Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Goodsell

Eldridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. ²⁸¹ The appellee, Vincent F. Goodsell, on June 6, 1978, filed a certificate of candidacy for the office of County Executive of Prince George’s County, Maryland. The appellant, the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Prince George’s County, refused to accept the certificate or place his name on the ballot, maintaining that he did not meet the qualifications for the office set forth in the County Charter. Goodsell then brought this action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County for a writ of mandamus. After a hearing, the court ordered that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the Board to accept Mr. Goodsell’s certificate of candidacy and to place his name on the ballot for the upcoming September 1978 primary election.

The Board took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Because of the importance of the matter and the need for expedition, we issued a writ of certiorari prior to a decision by the Court of Special Appeals. On July 28, 1978, we filed a per curiam order affirming the decision of the circuit court, and we now state our reasons. The issue in this case concerns § 405 of Art. IV of the Prince George’s County Charter, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he County Executive shall have been a qualified voter of Prince George’s County for at least five years immediately preceding his election.” (Emphasis supplied.) Mr. Goodsell became a resident of Prince George’s County on August 1, 1972, and has resided there continuously since, a period in excess of five years.

On April 23,1976, he registered to vote in Prince George’s County and has remained registered since that time. Thus, at the time he tried to file for office, he had been a registered voter of the county for just slightly more than two years. Goodsell had satisfied all other requirements relating to his eligibility as a candidate for County Executive. In the circuit court, the Board contended that Goodsell was not entitled to be a candidate for County Executive because he was not a “qualified voter” of Prince George’s County for the five years immediately preceding the election.

The Board’s position was that registration was one of the qualifications to vote, and that, therefore, one could not be ²⁸² a qualified voter for five years unless he had been a registered voter for five years. Goodsell, on the other hand, argued that there was a distinction between a qualified voter and a registered voter, and that a qualified voter was one who possessed the citizenship, age and residency qualifications to be entitled to register and vote. Alternatively, Goodsell argued that if the Prince George’s County Charter required that one be a registered voter for the five years immediately preceding the election, such requirement would deny him the equal protection of the laws. The circuit court, in deciding that Goodsell was entitled to be on the ballot, held that § 405 of the Prince George’s County Charter does not mean that a person must be a registered voter of the County for five years to be eligible to run for the office of County Executive.

The court stated that the purpose of registration is “to compile a list of qualified voters for the administrative purpose of avoiding last-minute confusion concerning who is qualified to vote. Thus, registration is not a prerequisite to one qualifying to vote; it is merely an administrative process which lists those voters who are already qualified to vote.” Because of the circuit court’s interpretation of Art. IV, § 405, of the Prince George’s County Charter, it was unnecessary for the court to discuss Goodsell’s alternate equal protection argument. In this Court, the parties make the same arguments as below. Thus, the appellant Board, relying upon various provisions of the Prince George’s County Charter, argues that the framers of the Charter intended that the phrase “qualified voter” in Art. IV, § 405, refers to a person who has the legal capacity to vote and has in fact been registered to vote for at least five years.

The Board further argues, relying upon cases upholding substantial residency requirements to be a candidate for public office, that a five year registration requirement does not deprive one in Goodsell’s position of the equal protection of the laws. The appellee Goodsell, on the other hand, in arguing that there is a distinction between a “qualified voter” and a “registered voter,” and that to be a qualified voter one need ²⁸³ not be registered, relies upon provisions of the Maryland Constitution and the State Election Code, Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 33. These provisions seem to indicate that registration is not one of the “qualifications” for voting but is a mechanism for evidencing which voters have the requisite qualifications. 1 In addition to these Maryland constitutional and statutory provisions, Goodsell relies upon cases in other jurisdictions in support of his argument that registration is not a qualification within the meaning of the phrase “qualified voter.” McComb v. Robelen, 13 Del.

Ch. 157 , 116 A. 745 (1922); Gilbert v. Breithaupt, 60 Nev. 162 , 104 P. 2d 183 (1940); Alston v. Mays, 152 N.J. Super. 509 , 378 A. 2d 72 (1977); In re Ray, 26 N.J. Misc. 56 , 56 A. 2d 761 (1947); In re Sullivan, 307 Pa. 221 , 160 A. 853 (1932); Hindman v. Boyd, 42 Wash. 17 , 84 P. 609, 613 (1906). But cf. Lane v. Henderson, 39 Ariz. 457 , 7 P. 2d 588 (1932); State ex rel. Burke v. Campbell, 542 S.W.2d 355, 357-358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Southerland v. Town of Goldsboro, 96 N. C. 49 , 1 S. E. 760 (1887); Defilipis v. Russell, 52 Wash. 2d 745 , 328 P. 2d 904 (1958).

Goodsell also reiterates his argument that, if the Prince George’s County Charter does require that a person be a registered voter for five years to be eligible to run for County Executive, such requirement unconstitutionally discriminates against residents of Prince George’s County who have not been registered to vote for five years. ²⁸⁴ (1) We assume, without deciding, that registration is not one of the qualifications to vote as the term “qualified voter” is generally interpreted, and that Art. I of the Maryland Constitution and § 3-4 of the Election Code reflect this general meaning. However, the issue in this case is not the meaning of the phrase “qualified voter” generally or the meaning of that phrase in some other context. The issue is what was the intent of those who framed and adopted the Prince George’s County Charter. It is true that, in the absence of any indication in the Charter that the language was being used in a special sense, we would assume that the phrase was intended to have its general meaning.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ins.

Com’r, 283 Md. 663, 670 , 392 A. 2d 1114, 1118 (1978); Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 598 , 380 A. 2d 1052 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 997 , 98 S. Ct. 1650 , 56 L.Ed.2d 86 (1978); Balto. Gas & Elect. Co. v. Board, 278 Md. 26, 31 , 358 A. 2d 241 (1976); Blue Cross v. Franklin Sq. Hosp., 277 Md. 93, 105 , 352 A. 2d 798 (1976); Bright v. Unsat.

C. & J. Fund Bd., 275 Md. 165, 169 , 338 A. 2d 248 (1975). Nevertheless, in our view, the provisions of the Prince George’s County Charter make it clear that the phrase “qualified voter” means one who, among other things, is registered to vote. The words “qualified voter” are used in different places in the County Charter. The meaning of the phrase is most clearly shown by Art. Ill, § 319, of the Charter.

It provides that, with certain exceptions, any law enacted pursuant to the Charter may, upon a petition containing the signatures of 10,000 “qualified voters,” be submitted to the electorate for referendum. The section goes on to state that “[a] minor variation in the signature of a petitioner between his signature on a petition and that on the voter registration records shall not invalidate the signature.” Obviously, this provision contemplated that “qualified voters” were those whose signatures were on the voter registration records. The next sentence of the section provides that the appellant Board of Supervisors of Elections should verify the qualifications of each petitioner. The only way in which the Board could verify the qualifications of 10,000 or more signatories would ²⁸⁵ be to check the signatures against the voter registration records.

But if one did not have to be registered to be a “qualified voter,” and thus eligible to sign a petition, it would be impossible for the Board to carry out its verification responsibilities. See Board of Supervisors Carroll Co. v. Smith, 111 U. S. 556, 565 , 4 S. Ct. 539 , 28 L. Ed. 517 (1884); Southerland v. Town of Goldsboro, supra. The referendum section also provides that “[i]f such a petition is filed, the law to be referred shall not take effect until thirty calendar days after its approval by a majority of the qualified voters of the County voting thereon at the next” regular election. In using the phrase “qualified voters,” the framers were likely referring to registered voters, as only registered voters would be “voting thereon” at the next election.

Article III, § 303, and Art. IV, § 403, of the Charter provide that members of the County Council and the County Executive “be nominated and elected by the qualified voters of the entire County....” However, under Art. I of the Maryland Constitution, no one may vote in any election unless that person is a registered voter. When the term “qualified voters” in the Charter is viewed in light of this constitutional requirement it would seem clear that under the Prince George’s County Charter, in order to be a qualified voter one must be registered. In sum, we agree with the appellant Board that the phrase “qualified voter” in the Prince George’s County Charter means one who possesses the present capacity to vote, and therefore he must be registered. Consequently, the provision in Art. IV, § 405, of the Charter, that the County Executive must be a “qualified voter” of the County for at least five years immediately preceding his election, includes a five year registration requirement.

We must, therefore, deal with Goodsell’s alternate argument that a five year registration requirement to be a candidate for County Executive unconstitutionally discriminates against those registered for a lesser period of time. ²⁸⁶ (2) The first step in dealing with a contention that a particular classification denies to members of one class the equal protection of the laws is to determine the appropriate standard for reviewing the classification. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 142 , 92 S. Ct. 849, 855 , 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); Wheeler v. State, supra, 281 Md. at 601-602 . The usual standard of judicial review is the so-called rational basis test, which involves a high degree of deference to the legislative judgment. Under it, a classification made by law is presumed to be reasonable; the person assailing it has a heavy burden of showing that it is essentially arbitrary; and “if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.” Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79 , 31 S. Ct. 337, 340 , 55 L. Ed. 369 (1911); Montgomery Co. v. Fields Road, 282 Md. 575, 579-580 , 386 A. 2d 344 (1978); Wheeler v. State, supra, 281 Md. at 602-603 , and cases there collected.

On the other hand, “[w]hen fundamental rights or a suspect class are involved, the classification must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny and must be justified by a compelling state interest.” Wheeler v. State, supra, 281 Md. at 601 . In the present case, the validity of the requirement that a candidate for Prince George’s County Executive be a registered voter for five years may well depend upon which standard of judicial review is appropriate. The appellant Board, citing Bullock v. Carter, supra, argues that “the pursuit of public office is [not] a fundamental right,” and that, therefore, the rational basis test is applicable here. The Court in Bullock did point out that it “has not heretofore attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.” 405 U. S. at 142-143 .

Nevertheless, the Bullock case does not support the Board’s argument that no fundamental right is implicated by the charter provision here at issue. In Bullock v. Carter, supra, several prospective candidates for local office in Texas brought an action to have a state statutory scheme, requiring very high filing fees in primary elections, declared invalid ²⁸⁷ under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although, as previously noted, the Court indicated that the right to run for public office is itself not a fundamental right, the Court went on ( 405 U. S. at 143 , emphasis supplied): “However, the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. Of course, not every limitation or incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of review----Texas does not place a condition on the exercise of the right to vote, nor does it quantitatively dilute votes that have been cast.

Rather, the Texas system creates barriers to candidate access to the primary ballot, thereby tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose. The existence of such barriers does not of itself compel close scrutiny.... In approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters." The Court then stated that the high filing fees give the Texas system an “exclusionary character,” that many potential office seekers would as a practical matter be precluded from running for office, that the effect on voters “is neither incidental nor remote,” and that the voters are “substantially limited in their choice of candidates.” Id. at 143-144 . Because of this impact upon voter choice, the Court concluded that the Texas filing requirements were subject to the same “close scrutiny” test which is applicable to laws placing barriers upon the right to vote.

Id. at 144 . See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 , 92 S. Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , 86 S. Ct. 1079 , 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966). Recently the United States Court