Bonnaville v. Shupp

HorniJy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Orphans’ Court of Washington County, in overruling the exceptions to the first and final administration account and distribution of the personal estate of Jeannette E. Due, deceased, thereby allowed Nancy Pittman, an adopted person, 1 to take in intestacy from a natural sister. From this action, the exceptant (Virginia Mae Bonnaville) appealed. The only question presented is whether an adopted person can participate in the distribution of the estate of a natural relative who died intestate.

We think it is quite clear that she can. Code (1957), Art. 16, § 78 (b), 2 provides that: “The natural parents of the person adopted, if living, shall after the interlocutory decree be relieved of all legal duties and obligations due from them to the person adopted, and shall be divested of all rights with respect to such person; provided, that nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to prevent the person adopted from inheriting from his natural parents and relatives under the laws of this or any other state.” 3 [Italics supplied.] The appellant contends that a construction allowing an adopted child to take from a natural relative is inconsistent ³⁹² with the provisions of §§ 143, 144 and 147 of Art. 93, 4 which when read together, allow an adopted child to take from, through and as a representative of its adopting parents. But, as we read these sections, there is nothing therein that is inconsistent with the theory, declared by the Legislature in § 78 (b)-of Art. 16, that an adopted child can take from natural relatives as well as adoptive relatives. Obviously, the only purpose of § 147 was to make it clear that there should be no distinction between a child by adoption and a child by birth, and, there is not even a suggestion in any of these sections that-— because an adopted child is allowed to take from or through the adopting parents in the same manner as a natural child-—■ he or she is thereby precluded from also taking from his or her natural relatives.

Prior to the enactment of § 78 (b) of Art. 16 and § 147 of Art. 93, the law was generally to the effect that the right of an adopted child to inherit from its natural parents and other relatives in the event of their death intestate was not affected or changed by the adoption. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 236 S. W. 2d 733 (Ark. 1951); In re Tilliski’s Estate, 61 N. E. 2d 24 (Ill. 1945); In re Klapp’s Estate, 164 N. W. 381 (Mich. 1917); Head v. Leak, 111 N. E. 952 (Ind. App. 1916); Strahorn, Adoption in Maryland, 7 Md. L. Rev. 275, 316; Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations, p. 363, n. 41; 1 Am. Jur., Adoption of Children, § 57.

Cf. In re Penfield’s Estate, 81 F. Supp. 622 (D. C. 1949). And for a more comprehensive review of the cases on the subject see the Annotation, Adoption-Inheritance Prom Natural Kin, 37 A.L.R. 2d 333 . See also the annotations in 80 A.L.R. 1403 and 123 A.L.R. 1038 , 1042.

Thus, it is apparent that the argument by the appellant that it is “contrary to the laws of nature as well as .man” to permit an adopted child to inherit from its natural ³⁹³ as well as its adoptive relatives because it has never been possible for any child to have “two mothers and two fathers and two families” is not valid. See