Boyer v. State

ELDRIDGE, Judge. This case involves the possible liability of law enforcement officers, the State of Maryland, and Charles County for injuries sustained by motorists struck by a suspected drunk driver who was being pursued by the officers in a high-speed chase. I. The case is before us on appeal from orders granting the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The orders were based on the complaint, the motions, and the responses thereto.

The underlying facts for purposes of the trial court’s rulings on the summary judgment motions were essentially those alleged by the plaintiffs. On August 9, 1984, at about 11:30 a.m., Maryland State Police Trooper Robert C. Titus was driving his police car southbound on U.S. Route 301 in Waldorf, Maryland. He observed another vehicle being driven southbound on Route 301 in an unsafe and erratic manner, and Trooper Titus suspected that the driver of the other vehicle was intoxicated. Both the other vehicle and Trooper Titus’s police car stopped at a red light.

While so stopped, Trooper Titus got out of his car, approached the other vehicle, and instructed the driver, Richard Milton Farrar, to pull over to the shoulder of the road on the other side of the intersection as soon as the light turned green. Trooper Titus then returned to ⁵⁶³ his police car. When the traffic light turned green, Mr. Farrar, instead of pulling over onto the shoulder of the road as he had been instructed, accelerated his vehicle and drove south on Route 801 at a high rate of speed. Trooper Titus immediately began pursuing Mr. Farrar.

Deputy sheriffs from the Charles County Sheriffs Office and other Maryland State police officers joined Trooper Titus in the chase of Mr. Farrar. The plaintiffs claimed that the pursuit of Mr. Farrar continued for approximately seven miles on Route 301 through heavy traffic and numerous intersections at high speeds. The plaintiffs asserted that the police officers chasing Mr. Farrar reached speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. The plaintiffs stated that “[djespite the presence of numerous other slow moving vehicles on the road, the police officers in question did not break off their pursuit but rather increased their speed and continued the pursuit despite the clear and present danger of so doing.” In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that Trooper Titus failed to “activate immediately all of the emergency equipment on his police car” and failed to “adhere to the acceptable police procedures and policies in attempting to apprehend defendant Farrar.” The pursuit of Mr. Farrar ended tragically when the suspected drunk driver’s vehicle hit the rear of another vehicle at the intersection of U.S. Route 301 and Maryland Route 225 in the town of La Plata.

The struck vehicle was occupied by Mary Jackisch Boyer and her husband, Joseph A. Boyer. Mrs. Boyer died at the scene of the accident. Mr. Boyer was hospitalized and died on October 26, 1984, as a result of injuries sustained in the accident. The plaintiffs in the case, the surviving sons of Mr. and Mrs. Boyer, filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County a complaint containing eleven counts, naming the State of Maryland, the County Commissioners of Charles County, Trooper Titus, the Charles County “Sheriff’s De ⁵⁶⁴ partment” and Richard Milton Farrar as defendants. 1 The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County determined that venue was improper and transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Charles County.

Counts I through V of the complaint are survival claims and counts VI through X are wrongful death claims. Count XI contains a demand for punitive damages. The plaintiffs alleged in counts I and VI that Trooper Titus was grossly negligent “in failing to arrest defendant Farrar while defendant Farrar was stopped at a red light; ... in pursuing defendant Farrar, a suspected drunk driver, at an excessively high rate of speed through a heavy traffic area; in continuing to recklessly pursue defendant Farrar at extremely high and dangerous rates of speed; in failing to activate immediately all of the emergency equipment on his police car so as to warn other motorists ...; and in ... failing to adhere to the acceptable police procedures and policies____” The plaintiffs also asserted in counts I and VI vicarious liability on the part of the State of Maryland for Trooper Titus’s negligence and on the part of the Charles County “Sheriff’s Department” and the County Commissioners of Charles County for the asserted “gross negligence” of the Charles County deputy sheriffs involved in the high-speed chase of Mr. Farrar. The plaintiffs claimed in counts II and VII that the State of Maryland “fail[ed] to exercise due care in selecting, hiring, retaining, training and supervising defendant Titus____” Similarly, counts III, IV, VIII and IX asserted that the County Commissioners of Charles County and the Charles County “Sheriff’s Department” negligently “hired, retained, trained and supervised the officers and employees of the Charles County Sheriff’s Department____” Counts V and X of the complaint alleged that Richard Milton Farrar was negligent for, among other things, failing to ⁵⁶⁵ obey the speed limit and operating his vehicle while intoxicated.

The principal statutory ground invoked by the plaintiffs for the asserted liability of the State of Maryland was the Maryland Tort Claims Act, which at the time of the accident in this case waived the State’s governmental immunity in, inter alia, “[a]n action to recover damages caused by the negligent maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle by a State employee.” Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), § 5-403(a)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 2 Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that they had complied with the procedural requirements for bringing an action under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. In connection with their claim against the State of Maryland, as well as their claims against the County Commissioners of Charles County and the Charles County “Sheriff’s Department,” the plaintiffs also relied on Code (1977, 1987 Repl. Vol.), § 19-103(c)(1) of the Transportation Article, which provides that the owner of an emergency vehicle is liable, up to certain limits, “for any damages caused by a negligent act or omission of an authorized operator while operating the emergency vehicle in the performance of emergency service____” 3 The plaintiffs also sought to impose liability on ⁵⁶⁶ the County Commissioners of Charles County and the Charles County “Sheriffs Department” on the theory that the County Commissioners and a county agency known as the “Sheriffs Department” were the employers of the ⁵⁶⁷ deputy sheriffs and liable under the principle of respondeat superior. With regard to their claim against Trooper Titus individually, the plaintiffs relied upon § 21-106 of the Transportation Article of the Code which extends certain privileges to drivers of emergency vehicles but which specifies in subsection (d) that “[t]his section does not relieve the driver of an emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.” 4 The plaintiffs also invoked § 19-103(b) of the Transportation Article which provides that the immunity from suit granted by § 19-103 to the operator of an emergency vehicle does not apply where the ⁵⁶⁸ operator is guilty, inter alia, of “gross negligence.” 5 In addition, the plaintiffs contended that, under § 16-205.-1(b)(2) of the Transportation Article, Trooper Titus had a duty to detain Mr. Farrar when he approached him at the stop light on Route 301, and that Trooper Titus was liable for his alleged breach of that duty. 6 Finally, the plaintiffs relied on cases holding that, absent statutory immunity, the driver of an emergency vehicle is “ordinarily” liable for his negligence in the operation of the vehicle.

See, e.g., James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 328 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980). After this case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Charles County, and after answers were filed, two motions for summary judgment were filed, one on behalf of the State of Maryland and Trooper Titus, and the other on behalf of the County Commissioners of Charles County and the Charles County “Sheriffs Department.” The motion for summary judgment on behalf of the State and Trooper Titus, along with the supporting memoranda, was based upon two grounds only: (1) the State and Trooper Titus were entitled to governmental immunity; (2) “the law imposes no tort duty on Trooper Titus (or the State of ⁵⁶⁹ Maryland) for injuries to the plaintiffs resulting from the acts of Mr. Farrar.” (Emphasis in original). In asserting that the State was entitled to governmental immunity, the State defendants pointed to the pre-1985 language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act which waived governmental immunity only for certain types of acts, including the “negligent ... operation of a motor vehicle by a State employee.” They argued that the alleged negligence of Trooper Titus in deciding not to detain Mr. Farrar at the stop light, in commencing the high speed chase, and in continuing the high speed chase, did not constitute “negligent ... operation of a motor vehicle.” It was claimed that the doctrine of public official immunity was applicable to the alleged negligence of Trooper Titus. Under that doctrine, one “is relieved of liability for Ms negligent acts ... [if he] is a public official rather than a mere government employee or agent ... [and iff his tortious conduct occurred while he was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts in furtherance of Ms official duties.” James v. Prince George’s County, supra, 288 Md. at 323 , 418 A.2d at 1178 (emphasis in original).

See Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 672-673 , 541 A.2d 1303, 1308 (1988); Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 620-622 , 510 A.2d 1078, 1080 (1986). In arguing that, even if the State and Trooper Titus were not protected by immunity, Trooper Titus nevertheless owed no duty to the Boyers, the State defendants relied exclusively on Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 306 Md. at 624, 626-635 , 510 A.2d at 1081, 1082-1087 , which held that, when a police officer makes the discretionary decision as to whether a criminal suspect should be apprehended, the police officer who decides not to apprehend the suspect ordinarily owes no duty to third persons who may thereafter be injured by the suspect. The motion for summary judgment on behalf of the County Commissioners of Charles County and the Charles County “Sheriffs Department” also relied on governmental immunity and the claimed lack of any duty owed to the ⁵⁷⁰ Boyers. With regard to the waiver of governmental immunity contained in § 19-103(c) of the Transportation Article, the County Commissioners principally contended that the allegedly negligent pursuit of Mr. Farrar by the deputy sheriffs did not constitute negligence “while operating an emergency vehicle.” The motion for summary judgment also took the position that “[t]he ‘Charles County Sheriffs Department’ is not a legal entity capable of being sued.” Neither of the motions for summary judgment questioned the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence.

At no time in the trial court, or in this Court, did the defendants argue that, even if there were no immunity and even if the police officers owed a duty to the Boyers, the plaintiffs’ allegations of negligence were insufficient to set forth a breach of that duty. Furthermore, there is no indication from the record that the circuit judge questioned the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ allegations of simple negligence. On the other hand, in ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the circuit court did hold that the plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to charge Trooper Titus with gross negligence. The circuit court issued a brief order granting the motions for summary judgment on behalf of the State of Maryland, the County Commissioners of Charles County, and the Charles County “Sheriff’s Department,” apparently relying on one or the other of the grounds set forth in the motions.

In a separate memorandum and order, the circuit court granted summary judgment for Trooper Titus specifically on the ground that the police officer was entitled to immunity under § 19-103(b) of the Transportation Article, which confers upon the operator of an emergency vehicle immunity “from suit in his individual capacity for any’ damages resulting from a negligent act or omission while operating the emergency vehicle,” as long as the operator is not guilty of malice or gross negligence. The circuit court certified the summary judgment orders as final pursuant to ⁵⁷¹ Maryland Rule 2-602(b). 7 The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed. Boyer v. State, 80 Md.App. 101 , 560 A.2d 48 (1989). The Court of Special Appeals held that Trooper Titus was immune from suit under the doctrine of public official immunity. 80 Md.App. at 106 , 560 A.2d at 50 .

The appellate court also, apparently, held that the deputy sheriffs, if they had been sued, would have been entitled to public official immunity. The appellate court then reasoned, relying upon Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294 , 396 A.2d 255 (1979), that “[t]he County and the State are also without liability because the alleged tortious conduct on which the suit against them is based results from actions of an individual who is personally immune.” Boyer v. State, supra, 80 Md.App. at 106 , 560 A.2d at 50 . Thereafter, we granted the plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari. 8 II. First, we address the claimed liability of the County Commissioners of Charles County and the Charles County “Sheriff’s Department.” A. As previously mentioned, the plaintiffs in part base their action against the County Commissioners and the “Sheriffs Department,” in counts I and YI of their complaint, on the ⁵⁷² doctrine of respondeat superior and the assumption that deputy sheriffs are county employees and that the “Sheriffs Department” is a county agency. 9 It is clear, however, that under Maryland law the Sheriff and deputy sheriffs of Charles County are State employees.

Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275, 281 , 558 A.2d 399, 402 (1989) (“The role of a sheriff as a State constitutional officer whose duties are subject to control by the General Assembly leads us to the conclusion that sheriffs are State rather than local government employees. Because a deputy sheriff functions as the alter ego of the sheriff, and exercises the same authority, we reach the same conclusion with respect to deputy sheriffs”). See also the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Code (1984, 1990 Cum. Supp.), § 12-101(6) of the State Government Article, specifying that “State personnel” includes “a sheriff or deputy sheriff of a county or Baltimore City.” Therefore, to the extent that the County Commissioners of Charles County and any purported agency of Charles County are named as defendants based on a theory that they are liable as employers for the alleged negligence of the Charles County deputy sheriffs, the judgment in their favor was correct.

See Rucker v. Harford County, supra, 316 Md. at 292 , 558 A.2d at 407 (“counties and municipalities in Maryland are generally not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the tortious acts of State officials or State employees acting in the scope of their employment”); Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 668 - ⁵⁷³ 669, 541 A.2d at 1306 . 10 B. The plaintiffs’ alternate ground for imposing liability upon the County Commissioners of Charles County for the alleged negligence of the deputy sheriffs is § 19-103(c) of the Transportation Article, which provides that the owner or lessee of an emergency vehicle is liable for the negligence of an authorized operator of the vehicle while operating the vehicle in the performance of an emergency service. This statute does not require that the operator of the emergency vehicle be an employee of the owner. Charles County’s principal argument as to why § 19-103(c) is inapplicable to the present case is that the alleged negligence of the deputy sheriffs in joining the pursuit and continuing the pursuit of Mr. Farrar was not negligence “while operating the emergency vehicle[s]” within the meaning of § 19-103(c). Both in the trial court and in this Court, Charles County argued that “the gravamen of the charge against Charles County is that [the deputy sheriffs] were negligent in responding to Trooper Titus’s request for assistance, and electing to join in the pursuit of the fleeing Farrar.

In determining the legal consequences of that action, the crucial factor is the officers’ decision to maintain the pursuit rather than breaking it off. * * * [T]hat decision [does not] constitute a ‘negligent act or omission ... while operating an emergency vehicle’ within the meaning of § 19-103(c).” (Brief for the County Commissioners of Charles County, p. 2). Charles County’s argument regard ⁵⁷⁴ ing § 19-103(c) is essentially the same as the State’s argument with respect to the Maryland Tort Claims Act. The State has insisted that Trooper Titus’s allegedly negligent decision to chase Mr. Farrar and his allegedly negligent decision to continue the high speed chase did not amount to the “negligent operation of a motor vehicle” under the pre1985 language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), § 5-403(a)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Preliminarily, we question the conclusion by Charles County and the State that the gravamen of the alleged negligence was limited to the decisions to pursue Mr. Farrar and to continue the pursuit.

Instead, the alleged negligence involved the decisions to pursue and continue pursuit at speeds in excess of 100 miles an hour, through busy intersections, and without activating emergency equipment immediately. Moreover, we disagree with Charles County’s and the State’s contention that a negligent decision to operate a motor vehicle in a particular manner under certain circumstances, and a negligent decision to continue operating the vehicle under those circumstances, does not constitute the negligent “operation of a motor vehicle.” This Court has held that the statutory phrase “ ‘operate ... a motor vehicle’ ” is broad, and in fact is much “broader than the term ‘drive.’ ” See Thomas v. State, 277 Md. 314, 317-319 , 353 A.2d 256, 258 (1976), and cases there discussed. Other cases have held that a police officer’s negligent decision to initiate and continue a high speed chase may constitute negligent “operation” of a vehicle within the meaning of waivers of immunity similar to § 19-103(c). See, e.g., Fiser v. City of Ann Arbor, 417 Mich. 461 , 339 N.W.2d 413 (1983); Dickens v. Upper Chichester Tp., 123 Pa.Commw. 226, 553 A.2d 510 ; Force v. Watkins, 118 Pa.Commw. 87, 544 A.2d 114 (1988); Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash.2d 321, 326-329 , 534 P.2d 1360, 1364-1365 (1975).

But cf. Kelly v. City of Tulsa, 791 P.2d 826, 828 (Okl.App.1990). ⁵⁷⁵ Negligent operation of a car is not limited to the negligent manipulation of the gas pedal, steering wheel, or brake pedal, such as involved in speeding, failure to pay attention to what may be in front of the vehicle, failure to apply the brakes, etc. A decision to operate or continue operating the car, when a reasonable person would not do so, clearly can be “negligent operation.” For example, if one decides to operate or to continue operating a motor vehicle when he is dizzy or otherwise ill, he may be guilty of negligent operation. Cf Stumpf v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 252 Md. 696, 702 , 251 A.2d 362, 365 (1969) (person subject to epileptic seizures chose to drive car). A decision to operate a car or to continue operating a car knowing that the brakes are faulty may obviously constitute the “negligent operation” of the vehicle.

Therefore, we reject the arguments by Charles County and the State that the alleged negligence of the deputy sheriffs and Trooper Titus in commencing and maintaining a high speed chase was not negligence “while operating” or in “the operation” of motor vehicles. 11 C. There is in this case, however, a problem with the plaintiffs’ reliance upon § 19-103(c) as a basis for imposing liability upon Charles County. The plaintiffs did not allege in their complaint that the County Commissioners of Charles County owned the vehicles driven by the deputy sheriffs. Moreover, such an allegation was not made in any attachments to the summary judgment motions or the responses thereto. Charles County, in its motion for summary judgment, established a prima facie defense of gov ⁵⁷⁶ ernmental immunity.

See Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 460 , 545 A.2d 1312, 1320 (1988). The plaintiffs attempted to rebut that defense by, inter alia, invoking § 19-103(c); however they overlooked a critical element for § 19-103(c) to be applicable. Consequently, we cannot conclude that the waiver of governmental immunity contained in § 19-103(c) applies to Charles County in this case. Ordinarily, we would affirm the judgment in favor of Charles County on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to allege ownership of the deputy sheriffs’ vehicles by Charles County.

Nevertheless, the matter of vehicle ownership was not raised in the case until oral argument in this Court. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs should have the opportunity of amending their complaint to allege, if they can, ownership of the vehicles by Charles County. As to the judgment in favor of Charles County, therefore, we shall remand in accordance with Maryland Rule 8-604(d). 12 III. We now turn to the plaintiffs’ contention that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Trooper Titus.

For purposes of convenience, the asserted negligence of Trooper Titus can be divided into two categories: 1. the allegedly negligent decision not to apprehend Mr. Farrar at the red light but, instead, to instruct him to proceed through the light when it turned green and pull over on the other side of the intersection; 2. the allegedly negligent decisions to pursue and continue the pursuit of Mr. Farrar at high speeds, through busy intersections, without immediately activating emergency devices. ⁵⁷⁷ A. Under this Court’s opinion in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, supra, it is clear that the decision not to apprehend Mr. Farrar at the red light cannot be a basis for imposing liability upon Trooper Titus. Ashburn held that a police officer, in deciding whether to apprehend a criminal suspect, is ordinarily protected from liability under the doctrine of public official immunity. In fact, Ashburn drew a sharp distinction between operating an emergency vehicle and the decision whether or not to apprehend a citizen, saying ( 306 Md. at 623-624 , 510 A.2d at 1081 ): “[In James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980),] the Court held that the operation of such an emergency vehicle ‘is not ordinarily a discretionary act for which immunity will shield the driver from liability for negligence.’ Id. at 328 , 418 A.2d at 1180-81 . The driving of an emergency vehicle, as in James , however, is different from making a decision as to whether a citizen shall be apprehended.

When a police officer performs this function, he is acting in a discretionary capacity*” Moreover, we held in Ashburn that § 16-205.1(b)(2) of the Transportation Article, upon which the plaintiffs in the instant case also rely, 13 does not render inapplicable the principle of public official immunity with regard to a police officer’s decision not to apprehend a suspected drunk driver. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 306 Md. at 624-626 , 510 A.2d at 1081-1082 . As an alternative holding we took the position in Ashburn that, in making the decision not to apprehend a drunk driver, a police officer ordinarily owes no duty, enforceable by tort liability, to third persons who may thereafter be injured by the drunk driver. Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 306 Md. at 624, 626-635 , 510 A.2d at 1081, 1082-1087 . ⁵⁷⁸ Both holdings in Ashburn are dispositive of the plaintiffs’ attempt to impose tort liability upon Trooper Titus for his allegedly negligent decision not to apprehend Mr. Farrar at the red light.

No facts have been alleged in this case which would render inapplicable the ordinary immunity and lack of duty principles set forth in Ashburn . B. As to the plaintiffs’ claim that Trooper Titus was negligent in commencing and maintaining the high speed pursuit of Mr. Farrar, it is obvious that Trooper Titus is entitled to statutory immunity under § 19-103(b) of the Transportation Article. He is also, under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, not liable for damages. Section 19-103(b) flatly renders the operator of an emergency vehicle “immune from suit ... for any damages resulting from a negligent act or omission while operating the emergency vehicle____” The pre-1985 language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act waived the State’s tort immunity for “[a]n action to recover damages caused by the negligent ... operation of a motor vehicle by a State employee,” and it rendered the State employee “not liable ... for any damages resulting from tortious conduct for which the State has waived its immunity under this subtitle____” See Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), §§ 5-403(a)(l) and 5-404(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

We have held in Part II B of this opinion that the alleged negligence in commencing and continuing the high speed chase of Mr. Farrar constituted the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Thus, the immunity provision of § 19-103 and the non-liability provision of the Tort Claims Act are applicable to these allegations of negligent conduct by Trooper Titus. The plaintiffs point out, however, that the immunity and non-liability provisions of § 19-103 and the Tort Claims Act do not apply if the State employee was grossly negligent, and they contend that their allegations were sufficient to charge Trooper Titus with gross negligence. We agree ⁵⁷⁹ with the circuit court that the allegations were insufficient to charge gross negligence. 14 In order to charge Trooper Titus with gross negligence, the plaintiffs must have pled facts showing that Trooper Titus acted with a wanton and reckless disregard for others in pursuing Mr. Farrar.

See Nast. v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343, 366-367 , 539 A.2d 1113, 1124-1125 (1988); Hughes v. State, 198 Md. 424, 431-432 , 84 A.2d 419, 422 (1951). The complaint stated that Trooper Titus was grossly negligent “in pursuing Farrar, a suspected drunk driver, at an excessively high rate of speed through a heavy traffic area; in continuing to recklessly pursue defendant Farrar at extremely high and dangerous rates of speed; in failing to activate immediately all of the emergency equipment on his police car so as to warn other motorists of the foreseeable dangers to their health and safety created by defendant Titus’s negligent and reckless pur ⁵⁸⁰ suit; and in otherwise failing to adhere to the acceptable police procedures and policies in attempting to apprehend defendant Farrar.” Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we nevertheless hold that Trooper Titus’s alleged conduct did not amount to gross negligence as a matter of law. The plaintiffs’ allegations that Trooper Titus drove at high speeds on a road congested with traffic in an attempt to apprehend a suspected intoxicated driver do not indicate that he acted with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others. Although the complaint states that Trooper Titus did not “immediately” activate his emergency equipment and violated police procedures, these somewhat vague allegations do not support the conclusion that he acted with gross negligence.

See Breck v. Cortez, 141 Ill.App.3d 351, 353-354, 359-361 , 95 Ill.Dec. 615, 616-17, 620-21 , 490 N.E.2d 88, 89-90, 93-94 (1986) (conduct of police officers did not amount to willful or wanton negligence, as a matter of law, where they pursued a vehicle observed driving recklessly without its headlights on at about 9 p.m., where the chase took place over eight miles on an interstate highway and a two-lane road, where the roads were wet but traffic was light to medium, and where the officers were driving substantially over the speed limit); Bullins v. Schmidt, 322 N.C. 580 , 369 S.E.2d 601 (1988) (police officers did not act with conscious or reckless disregard for others when they pursued a car driving erratically at about 1 a.m. over eighteen miles at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour). See also, Nast v. Lockett, supra, 312 Md. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125 (as a matter of law, evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant, who was driving under the influence of alcohol, was grossly negligent in the operation of her automobile). Therefore, because Trooper Titus did not act with wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of ⁵⁸¹ others in pursuing Mr. Farrar, he was entitled to summary judgment. 15 IV. Finally, we deal with the plaintiffs’ claim against the State of Maryland under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. 16 A. The ground invoked by the Court of Special Appeals for affirming the judgment in favor of the State is not ⁵⁸² tenable.

The intermediate appellate court held that all of Trooper Titus’s actions were protected by the doctrine of public official immunity, and that under Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, supra, the governmental employer is not liable when “the alleged tortious conduct on which the suit against [it] is based results from actions of an individual who is personally immune.” Boyer v. State, supra, 80 Md.App. at 106 , 560 A.2d at 50 . 17 The holding of the Bradshaw case relied on by the Court of Special Appeals, however, was overruled in James v. Prince George’s County, supra, 288 Md. at 329-336 , 418 A.2d at 1181-1184 . See Clea v. City of Baltimore, supra, 312 Md. at 667 n. 2, 541 A.2d at 1305 n. 2. In James , we held “that the government, when it has waived immunity ..., is liable for torts committed by its officers even though those officers themselves are not liable because of public official immuni ⁵⁸³ ty.” 288 Md. at 333 , 418 A.2d at 1183 . See also Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439, 443 , 578 A.2d 745, 747 (1990); Prince George’s County v. Fitzhugh, 308 Md. 384, 388 , 519 A.2d 1285, 1287 (1987).

B. As we have noted, supra, footnote 11, the alleged negligence of Trooper Titus in deciding not to apprehend Mr. Farrar at the red light was not conduct for which the Government had waived immunity under the pre-1985 language of the Maryland Tort Claims Act. The plaintiffs, relying on Foor v. Juvenile Services, 78 Md.App. 151 , 552 A.2d 947 , cert. denied, 316 Md. 364 , 558 A.2d 1206 (1989), argue that the 1985 amendments to the Tort Claims Act, which broadened the State’s waiver of immunity, apply retroatively to the present case. The State, as might be expected, resists this argument and contends that the Foor case was incorrectly decided. It is unnecessary for us to resolve this question in the present case.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the State’s immunity had been waived for Trooper Titus’s alleged negligence at the red light, we have held in Part III A that Trooper Titus owed no duty to the Boyers in connection with his decision not to apprehend Mr. Farrar at the red light. If Trooper Titus owed no duty to the Boyers in this regard, he is guilty of no tort for which the State can be liable under the Tort Claims Act. C. We have held that Trooper Titus’s alleged negligent engagement in the high speed chase was conduct encompassed by the pre-1985 amendments to the Tort Claims Act. The same is true with respect to the pursuit by the deputy sheriffs.

Thus, the last issue for us to decide in this case is whether Trooper Titus and the deputy sheriffs may have owed a duty to the Boyers in connection with their decisions to commence and continue the high speed chase. If so, the ⁵⁸⁴ judgment in favor of the State will have to be vacated in part. In contending that the police officers’ engagement in the high speed chase implicated no duty owed to the Boyers, the State’s sole reliance has been Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 306 Md. 617 , 510 A.2d 1078 . As previously discussed, however, Ashbum involved a police officer’s decision not to apprehend a suspected drunk driver and the argument that § 16-205.1(b)(2) of the Transportation