Kazadi v. State

Tshibangu Kazadi v. State of Maryland, No. 11, September Term, 2019 VOIR DIRE – FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS – PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE – BURDEN OF PROOF – RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY – STARE DECISIS – SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN LAW AND FACTS – DISCOVERY – CROSS- EXAMINATION – IMMIGRATION STATUS – In 1964, fifty-five years ago, in Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100 , 198 A.2d 291, 293 (1964), Court of Appeals held that voir dire questions concerning jury instructions were not appropriate. Thus, voir dire questions concerning jurors’ ability and willingness to follow jury instructions on fundamental principles of presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and defendant’s right to remain silent were not permitted. Given opportunity to review this issue and upon thorough consideration of recent developments—most importantly, Court’s subsequent holdings in Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 179-80 , 423 A.2d 558, 565 (1980) and Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 91 , 437 A.2d 654, 658 (1981), that instructions as to law are binding and not advisory only—Court determined that holding in Twining is based on outdated reasoning and has been superseded by significant changes in law. As such, to extent that Court held in Twining that it is inappropriate to ask on voir dire questions concerning presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and defendant’s right to remain silent, Court overruled that holding and concluded that, on request, during voir dire, trial court must ask whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with jury instructions on fundamental principles of presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and defendant’s right not to testify.

Court also held that, absent additional circumstances—such as allegations of quid pro quo or leniency in immigration case—State’s witness’s status as undocumented immigrant, or person subject to deportation order, does not show character of witness for untruthfulness or demonstrate motive to testify falsely. Without more, State’s witness’s status as undocumented immigrant, or person subject to deportation order, is not required to be disclosed by prosecutor during discovery and is not proper subject of cross-examination. Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 116042016 Argued: October 7, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 11 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ TSHIBANGU KAZADI v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Wilner, Alan M. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. McDonald, Hotten, and Getty, JJ., dissent in part. ______________________________________ Filed: January 24, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

Suzanne Johnson 2020-06-18 11:27-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This case presents another in a series of questions about the voir dire process in Maryland. In recent years, this Court has addressed matters concerning the proper form of voir dire questions and whether certain questions, when requested, are mandatory. See Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 354 , 86 A.3d 1232, 1234 (2014); Collins v. State, 463 Md. 372, 379 , 205 A.3d 1012, 1015-16 (2019). In this case, we must decide whether, upon request, a trial court must ask voir dire questions concerning a prospective juror’s ability to follow jury instructions on the long-standing fundamental principles of the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and a defendant’s right to remain silent.

Fifty-five years ago, in Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97, 100 , 198 A.2d 291, 293 (1964), this Court held that a trial court need not ask during voir dire whether any prospective jurors would be unwilling to follow jury instructions on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof. In the decades between then and now, this Court has never before expressly addressed whether Twining remains good law. In this case, for the first time, we are explicitly asked to reexamine Twining. And, as another matter, we must also determine whether, during discovery, a prosecutor must disclose immigration-related information concerning a State’s witness who is an undocumented immigrant, and whether a defendant may cross-examine such a witness concerning his or her immigration status.

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the State, Respondent, charged Tshibangu Kazadi, Petitioner, with first-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence or felony, and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. Kazadi requested that the circuit court ask during voir dire whether any prospective jurors were unwilling or unable to follow jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify. The circuit court declined to do so. Before trial, Kazadi filed a motion to compel the State to disclose the Alien Registration Number,1 immigration case number, and immigration-related paperwork of one of the State’s witnesses, S.L., who, according to Kazadi, was an undocumented immigrant subject to a deportation order and who, along with her son, M.L.,2 were allegedly attempting to avoid complying with the deportation order.

The State filed an opposition to the motion to compel and a motion in limine to preclude Kazadi from cross- examination about S.L.’s immigration status. The circuit court denied the motion to compel and granted the State’s motion in limine. After being convicted, Kazadi appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Kazadi filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted.

Upon careful consideration of developments that have occurred in the fifty-five years since this Court decided Twining, 234 Md. 97 , 198 A.2d 291—including this Court’s subsequent holdings that, other than with respect to the crime charged, jury instructions are binding, see Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 179-80 , 423 A.2d 558, 565 (1980), and 1 An Alien Registration Number—also known as an Alien Number, A-Number, or A#—is “[a] unique seven-, eight-[,] or nine-digit number [that is] assigned to a noncitizen by the [United States] Department of Homeland Security.” United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Glossary, https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary [https://perma.cc/ 4J4A-NZKM]. 2 Like the Court of Special Appeals, we refer to S.L. and M.L. by their initials. The Court of Special Appeals referred to one of the witnesses as “S.L.H.”; we refer to her as “S.L.” because, after the circuit court asked her how she preferred to be addressed, she responded: “[S.L.]” -2- Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 91 , 437 A.2d 654, 658 (1981)—we determine that this Court’s holding as to voir dire questions in Twining is based on outdated reasoning and has been superseded by significant changes in the law. To the extent that this Court held in Twining that it is inappropriate to ask on voir dire questions concerning the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and a defendant’s right to remain silent, we overrule the holding in Twining, and conclude that, on request, during voir dire, a trial court must ask whether any prospective jurors are unwilling or unable to comply with the jury instructions on the fundamental principles of presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify. We also hold that, absent additional circumstances—such as evidence of a quid pro quo arrangement or allegations of leniency in an immigration case—a State’s witness’s status as an undocumented immigrant, or the existence of a deportation order applicable to the witness, do not show the character of the witness for untruthfulness or demonstrate a motive to testify falsely.

Without more, a State’s witness’s status as an undocumented immigrant, or any deportation order to which the witness is subject, are not required to be disclosed by a prosecutor during discovery, and are not proper subjects of cross- examination. BACKGROUND Voir Dire On January 17, 2017, jury selection occurred. On that date, Kazadi’s counsel provided the circuit court with a document that was entitled “Defendant’s Proposed Voir Dire[,]” and that included the following questions: -3- The Court will instruct you that the State has the burden of proving the Defendant guilty of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Are there any of you who would be unable to follow and apply the Court’s instructions on reasonable doubt in this case?

Is there any member of the [] jury panel who would hesitate to render a verdict of not guilty if you had hunch that the Defendant had committed the alleged crime, but were not convinced of that fact beyond reasonable doubt? The Court will instruct you that the Defendant is presumed of be innocent of the offenses charged throughout the trial unless and until the Defendant is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Is there any member of the jury panel who would be unable to give the Defendant the benefit of the presumption of innocence? Under the law[,] the Defendant has an absolute right to remain silent and to refuse to testify.

No adverse inference or inference of guilt[] may be drawn from the refusal to testify. Does any prospective juror believe that the Defendant has duty or responsibility to testify[,] or that the Defendant must be guilty merely because the Defendant may refuse to testify? (Numbers omitted). Kazadi’s counsel requested that the circuit court ask the four questions during voir dire.

The circuit court declined, stating: “Those are covered adequately in the instruction portion of the case and I think are covered in other questions that [I] ask.” During voir dire, after asking questions of the jury panel, the circuit court asked counsel whether there were any objections. Kazadi’s counsel stated that he wanted the circuit court to ask the questions in his proposed voir dire that the court had declined to give. The circuit court responded: “[Y]ou’ve preserved your objection[.]” Motion to Compel, Motion in Limine, and Motion to Suppress On December 8, 2016, Kazadi filed a “Motion to Compel Discovery.” (Some capitalization omitted). In the motion to compel, Kazadi advised that one of the State’s witnesses, S.L., had provided a statement in which she said “that she was hesitant to come -4- forward with information because she was worried about an outstanding deportation order[.]” Kazadi’s counsel requested from the prosecutor, but was not provided, S.L.’s Alien Registration Number, “her immigration case number, and any paperwork [that] she ha[d] regarding her immigration status, including a copy of the deportation order[.]” Kazadi’s counsel met with S.L. and the prosecutor, who instructed S.L. not to disclose her Alien Registration Number or answer any questions about the deportation order.

Kazadi contended that the deportation order gave S.L. and her son, M.L., a motive to testify against Kazadi, in that their testimony could make them eligible for relief from deportation. Kazadi argued that S.L.’s and M.L.’s alleged noncompliance with the deportation order demonstrated a character trait of untruthfulness. On December 22, 2016, the State filed an Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Discovery and State’s Motion In Limine. The State contended that it was not obligated to comply with the discovery requests for immigration-related information because the State had not promised S.L. that she would receive special treatment in exchange for her cooperation.

The State argued that Kazadi had provided no evidence that S.L. was attempting to evade the deportation order. The State asserted that Kazadi’s “speculation should not serve as a basis for a fishing expedition into [S.L.’s] immigration status[.]” Addressing the motion in limine, the State requested that the circuit court preclude Kazadi from cross-examining S.L. about her immigration status. The State contended that information about a witness’s immigration status is admissible only where there is a connection between the witness’s immigration status and a motive to fabricate testimony. -5- The State argued that S.L. had no such motive as she had no connection to the murder, apart from being a witness who decided to come forward with material information. On January 13, 2017, the circuit court issued a “Memorandum and Discovery Order[,]” denying the motion to compel and reserving on the motion in limine for a ruling by the circuit court judge who would preside over the trial.

(Some capitalization omitted). The circuit court concluded that, without a showing by Kazadi of some “special relationship” between S.L. and the State as to immigration, or a promise, inducement, or benefit that the State extended concerning immigration, Kazadi failed to show a basis to compel disclosure of the requested information. The circuit court noted that Kazadi had not identified any promise or inducement that the State extended to S.L. or M.L. in connection with S.L.’s immigration status. The circuit court explained that, seemingly, Kazadi wanted to attempt to confirm the information that S.L. had provided with some hope that it might develop into a credibility issue.

Before the start of trial, the circuit court conducted a hearing on a motion to suppress any in-court identification of Kazadi by S.L. or M.L. At the hearing, S.L. and M.L. testified through an interpreter. Neither S.L. nor M.L. testified concerning any immigration-related matters. S.L. testified that she did not expect any benefit in exchange for testifying, and that, apart from requesting and receiving moving expenses and rent for a new home, she had neither requested nor received any benefits from the Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City. M.L. testified that he had not thought that he or his relatives would receive any benefit in exchange for speaking to law enforcement officers. -6- After S.L. and M.L. testified, the circuit court denied the motion to suppress.

Before the circuit court heard argument on the motion in limine, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: I’ve not heard anything from [S.L. and M.L.] indicating to me that there is an immigration issue that would have been factor in them testifying. But[,] obviously[,] if you have an argument to make on that point[,] I would love to hear it. [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: Okay. THE COURT: And let me tell you, I have significant concern about -- and we have no idea how this jury’s going to react -- there is some level of hostility in some circles in our society to people who are perceived as being here illegally. Whether that is valid or not valid, I don’t want to be in situation where we prejudice a jury by raising an issue [that] may not be germane to the case.

Obviously[,] if it is germane to the case, if they’ve been promised to stay in the U.S. indefinitely while they were, you know, in exchange for testimony[,] that obviously is a very valid factor[,] and in which case the prejudice is something that would not be outweighed. But I’m open to hear whatever you may have to say about that. Kazadi’s counsel stated that law enforcement officers had interviewed S.L., who said that one of the reasons why she did not come forward sooner was that she was subject to a deportation order. The circuit court asked whether there was any evidence of “quid pro quo for immigration status.” Kazadi’s counsel responded that S.L.’s social worker told her that the Baltimore Police Department would not enforce the deportation order.

The prosecutor and the circuit court observed that there had not been any testimony to that effect. The following exchanges occurred: THE COURT: [U]nless you have something more concrete about her immigration status[,] I am really concerned about putting into the record possibly that [S.L.] is an illegal immigrant -- an undocumented alien, if you will[,] or that [M.L.] is[,] given the fact that there is, as I say, among circles in our society[,] strong bias, prejudice, in fact, even among people [whom] I know socially[,] against people who are undocumented aliens. And I don’t want to -- I think [that] it’s legitimate to pursue areas of legitimate inquiry -7- on cross[-]examination. [Kazadi] has a right to that[,] and that’s your obligation. But[,] by the same token[,] I don’t want to get into areas that I think are going to shed more heat than light.

This is one. So unless you can make a proffer to me, let’s say tomorrow[,] when [S.L.] comes on to testify[ at trial,] that you’ve got something that would constitute something -- quid pro quo on the immigration status[,] I’m uncomfortable with letting that in. I truly am. *** [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: [T]here’s a difference between having a deportation order and being an illegal immigrant because there are many legal immigrants or legal visitors to this country who could be ordered deported. I mean, and then they become -- they kind of -- THE COURT: They become illegal if they overstay. [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: Far -- THE COURT: Well, even the, you know, you’re, again, I mean, the -- you’ve raised another aspect of this, okay.

So[,] that may be true[,] but that doesn’t help much either because[,] why do you get deported? People who know -- who follow these things will know [that] one of the reasons [why] you get deported is you’re found guilty of a crime of some type. And you know that there’s significant limitations on the ability to use history of [prior] bad acts for impeachment. And we don’t know that anything that [S.L.] did, if there was something [that] she did, and we don’t know what she may have done, we don’t know that any of that has anything to do with honesty or a likelihood to lie on the stand.

And there’s no evidence of the quid pro quo. So she’s being asked to leave because, you know, she was picked up for, you know, possession of heroin, let’s say. Yeah, that’s a bad thing, but that’s not an impeachable offense, basically. So that would also concern me a little bit, that, you know, I don’t want to -- I mean, I think you have a right, obviously, to question these witnesses as to what they saw[,] and when they saw it[,] and the circumstances[,] and all that.

And[,] if they have a motive to bias, I would -- sure. You know, if you were going to argue that it’s -- this is the result of neighborhood feud[,] and not a result of the witness of a crime, I mean, sure, that’s fine. But I really am uncomfortable with the notion that we’re going to put into the record the existence of deportation order[,] or the suggestion of a quid pro quo[,] without some stronger evidence that that is[,] in fact[,] the case because I think [that] there’s an impermissible level of prejudice that could result from her if that were to happen. -8- [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: I guess I would have two responses. One, I think [that] the act of evading a deportation order is itself evidence of deceit[,] much like -- analogous to the way that the Court of Appeals has said drug dealers necessarily are surreptitious[,] and that’s -- THE COURT: Boy, I sure don’t buy the notion that a family who comes to America to try to make something of themselves[,] and get their kids in school[,] is equivalent to a drug dealer. [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: No, I -- that’s not -- THE COURT: I mean, I’m not saying it’s legal, but I’m saying, boy, it -- the one is really understandable[,] and the one really is a pox on the community. [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: Well, I would say [that] I’m -- it’s not just that they came here illegally.

It’s that they were told to leave[,] and didn’t. And I think [that] that’s what makes it different. THE COURT: Well, it may be under, you know, I mean, again, if there’s an appeal[,] and if they’re -- I mean, it just -- I just, you know, we’re not going to do an immigration trial here in this court as part of this criminal case. And again, as I said, think that this is one of those circumstances in which the equities think really militate against allowing that particular thing to become an issue in [this] case.

Now, if it turns out that you can come up with something that makes it more than a speculation that there’s a quid pro quo, and obviously that’s legitimate. But[,] I’m not hearing it. And[,] unless you come up with something [that] you can show me out of the hearing of the jury to indicate that there is more to this than just a notion, I just think [that] it would be unfairly prejudicial to [S.L.] At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court granted the motion in limine, and stated: “As I said, if you discover something that is relevant and that is concrete, I am open to changing my mind. Based on what I know at this moment, however[, t]hat’s my ruling.” S.L.’s and M.L.’s Trial Testimony3 and Verdicts On January 18, 2017, at trial, as a witness for the State, through an interpreter, S.L. 3 Because the other State’s witnesses’ trial testimony is not relevant to the issues that are before this Court, we summarize only S.L.’s and M.L.’s trial testimony. -9- testified that, in August 2015, she and her son, M.L., lived in Baltimore City near Kazadi.

On August 18, 2015, S.L. sent M.L. outside of their house to retrieve trashcans. While M.L. was outside, S.L. heard four or five gunshots. S.L. went outside and saw M.L. running toward her. M.L. said that “the guy had killed someone.” S.L. saw Kazadi hide a gun and run into his basement.

S.L. looked in the alley and saw a man who had been shot. Kazadi’s mother and sister, who lived with him, came out of their house and spoke to S.L., who told them that she had seen Kazadi shoot the victim. Law enforcement officers came to S.L.’s house, but she did not speak with them because she was afraid. The prosecutor asked S.L. why she was afraid.

S.L. responded: “Because they realized that we had said that [Kazadi] was the one [who] had killed [the victim].” For months, S.L. continued to live near Kazadi. On January 19, 2016, S.L. spoke to a detective, and identified Kazadi as the person who “killed the [victim]” in a photographic array. After S.L.’s direct-examination, at a bench conference, the prosecutor stated that there had been “no additional evidence . . . with regards to the immigration issue.” Kazadi’s counsel disagreed, contending that, although S.L. had testified that she did not come forward sooner because she was afraid of Kazadi, she had previously told law enforcement officers that she did not come forward sooner because of “fear of immigration[.]” The following exchanges occurred: THE COURT: I ruled yesterday, and I really am concerned about this[.] I don’t want to get this jury upset with [S.L.] possibly being here without documents. And I just really am concerned about that.

What I will allow you to do is ask [whether] she gave a different reason. So she said she was - - what did she say? She was afraid of being deported. [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: Yes, because she has an outstanding -- - 10 - [THE PROSECUTOR]: She said she[] was scared. And then[,] when they sort of flushed it out[,] that’s when the additional part of the documentation issue came out.

But she had initially indicated that she was scared for her safety and the safety of her children. So that is consistent. THE COURT: Mm-hmm. [THE PROSECUTOR]: I obviously didn’t go any further because of the Court’s order. THE COURT: No, I know.

So[,] if you go in[,] you’re trying to prove what, that she’s lying? [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: Right. Well, one, I don’t -- one, when she was given a chance to say why she was afraid, one, she didn’t say because she felt threatened. And, two, because she said something else. Because[,] right now[,] the jury thinks that [Kazadi]’s family was threatening her the entire time.

THE COURT: I know they certainly -- well, I don’t know if they thin[k] -- [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: Or could[.] I don’t know if they think that. Correct. THE COURT: I mean, yeah. I think[ that] she didn’t say that they were threatening her, what she said was[: “]I lived next door to the guy [whom] I was going to finger.[”] So they can assume that that probably is not a good thing to do.

Not a safe thing to do. It’s a good thing to do. Well[,] I don’t know how one does that and avoid[s] bringing up the fact that she possibly is undocumented. And I really am uncomfortable having that come out.

I’m really absolutely uncomfortable, particularly when there’s no indication[,] and she specifically testified[, that] she got no quid pro quo, [and] you have no concrete evidence that there was a quid pro quo. And the inconsistency[,] I don’t think[,] is material[,] qui[te] honestly. I’m not going to permit it[,] and if I’m wrong[,] I’m wrong. But -- [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: So I can’t get into it at all?

Not even like[,] she gave a different reason? THE COURT: I would allow that, but I want to keep a tight rein on this[,] as I said. And the reason is, quite honestly, there is an atmosphere of intolerance out there about people who are here in an undocumented capacity, who are - 11 - illegal. And[,] some people[,] it doesn’t make a big difference to.

I don’t honestly think it goes to credibility[,] particularly. And I don’t want to have a jury be prejudiced against [S.L.] Yeah, I’m going to allow you to ask if there’s an inconsistent reason. If you get into the question of immigration[,] then [the prosecutor] will object[,] and I will likely sustain it. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Okay. [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: All right. THE COURT: If you feel that there’s an inconsistent reason, you can ask[: “Y]ou didn’t blame it on the family[?”] I think that’s a legitimate issue for you to explore.

I don’t have a problem with that. [THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, my concern is that [Kazadi’s c]ounsel will follow up with [--] is that other inconsistent reason [--] the fact that, you know, you have deportation order. You can’t unring that bell. THE COURT: Well, you’re not going to do that. [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: I figured [that] I couldn’t do that. THE COURT: Yeah, thank -- [KAZADI’S COUNSEL]: I mean, I would like to do that, but I’m assuming that the order was that I could not do that.

THE COURT: Yeah[.] During S.L.’s cross-examination, the following exchanges occurred: [KAZADI’S COUNSEL: W]hen you talked to [the police] in January, they asked you why you didn’t come forward initially. [S.L.:] Because I was scared. [KAZADI’S COUNSEL:] Okay. And I’m going to ask you this question very carefully. But[,] at the time[,] you didn’t tell the police that you were scared of [] Kazadi or his family[. Y]ou told them [that] you were scared of something else, correct? [S.L.:] Yes. - 12 - *** [KAZADI’S COUNSEL:] The other thing that you’re scared of is not connected to [] Kazadi or his family? [S.L.:] I said -- I said both.

I said why I was worried. *** [KAZADI’S COUNSEL:] You remember talking to the police and it being recorded in January, right? Now[,] I’m going to show you something that I had prepared about what you said. . . . [T]his is the part where you’re talking to the police about what you’re afraid of. . . . [Y]ou talk about the other thing, not [] Kazadi or his family, correct? [S.L.:] I repeat again, I spoke about both. I was afraid of his family and something else. [KAZADI’S COUNSEL:] Okay. I guess [--] why don’t you just read the next page.

And[,] at that point[,] you still just continue to talk about something else[,] and not [] Kazadi or his family? [S.L.:] Yes, I said that. As a witness for the State, through an interpreter, M.L. testified that, on August 18, 2015, he retrieved trashcans that were behind his house. As M.L. was walking back to his house, he heard a gunshot. M.L. turned and saw Kazadi and another man in the alley.

Kazadi was holding a revolver. The other man said: “[C]hill.” Kazadi shot the other man two or three times, then ran toward the back of his house. M.L. saw his mother, S.L., at the back door of their house and told her what he had seen. M.L. did not speak to law enforcement officers that night because he was “afraid” and “in shock.” Eventually, however, M.L. spoke to detectives, and identified Kazadi as the shooter in a photographic array.

During M.L.’s cross-examination, Kazadi’s counsel requested a bench conference, - 13 - which the circuit court granted. At the bench conference, Kazadi’s counsel stated that he wanted to ask “immigration-related questions,” but he was not going to do so “based on the Court’s earlier order.” The circuit court responded: “[T]he questions are ruled out as far as the immigration question.” The State entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining charge of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. The jury found Kazadi not guilty of first-degree murder, but guilty of second-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals Kazadi appealed.

On February 4, 2019, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Kazadi’s convictions. See Kazadi v. State, 240 Md. App. 156, 162 , 201 A.3d 618, 622 (2019). The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to ask voir dire questions concerning jury instructions. See id. at 164 , 201 A.3d at 623 .

The Court of Special Appeals concluded “that Twining is still controlling” because, “[c]ontrary to [Kazadi]’s contention, the Court of Appeals has affirmed the continuing vitality of Twining[.]” Kazadi, 240 Md. App. at 168 , 201 A.3d at 625 . The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel. See id. at 183 , 201 A.3d at 634 . The Court of Special Appeals determined that, “[a]bsent any evidence of an immigration-related quid pro quo indicating a bias or motive to testify falsely, [the motion to compel] amounted to a fishing expedition for information that would not be admissible to impeach [S.L.]” Id. at 183 , 201 A.3d at 634 .

The Court of Special Appeals noted that there was no link between the deportation order or S.L.’s and M.L.’s immigration status and their identification of - 14 - Kazadi as the killer. See id. at 183 , 201 A.3d at 634 . The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in precluding cross-examination of S.L. and M.L. about their immigration statuses. See id. at 188 , 201 A.3d at 637 .

The Court of Special Appeals explained: From the initial written pleadings, to the pretrial suppression hearing, to the trial, this record is devoid of any evidence that S.L.[] or M.L. received or expected an immigration-related benefit as a result of either their [pretrial] identification[s] of [Kazadi] or their testimony against him. . . . To the contrary, the prosecutor insisted [that] she had never discussed immigration status with S.L.[] At the suppression hearing before trial, S.L.[] testified that the only benefit [that] she received was relocation expenses, which were not tied to the family’s immigration status. She maintained that she did not expect any benefit for coming forward to identify [Kazadi] or testify against him. Her trial testimony was consistent on that point.

Absent any link between [S.L.’s and M.L.’s] immigration status and their credibility, the [circuit] court did not abuse its discretion in foreclosing cross-examination of S.L.[] and M.L. about immigration matters. Significantly, the [circuit] court’s ruling only disallowed cross-examination about immigration status, without preventing [Kazadi’s] counsel from asking whether S.L.[] hoped to receive any other benefit from her testimony, such as relocation expenses. Accordingly, [Kazadi]’s concern that S.L.[]’s testimony was influenced by her immigration status was simply speculative, and evidence of her immigration status – if relevant at all to her bias and partiality – would have had very little probative value. As alternative grounds for affirming the [circuit] court’s decision to restrict cross-examination, we hold that the [circuit] court did not abuse its discretion in ruling, pursuant to [Maryland] Rule 5-403, that questioning S.L.[] and M.L. about their immigration status and/or the deportation order would unfairly prejudice the jury by introducing the possibility of invidious discrimination on the basis of alienage.

As the [circuit] court emphasized, such evidence had a significant potential both to prejudice jurors against the [State’s] witnesses and to confuse jurors by injecting unrelated immigration issues involving mere bystanders into this murder trial against [Kazadi]. Id. at 186-87 , 201 A.3d at 636-37 (cleaned up). Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari On March 12, 2019, on his own behalf, Kazadi petitioned for a writ of certiorari. - 15 - On March 26, 2019, on Kazadi’s behalf, his appellate counsel petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the following three issues: 1. Is a criminal defendant entitled, upon request, to voir dire questions aimed at identifying prospective jurors who are unable or unwilling to apply the principles that the State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is presumed innocent[,] that the defendant has the right to remain silent and refuse to testify[,] and that no adverse inference may be drawn from the defendant’s silence? 2.

Where a critical State’s witness reveals pretrial that she and her minor son (also a witness) are subject to a deportation order, must the State provide in discovery the witness’s Alien [Registration] Number and a copy of the deportation order so that defense counsel may identify potential impeachment evidence as described in Maryland Rules 5-608[](b) and 5- 616[](a)[](4)? 3. Where defense counsel has a good-faith basis to believe that critical State’s witnesses are the subject of a deportation order, is defense counsel entitled to cross-examine those witnesses about their immigration issues pursuant to Maryland Rules 5-608[](b) and 5-616[](a)[](4), the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution[,] and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights? (Footnote omitted). On April 25, 2019, on his own behalf, Kazadi supplemented the petition that he had filed.

On May 14, 2019, this Court granted the petition that Kazadi’s appellate counsel had filed, and denied the petition and supplement that Kazadi had filed on his own behalf. See Kazadi v. State, 463 Md. 637 , 207 A.3d 1215 (2019). DISCUSSION I. Voir Dire The Parties’ Contentions Kazadi contends that, on request, a defendant is entitled to voir dire questions concerning prospective jurors’ willingness and ability to follow jury instructions on the - 16 - presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify. Kazadi argues that a prospective juror who is unwilling or unable to honor these fundamental rights has a bias or misconception that constitutes a specific cause for disqualification.

Kazadi asserts that there is no valid reason why voir dire questions concerning these three fundamental principles should continue to be considered inappropriate in Maryland. Kazadi maintains that contrary to this Court’s holding in Twining, voir dire is the most appropriate time to question prospective jurors as to whether they would be able or willing to follow jury instructions regarding the State’s burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the defendant’s right to remain silent. Kazadi essentially maintains that Twining should be overruled. The State responds that we should decline to overrule this Court’s holding in Twining, under which trial courts are not required to ask voir dire questions concerning jury instructions.

The State contends that Kazadi has not shown that Twining is subject to an exception to the doctrine of stare decisis. The State argues that Twining was not clearly wrong and contrary to established principles because, in Twining, this Court followed the lead of the majority of courts in other jurisdictions. The State asserts that Twining has not been superseded by significant changes in the law or the facts because this Court recently reaffirmed its holding in State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378 , 906 A.2d 374 (2006) and Stewart v. State, 399 Md. 146 , 923 A.2d 44 (2007). Standard of Review “An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision as to whether to ask a voir dire question.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 356 , 86 A.3d at 1235 (citation - 17 - omitted).

Maryland Case Law on Jury Instructions, Voir Dire, and Stare Decisis Since 1851, the Constitution of Maryland has included the following language: “In the trial of all criminal cases, the jury shall be the judges of law as well as fact.” See Stevenson, 289 Md. at 173 & n.3, 423 A.2d at 561 & n.3.4 For more than a century after 1851, it was common practice for trial courts to instruct jurors that they were the judges of both the law and the facts, and that the jury instructions were “advisory only.” For example, in Vogel v. State, 163 Md. 267, 269 , 162 A. 705, 705 (1932), a trial court instructed a jury: “Under the laws of Maryland[,] you are judge[s] of the law and of the evidence in a criminal case. Any instruction to you by the Court as to the law is, therefore, advisory only and not binding on you.” (Cleaned up). In 1964, with “advisory only” jury instructions being the common practice, in Twining, 234 Md. at 100 , 198 A.2d at 293 , this Court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining a defendant’s request to ask during voir dire whether the prospective jurors “would give the [defendant] the benefit of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.” This Court reasoned: The rules of law [that were] stated in the proposed questions were fully and fairly covered in subsequent instructions to the jury. It is generally recognized that it is inappropriate to instruct on the law [during voir dire], or to question the [prospective jurors] as to whether or not they would be 4 This language was in Article X, Section 5 of the Constitution of Maryland of 1851; Article XII, Section 4 of the Constitution of Maryland of 1864; and, initially, Article XV, Section 5 of the Constitution of Maryland of 1867.

See Stevenson, 289 Md. at 173 & n.3, 423 A.2d at 561 & n.3. In 1978, this language was recodified in Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights within the Constitution of Maryland of 1867, see id. at 173 n.3, 423 A.2d at 561 n.3, where it remains today. - 18 - disposed to follow or apply stated rules of law. See 50 C.J.S. Juries § 275(2). This would seem to be particularly true in Maryland, where the [jury] instructions are only advisory.

Id. at 100, 198 A.2d at 293 . Sixteen years after deciding Twining, in Stevenson, 289 Md. at 169, 189 , 423 A.2d at 559, 570 , this Court held that, although on its face, the language “[i]n the trial of all criminal cases, the jury shall be the judges of law as well as fact”—which, by then, was in Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights—did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, case law demonstrated that Article 23 did not grant a jury “the power to decide all matters that may be correctly included under the generic label ‘law.’ Rather, [a jury’s] authority is limited to deciding the law of the crime, or the definition of the crime, as well as the legal effect of the evidence before the jury.” Id. at 178 , 423 A.2d at 564 (cleaned up). This Court observed: “Implicit in the decisions of this Court limiting the jury’s judicial role to the law of the crime is a recognition that all other legal issues are for the [trial court] alone to decide.” Id. at 179 , 423 A.2d at 565 (cleaned up). This Court cautioned that a trial court must make clear to a jury that, other than the law of the crime, “all other aspects of law (e.g., the burden of proof, the requirement of unanimity, the validity of a statute) are beyond the jury’s pale, and that the [jury instruction]s on these matters are binding upon that body.” Id. at 180 , 423 A.2d at 565 .

The following year, in Montgomery, 292 Md. at 91 , 437 A.2d at 658 , this Court held that a trial court erred in instructing a jury that it “could pay no attention to instructions on the law [that] did not pertain to the elements of the crime[,] but which were standard - 19 - instructions [that were] invoked to preserve the integrity of the judicial system and to assure the defendant a fair and impartial trial.” In Montgomery, id. at 90 , 437 A.2d at 657 , the trial court had stated: “I, therefore, instruct you in an advisory capacity that[,] in any criminal case you will sit on[,] the law places the burden on the State of Maryland to prove that a defendant is guilty beyond what we call a reasonable doubt.” (Ellipsis omitted). This Court observed that fundamental rights, such as the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the right not to testify, “are not the law of the crime; they are not advisory; and they cannot be the subject of debate by counsel before the jury. They are binding. They are the guidelines of due process to which every jury is required to adhere.” Id. at 91 , 437 A.2d at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Before today, this Court mentioned Twining by name in only one case—Logan, 394 Md. at 399-400 , 906 A.2d at 386-87 . In Logan, id. at 398 , 906 A.2d at 386 , this Court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining a defendant’s request to ask voir dire questions concerning the defense of not criminally responsible. One of the requested voir dire questions was: “If the defendant satisfies his burden in this regard, will any member of the jury be unable to find the defendant not criminally responsible?” Id. at 398 , 906 A.2d at 386 . This Court determined that this voir dire question “amount[ed] to a solicitation of whether prospective jurors would follow the [jury] instructions. . . .

This practice is generally disfavored in Maryland[.]” Id. at 398-99 , 906 A.2d at 386 (citing Twining, 234 Md. at 100 , 198 A.2d at 293 ). Another requested voir dire question was: “Does any juror anticipate having difficulty following the [jury] instructions on the defense of ‘not criminally responsible,’ particularly in view of the crimes charged in the - 20 - indictment?” Logan, 394 Md. at 399 , 906 A.2d at 387 . This Court determined that this voir dire question was also unnecessary, explaining: “As we made clear in Twining, 234 Md. at 100 , 198 A.2d at 293 , voir dire is not the appropriate time for the trial [court] to instruct the jury on the law [that is] applicable to the case.” Logan, 394 Md. at 399-400 , 906 A.2d at 387 . The following year, in Stewart v. State, 399 Md. 146, 165, 153 , 923 A.2d 44, 55, 48 (2007), relying on Logan, this Court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to ask during voir dire whether any prospective jurors would treat the indictment as evidence of guilt, or whether any prospective jurors had “any quarrel with” the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.

This Court reasoned that the voir dire questions “addressed matters of law, and[,] as such, were not the proper subject of voir dire.” Id. at 165 , 923 A.2d at 55 . This Court stated: “[Q]uestions asking whether prospective jurors would follow the [jury] instructions . . . are disfavored in Maryland[,] and a court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to ask them.” Id. at 162-63 , 923 A.2d at 53 -54 (citing Logan, 394 Md. at 399 , 906 A.2d at 386 ). In multiple cases, relying on Twining, 234 Md. at 100 , 198 A.2d at 293 , the Court of Special Appeals has held that trial courts did not abuse their discretion in declining to ask during voir dire whether the prospective jurors understood certain legal principles. As one example, in Scott v. State, 49 Md. App. 70, 74 , 430 A.2d 615, 618 (1981), without specifying the voir dire questions at issue, the Court of Special Appeals held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to ask voir dire questions that were aimed at “whether the prospective jurors would apply proper legal principles.” And, in Baker v. - 21 - State, 157 Md. App. 600, 618 , 853 A.2d 796, 806 (2004) and Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95, 141, 144 , 882 A.2d 900, 927, 929 , cert. denied, 390 Md. 91 , 887 A.2d 656 (2005), the Court of Special Appeals observed: “[I]t is up to the Court of Appeals, not this Court, to decide, as [the defendant] suggest[ed], that the reasoning of Twining is ‘now outmoded.’” The doctrine of stare decisis frames the issue of whether this Court should overrule its holding as to voir dire in Twining.

Under the doctrine of stare decisis—Latin for “to stand by things [that are] decided”—generally, “a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.” Stare Decisis, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). That said, “stare decisis is not absolute.” Meyer v. State, 445 Md. 648, 669 , 128 A.3d 147, 159 (2015) (cleaned up). Under two exceptions to stare decisis, an appellate court may overrule a case that either was “clearly wrong and contrary to established principles[, or] has been superseded by significant changes in the law or [the] facts.” Wallace v. State, 452 Md. 558, 582 , 158 A.3d 521, 535 (2017) (cleaned up). The second exception to stare decisis applies “where changed conditions or increased knowledge have rendered the appellate court’s precedent unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, and no longer suitable to the people.” Id. at 582 , 158 A.3d at 535 (cleaned up).

Other Jurisdictions’ Laws on Voir Dire Questions Concerning Fundamental Rights Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the question of whether, on request, during voir dire, a trial court must ask the prospective jurors whether they are willing and able to follow the jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, - 22 - and/or the defendant’s right not to testify. In 2005, in Hayes v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 574, 586 (Ky. 2005), the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendants’ “counsel to ascertain during voir dire whether any of the prospective jurors would hold against them the fact that they exercised their [] privilege not to testify[.]” The Court explained: If any [prospective] jurors . . . had expressed [] a prejudice[ against defendants who do not testify], the trial court would have been required to strike those [prospective] jurors for cause. But how could defense counsel identify [prospective] jurors [who were] holding such prejudice if defense counsel is precluded from making the relevant inquiry on voir dire? By limiting the voir dire to exclude any inquiry into that issue . . . , the trial court prevented them from identifying any [prospective] jurors [who were] so prejudiced[,] and thereby precluded the exercise of possible challenges for cause[.] Id. at 585 .

In People v. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d 1062, 1063-64 (Ill. 1984), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a trial court erred in declining to ask during voir dire whether the prospective jurors understood the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant’s right not to testify. The Court explained: [E]ssential to the qualification of jurors in a criminal case is that they know that a defendant is presumed innocent, that he [or she] is not required to offer any evidence [o]n his [or her] own behalf, that he [or she] must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his [or her] failure to testify [o]n his [or her] own behalf cannot be held against him[ or her]. If a juror has a prejudice against any of these basic guarantees, a[ jury] instruction [that is] given at the end of the trial will have little curative effect. It is also vital to the selection of a fair and impartial jury that a juror who finds that the State has failed to sustain its burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt have no prejudices against returning a verdict of not guilty. . . . [E]ach of [the] questions [that the defendant requested] goes to the heart of a particular - 23 - bias or prejudice which would deprive [the] defendant of his right to a fair and impartial jury[.] Id. at 1064 (cleaned up).5 In State v. Cere, 480 A.2d 195, 198 (N.H. 1984), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that, “in all future criminal trials,” the following voir dire questions were required to be asked: Do you believe that because the defendant has been charged with a crime, he (she) is probably guilty and therefore must present evidence to prove that he (she) is innocent?

If you have such a belief, would that belief prevent you from accepting from this court and applying to this case the correct formulation of law; that is, that a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty, that the State has the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the defendant need present no evidence whatsoever on his own behalf? The Court explained that multiple sources indicate[d] a shockingly widespread ignorance of those valued precepts [that are] most central to our American system of criminal justice[—]a defendant’s presumption of innocence and the government’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of this apparently widespread misinformation about those precious protections [that are] afforded by our legal system, we are compelled to take action [] to ensure, as 5 After deciding Zehr, 469 N.E.2d 1062 , the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted an amendment to an Illinois rule that codified the Court’s holding in Zehr. See IL R S CT Rule 431 cmt.

Today, IL R S CT Rule 431(b) states in pertinent part: The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in a group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that if a defendant does not testify it cannot be held against him or her; however, no inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant’s decision not to testify when the defendant objects. - 24 - much as possible, that those persons [who are] serving as jurors are aware of, understand, and can implement those constitutional requirements relating to the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. Id. In State v. Hayes, 364 So.2d 923, 925, 924 (La. 1978), the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that a trial court erred in sustaining a prosecutor’s objection to the following question, which a defendant’s counsel asked during voir dire: “[D]o any of you feel that you want to hear [the defendant’s] side of the story?” Immediately before that, the defendant’s counsel had told the prospective jurors: “[T]he defendant is not required to take the witness stand in his own behalf[,] and we will tell you[,] and the [trial court] will tell you in the [jury instructions], that you can’t hold this against him.” Id. at 924 . On appeal, the defendant contended “that the defendant’s right to silence is a difficult one for the jurors to understand because it goes against a natural desire to hear all sides of a story, and that some jurors might have difficulty according the presumption of innocence to the silent defendant.” Id.

The Court explained that “unjustified restrictions on voir dire concerning the presumption of innocence [cannot be] cured by a general [jury] instruction that the jurors must follow the law as given to them by the [trial] court.” Id. (citation omitted). In State v. Clement, 2 S.W.3d 156, 158-59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999), the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a trial court erred in declining to ask during voir dire whether any prospective jurors would draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s decision not to testify.

The Court observed that “one specific and critical area of bias and prejudice [that] a [defendant] has a right to uncover during [] voir dire [] is whether a prospective juror will - 25 - be prejudiced based on [the] defendant’s [decision not] to testify.” Id. at 159 . The Court explained: “[I]f a criminal defendant is to be able to effectively exercise his or her right not to be compelled to testify at trial, then he or she must be able to inquire of the [prospective juror]s whether they will draw an adverse inference if defendant [decides not] to testify.” Id. at 159-60 (citations omitted). In State v. Lumumba, 601 A.2d 1178, 1189 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1992), the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey held that, during voir dire, “[a]t the least, the [prospective jurors] must be asked whether they understand the basic principles of presumption of innocence and [that] the indictment [is not evidence,] and whether they can abide by these principles.” The Court agreed with the defendant that, in that case, “voir dire did not result in an impartial jury because the trial court . . . did not probe [the prospective jurors] as to their understanding of basic principles [that are] applicable to criminal trials and their ability to abide thereby.” Id. at 1187 .6 6 In State v. Moore, 585 A.2d 864, 877 (N.J. 1991), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, in that case, voir dire “was sufficiently probing to assure that [the] defendant received a fair trial by an impartial jury”; however, the Court “offer[ed] comments for guidance in future capital trials.” Addressing voir dire questions concerning the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, the Court stated: Would it not be anomalous in the extreme to allow extensive death- qualification of [prospective] jurors before trial to make sure that they can follow and apply the State’s system of capital punishment, yet not to allow defendants a brief, if not cursory, inquiry into [prospective] jurors’ attitudes about other fundamentals of the system, such as the presumption of innocence?

Perhaps the general orientation of a [jury] panel [] will suffice to convey the essentials, with [prospective] jurors being asked if they have any reservations about their duties as jurors. In the alternative, [trial] courts can administer either a questionnaire or brief inquiry of [prospective] jurors - 26 - In Jones v. State, 378 So.2d 797, 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), a District Court of Appeal of Florida stated that, during voir dire, counsel must be permitted to inquire of prospective jurors concerning their willingness and ability to accept the [jury instructions] in a criminal case concerning the presumption of innocence, the [S]tate’s burden of proof in respect to each element of the offense charged, and the defendant’s right not to testify, if the court has not first thoroughly examined the prospective jurors on those subjects.

Consistent with the above-discussed case law from other States, in United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 1973), the Sixth Circuit held that a trial court abused its discretion in declining to ask during voir dire whether the prospective jurors “could accept the proposition[s] of law that a defendant is presumed to be innocent, has no burden to establish his [or her] innocence, and is clothed throughout the trial with this presumption.” The Sixth Circuit explained: “Certainly, a challenge for cause would be sustained if a [prospective] juror expressed his [or her] incapacity to accept the proposition that a defendant is presumed to be innocent despite the fact that he [or she] has been accused in an indictment or information.” Id. Subsequently, in United States v. Hill, 738 F.2d 152, 155, 153 (6th Cir. 1984), the Sixth Circuit held that a trial court abused its discretion in declining to ask during voir dire questions concerning the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. The Sixth Circuit observed that, if the trial court had asked asking them if they can agree and accept the principles of law as the [trial] court will state them, including that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty and that the State has the defined burden of proving the defendant's guilt. Id. at 882. - 27 - the prospective jurors “whether they could accord the defendants the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt[, a] negative answer[,] or even a hesitant one[,] from any prospective juror would surely have produced a defense challenge” for cause.

Id. at 153. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, other United States Courts of Appeals have determined that, during voir dire, a trial court need not comply with a request to ask the prospective jurors whether they are willing and able to follow jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and/or the defendant’s right not to testify. See United States v. Sherman, 551 F.3d 45, 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1967); Jacobs v. Redman, 616 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Robinson, 804 F.2d 280, 281 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Rodriguez, 993 F.2d 1170, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1325 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Cosby, 529 F.2d 143, 148 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978); Grandsinger v. United States, 332 F.2d 80, 81 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v. Miller, 758 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Consistent with these federal cases, in People v. Lambo, 154 N.W.2d 583, 585, 584 (Mich.

Ct. App. 1967), the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to ask during voir dire whether any prospective jurors would treat the defendant’s decision not to testify as evidence of guilt. The Court reasoned that certain voir dire questions that the trial court asked rendered unnecessary the one that the defendant requested, but acknowledged that, in other States, “[o]ne of the preferred methods is to have the [trial] court briefly outline the rules of law [that are] covered in the - 28 - [v]oir dire requests, and then ask the [prospective] jurors if they would and could follow such instructions.” Id. at 585 (citation omitted). In Ganas v. State, 537 S.E.2d 758, 762 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000), the Court of Appeals of Georgia held that a trial court did not “abuse its discretion in precluding questions concerning the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence, for these are technical legal questions on which the [trial] court will instruct at the end of trial.” (Footnote omitted).

In State v. Bitz, 460 P.2d 374, 379, 378 (Idaho 1969), the Supreme Court of Idaho held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to ask during voir dire questions concerning the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the right not to present evidence. The Court pointed out that “[t]he jury is bound by the [jury] instructions[.]” Id. at 379 (citation omitted). In McCoy v. State, 361 A.2d 241, 243 (Del. 1976), the Supreme Court of Delaware held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to ask during voir dire about the prospective jurors’ “views relating to the