Brann v. Mahoney

Collins, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by W. L. Brann and Sylvester W. Labrot, Jr., owners and breeders of race horses, and Edward A. Christmas and Clay Sutphin, licensed trainers of horses, hereinafter known as appellants, from an order of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City sustaining a demurrer to the supplemental bill of complaint, filed by them, without leave to amend and dismissing the supplemental bill. The appellants filed an original bill of.complaint in which Messrs. Brann and Labrot alleged the fact that they were owners and breeders of race horses and had a considerable investment in the business.

The following facts were alleged in the original bill. Christmas is employed as a trainer for Brann, and Sutphin is employed as a trainer for Labrot. Both Christmas and Sutphin had been duly licensed by the Maryland Racing Commission to train race horses, making the customary annual application therefor, paying the established fees and receiving the annual license issued by the Maryland Racing Commission of which the appellees herein are members. The bill of complaint recites Sec. 11 of Article 78B giving the Racing Commission power to prescribe rules and regulations and conditions under which all horse races shall be conducted in this State.

It further recites the provisions of Rule 146 adopted by the Racing Commission which provides in paragraph (d), and under which the Commission operated in the case at bar, that, if it is found by analysis that any drug has been administered to a horse forty-eight hours before the race, the trainer shall be subject to suspension whether or not he administered the drug or knowingly or carelessly per ⁹³ mitted it to be administered. - Sub-section (e) of paragraph (d) further provides as follows: “The fact that the analysis shows the presence of a drug shall be conclusive evidence either that there was knowledge of the fact on the part of the trainer or that he was guilty of carelessness in permitting it to be administered.” Section (f) is a definition of the term “drug.” Rule 146, Sections (a) and (d), are set out in full in the case of Mahoney et al. v. J. Dallet Byers, 187 Md. 89 , 48 A. 2d 600 . The bill further alleges that Brann sent fourteen horses to the Pimlico Race Track where they were stabled during the race meeting and he entered different horses from time to time in various races. The races, race course, stables, and officials are under the control of the Maryland Racing Commission to take whatever measures might be necessary to safeguard and protect the rights and properties of the various owners including the said Brann and Labrot. Brann’s horses were in charge of appellant Christmas.

The three horses owned by Labrot were in charge of the appellant Sutphin. During the Pimlico meet samples of saliva and urine of horses were taken daily after each race. The Maryland Racing Commission shipped false samples of saliva to the laboratory of the New York Racing Commission, and at the same time sent genuine samples to the laboratory of the University of Maryland. On Monday, November 19, 1945, samples of saliva taken from horses which participated in the racing at Pimlico on that day were left in the laboratory of the University of Maryland.

The next day, on account of the illness of the person in charge of the analysis of the samples, about fiften saliva samples were removed from the laboratory in Baltimore and taken to a Dr. Munch in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, where they were analyzed. On the night of November 28, 1945, the Maryland Racing Commission sent a telegram to the appellant, Christmas, advising him that a test of the sample taken from the horse named New Challenge, owned by appellant, Brann, ⁹⁴ on November 19, 1945, showed that it contained a stimulant and further advising him that all horses trained by him were suspended beginning November 29, 1945. A similar telegram was sent to appellant, Sutphin, with respect to the horse named Shako, owned by appellant, Labrot. The effect of these notices was to suspend appellants, Christmas and Sutphin, as trainers and to disqualify from racing all horses owned by appellants, Brann and Labrot, on all race tracks in the State of Maryland, and also on all the tracks in the United States where the actions of the Maryland Racing Commission are followed • automatically by prior agreement.

At the time this action was taken by the Maryland Racing Commission against the appellants similar action was taken against three other owners and three other trainers. The appellants were notified that the charges against them would be heard on December 10 and 11, 1945. On December 9, 1945, the Maryland Racing Commission, appellee, sent another telegram to appellant, Christmas, advising him of the alleged finding from a horse named Weathercock owned by •appellant, Brann. Hearing on this alleged finding was scheduled for December 11, although the appellants had no notice until the night of December 9th.

Meanwhile, on December 8,1945, counsel for appellants addressed a letter to the Maryland Racing Commission asking for particulars and specifications of the charges against the appelants in order to prepare for the hearing and properly to present the defense. On December 5,” 1945, Mahoney, one of the appellees, replied for the Commission declining, as to some of the particulars requested, to furnish the information prior to the hearing. He alleged that other requested information was immaterial. The appellants were thus forced into a hearing without sufficent information and without any opportunity to prepare an answer.

Brann ivas residing in Florida and Labrot in Louisiana. It was impossible for either of these two appellants to reach Baltimore within the limited period fixed by the appellee, and this action by the appellee ⁹⁵ operated to deprive them of their rights and privileges without an opportunity to be present at the so-called hearing, to produce their witnesses and be heard before any action could be taken against them. The Commission wrote a letter dated December 5,1945, promising appellants an opportunity for investigation and rebuttal, and every opportunity to present all material facts. This promise was repeated orally to counsel for appellants on December 10,1945.

The understanding was that the Commission, appellee, would present its testimony and then adjourn until appellants had reasonable opportunity to study the stenographic record and to prepare their defense. The next morning, December 11, however, the Commission advised counsel for appellants that appellants’ testimony must be presented on December 19, later changed to December 20th. Inasmuch as copies of the stenographic transcript were not delivered to counsel for appellants until December 14th, the appellants were unable to make the necessary studies as to the analyzing of the samples of saliva and urine. It developed at the hearing before the appellees on December 10 and 11, 1945, that the stimulant allegedly discovered from the horses, New Challenge, Shako, and Weathercock was morphine.

The Commission withheld this information until the hearing was underway, thereby giving the appellants no real opportunity to meet this charge. The allegation that morphine was used is of the gravest nature, as the unauthorized use of this drug is a Federal offense. All of the fifteen samples examined in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, were reported to show the presence of morphine. The appellants do not yet know whether the analysis was erroneous, not being advised as to conditions under which the analysis was made, whether samples were contaminated, and methods of transportation and shipment.

The Commission refused the appellants’ request, made at the hearing, that Dr. Morgan, chemist of the New York Racing Commission, be invited to testify, although his testimony had been used and relied on by the appellees in previous cases. ⁹⁶ The newspapers and radio were supplied with information concerning these charges made against the appellants, before notices were received by the appellants from the Commission. Further, on December 11, 1945, one of the appellees, George P. Mahoney, chairman, according to statements made to counsel for appellants, gave an interview to a reporter of a world-wide news service in which Mahoney indicated that five trainers, including Christmas and Sutphin, would be suspended for one year “regardless of additional facts yet to be revealed in hearings.” This statement appeared in newspaper articles in Philadelphia and Baltimore. Counsel for the appellants have been advised that such statements were actually made by the appellee, Mahoney, and are prepared to prove that such statements were made in the presence of a number of newspapermen. The bill alleges further, “These complainants believe and therefore aver and allege that the defendant, George P. Mahoney, chairman of the Maryland Racing Commission, has prejudged the complainants’ cases, has made up his mind before any defenses are presented, and is prepared and ready to act aversely to these complainants without giving them an adequate opportunity to meet the charges, and without regard to any and all of the testimony yet to be offered on behalf of the complainants.

And these complainants believe and therefore aver and allege that the defendant, George P. Mahoney, is or should be disqualified from conducting any further hearings of the charges against these complainants, or taking any action which he has indicated he is prepared to take before the complainants have their defenses and testimony in support of them.” The bill further alleges that the Rule 146 Section (d) and (e), which make the presence of a drug conclusive evidence, is not authorized by law and is invalid. The appellants further say that they never administered, or knowingly, or carelessly permitted any drug to be administered to the horses mentioned herein. And further it is stated that “These complainants al ⁹⁷ lege that their reputations as good, honest and loyal citizens are being impaired, and that they are being put to great inconvenience and expense and loss because of unfounded charges made under the defendants’ invalid rules and regulations; and that this great inconvenience, expense and loss, and injury to reputation and high standing in the community will continue and be materially increased unless this Honorable Court intervenes to protect and safeguard these complainants, and, to grant them the rights, privileges and immunities to which they are entitled under the laws of the land. That these complainants, being denied a full and fair opportunity to prepare their defenses before the Maryland Racing Commission, and being denied a fair trial of the issues on which a judgment has already been announced in advance of hearing, have no adequate remedy at law.” The bill of complaint prayed that Rule 146 and especially sub-paragraphs (d), (e),and (f) be declared void.

That the appellees be preliminarily and perpetually enjoined by a writ of' injunction from attempting to enforce the provisions of this Rule against them. Further that the appellees be enjoined from conducting any further hearings as to analysis of samples of saliva and urine from the horses New Challenge, Shako, and Weathercock. The bill also asked for further relief. The appellees demurred to this original bill of complaint.

After hearing the Chancellor, on February 25, 1946, by decree declared Rule 146 (d) of the Maryland Racing Commission aforesaid invalid. He overruled the demurrer to the bill and gave leave to the appellees to answer within five days and upon failure of appellees to answer within five days they were to pay the costs of the proceedings. In the opinion of the chancellor filed with this order he made the following statement: “In Maryland Theatrical Corporation v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377 , at page 389 [ 24 A. 2d 911 , at page 917], the Court of Appeals, having declared the invalidity of a statute, said, in regard to the prayer for an injunction, that there was no occásion for the ⁹⁸ issuance of an injunction, since it is to be presumed that the Police Commissioner- would take notice of the declaratory decree, and act accordingly. The same considerations apply here, as it is to be presumed that The Racing Commission will likewise take notice of the declaratory decree to be made herein.” The chancellor evidently thought that his ruling on the demurrer would have the effect of restoring the licenses and end the proceedings before the Commission.

After waiting from February 25th, no answer having been filed by appellees, on April 5, 1946, the appellants filed a supplemental bill reciting the filing of the original bill herein and set out the decree of "the court declaring Rule 146 (d) invalid. The supplemental bill further recited: “* * * The respondents failed to file an answer within the time allowed by this Honorable Court and are now in default for want of a defense to any and all of the allegations contained in the Bill of Complaint.” “3. On March 2nd, 1946, the Superior Court of Baltimore City granted a petition for a writ of mandamus brought against the respondents by a trainer of race horses who had been suspended after hearing by the respondents, Byers v. Mahoney, et al., Daily Record, March 4th, 1946, the Court filing a written opinion in which the opinion of this Court was adopted, and in which Rule No. 198 of the Maryland Racing Commission was also held to be invalid.” “4. That following the opinion and order by the Superior Court, the respondents lifted the disqualification of the race horses owned by the Complainants W. L. Brann and Sylvester.W. Labrot, Jr., and lifted the suspension as trainers of the Complainants Edward A. Christmas and Clay Sutphin, issuing them new trainer’s licenses bearing the following qualification: ‘The issuance of this license is not to be, nor to be construed as a waiver of any right of the Commission to revoke or suspend it for any reason or cause now or hereafter legally permitting such action.’ The respondents have ⁹⁹ appealed the order of the Superior Court to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, and the Deputy Attorney General has advised counsel for the Complainants that if said order is reversed on appeal, the respondents intend again to proceed against the Complainants, and to hold hearings, or additional hearings, on the same charges or on charges involving the same circumstances described in the Bill of Complaint.” “5.

These Complainants respectfully represent that the dismissal or other disposition of the charges involving them should not be dependent upon the findings by the Court of Appeals in some other