Mitchell v. State

Briscoe, J., delivered tbe opinion of tbe Court. Tbe traverser was indicted, on tbe second day of November, 1910, in the Circuit Court for Worcester County, for tbe violation of tbe Acts of 1908, chapter 27, commonly known as the local option law of that- county.. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to pay-a fine of one hundred and fifty dollars, and to be confined in tbe Maryland House of Correction for tbe period of six months. He has taken this appeal.

At tbe trial of tbe case tbe traverser demurred to tbe indictment upon tbe ground that it failed to allege tbe offense, in tbe language of tbe statute; that is, to charge that tbe sale of tbe intoxicating liquor was made at a place of business of tbe traverser; secondly, tbe act is unconstitutional and void, because in violation of Article 3, section 29, of tbe ³⁶³ Constitution of Maryland, which provides that every law enacted hy the General Assembly shall embrace hut one subject, and that shall be described in its title. The objections, to the indictment, and to the validity of the Act of 1908, chapter 27, raised on the record, in this case, cannot be sustained, and, we think, the ruling of the Court below in overruling the demurrer was entirely correct. The language of the second section of the Act of 1908, under which the indictment was framed, is clear and definite, in its legislative meaning and intent and can admit of but one construction. It provides “that if the returns of the election provided for in section 1 of this act' shall show that a majority of the votes cast at said election were against the sale of intoxicating liquors in Worcester County; that it shall be unlawful for any person or persons, firm, corporation or association of persons, under any pretense whatever, directly or indirectly, to barter, sell, give away or otherwise dispose of it at a place of business, or keep at any place whatsoever for the purpose of bartering or selling any spirituous, fermented or intoxicating liquors, alcoholic hitters or compounds within the limits of Worcester County; and it shall also be unlawful for any person or persons, firm, corporation or association of persons under any pretense whatever, within the limits of the county aforesaid, to take orders for any spirituous, fermented or intoxicating liquors, alcoholic hitters, or compounds, or for any person or persons, firm, corporation or association of persons, to operate as distributing or collecting agents for any spirituous, fermented or intoxicating liquors, alcoholic hitters or compounds”.

The indictment charged that Charles Mitchell, the appellant here, of the county and state named in the indictment, on the ninth day of July, in the year 1910, at said county and state, unlawfully did sell certain spirituous, feimented or intoxicating liquors, to wit.: One gill of spirituous, fermented or intoxicating liquors to a certain Henry Davis, contrary to ³⁶⁴ the form of the Act of Assembly in such case made and provided and against the peace, government and dignity of the State. This indictment, it seems to us, clearly and sufficiently charged an offense, within the statute, because the statute by its very terms prohibits the sale of spirituous, fermented and intoxicating liquors within the limits of Worcester. County and made it unlawful to keep, at any place whatsoever for the purpose of barter or sale any spirituous or intoxicating liquors within the limits of that county. The use of the words in the statute, “to give away or otherwise dispiose of it at- a place of business”, was not intended to allow the sale of intoxicating liquors in the county at other places than “a place of business”, but they were inserted for the purpose of enlarging the prohibition, and making it unlawful, to give or otherwise dispose of it, under any other circumstances and conditions, at a place of business, than those previously named in the statute.

It was not, therefore, necessary to allege, that the sale was made “at a palee of business” conducted by the traverser, because it was unlawful under the .provisions of the statute to sell directly or indirectly spirituous or intoxicating liquors at any place whatsoever within the limits of Worcester County. This is clear both from- the title, and the provisions of section 2 of the act itself. The cardinal rule in the construction of a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature as it is expressed in the words of the statute, and for this purpose the whole act must be considered together. In State v. Archer, 73 Md. 57 , this Court said this rule lies at the bottom of all statutory construction.

The law, it is true, in its tenderness for life and liberety,' requires that penal statutes shall be strictly construed, by which is meant that Courts will not extend the punishment to cases not plainly within the language used. At the same time, such statutes are to be fairly and reasonably construed and Courts will not, by a narrow and strained construction exclude from their operation cases plainly within ³⁶⁵ their scope and meaning. This intention is to he ascertained, primarily, of course, from the language of the statute itself, and if the language used in plain and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood as meaning what they have expressly declared. U. S. v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624 ; Foby v. Fletcher, 28 L. J. Exch. 100.

Statutes must also be construed with special reference to the subject matter legislated upon, and with reference to the manifest mischief the act was intended to remedy. Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 472 ; Roland Parle Co. v. State, 80 Md. 451 ; Maxwell v. State, 40 Md. 273 ; Johnson and Wife v. Heald, 33 Md. 352 . The construction we have thus given the act here in dispute not only, we think, accords with the well-settled rules of statutory interpretation established by the Courts, but carries out the legislative purpose and intent of the act itself. It is contended, however, that section two (2) of the act is invalid and unconstitutional because in violation of Article 3, section 29 of the Constitution, for the want of a valid title.

The title of the act, it will be seen, is an act to enable the qualified voters of Worcester County to determine at a special election to be held Saturday, March 21, 1908, whether or not spirituous, fermented or intoxicating liquors, alcoholic bitters or compounds, shall be sold in said county and providing certain fines and penalties for the violation of the provisions of the same. Mow, it is objected, because section 2 in the body of the act makes it also unlawful in addition to the sale thereof “to give away”, “otherwise dispose of”, “to take orders for” and “to operate as distributing or collecting agents for”, any spirituous, fermented or intoxicating liquors within the limits of the county, and as the last-named violations are not embraced in the title, the statute should be declared invalid. The answer to this contention, is, that the indictment and conviction in this case, is for the sale of liquor, and we are not concerned with the violation of the statute, in other ³⁶⁶ respects. The .objection, however, is obviously not tenable upon authority. • In Cearfoss v. The State, 42 Md. 403 , this Court held, that the