Brenner v. Brenner

Stockbridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The primary question presented on this appeal is the correctness of a ruling of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, as to the jurisdiction of that Court to entertain an appeal which had been taken to it from an award of the State Industrial Accident Commission. The facts, so far as they are necessary to be now considered, are as follows: The Reliable Junk Company was engaged in conducting a business such as the name implies, in Hagerstown, Washington County. The name was not that of a corporation, but a name for a business which was conducted either by Joe Brenner alone or by him in connection with a Mr. Coffman, or by one or the other or both of these gentlemen in connection with Morris Brenner.

On January 15th, 1915, Toba Brenner and Mary Brenner, the mother and sister respectively of Morris Brenner, filed a claim under. Chapter 800 of the Act of 1914 (Workmen’s Compensation Act) as- dependents of Morris Brenner, the son and brother of the claimants, in which it was alleged that Morris Brenner was an employee of the Reliable Junk Company, and while such employee received injuries resulting in death on the 5th December, 1914. The Industrial Accident Commission by its findings held the business to be that of Joe Brenner, that Morris Brenner was an employee, that he suffered death as the result of an explosion while working for and upon the premises occupied by the Reliable Junk Company, that the claimants were partial dependents and awarded them compensation. The Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation, Limited, which had issued a policy and was thus ¹⁹² the insurance carrier of the liability, was made a party to the proceedings.

Upon the award being made by the Commission an appeal was taken by the Guarantee Corporation to the Superior Court of Baltimore City, whereupon Toba and Mary Brenner through their counsel moved to dismiss the appeal, which motion was granted, and the appeal dismissed, and it is from such order of dismissal of that appeal, that the case has been brought to this Court. The question presented by the motion is one of jurisdiction only. To sustain that jurisdiction the appellants rely upon section 55 of the Act, codified as section 56 of Article 101 of the Codé, and particularly upon the following language in said section: “Any employer, employee, beneficiary or person feel ing aggrieved by any decision of the Commission affecting his interests under this Act may have the same reviewed by a proceeding in the nature of an appeal and initiated in the Circuit Court of the County, or in the common law courts of Baltimore City, having jurisdiction over the place where the accident occurred or over the person appealing fro7n such decision, and the Court shall determine whether the Commission has justly considered all the facts concerning injury, whether it has exceeded the powers granted it by the Act, whether it has misconstrued the law and facts applicable to the case decided.” The argument is, that inasmuch as. jurisdiction’to entertain such appeal is conferred upon the Court having jurisdiction over the person appealing from such decision, and that appeal in the present case having been taken by the insurance carrier, a corporation, the agent of which is within the jurisdiction of 'the Superior Court, therefore, that tribunal is clothed with power to entertain the appeal. It is also true that the Insurance carrier, in this case a foreign corporation which has complied with the statutes so as to enable it to do business in this State, is amenable to the process of any of the Courts of this State.

It is necessary, ¹⁹³ therefore, to* determine if possible the intent of the Legislature in the passage of the Act upon this subject. By section 60 of the Act it was provided that, “the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to he strictly construed, shall have no application to this Act; but this Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose.” The rules of statutory construction have been laid down in this State in the following language: . “The cardinal rule in the construction of-a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature as it is expi’essed in the words of the statute, and for this purpose the whole of the Act must be considered together.” Mitchell v. State, 115 Md. 360 ; Healy v. State, 115 Md. 377 ; Purnell v. State Bd. of Ed., 125 Md. 266 . And “the real intent when ascertained will always prevail over the literal sense of the language.” Cutty v. Carson, 125 Md. 25 -33, and cases there cited. While the legislation of this character is of recent growth in this country the end sought to be accomplished is thoroughly well understood.

The object and purpose of such legislation has been two-fold: first, in cases of injury to employees to provide a speedy and inexpensive method by which compensation might be made to them or those dependent upon them without the delay of long and tedious litigation, and at a minimum of cost; and secondly, to substitute a more uniform scale of compensation in cases of accident than could be obtained from the varying and often widely divergent estimates of juries, and also to avoid the application of certain well established rules of law, which in some eases, have seemed to be harsh in their operation. It will have been observed that by the provisions of section 56, already quoted, a right of