Bridgett v. Montgomery County

ZARNOCH, Judge. In this case, we consider whether the Circuit Court for Montgomery County was correct in granting appellee Montgomery County’s motion for summary judgment and rejecting a Workers’ Compensation Commission award made to appel ⁶¹⁸ lant Kevin Bridgett for the claimed occupational disease of Dupuytren’s contracture. 1 For reasons set forth below, we conclude that it was error for the court to grant summary judgment. Thus, we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS For more than 30 years, appellant was employed with the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Services (MCFRS) as a firefighter 2 and later, a lieutenant in the River Rescue and Tactical Services (RRATS). 3 In an affidavit filed in the circuit court, Bridgett described the employment conditions associated with service in RRATS: All river rescue fire fighters must constantly hold a rope while under water in order to find their way back to the boat,...

All river rescue fire fighters engage in undeiwater work which is mostly done with zero visibility and so the hands must be used to “visualize” everything under water. The hands must constantly be used to find objects and manipulate those objects under water to determine what they are .... all fire fighters are also constantly using their hands on an extensive basis to perform tasks such as removing ceilings, pulling hoses, pulling oneself into fire trucks, grasping tools, and pulling on doors, pipes and other objects.... The overuse of the hands is a condition of employment that is common to all fire rescue fighters.[ 4 ] ⁶¹⁹ Appellant described his working conditions in similar terms at a June 2007 hearing before a Workers’ Compensation Commissioner. 5 At the same hearing, Bridgett said that eventually he “got a big lump in the palm of [his] hand.” In April 2007, appellant filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation Commission alleging: “I developed Dupuytren’s contracture as a result of many years (over 35) of use of hands grasping, pulling and hand manipulations as a firefighter.” Appellee responded by indicating it would be contesting issues. Two and a half-months later, at a hearing before Commissioner Sfekas, medical evidence was offered by both sides.

Bridgett’s orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Sunjay Berdia, said in a letter that appellant developed Dupuytren’s contracture of his right hand. He observed: ⁶²⁰ As you know Dupuytren’s contracture is due to the disease myelo fibroblast. This in itself proliferates and causes fascial contractures which initially result in nodules and then subsequently can result in contractures of the fingers. Although there is a certain genetic predisposition of developing Dupuytren’s contracture, we also believe that in the majority of patients, there is usually an inciting event such as either trauma or overuse of the palmar skin.

Given the fact that Mr. Bridgett has been a firefighter for over 35 years in which he has been grasping and pulling ropes and in addition doing similar activities while he was on a rescue dive team for the last 16 years, I feel that Mr. Bridgett’s development of Dupuytren’s contracture, within a reasonable degree of medical probability is more likely than not (greater than 51%) due to his duties as a fire fighter. Appellee countered with a letter from a hand specialist, Dr. Peter Innis, who after examining Bridgett, noted: I am forwarding for your review a pamphlet that the patient was reading in our office, which is put out by the American Society for Surgery of the Hand', which is our national organization. This pamphlet entitled: “Dupuytren’s Disease” states under the section “What causes it?” “There is no proven evidence that hand injuries or specific occupational exposure lead to a higher risk of developing Dupuytren’s disease.” I agree with this statement, and it is my opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that this very pleasant gentleman had a right palmar nodule consistent with Dupuytren’s disease, which was not related to his work as a fire and rescue lieutenant. On June 20, 2007, Commissioner Sfekas issued an award of compensation to Bridgett.

In ordering the payment of benefits, the Commission order said: The Commission finds on the issues presented that the claimant sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment, that the first date of disablement was December 15, 2005, that the disability of the claimant (Dupuytren’s contracture; right/wrist) is the ⁶²¹ result of the occupational disease, and that as a result thereof the claimant was temporary totally disabled from December 15, 2005 to December 80, 2005 inclusive. On July 11, 2007, Montgomery County filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission’s decision and a request for jury trial. Appellant answered. Four months later, the County filed a motion for summary judgment.

Appellee submitted no new evidence, but argued as a matter of law that Bridgett had not suffered a compensable injury as defined by § 9—502(d)(1)(i) of the Labor and Employment (L & E) Article of the Md.Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol.), and as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in King v. Bd. of Ed. of Prince George’s County, 354 Md. 369 , 731 A.2d 460 (1999); 6 and 2) that the claimant’s Dupuytren’s contracture did not amount to a compensable occupational disease. 7 Specifically, appellee argued that “the issue is not whether . .. Bridgett excessively used his hands, but whether firefighterfs] as a class excessively use their hands during the course of their employment.” The County added that to qualify as a compensable occupational disease, the condition “must not only be inherent in the nature of the claimant’s job, but the disease also cannot occur with equal frequency in any other employment ...” and that the appellant failed this test. The appellee also argued that the Workers’ Compensation Act was not meant to cover “the common perils of life” and that the overuse of hands was just such an activity.

Solely for purposes of the summary judg ⁶²² ment motion, the County said it would “accept Mr. Bridgett’s contention that the [D]upuytren’s contracture of his right hand/wrist was caused by use of [his] hands.” Appellant opposed these contentions and submitted an affidavit of Bridgett, the award of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, Montgomery County Class Specifications for Firefighter/Rescuer I, II, and III, the written evaluation of Dr. Berdia, and the transcript of testimony before Commissioner Sfekas. Specifically, appellant argued that under L & E Article, § 9-745(b), as interpreted by the Court of Appeals in Baltimore County v. Kelly, 391 Md. 64 , 891 A.2d 1103 (2006), the Commission’s award in Bridgett’s favor was prima facie correct and sufficient to defeat appellee’s motion for summary judgment. 8 He also contended that the evidence he had presented created material disputes of fact not resolvable by summary judgment. On February 28, 2008, the circuit court heard argument on the motion and issued its ruling: All right. Okay.

I think the King case is applicable here and I will grant the motion for summary judgment. On March 12, 2008, an order was entered granting the summary judgment motion and remanding the case to the Workers’ Compensation Commission “for the entry of an award affirming its decision to disallow the claim [sic ] filed here.... ” Two days later, Bridgett noted his appeal. QUESTIONS PRESENTED Appellant raises the following questions: I. Whether in an appeal of a workers’ compensation decision where the Claimant was successful before the Worker’s Compensation Commission in a full evidentiary Hearing and the Employer/Self-Insurer appealed to the Circuit Court and presented no new evidence, under ⁶²³ Baltimore County v. Kelly, 391 Md. 64 , 891 A.2d 1103 (2006) and its progeny, which preclude summary judgment at such a stage, the Circuit Court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of the appealing party (the Employer/Self-Insurer) was erroneous?

II

Whether in an appeal of a workers’ compensation decision where the Claimant was successful before the Workers’ Compensation Commission and the Employer/Self-Insurer appealed to the Circuit Court, granting summary judgment to the appealing employer was erroneous where there was a material dispute of fact as to whether the claimant’s Dupuytren’s contracture was due to the nature of the employment as a fire fighter given that there was evidence that the hazards of the occupational disease (overuse of the hands) exist in that occupation? Appellee frames the issues in this fashion: I. Did the circuit court correctly grant summary judgment to the County where Mr. Bridgett’s Dupuytren’s contracture was not due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist?

II

Did the circuit court properly grant summary judgment where the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s decision was not supported by minimum evidence sufficient for a prima facie case? 9 DISCUSSION Under Md. Rule 2-501(f), a court may not grant summary judgment unless there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering the motion, the court views the facts, including all inferences, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 ⁶²⁴ Md. 509, 536, 836 A.2d 655 (2003). In reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we must determine whether the decision was legally correct and our review is confined to the basis relied upon by the court below.

Id. In this case, by its exclusive reliance on King, supra, the circuit court appears to have based its summary judgment decision solely on Bridgett’s asserted failure to show that his condition was compensable under L & E Article, § 9-502(d)(1)(i), because it was not “due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist.” Thus, the County’s contentions that Dupuytren’s contracture is not an occupational disease of Bridgett’s job as determined by the Commission and that the Commission’s award was not supported by sufficient evidence to warrant its acceptance as prima facie correct would seem, at first blush, not to be before us. However, because of appellant’s undei*standable reliance on the Commission’s award to survive summary judgment and its express rejection in the court’s March 12, 2008 order, the County’s contentions are necessarily entwined with the compensability issue. For these reasons, it is permissible for us to consider all of these questions.

See Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 243-44 , 932 A.2d 571 (2007). The logical place to begin our analysis is a consideration of the impact of the Commission’s award in a summary judgment setting. 1. Effect of the Commission’s Award Section 9-745(b) of the L & E Article states: In each court proceeding under this title: (1) the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct; and (2) the party challenging the decision has the burden of proof. As Maryland courts have interpreted this provision, when a claimant prevails before the Commission and the matter comes before the circuit court, the administrative decision is the claimant’s prima facie case.

Kelly, 391 Md. at 75-76 , 891 ⁶²⁵ A.2d 1103; Smith v. Howard County, 177 Md.App. 327, 338 , 935 A.2d 450 (2007). As such, the claimant generally cannot suffer a summary judgment or a directed verdict against the employee on the grounds that he or she failed to produce a prima facie case. Smith, 177 Md.App. at 338 , 935 A.2d 450 . There are some important exceptions to this rule.

Prima facie correctness is denied to a Commission decision not based on its actual “consideration of conflicting evidence as to essential facts or the deduction of permissible but diverse inferences therefrom....” Moore v. Clarke, 171 Md. 39, 45 , 187 A. 887 (1936). See Kelly, 391 Md. at 75-77 , 891 A.2d 1103 ; Smith, 177 Md.App. at 338 , 935 A.2d 450 . In addition, the Commission’s decision does not make the claimant’s prima facie case if the agency did not have before it “the minimum evidence necessary to support an award.” Dove v. Montgomery County, 178 Md.App. 702, 724-25 , 943 A.2d 662 (2008)(quoting Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 130.06[3][a](2006)). This burden is “slight,” Smith, 177 Md.App. at 332 , 935 A.2d 450 , but means at least “proving a case beyond speculation and conjecture.” Larson, supra at § 130.06[l][a] and [3][a], Finally, a Commission decision would not be invulnerable from attack by summary judgment if the contention raised is a legal ground.

Kelly, 391 Md. at 78 , 891 A.2d 1103 ; Marshall v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 161 Md.App. 379, 382 , 869 A.2d 391 (2005). We find none of these exceptions applicable in this case. 2.

Conflicting Evidence/Legal Grounds This was a contested case before the Commission. Medical evidence was offered by both sides, with sharp disagreement over whether Dupuytren’s contracture was an occupational disease and whether the condition arose from Bridgett’s employment as a firefighter/rescue diver. See pp. 3-4 supra. The claimant also testified on these matters.

In addition, the issues of whether the appellant had an occupational disease under § 9-101(g) of the L & E Article and of whether it was compensable under § 9-502(d)(l)(i) were primarily fact-driven and were not purely questions of law. ⁶²⁶ 3. Minimum Evidence Before the Commission To address the question of whether there was minimum evidence before the Commission to support its award, we first consider whether Dupuytren’s contracture could ever be an occupational disease. 10 Although this issue' may be a novel one in Maryland, a cursory review of out-of-state cases discloses that the question was first litigated more than 75 years ago, see John Reardon’s Case, 275 Mass. 24 , 175 N.E. 149 (1931), and continues to be contested today, see Hollingsworth v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 183 N.C.App. 154 , 643 S.E.2d 675 , 2007 WL 1247050 (N.C.App.2007), 11 with mixed results. In John Reardon’s Case, supra, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the workers’ compensation claim of a