Bonilla v. State

ADKINS, J. In Maryland, “[a]n illegal sentence is a sentence ‘not permitted by law.’ ” State v. Wilkins, 398 Md. 269, 273 , 900 A.2d 765, 767-68 (2006) (citation omitted). Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(a), a “court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.” This Court has “held that a sentence that exceeds the sentence to which the parties agreed as part of a plea agreement is an illegal sentence within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a).” Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 , 575 n. 1, 7 A.3d 557 , 561 n. 1 (2010) (emphasis added) (citing Dotson v. State, 321 Md. 515, 521-22 , 583 A.2d 710, 713 (1991)). In this case, we consider whether a sentence is illegal under Rule 4-345(a) when a sentencing court imposes a sentence below the sentence agreed to in a binding plea agreement 1 without the State’s consent. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS In 1989, a Prince George’s County grand jury indicted Petitioner, Tommy Garcia Bonilla, on two counts of first degree murder and several other serious crimes.

Count I of the indictment charged Bonilla with the first degree murder of ⁴ Jose Lozano, and Count III charged Bonilla with the first degree murder of Ruth Vasquez. At an August 28, 1990 hearing in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Bonilla pleaded guilty to Counts I and III pursuant to a binding plea agreement with the State. 2 This agreement provided that Bonilla would, if called by the State, testify truthfully against one of his co-defendants, Freddy DeLeon, and would plead guilty to Counts I and III. In exchange, the State agreed that Bonilla would receive a sentence of life imprisonment on Count III with a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment, with all but 20 years suspended, on Count I. The State further agreed that it would withdraw its notice of intent to seek a sentence of life without the possibility of parole and would enter a nolle prosequi to the remaining counts in the indictment. This was presented to the judge as a proposed binding plea agreement.

After a proffer of facts by the State, 3 the hearing judge determined that Bonilla was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty and accepted his guilty pleas. The hearing judge then approved the plea agreement — stating on the record that he was “bound” by its terms — and postponed sentencing until after DeLeon’s trial. On February 20, 1991, having fulfilled his obligation to testify truthfully against DeLeon, Bonilla appeared before the ⁵ Circuit Court for sentencing. When outlining the sentencing terms of the plea agreement, defense counsel reversed the terms — incorrectly stating that the Parties agreed to a sentence of life imprisonment on Count I and a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment, "with all but 20 years suspended, on Count III.

The State did not recognize this error and agreed with the sentence presented by defense counsel. Consistent with the Parties’ representations, the court sentenced Bonilla to life imprisonment on Count I and a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment, with all but 20 years suspended, on Count III. Over two decades later, on November 7, 2011, Bonilla filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence and Motion for Credit Against Time Spent in Custody, arguing that his sentence on Count I was illegal because it “exceeded] the sentence agreed upon by the parties under the terms of the binding plea agreement.” In response, the State filed a Motion to Correct the Entire Sentence, contending that the sentences on Count I and Count III were illegal because they deviated from the binding plea agreement. On February 7, 2012, the Circuit Court issued a Memorandum and Order, concluding that the sentences on both counts were illegal and ordering a resentencing “in accordance with the original plea agreement.” At the resentencing hearing, the Circuit Court resentenced Bonilla to life imprisonment on Count III and a consecutive sentence of life imprisonment, with all but 20 years suspended, on Count I. Bonilla appealed.

In a reported opinion authored by Judge Salmon, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the sentencing court, agreeing that Bonilla’s original sentence on Count III was illegal because it was below the binding plea agreement. Bonilla v. State, 217 Md.App. 299 , 92 A.3d 595 (2014), cert, granted, 440 Md. 114 , 99 A.3d 778 (2014). Bonilla petitioned for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted to answer the following question: Did the Court of Special Appeals err by affirming the Circuit Court’s judgment that a sentence below a binding ⁶ plea agreement constitutes an illegal sentence [within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a) ]? Because we answer no, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the legal issue of the sentencing in this case as a matter of law. See Cuffley, 416 Md. at 581 , 7 A.3d at 564 (“Whether a trial court has violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law, which we review de novo.”); Blickenstaff v. State, 393 Md. 680, 683 , 904 A.2d 443, 445 (2006) (“We shall address the legal issue of the sentencing in the case at bar under a de novo standard of review.”). DISCUSSION Whether A Sentence Below A Binding Plea Agreement Is “Inherently Illegal” Within The Meaning Of Rule 4-345(a)? We begin by briefly defining what constitutes an illegal sentence under Rule 4-345(a).

For a sentence to be illegal within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a) “the illegality must inhere in the sentence itself, rather than stem from trial court error during the sentencing proceeding.” Matthews v. State, 424 Md. 503, 512 , 36 A.3d 499, 505 (2012). Accordingly, “we have denied relief pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) because the sentences imposed were not inherently illegal, despite some form of error or alleged injustice.” Id. at 513 , 36 A.3d at 505 (emphasis added). Bonilla argues that his original sentence on Count III was legal under Rule 4-345(a) because it was the product of an “error in pronouncement” and was not inherently illegal. The State, concurring there was error, disagrees that the sentence was legal, arguing that “any sentence imposed in violation of a binding plea agreement constitutes an inherently illegal sentence, whether a sentence exceeds or falls below the plea agreement.” To resolve this dispute, we turn first to Mary ⁷ land Rule 4 — 243(c)(3)—the Rule that governs a sentencing court’s obligations when imposing a sentence pursuant to a binding plea agreement.

Rule 4-243(c)(3) now provides, as it did in 1991 when Bonilla was first sentenced, that when “[a] plea agreement is approved, the judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition, or other judicial action encompassed in the agreement or, with the consent of the parties, a disposition more favorable to the defendant than that provided for in the agreement.” (Emphasis added.) In this case, Rule 4-243(c)(3) required the sentencing court to impose the sentencing terms in the binding plea agreement, and the Parties had agreed to a sentence of life imprisonment on Count III — not the lower sentence of life imprisonment, with all but 20 years suspended, that the sentencing court imposed. The State never consented to this lower sentence. 4 Because the Maryland Rules “have the force of law,” Dotson, 321 Md. at 523 , 583 A.2d at 714 (citation omitted), the sentencing court committed legal error when it deviated from the plea agreement by imposing a lower sentence on Count III. This does not end our inquiry, however, because in order to determine whether the original sentence on Count III was illegal under Rule 4-345(a), we must resolve whether the sentencing court’s error rendered the sentence inherently illegal. ⁸ In Dotson and Cuffley , we considered whether a sentence is inherently illegal within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a) when a sentencing court violates Rule 4-243(c)(3) by imposing a sentence that exceeds the binding plea agreement. In Dotson , the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual offense in the second degree, and the trial court, pursuant to a plea agreement that it approved, sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 15 years imprisonment for each conviction. 321 Md. at 519-20 , 583 A.2d at 712 .

The defendant moved for reconsideration of his sentence by a review panel. Id. at 520 , 583 A.2d at 712 . The panel vacated the trial court’s sentence and imposed a sentence of 15 years on each conviction to run consecutively rather than concurrently — thereby increasing the sentence from 15 to 30 years. Id. at 521 , 583 A.2d at 713 .

The defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence imposed by the review panel was illegal. Id. We agreed that the review panel’s sentence was illegal, emphasizing that Rule 4 — 243(c)(3) required the trial judge to sentence the defendant in accordance with the plea agreement: “When the judge accepted the pleas, the agreement as to punishment came into full bloom; it stood approved by the judge. Thereafter, the agreement was inviolate, and the judge was required under the dictate of Rule 4-243(c)(3) to embody in the judgment the agreed sentence.” Id. at 523 , 583 A.2d at 714 .

Because “[o]ur rules have the force of law,” we determined that Rule 4 — 243(c)(3) dictated that the 15-year sentence provided in the plea agreement was the maximum sentence “allowable by law.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, we reasoned, the review panel’s sentence was inherently illegal because it exceeded the plea agreement. 5 Id. at 524 , 583 A.2d at 714 . ⁹ Over a decade later, in Cuffley , we again considered whether a sentence that exceeds the terms of a binding plea agreement is illegal. Cuffley pleaded guilty to robbery pursuant to a plea agreement under which the State agreed to a guidelines sentence of four to eight years.

Cuffley, 416 Md. at 573-74 , 7 A.3d at 560 . After ensuring that Cuffley was knowingly and voluntarily entering the plea, the hearing court accepted the plea agreement pursuant to Rule 4-243(c) and bound itself to its terms. Id. at 574 , 7 A.3d at 560 . At the ensuing sentencing hearing, the court imposed a sentence of 15 years imprisonment with all but six years suspended.

Id. Cuffley filed a Rule 4-345(a) motion, contending that his sentence was illegal because it exceeded the maximum sentence of eight years to which the court had bound itself. Id. at 574-75 , 7 A.3d at 561 . The sentencing court denied the motion, concluding that it had discretion to suspend time, this discretionary power was “alluded to” at the plea hearing, and Cuffley “got exactly what he bargained for.” Id. at 576 , 7 A.3d at 561 .

We disagreed. After emphasizing that Rule 4-243(c)(3) “mandates that the court, upon accepting and approving the agreement, ‘shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence,’ ” id. at 581 , 7 A.3d at 565 (emphasis in original), we explained that “by its express terms, Rule 4-243 requires strict compliance with its provisions,” id. at 582 , 7 A.3d at 565 . We then applied Rule 4-243(c)(3) to Cuffley’s plea agreement to conclude that because the sentencing court “breached the agreement by imposing a sentence that exceeded a total of eight years’ incarceration[,] [t]he sentence [was] illegal.” Id. at 586 , 7 A.3d at 567 . Two years after Cuffley , in Mattheius v. State, we further elaborated on our conclusions in Cuffley .

We explained that “Cuffley adhered to our precedent limiting relief pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) to challenges to inherently illegal sentences.” Matthews, 424 Md. at 517 , 36 A.3d at 508 (emphasis added). We emphasized that because Cuffley’s sentence varied from ¹⁰ the sentence the court was required to impose pursuant to Rule 4-243(c)(3), “the sentence was not merely the product of procedural error; rather it was inherently illegal and thereby subject to correction under Rule 4-345(a).” Id. at 518 , 36 A.3d at 508 (emphasis added); see also id. at 517, 36 A.3d at 507 (“We viewed the illegality [of Cuffley’s sentence] as inhering in the sentence itself; the sentence, in other words, was not merely the product of procedural or trial court error.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). As Bonilla recognizes, the sentences this Court declared inherently illegal in Dotson and Cuffley exceeded the plea agreements. Neither our reasoning nor our holdings in those cases, however, suggest that striking a sentence as illegal can only occur when a sentence exceeds the terms of a binding plea agreement.

In both cases, we determined that the sentences were illegal because the sentencing courts violated Rule 4-243(c)(3) by deviating from the binding plea agreements. See Dotson, 321 Md. at 523 , 583 A.2d at 714 (“[T]he judge was required under the dictate of Rule 4-243(c)(3) to embody in the judgment the agreed sentence.”); Cuffley, 416 Md. at 581-82 , 7 A.3d at 565 (Rule 4-243(c)(3) mandates that after accepting a plea agreement, the court “shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence” and “Rule 4-243 requires strict compliance” (emphasis in original)). Chertkov v. State, 335