the operation of § 3-8A-07 so as to effectuate the purposes of the juvenile causes subtitle, including the treatment and rehabilitative goals of juvenile proceedings. In response to Appellant’s amplified arguments at oral argument, Appellees advocated that the statute would be unworkable if interpreted to require the juvenile court to act without prior notice of the cximinal charge that might lead to a conviction.

They pointed out that the statute identified no mechanism to ensure the juvenile court or the DJJ would be notified prior to a conviction. The juvenile court, as it did in the present matter, might hear of the cximinal conviction oxxly after the conviction had been entered and juvenile jurisdiction terminated. Furthermore, Appellees suggested that the statute’s legislative history indicated that the Legislature intended that the conviction of a juvenile for a relatively minor offense, such as occurred hex-e, not interfere with the general rehabilitative program fashioned by the juvenile court. 12 Recognition of the Legislature’s intent, Appellees argued, requix'es this Court to find the language of the writ of attachment sufficient to preserve the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over Appellant.

III

A. This Coux-t repeatedly has noted the Legislature’s intent that the system of juvenile justice in Maryland is guided ⁶⁷³ generally by principles of protection and rehabilitation of the individual rather than a societal goal of punishment and retribution. See In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 90-91 , 646 A.2d 1012, 1014-15 (1994) (discussing the historical development of the juvenile justice system in Maryland); In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 522 , 255 A.2d 419, 422 (1969) (stating that the concept underlying juvenile proceedings is protection of the juvenile). We have recognized the legislative intent of the Juvenile Causes Act “to rehabilitate and treat juvenile delinquents so that they become useful and productive members of society.” In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 72 , 763 A.2d 136, 148 (2000). Although a “delinquent child” is defined as a child “who has committed a delinquent act and requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation,” Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Cts. & Jud.

Proc. Art., § 3-8A-01(l), the keystone of Maryland’s disposition of juvenile delinquents is that “the moral responsibility or blameworthiness of the child [is] of no consequence,” such that delinquency adjudication is seen as the opportunity for the State to provide needed rehabilitative intervention. Victor B., 336 Md. at 91-92 , 646 A.2d at 1015 . See Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 528 , 140 A.2d 914, 916 (1958) (asserting that the juvenile system does not contemplate punishing children found to be delinquent, but rather requires attempting to correct and rehabilitate such children).

Even when this Court has extended “criminal defendant” type rights to juveniles, the cases explain that the overall proceedings maintain their focus on the special goals of delinquency adjudication. See In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 70 , 811 A.2d 310 (2002) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights require that the right to a speedy trial apply to juvenile proceedings); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. at 69 , 763 A.2d at 146 (stating that despite the civil nature of juvenile proceedings a juvenile does not relinquish all rights a person would be entitled to in a criminal proceeding). The purposes enumerated for subtitle 8A of the Code addressing juvenile causes for children other than children in need of assistance and adults include balancing the competing objectives of: “(i) Public safety and the protection of the community; (ii) Accountability of the child to ⁶⁷⁴ the victim and the community for offenses committed; and (iii) Competency and character development to assist children in becoming responsible and productive members of society ....” Md.Code (1978, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Cts. & Jud. Proc.

Art., § 3-8A-02(a)(1)(i)-(iii). The statute addressing jurisdiction in the juvenile court was written mindful of the special goals of the juvenile justice system. Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Cts. & Jud. Proc.

Art., § 3-8A-03 comprehensively provides the juvenile court with exclusive original jurisdiction over children “alleged to be delinquent or in need of supervision or who ha[ve] received a citation for a violation.” 13 Once jurisdiction over the juvenile is vested in the juvenile court, that jurisdiction may be waived ⁶⁷⁵ generally and only pursuant to the procedures outlined in Md.Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-8A-06. Once the juvenile court obtains jurisdiction over a child pursuant to subtitle 8A, that jurisdiction, unless waived, continues until the child turns twenty-one years old or is terminated otherwise.

Md.Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art., § 3-8A-07(a). One of the “otherwise” situations, provided in § 3-8A-07(c), occurs when a person eighteen years old or older is convicted of a crime in adult court, “unless otherwise ordered by the [juvenile] court.” This Court has recognized as a general principle of criminal law that jurisdiction, once obtained, continues despite the occurrence of subsequent events the happening of which before jurisdiction attached would have prevented jurisdiction from vesting originally.

For example, in Franklin v. State, 264 Md. 62 , 285 A.2d 616 (1972), Franklin was tried and convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of robbery with a deadly weapon. The crime was committed when Franklin was sixteen years old. 14 This Court found that Franklin, as a juvenile, and pursuant to then extant Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Supp.), Article 26, § 70-16, could not be tried in adult criminal court unless the juvenile court so ordered following a waiver hearing. 15 We noted that because the ⁶⁷⁶ Legislature expressly restricted the right of the criminal court to try a juvenile, without waiver by the juvenile court, Franklin’s criminal trial was mere form lacking substance. The conviction produced by that trial, therefore, was null and void. In re Darren M., 358 Md. 104 , 747 A.2d 612 (2000), was another case where a trial court facially exercising criminal jurisdiction exceeded its jurisdiction.

Darren M. was charged originally in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore City, with one count of rape in the first degree, assault in the second degree, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, use of a deadly weapon with intent to injure, and carrying a handgun. 358 Md. at 106 , 747 A.2d at 612 . Before trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi to the counts of first degree rape, first degree assault, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, and carrying a handgun. 358 Md. at 106-07 , 747 A.2d at 613 . Trial commenced in the District Court on the remaining counts. After receiving testimony from the first witness, it became apparent to all concerned, supposedly for the first time, that Darren M. was only seventeen at the time the alleged crime occurred.

Id. At that point the State nol prossed the remaining criminal charges and subsequently filed a delinquency petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, sitting as the juvenile court. The Circuit Court dismissed the petition, concluding that the District Court possessed exclusive jurisdiction given Darren M.’s age at the time of the conduct complained of and the nature of the alleged crimes. The jurisdictional determination in Darren M. was based on age; therefore, the age of the person at the time he allegedly committed the charge controlled.

Finding that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over Darren M., we stated that “if the jurisdiction once attached to the person and subject matter of the