Davis v. Slater

⁶⁰² BATTAGLIA, J. Petitioner, Jimmy L. Davis [hereinafter “Davis”], comes before this Court to challenge the trial court’s denial of his Motion to Strike Jury Demand. Davis argues that when he reduced his ad damnum clause from Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars to Ten Thousand Dollars by amending his complaint, the Respondent, Patricia Ann Slater [hereinafter “Slater”], who had elected a jury trial, was no longer entitled to a jury trial. Because we do not interpret Article 28 of the Declaration of Rights or Section 4-402(e)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article as divesting parties in civil cases of their common law entitlement to a jury trial where the amount in controversy fails to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars, we affirm the denial of the Motion to Strike Jury Demand. I. Facts and Procedural History On Monday, July 26, 1999, at approximately 2:20 p.m., Slater collided with a 1995 Plymouth Neon driven by Davis while it was stopped at a red light just beyond the off-ramp from 1-695 on Moravia Road in Baltimore County, Maryland.

An ambulance arrived at the scene and transported Davis to Bay View Hospital. On May 29, 2001, Davis filed a complaint in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County requesting twenty-five thousand dollars in damages and the costs of maintaining the action. One month later, Slater filed her Answer and properly elected a jury trial pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1999 RepLVol.), Section 4-402(e)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 1 On July 12, 2001, the District Court ⁶⁰³ transferred the action to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. For the next 18 months, both parties engaged in discovery.

On February 11, 2003, Davis filed an Amended Complaint reducing his ad damnum demand to Ten Thousand Dollars. Davis then filed his Motion to Strike Jury Demand and Request for Hearing on August 13, 2003, relying upon Section 4-402(e)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 2 Slater’s response, filed on August 25, 2003, also relied on Section 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and the provisions contained in Maryland Rule 2 — 325(f). 3 On October 20, Judge Ruth A. Jakubowski denied Davis’s Motion to Strike Jury Demand without a hearing. At trial on December 10, 2003, Davis renewed his Motion to Strike Jury Trial, and Judge J. Norris Byrnes denied the Motion. The jury was selected and empaneled.

At the close of evidence, Davis again renewed his Motion to Strike Jury Trial, which was denied. After closing arguments, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict in favor of Davis in the amount of $727.03 plus interest and costs. Davis noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and this Court issued, on its own initiative, a writ of certiorari, Davis v. Slater, 381 Md. 673 , 851 A.2d 593 (2004), prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court. Davis’s brief presented the following question for our review: Did the Circuit Court erroneously order that Petitioner’s claim for $10,000 should properly be heard by a jury?

We conclude that the Circuit Court was correct and affirm its denial of Davis’s Motion to Strike Jury Trial. ⁶⁰⁴ II. Standard of Review The resolution of whether a jury trial was proper under the circumstances of this case requires us to construe the meaning of Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Section 4-402(e)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and Maryland Rule 2 — 325(f). Because our interpretation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Constitution, provisions of the Maryland Code, and the Maryland Rules are appropriately classified as questions of law, we review the issues de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these matters. See e.g., J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning, 368 Md. 71, 93-94 , 792 A.2d 288, 301 (2002); Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 365 Md. 67, 77 , 775 A.2d 1218, 1223 (2001); Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425, 435 , 727 A.2d 358, 363 (1999).

When interpreting constitutional provisions, we generally employ the same rules of construction that are applicable to the construction of statutory language. Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. G.A.A., Inc., 337 Md. 1, 8 , 650 A.2d 705, 708 (1994); Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 277 , 412 A.2d 396, 398 (1980); Kadan v. Bd. of Sup. of Elections, 273 Md. 406, 414 , 329 A.2d 702, 707 (1974); New Cent. Co. v. George’s Creek Co., 37 Md. 538 (1873). Similarly, the principles applied to statutory interpretation are also used to interpret the Maryland Rules.

Beyer v. Morgan State University, 369 Md. 335, 350 , 800 A.2d 707, 715 (2002); Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 78 , 775 A.2d 1218, 1224 (2001); see generally Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 265 , 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000). Like construing a statute, to ascertain the meaning of a constitutional provision or rule of procedure we first look to the normal, plain meaning of the language. Fish Market, 337 Md. at 8 , 650 A.2d at 708 ; Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194 , 204 n. 8, 647 A.2d 429 , 434 n. 8 (1994); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 511 , 374 A.2d 900, 902 (1977); Balto. Gas & Elect.

Co. v. Board, 278 Md. 26, 31 , 358 A.2d 241, 244 (1976); Johnson, 360 Md. at 265 , 757 A.2d at 804 . If that language is clear and unambiguous, ⁶⁰⁵ we need not look beyond the provision’s terms to inform our analysis, Fish Market, 337 Md. at 8 , 650 A.2d at 708 ; Rand, 280 Md. at 511 , 374 A.2d at 902 ; Johnson, 360 Md. at 265 , 757 A.2d at 804 ; however, the goal of our examination is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules. Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 603-04 , 573 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1990), citing Dept. of Environment v. Showell, 316 Md. 259, 270 , 558 A.2d 391, 396 (1989); Harford County v. Edgewater, 316 Md. 389, 397 , 558 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1989). To that end, we must consider the context in which the constitutional provision, statute, or rule appears, including related statutes or rules, and relevant legislative history.

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 129 , 756 A.2d 987, 991-92 (2000), citing Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 , 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987); Johnson, 360 Md. at 265 , 757 A.2d at 804 . Also, where the language of the constitutional provision, statute, or rule is ambiguous, external evidence may be referred to for discerning the purpose of the legislature, including the bill’s title or function paragraphs, relevant case law, and secondary sources. Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 678 , 814 A.2d 557, 567 (2003); Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde’s of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 483 , 833 A.2d 1014, 1021 (2003); Johnson, 360 Md. at 265 , 757 A.2d at 804 ; Schuman, Kane, Felts & Everngam, Chartered v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119 , 668 A.2d 929, 932 (1995); Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515 , 525 A.2d at 633 .

III

Background Davis contends that the Circuit Court erred as a matter of law when it held that Slater was still entitled to a jury trial despite the fact that the amount in controversy no longer exceeded Ten Thousand Dollars. He relies on the Court of Special Appeals’s opinion in Cheek v. J.B.G. Properties, Inc., 28 Md.App. 29, 344 A.2d 180 (1975), to support his assertion that access to a jury trial is triggered solely by the amount in controversy. Id. at 47 , 344 A.2d at 191-92 . Ultimately, Davis ⁶⁰⁶ argues that his amendment to the ad damnum clause, reducing the amount in controversy from Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars to Ten Thousand Dollars, divested Slater of her entitlement to a jury trial.

Slater counters that, pursuant to Rule 2 — 325(f), once a party has properly elected a jury trial in a civil case, all parties must ' consent to waive the entitlement to a jury trial for the case to be heard by the court rather than the jury. She interprets the language in Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights as guaranteeing an entitlement to a jury in suits where the amount in controversy exceeds Ten Thousand Dollars, and asserts, contrary to Davis’s position, that the guarantee does not act to forbid a jury trial where the amount in controversy does not exceed Ten Thousand Dollars. In reaching that conclusion, Slater reads the provisions of Articles 5 and 23 of the Declaration of Rights 4 in tandem so that litigants still have the entitlement to a jury trial where the amount in controversy fails to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars, but that, according to the language of Article 5, it is subject to regulation by the General Assembly. 5 Slater also analogizes the situation before this Court to that in Thompson v. State, 278 Md. 41 , 359 A.2d 203 (1976), a ⁶⁰⁷ criminal case in which a defendant properly demanded a jury trial, which was denied by the trial court when the State decided to nolle prosequi the charge that entitled the defendant to a jury trial. Slater reasons that because a defendant in a criminal case was entitled to a trial by jury at common law even where the “major” criminal violation was dismissed, this Court should reach a similar result in a civil case when the amount in controversy contained in Article 23 is no longer satisfied.

To further emphasize the fundamental nature of the entitlement to trial by jury, Slater relies on this Court’s decision in Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 365 Md. 67 , 775 A.2d 1218 (2001), which analyzed the purpose of the Maryland Rules addressing the entitlement to a jury trial and the scope and application of those rules. Drawing on our prior opinion, Slater contends that the rules must be construed in a manner that recognizes the need to preserve the constitutional entitlement to a jury trial and simultaneously enable the reasonable regulation of that entitlement in the public interest. She argues that interpreting the relevant rules in that way reinforces her position that a party cannot unilaterally divest all other parties to the litigation of their entitlement to a properly elected trial by jury. Slater’s major argument concerning the interpretation of the Maryland Rules focuses on Rule 2 — 325(f), prohibiting the withdrawal of an election for a trial by jury without the consent of all parties to the litigation.

She interprets this provision as prohibiting one party from unilaterally divesting another of the entitlement to a jury trial where the election has been properly made. Her analysis of the rule relies in large part on Judge Paul V. Niemeyer’s Maryland, Rules Commentary, Second Edition, which states: Once a jury trial is properly elected by a party, it becomes the right of any party thereafter to have the case tried before a jury. All parties may rely on the properly filed demand of any other party and need not file an additional demand on their own behalf... .This rule evidences an ⁶⁰⁸ intent to preserve and favor the jury trial right even if, to preserve it, a technical expansion might occur. Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Maryland Rules Commentary, Second Edition, 207 (2d ed.1992).

Slater also discusses Maryland Rule 2-327(a)(2) 6 , which requires both parties to consent to a transfer to District Court and to waive any rights to a jury trial that they currently possess or may come to possess in the course of the litigation and appeals process, as a supporting argument. Slater, in her interpretation of the meaning of Rules 2 — 325(f) and 2-327(a)(2), asserts that if Davis could divest Slater of her entitlement to a properly elected jury trial without her consent, Rules 2 — 325(f) and 2-327(a)(2) would be rendered meaningless. Finally, Slater notes that Davis’s citation of Cheek in support of his position is inapposite. She argues that Cheek is not on point, because it addresses the jurisdictional limits of the Circuit and District Courts rather than the “amount in controversy” requirement for the entitlement to a jury trial under Article 23.

IV

Discussion To fully understand, and thus properly analyze, the entitlement to demand a jury trial under the common law and Articles 5(a) and 23 of the Declaration of Rights, we must trace its development from its inception, to the English common law in force in the colonies and Maryland’s first Constitution, and finally, to the protections presently in force in Articles 5(a) and 23. ⁶⁰⁹ A. Article 5(a) of the Declaration of Rights The genesis of the common law jury trial has long been debated by scholars. Some trace its inception to the reign of Alfred the Great (871-899 A.D.), and others to the period of the invasion by William the Conqueror in 1066. Hon. Randy J. Holland, State Jury Trials and Federalism: Constitutionalizing Common Law Concepts, 38 Val.

U.L.Rev. 373, 376 (2004) [hereinafter “Holland”]. Regardless of its birth date, the jury was well established in various criminal and civil cases during the eleventh and twelfth centuries throughout England. Id. The entitlement to a jury trial, however, was not recognized formally by statute, but rather, its use was mandated by custom.

Id. The entitlement to a trial by jury was guaranteed in writing for the first time by the Magna Carta on June 15, 1215. Id. That document provided that “no freeman would be disseized, dispossessed, or imprisoned except by judgment of his peers.” Id.

The opus further stated, “[t]o none will we well, to none will we deny, to none will we delay right or justice.” Id. at 376-77. This language guaranteed the entitlement to a jury where freedom or property was at risk and applied to civil and criminal proceedings. During this time jury members were chosen based on their personal knowledge of the events in dispute or their particular expertise in a subject at issue, and acted as a body of witnesses to assist the court. The Civil Jury, 110 Harv.

L.Rev. 1408, 1416 (1997) [hereinafter “The Civil Jury”]. Eventually, however, the English jury evolved into the adjudicatory body that it is today. Id. The first jury trial resembling the modern incarnation occurred at the end of the fifteenth century, with the jury acting as an impartial fact finder.

Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 129-30 (Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed.1956). At that time, as today, the entitlement to a jury trial only applied in cases at law as opposed to those in equity. See generally, Ellen E. Sward, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U. Kan. L.Rev. 347 (2003) [hereinafter “Sward”]; ⁶¹⁰ The Civil Jury, supra; Holland, supra.

Furthermore, the right attached to all civil cases at law regardless of the amount in controversy. See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries, ³⁵² (stating that when a party demands a jury trial in a common law civil action the court automatically “awards a writ of venire facias ” commanding the sheriff to empanel a jury of twelve). At least as early as 1642, the Provincial Court of Maryland was conducting civil jury trials in matters of law. See Maryland Provincial Court Records, 1637-1650, vol. 4, at 156; see also Michael C. Tolley, State Constitutionalism in Maryland, at 187 (1990).

By 1776 juries played an increasingly important role in the Colonies. Juries were more inclined to resist objectionable laws imposed by England, which added to their increasing popularity. Charles A. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn. L.Rev. 639, 703-708 (1973).

It was held in such high regard that the jury became the preeminent means of trying cases arising under the common law in the newly formed United States. Sward, supra, at 373. The first State Constitution was adopted in Maryland in 1776 and did not explicitly guarantee entitlement to a jury trial in civil proceedings. Rather, in Article 3 of the Declaration of Rights, the drafters stated that “the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law.” Md. Const.

Declaration of Rights Art. 3 (1776); at the time, a trial by jury consisted of the presentation of evidence to twelve landowners from the “vicinage,” 7 whose verdict was required to be unanimous. See Holland, supra, at 377. During the period in which the 1776 Maryland. Constitution was in effect, from 1776 to 1850, the Legislature did not regulate or enumerate the types of civil disputes in which parties may demand a jury ⁶¹¹ trial, and no minimum amount in controversy was required for the entitlement to attach.

See Debates and Proceedings of the 1850 Constitutional Convention, vol. 2 at 767. 8 Article 3 of the 1776 Declaration of Rights became Article 4 of the Declaration of Rights in the 1864 Constitution, Md. Const. Declaration of Rights Art. 4 (1864), and in 1867, it was moved to Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights. Md. Const. Declaration of Rights Art. 5 (1867).

In 1992, the original language of Article 5 was amended to include two new subsections permitting juries of less than 12 members in any civil proceeding. 1992 Md. Laws, Chaps. 203 and 204. It is against this historical backdrop that we examine the plain meaning of Article 5(a). The structure and plain meaning of the language of Article 5(a) of the Declaration of Rights indicate that although the common law as a whole is subject to modification by the legislature, the “trial by Jury” is not. Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights provides in its entirety: (a) That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State.

And the Inhabitants of Maryland ⁶¹² are also entitled to all property derived to them from, or under the Charter granted by His Majesty Charles the First to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore. (b) The parties to any civil proceeding in which the right to a jury trial is preserved are entitled to a jury of at least 6 jurors. (c) That notwithstanding the Common Law of England, nothing in this Constitution prohibits trial by jury less than 12 jurors in any civil proceeding in which the right to a jury trial is preserved. Md. Const.

Declaration of Rights Art 5. Article 5(a) enumerates three bodies of law to which the people of Maryland are entitled: the English Common Law, the English statutes in effect as of July 4, 1776 that have been found useful by the local government and the courts, and the Acts of Assembly in force in 1867 that are not expired or rendered unconstitutional. In examining the plain meaning and structure of Article 5(a), it is apparent that the phrase “subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of the State” applies to those three collections of law. The clause applies to the English common law in particular because, as we have held, the common law described in Article 5(a) is “the common law in mass, as it existed here, either potentially, or practically, and as it prevailed in England at the time, except such portions of it as are inconsistent with the spirit of that instrument [the Declaration of Rights], and the nature of our new political institutions.” State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 358 (1821) (emphasis added).

The commas surrounding the words “,and the trial by Jury,” however, indicate that it should be viewed as a provision independent of the entitlement to the common law provision, although its language is a guarantee of its entitlement by the citizenry. Specifically, the use of the word “the” as opposed to “a” indicates that the phrase refers to the institution of “trial by jury” as opposed to merely a proceeding before a jury. As such, the clause permitting the legislature to alter the common law or statutes in effect cannot be interpreted as applying to the “trial by Jury” contained in Article 5(a), because the “trial ⁶¹³ by Jury” as an institution exists independent of the law governing its use. Prior opinions by this Court are consistent with this plain meaning interpretation.

We have invariably held that the provision concerning the jury trial denotes “the historical trial by jury, as it existed when the constitution of the state was first adopted.” Bryan v. State Roads Comm’n of the State Highway Admin., 356 Md. 4, 9 , 736 A.2d 1057, 1060 (1999), quoting Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Railway, 87 Md. 623, 624, 40 A. 890, 891 ; 9 Luppino, 336 Md. at 201 , 647 A.2d at 432 , quoting Houston v. Lloyd’s Consumar Acceptance Corp., 241 Md. 10, 20 , 215 A.2d 192, 198 (1965). We have indicated that the fundamental aspects of the jury trial are not subject to change by the General Assembly. See e.g., Bryan, 356 Md. at 9 , 736 A.2d at 1060 ; Knee, 87 Md. at 627 , 40 A. at 892 ; Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 542 , 530 A.2d 724, 729 (1987). These fundamental aspects include “the 12-man jury, the presence and superintendence of a judge having the power to instruct the jury on the law and to advise them upon the facts, and the unanimous verdict.” State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 563 , 375 A.2d 228, 231 (1977), citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 , 50 S.Ct. 253 , 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930).

The General Assembly itself has recognized this limitation on its power to alter the fundamental aspects of the common law jury trial when it proposed legislation permitting six member juries in civil . cases through ratification by constitutional amendment rather than by statute. See 1992 Md. Laws, Chap. 203 and 204; Bryan, 356 Md. at 9-14 , 736 A.2d at 1060-63 . ⁶¹⁴ The judicially created body of law known as the “common law,” however, is not insulated from alteration by the General Assembly. This Court has continually observed that “[although the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law, that law is subject to modification by legislative acts or by decisions of this Court.” Baltimore Sun Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 662 , 755 A.2d 1130, 1135 (2000); Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323 , 337 n. 10, 493 A.2d 1062 , 1069 n. 10 (1985) (“The common law rule may, within constitutional constraints, be changed or modified by legislative enactment or judicial decision where it is found to be a vestige of the past, no