Meyer v. State State v. Rivera

GREENE, J. The issue before the Court is whether a trial court has the authority to restrict a defendant’s driving privileges as a condition of probation. In Matthew David Meyer v. State of Maryland, the appellant, Matthew David Meyer (“Meyer”), appealed from the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. He alleged that the special condition of probation that he not operate a motor vehicle in Maryland during the probationary term constituted an illegal sentence. In State of Maryland v. Helen C. Rivera, the respondent, Helen C. Rivera (“Rivera”), was convicted of two counts of second-degree assault and one count of failing to remain at the scene of an accident involving bodily injury.

For each of the three counts, Rivera was sentenced to six months, suspended, and was placed on probation before judgment for the two assault counts. The trial judge placed Rivera on a two-year probationary term and, as a condition of probation, prohibited her from operating a motor vehicle. Rivera appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the trial judge abused his discretion by imposing the no-driving condition of probation. 1 ⁶⁵⁶ The State of Maryland filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court in the case of Matthew David Meyer v. State of Maryland, 442 Md. 194 , 112 A.3d 373 (2015), as well as the companion case, State of Maryland v. Helen C. Rivera. We granted certiorari in both cases and consolidate them in this opinion to address the common questions of law and fact: 1.

Does a court have authority to restrict a defendant’s driving privileges as a condition of probation where (a) the defendant consents to the conditions, or (b) the crime for which probation is imposed is not a traffic offense subject to “a specific statutory scheme of regulation delegated to the executive branch,” such as DUI? 2. If Sheppard v. State, 344 Md. 143 [ 685 A.2d 1176 ] (1996), prohibits a court from restricting a probationer’s privilege to drive under the circumstances described above, should Sheppard be overruled? Because we believe that the Sheppard case was wrongly decided, we need not answer the first question. Accordingly, we answer the second question in the affirmative and overrule our decision in Sheppard .

In Meyer, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County denying the appellant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. In Rivera, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals holding that the no-driving condition of probation violated the separation of powers doctrine. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Matthew D. Meyer On or about the evening of October 23, 2002, Meyer turned eastbound on Mount Aetna Road in Washington County and began tailgating the vehicle in front of him. In order to pass the vehicle, Meyer sped up dramatically and crossed the double yellow line into the westbound lane.

The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour. After passing the vehicle, Meyer continued to drive eastbound in the westbound lane at ⁶⁵⁷ a minimum speed of 75 miles per hour and struck an oncoming Ford Ranger occupied by Gerald and Mary Dietrich. The collision caused the Dietrichs’ truck, traveling at a speed of about 24 miles per hour, to flip over on its side, skid in the reverse direction, and roll onto its roof about 40 feet from the site of impact. During the collision, Mr. Dietrich was ejected from his truck.

He was later transported to Washington County Hospital and pronounced dead. Mrs. Dietrich was trapped in the upside down truck and pronounced dead at the scene of the collision. Meyer was also trapped in his vehicle, but was successfully extracted and flown to Shock Trauma in Baltimore. He survived the collision.

At the time of this incident, Meyer had already amassed a series of traffic violations, 2 including an accident in May 2000 which left him paralyzed from the chest down. On November 19, 2003, Meyer pled nolo contendere 3 in the Circuit Count for Washington County to two counts of manslaughter by motor vehicle 4 (“vehicular manslaughter”). 5 As a result, the Circuit Court sentenced Meyer to a total of fourteen years of incar ⁶⁵⁸ ceration, seven of which were suspended, and imposed three years of unsupervised probation with a special condition. In pertinent part, Judge W. Kennedy Boone, III stated: [Meyer] will not be allowed to operate a motor vehicle, and I can only order in [ ] the State of Maryland, [that he not] operate a motor vehicle, obviously during the time of his confinement, [and] during the time of any probation. Now that’s always subject to show cause, or whatever, but I think that is appropriate.

Everything he’s done has been motor vehically [sic] related.... Meyer signed the Probation Order to indicate his consent to the condition that he “not be allowed to operate a motor vehicle in the State of Maryland.” On or about October 7, 2008, Meyer’s probation commenced following his release from prison. During the probationary period, on April 20, 2010, Meyer obtained a driver’s license from the Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”). About two months later, while still on probation, Meyer operated a motor vehicle traveling at a speed of 84 miles per hour in a 40 mile per hour zone.

The State Trooper who stopped the vehicle driven by Meyer issued him a citation for driving at an unreasonable speed. Again, on July 4, 2010, Meyer was stopped by a police officer for failing to use the headlamps while operating a motor vehicle. As a result of these traffic violations, Meyer was charged with violating the special condition of his earlier probation. At the violation of probation hearing on February 16, 2011, he admitted to driving in the State of Maryland and to the commission of the traffic violations.

Meyer, however, moved to dismiss the action, asserting for the first time that the condition of probation prohibiting him from driving in the State of Maryland, even though imposed in 2003, agreed to by him, and effective upon his release from prison in 2008, was illegal. On March 7, 2011, Judge Boone issued an Opinion and Order in response to Meyer’s motion to dismiss. The court determined that Meyer ⁶⁵⁹ violated his probation based on his admission of operating a motor vehicle in the State of Maryland. Judge Boone explained his decision: In the case at bar, the special condition imposed by the [e]ourt was made part of his probation order.

There was consent to the condition as evidenced by [Meyer’s] signature, and there was no appeal of the condition, or alleging the condition being plain error. In addition, the condition was clear and could be understood by all those who read it. The condition also seems proper when considering that [Meyer] became debilitated, both mentally and physically, due to driving at excessive speeds, and killing two people due to driving at excessive speeds, and after being released from prison he was apprehended for traveling at an excessive high rate of speed. Also the condition appears appropriate in the context of public safety and [Meyer’s] history of high speed moving violations and accidents.

The [c]ourt thought it best to restrict [Meyer’s] driving due to his constant disregard for human life and his lack of the mental wherewithal necessary to comprehend the dangerousness of his actions of high speed due to his diagnosed physical and neurological disabilities. The [c]ourt did not divest power from the MVA, nor forbid [Meyer] from following the proper and necessary MVA procedures to re-acquire an operator’s license from the MVA. The [c]ourt simply denied [Meyer] the right to drive within the State of Maryland to which [Meyer] acquiesced. After Judge Boone retired, Judge Daniel P. Dwyer of the Circuit Court for Washington County conducted the sentencing hearing on the violation of probation.

On May 18, 2011, Judge Dwyer sentenced Meyer to seven years of incarceration, three and a half years suspended, and placed him on two years of unsupervised probation with the condition that he obey all laws. 6 At the sentencing hearing, Judge Dwyer explained in part: ⁶⁶⁰ Judge Boone knew about your driving record.... He knew that you severely injured yourself a couple years before this tragic event. You injured yourself further Mr. Meyer from what I’ve read. More traumatic brain injury in the same accident that took the lives of Mr. and Mrs. Dietrich....

While it wasn’t an intentional killing, it was a wanton and willful disregard____And I believe Judge Boone was trying to fashion a sentence not so much to punish Mr. Meyer but to protect the public which I think [is] our number one sacred duty as judges is [sic] to try to prevent harm to the citizens of our country____ Taking the above into consideration, Judge Dwyer fashioned a sentence that would “give Mr. Meyer every incentive not to operate a motor vehicle again.” Approximately three years later, on April 18, 2014, Meyer filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(a). 7 Judge Dwyer denied this motion after a hearing on June 24, 2014 and explained his decision: I very much respect the Constitution, and I don’t want to tread on the province of the Executive Branch, who under the Motor Vehicle Administration rules decides who gets to drive and who doesn’t get to drive. The [ ] [c]ourt cannot issue an illegal sentence. I think that would be more akin to a sentence where the statutory maximum is a year in jail, and the defendant agrees and the judge sentences that defendant to two years in jail.... Mr. Meyer agreed to these conditions of probation in lieu of getting this full sentence imposed on him without any portion of it suspended.

He is now [ ] after violating that specific condition of ⁶⁶¹ probation by not only driving a motor vehicle, but I think the facts were speeding again, that he is estopped from complaining about it now____But I agree with the analysis that Judge Boone made. I do not find this to be an illegal sentence. On July 1, 2014, Meyer timely appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Pending the appeal and prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, we granted certiorari.

Matthew D. Meyer v. State of Maryland, 442 Md. 194 , 112 A.3d 373 (2015). B. Helen C. Rivera On June 3, 2013, Rivera was driving a black SUV northbound on Beach Drive in Bethesda, Maryland. As Rivera approached a group of bicyclists who were riding on the street, she began to drive aggressively. Upon passing the first bicyclist, Rivera swerved the SUV in the bicyclist’s direction and slammed on her brakes.

The bicyclist was able to avoid falling or colliding with the SUV. Rivera then repeated this behavior with a second bicyclist, using her SUV to physically push the bicyclist off the roadway. Rivera yelled, “There’s a bike path for people like you!” After being struck by the SUV, the second bicyclist fell to the ground, injuring his left rotator cuff and sustaining numerous abrasions. Instead of stopping, Rivera fled the scene and drove home.

On September 12, 2013, a Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted Rivera for criminal and traffic offenses: two counts of second-degree assault; one count of failure to remain at the scene of an accident involving bodily injury; one count of reckless driving; and one count of negligent driving. On February 4, 2014, during criminal proceedings in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a jury found Rivera guilty of two counts of second-degree assault under Md.Code (2002, 2012 RepLVol., 2015 Cum.Supp.), § 3-203 of the Criminal Law Article, and one count of failing to remain at the scene of an accident involving bodily injury under Md.Code (1977, 2012 RepLVol.), § 20-102(a) of the Transportation Arti ⁶⁶² ele. The State entered a nolle prosequi as to the reckless driving and negligent driving charges. On February 28, 2014, Judge Terrence J. McGann of the Circuit Court sentenced Rivera to six months, suspended, for each count of second-degree assault.

The sentencing judge, specific to the two counts of assault, granted Rivera’s motion to be placed on probation before judgment. For the one count of failure to remain at the scene, Rivera was sentenced to six months, suspended, to run concurrent to the sentence for the assault counts. The Circuit Court ordered a two-year period of probation, fined Rivera $350, and imposed a special condition of probation: Rivera was prohibited from driving a motor vehicle until “February 27, 2015 or until [the] Motor Vehicle Administration permits you[, Rivera,] to drive, whichever is later in time.” The sentencing judge elaborated: “So if [the] MVA says [ ] [you] can drive tomorrow [ ] [you] can’t drive for a year. If after a year[, however, the] MVA’s still got her suspended[,] she still can’t drive.... ” Rivera consented to the terms of probation and signed the probation order.

On July 29, 2015, the MVA held an administrative hearing and suspended Rivera’s license for thirty days. Rivera appealed the no-driving special condition of probation to the Court of Special Appeals, contending that the restriction on driving rendered her sentence illegal. 8 In an unreported opinion, our brethren on the Court of Special Appeals held that Sheppard was controlling and concluded that “the trial court abused its discretion in suspending Rivera’s driving privileges.... ” In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court reasoned that under the statutory scheme established by the General Assembly, the authority to ⁶⁶³ restrict driving privileges is delegated solely to the MVA, not the Judiciary. Further, the court held that the trial court had exceeded its authority by, in effect, revoking Rivera’s driver’s license because the no-driving special condition “significantly underminefs] the effectiveness of the legislatively-empowered MVA.” Rivera’s case was then remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to that court to vacate the no-driving condition of probation. We granted certiorari to address the issues raised in the State’s petition in State v. Helen C. Rivera, 442 Md. 194 , 112 A.3d 373 (2015). 9 STANDARD OF REVIEW First, whether the no-driving condition of Meyer’s sentence is an illegal sentence under Rule 4-345(a) is a question of law, which we will review de novo.

Bonilla v. State, 443 Md. 1, 6 , 115 A.3d 98, 100 (2015); see also Blickenstaff v. State, 393 Md. 680, 683 , 904 A.2d 443, 445 (2006). Second, because a “trial court does not have unlimited discretion to order conditions of probation,” we review Rivera’s no-driving condition of probation under an abuse of discretion standard. Bailey v. State, 355 Md. 287, 294 , 734 A.2d 684, 687 (1999). See Towers v. State, 92 Md.App. 183 , 607 A.2d 105 (1992) (striking a condition of probation that prohibited the defendant from working in a pharmacy without the court’s permission). ⁶⁶⁴ DISCUSSION Relying on our decision in Sheppard v. State, 344 Md. 143 , 685 A.2d 1176 (1996), Meyer argues that the no-driving condition of probation imposed by the trial court here is illegal because the court’s order encroached on the exclusive authority of the MVA.

He explains that even though he initially consented to the no-driving condition of probation, he cannot be convicted of violating the condition because one cannot consent to an illegal sentence. The State counters that this Court’s holding in Sheppard does not provide that a no-driving condition of probation is an illegal sentence nor does it prohibit a trial court from imposing a no-driving condition with a defendant’s consent. Instead, the State maintains, the Sheppard Court held that the trial judge abused his discretion by imposing as a condition of probation that the defendant not operate a motor vehicle, even if the MVA reinstated her driver’s license. Sheppard v. State, 344 Md. 143 , 685 A.2d 1176 (1996).

The State also argues that Sheppard is distinguishable because it applied a different standard of review—an abuse of discretion standard for a direct appeal from a no-driving condition—and did not address the effect of a defendant’s consent to a condition of probation. Because Sheppard does not control and a conviction for vehicular manslaughter is not subject to a “specific statutory scheme of regulation delegated to the executive branch,” the State concludes that this Court should hold that the no-driving condition of probation, which Meyer consented to, is reasonable and rational. In Rivera, the State initially argues that Sheppard is not controlling because it is a narrow opinion limited only to driving under the influence (“DUI”) offenses—an area heavily regulated by a “specific statutory scheme”—and is inapplicable because Rivera does not involve a DUI conviction. In the State’s view, the sentencing judge exercised his broad discretion to impose reasonable conditions of probation under the circumstances.

See Md.Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 6-221 of the Criminal Procedure Article (allowing trial courts to ⁶⁶⁵ impose terms the “court considers proper”). The State points out, however, that the discretion of a judge is not boundless. See Rule 4-345 (“The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.”); Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 532 , 671 A.2d 501, 505 (1996) (“A trial judge’s discretion is limited only by constitutional standards and statutory limits.”). Additionally, the State contends that the Court of Special Appeals, in the present case, failed to appreciate the distinction between a sentencing judge restricting a defendant’s ability to drive and a judge attempting to formally suspend or revoke a driver’s license.

Because the trial court in the instant case only imposed the former, the State contends that no separation of powers issue arises. Rivera, however, disagrees and asks this Court to affirm the ruling of the intermediate appellate court in concluding that the restriction on Rivera’s driving privilege was an abuse of discretion. Further, Rivera maintains that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in finding Sheppard to be controlling and, thus, a limitation on a judge’s discretion to impose conditions of probation. She posits that the Sheppard Court stated: The Transportation Article clearly and specifically sets the MVA administrative hearing procedures, suspension and revocation penalties, as well as manner of restoration of driving privileges for those convicted of driving under the influence.

This specific statutory scheme of regulation delegated to the executive branch controls over the general statute authorizing a court to impose conditions of probation. 344 Md. at 154 , 685 A.2d at 1181 . Rivera parallels her case with Sheppard , and presses this Court to hold that the MVA has the sole authority to restrict driving privileges. For support, Rivera also cites Md.Code (1977, 2012 RepLVol.), § 11-128 of the Transportation Article, which defines a “license” as the “privilege of any individual to drive a motor vehicle, whether or not that individual is formally licensed by this or any other jurisdiction.... ” Rivera further posits that the imposition of the no-driving condition is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because the Judiciary has en ⁶⁶⁶ croached on the powers of the MVA, an executive branch agency, which has the sole authority to restrict driving privileges. In sum, Rivera contends, “[w]hile the trial court may have wide discretion at sentencing, restricting the defendant’s driving privileges violates the Maryland Declaration of Rights and is therefore not within the trial court’s discretion.” Overruling Sheppard v. State In Sheppard v. State, the defendant was convicted of two counts of DUI under Md.Code (1977, 1992 RepLVol.), § 21-902(b) of the Transportation Article. 344 Md. 143, 144 , 685 A.2d 1176, 1176-77 (1996).

At sentencing, Sheppard received a suspended sentence and was placed on probation for three years. 10 Sheppard, 344 Md. at 145 , 685 A.2d at 1176 . As a special condition of probation, Sheppard was prohibited temporarily from operating a motor vehicle. Sheppard, 344 Md. at 145 , 685 A.2d at 1177 . Specifically, the judge stated, “I’m going to order [] [the defendant] to not operate a motor vehicle while on probation____Even if the [M]otor [V]ehicle [Administration gives you back your license, you cannot drive, because my order says you can’t.” Id.

The Sheppard Court granted certiorari to answer whether it was an abuse of discretion for the sentencing judge to impose the no-driving condition during the probationary period. Sheppard v. State, 341 Md. 719 , 672 A.2d 659 (1996). Relying on preemption and separation of powers grounds, the Court held that it was an abuse of discretion because the General Assembly conferred the power to suspend and rein ⁶⁶⁷ state driving privileges to the MVA, an Executive branch administrative agency. Sheppard, 344 Md. at 148 , 685 A.2d at 1178 .

The Court inferred that the enactment of the Transportation Article 11 is evidence of the legislative intent to preempt the Judiciary from imposing a no-driving condition. The Sheppard Court explained that only the Executive branch, by way of its administrative agency, had the power to “govern[ ] driver’s license suspension, revocation and reinstatement.” Sheppard, 344 Md. at 149 , 685 A.2d at 1179 . The act of imposing a no-driving condition of probation, therefore, violated the separation of powers doctrine, because the Judiciary was impermissibly encroaching on an area of law reserved for the Executive branch. Sheppard, 344 Md. at 154 , 685 A.2d at 1181 .

In error, this Court drew support for its holding by analogizing the facts in Sheppard with those in Towers v. State, 92 Md.App. 183 , 607 A.2d 105 (1992), and holding that a similar “very detailed statutory scheme” limited the broad discretion of a sentencing judge’s ability to fashion conditions of probation. Sheppard, 344 Md. at 149 , 685 A.2d at 1179 . The Sheppard Court explained: “By analogy [with Towers v. State], in the instant case, the legislature has left the decision to suspend one’s driving privileges to the MVA and not to the Circuit Court for Worcester County.” 344 Md. at 148 , 685 A.2d at 1178 . The Sheppard Court misconstrued Towers and, therefore, wrongly decided the case before it.

Towers , as we shall discuss below, is an “outlier” case, because, traditionally, when a member of the judiciary imposes a condition of probation, the probation order is specific to the regulation of the defendant’s conduct and does not interfere with the authority of ⁶⁶⁸ another branch of government. Unlike Towers , the facts in Sheppard did not evidence a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. No direct challenge to the licensing authority existed. The no-driving condition itself did not usurp the authority of the MVA nor did the judge attempt to order the MVA to suspend Sheppard’s driver’s license.

Simply put, the no-driving condition did not invalidate the driver’s license. Critically, the sentencing judge sought only to restrict the defendant’s physical ability to drive, which is different than a court ordering the formal suspension of one’s driver’s license. Consequently, the Sheppard Court should have decided the case solely on abuse of discretion grounds, and not on separation of powers grounds. The Sheppard Court erred in holding that the enactment of the Transportation Article preempted the Judiciary from imposing the no-driving condition.

Although the Transportation Article confers power on the MVA to regulate the issuance of driver’s licenses as well as suspensions, revocations and reinstatements, the language of the statutory scheme does not suggest or expressly restrict the broad discretion of a sentencing judge to place restrictions on one’s driving privileges as a condition of probation. As such, the Sheppard Court erred by implying legislative intent to curtail the power of the Judiciary in this area. The Executive branch and the Judiciary have shared authority to regulate driving privileges, but only the Executive branch has the authority to issue, suspend, revoke and reinstate a driver’s license. The Judiciary, however, has the discretion, where appropriate, to restrict a defendant’s standard of conduct, which includes prohibiting one’s ability to operate a motor vehicle as a condition of probation.

The Sheppard Court clearly overlooked the shared authority of the two branches in this instance. Both the Executive branch and the Judiciary may make decisions that adversely affect one’s driving privileges, however, the manner in which each branch may do so, as explained above, differs. In addition, we overrule Sheppard because its rationale grounded in the separation of powers doctrine was clearly ⁶⁶⁹ wrong. “Stare decisis means ‘to stand by the thing decided,’ and is ‘the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’” State v. Waine, 444 Md. 692, 699-700 , 122 A.3d 294, 298 (2015), reconsideration denied (Oct. 15, 2015) (citing Livesay v. Baltimore Cnty., 384 Md. 1, 14 , 862 A.2d 33 (2004)). “Our devotion to stare decisis ... is not absolute.” State v. Stachowski, 440 Md. 504, 520 , 103 A.3d 618, 627 (2014). “We have recognized two circumstances when it is appropriate for this Court to overrule its own precedent. First, this Court may strike down a decision that is, ‘clearly wrong and contrary to established principles.’ ” DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 416 Md. 46, 64 , 5 A.3d 45, 55 (2010) (quoting State v. Adams, 406 Md. 240, 259 , 958 A.2d 295, 307 (2008)). “[I]t is sometimes advisable to correct a decision or decisions wrongly made in the first instance, if it is found that the decision is clearly wrong and contrary to other established principles.” Townsend v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, 186 Md. 406, 417 , 47 A.2d 365, 370 (1946).

We may also depart from stare decisis when “there is a showing that the precedent has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts.” DRD Pool Serv., Inc. v. Freed, 416 Md. at 64 , 5 A.3d at 56 (citing Livesay v. Baltimore Cty., 384 Md. at 15 , 862 A.2d at 41 (2004)). See Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 467-68 , 830 A.2d 450, 454 (2003) (abrogating the interspousal immunity doctrine because it “is an antiquated rule of law which ... runs counter to prevailing societal norms”). We overrule Sheppard and disavow its extensive emphasis on the effect of the “specific statutory scheme of regulation.” 12 That discussion was superfluous, because the ⁶⁷⁰ facts failed to demonstrate that the Judiciary was challenging the licensing authority of the Executive branch. The validity of the no-driving condition of probation should have been decided solely on abuse of discretion grounds. “When imposing probation conditions, ‘[a] judge is vested with very broad discretion ... [in order] to best accomplish the objectives of sentencing—punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation[,]’ and is ‘limited only by constitutional standards and statutory limits.’ ” Henson v. State, 212 Md.App. 314, 327 , 69 A.3d 26 , 34 cert. denied, 434 Md. 314 , 75 A.3d 319 (2013) (quoting Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 531-532 , 671 A.2d 501 (1996)). “[A] condition of probation must not be vague, indefinite or uncertain.” Smith v. State, 306 Md. 1, 7 , 506 A.2d 1165, 1168 (1986).

The sentencing judge prohibited Sheppard from driving a motor vehicle in Maryland throughout her three-year probationary period. Today, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to impose as a special condition that a criminal defendant convicted of two counts of DUI, who had previously demonstrated she was a danger to public safety ⁶⁷¹ when operating a motor vehicle, may not drive during the period of her probation. Towers v. State and the Separation of Powers Doctrine Towers v. State is distinguishable from Sheppard because Towers involved an impermissible direct challenge to the validity of a licensing authority—a clear violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 92 Md.App. 183 , 607 A.2d 105 (1992). There, the sentencing judge expressly undermined the authority of the State Board of Pharmacy, an administrative agency established by the Legislature and responsible for regulating the pharmaceutical profession, by prohibiting the pharmacist-defendant from working in a pharmacy without the court’s permission even if the State Board of Pharmacy reinstated his pharmacy license. 13 It is without question the province of the State Board of Pharmacy to regulate the practice of the pharmaceutical profession, including the licensing of pharmacists and enforcing pharmacy practice standards.

The probation condition was an intentional disregard of the explicit role of the State Board of Pharmacy because the sentencing judge, in effect, placed the judiciary in a position superior to that of the Executive branch, even though the General Assembly had clearly carved out a very specific role for the administrative agency in that circumstance. Sheppard lacked this confrontation between two branches of government. There, the no-driving condition did not interfere with or undermine the licensing authority of the MVA, but, rather, only regulated Sheppard’s standard of conduct in a reasonable manner for the duration of the probationary period. The stark contrast between the conditions of probation between Sheppard and Towers is illuminated by the relationship of two principles, which normally operate harmoniously ⁶⁷² and in unison: (1) the broad discretion of a trial judge to sentence a criminal defendant, including fashioning reasonable conditions of probation, and (2) the elasticity of the separation of powers doctrine.

In overruling Sheppard and applying the abuse of discretion standard, these two concepts operate concurrently and allow the Judiciary to impose no-driving conditions of probation where appropriate. In Towers , however, the principles are adversarial to one another, which is why the intermediate appellate court held the condition violated the separations of powers doctrine. To further understand the interrelationship of these principles, it is necessary to examine the underpinnings of the separation of powers doctrine. The constitutional principle of separation of powers is integral to our tripartite system of government.

In Maryland, this doctrine is embodied in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 14 The doctrine does not, however, rigidly establish strict lines of demarcation between the three branches of government. “Since the beginning of our constitutional democracy, this Court has recognized that the respective powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are not ‘wholly separate and unmixed.’ ” McCulloch v. Glendening, 347 Md. 272, 283-84 , 701 A.2d 99, 104 (1997) (citing Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463, 476 (1829)). “Art. 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights does not impose ‘a complete separation between the branches of government.’ ” Judy v. Schaefer, 331 Md. 239, 261 , 627 A.2d 1039, 1050 (1993) (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 81 , 532 A.2d 1056, 1064 (1987)). In the past, we have addressed the flexibility of this doctrine as applied to administrative agencies: In response to the practical needs of government, not only has there been an extensive introduction of these administrative agencies in this State, ... but in addition, as a ⁶⁷³ consequence of this need, there has occurred within these agencies some mingling, blending and overlapping of the legislative, executive and judicial functions. We believe this to be permissible, within limits, as the separation of powers concept may constitutionally encompass a sensible degree of elasticity and should not be applied with doctrinaire rigor. Dep’t of Nat.

Res. v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 220 , 334 A.2d 514, 521 (1975). The doctrine’s flexibility accounts for the complexities of our tripartite system; however, the elasticity of the doctrine is not without limits: [T]his constitutional “elasticity” cannot be stretched to a point where, in effect, there no longer exists a separation of governmental power, as the Maryland Constitution does not permit a merger of the three branches of our State government, nor does it “make any one of the three departments subordinate to the other, when exercising the trust committed to it.” Id. In Maryland, we have applied this “sensible degree of elasticity” when alleged violations of the separation of powers doctrine occurred. There have been clear examples of the doctrine’s flexibility being stretched beyond its limits.

Such was the case in Towers v. State, where, as explained above, the Court of Special Appeals held the sentencing judge encroached upon an area reserved to the Executive branch. 92 Md.App. 183 , 607 A.2d 105 (1992). Leopold v. State is another example of the Judiciary overstepping its bounds and invading the province of another branch of government. 216 Md.App. 586 , 88 A.3d 860 (2014). In Leopold, the defendant was a public official who had been convicted of two counts of misconduct in office. The sentencing judge abused his discretion when he imposed a special condition of probation that prohibited the defendant from running as a “candidate for any local, state, or federal elected office.” Leopold, 216 Md.App. at 590 , 88 A.3d at 862 .

The condition itself challenged the validity of a statutory scheme in place—the Election Law Article and the Maryland Constitu ⁶⁷⁴ tion—which regulate the eligibility and removal of public officials in Maryland. The Court of Special Appeals held that the special condition violated the separation of powers doctrine, because even though the defendant was “qualified and eligible to run for office” pursuant to that statutory scheme, the Judiciary was interfering with this process by creating additional barriers to prevent the defendant from pursuing candidacy for public office. Leopold, 216 Md.App. at 611 , 88 A.3d at 874 . Again, Sheppard is distinguishable from Leopold because Sheppard did not challenge the authority of the MVA to issue, suspend, revoke or reinstate driving privileges.

In fact, the sentencing judge did not attempt to prohibit Sheppard from pursuing the reinstatement of her driver’s license if the MVA decided to suspend it. The condition simply restricted Sheppard’s physical ability to operate a motor vehicle. In contrast to Towers and Leopold, we have also recognized shared authority between the branches: “some mingling, blending and overlapping of the legislative, executive and judicial functions.” Linchester, 274 Md. at 220 , 334 A.2d at 521 . “Our own cases have never interpreted the separation of powers doctrine embedded in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as imposing a complete separation between the branches of government.” Armacost, 311 Md. at 81 , 532 A.2d at 1064 . See Armacost, 311 Md. at 75 , 532 A.2d at 1061 (holding no separation of powers violation occurred where the Legislature enacted the Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program, and delegated legislative authority to the MVA and the Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene); McCulloch v. Glendening, 347 Md. 272 , 701 A.2d 99 (1997) (holding the Governor acted within his discretionary power and did not usurp legislative authority in issuing an executive order that granted limited collective bargaining rights to Executive branch employees).

This shared authority is also present in the facts in Sheppard, which is why we overrule that holding. In fashioning conditions of probation, the Judiciary may impose reasonable conditions of probation where appropriate to curtail a criminal-defendant’s physical ability to ⁶⁷⁵ operate a motor vehicle. A criminal defendant may be “regulated by the standard of conduct imposed by the sentencing judge.... ” Hudgins v. State, 292 Md. 342, 348 , 438 A.2d 928, 931 (1982). A no-driving condition does not ordinarily subordinate the authority vested in the MVA by the Legislature, because it reflects the concurrent and harmonious relationship between the two principles discussed above: (1) the broad discretion of a judge to sentence a criminal defendant and (2) the elasticity of the separation of powers doctrine.

This overlap of shared authority is present in Sheppard, Meyer and Rivera. For example, in these cases, the Judiciary did not purport to authorize driving privileges for an individual who had been denied these privileges by the MVA. Conversely, the sentencing judges imposed restrictions on the ability to operate a motor vehicle in the State of Maryland, even if the MVA had issued a driver’s license. This imposition of restrictions on the ability to operate a motor vehicle during the probationary term is analogous to the imposition of a mandatory incarceration that is the length of the probationary term.

In Maryland, when the General Assembly has placed limits on the court’s sentencing authority, it has done so explicitly. 15 Here, there is nothing to indicate in the Transportation Article a legislative intent to limit the court’s broad authority to impose a no-driving condition of probation. The general principles of statutory interpretation are well established, as our goal is to identify and effectuate the