Briggeman v. Albert

CHASANOW, Judge. Phillip K. Albert, Jr. was driving in Ocean City, Maryland on June 8, 1985 when, at the corner of Philadelphia Avenue and 123rd Street, his automobile struck and seriously injured a pedestrian, Betty L. Briggeman. An officer from the Ocean City Police Department responded to the scene, wrote out a report, and issued a citation to Mr. Albert for failure to exercise due care for a pedestrian, in violation of Maryland Code (1977, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Transportation Article, § 21-504(a). Albert, a Howard County resident, chose not to stand trial in Worcester County but instead simply mailed the preset fine of $30.00 to the District Court of Maryland in Annapolis prior to a trial date being set.

Briggeman sued Albert in the Circuit Court for Howard County for injuries resulting from the accident. At trial, she sought to introduce evidence that Albert had paid the traffic fine, arguing that this was an admission by a party-opponent. Albert countered that the payment was made in the interest of convenience, not as an admission of guilt, and was more closely akin to a plea of nolo contendere. The trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible.

After the ¹³⁵ jury returned a verdict in favor of Albert, Briggeman appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the evidence of Albert’s payment of the fine. The intermediate appellate court found no error and consequently affirmed the circuit court judgment. Briggeman v. Albert, 81 Md.App. 482 , 568 A.2d 865 (1990). We are called upon to decide whether, in a motor tort case, the plaintiff may introduce into evidence the defendant’s payment of a traffic citation as an express admission, consent to conviction, or admission by conduct.

Admissions, in the form of words or acts of a party-opponent, may be offered as evidence against that party. Aetna Casualty & Surety v. Kuhl, 296 Md. 446, 455 , 463 A.2d 822, 827 (1983). See also McCormick on Evidence § 262 at 774 (E. Cleary, 3d ed. 1984). 1 It is reasoned that allowing such an admission into evidence is fair, as the party-opponent’s case cannot be prejudiced by an inability to cross-examine him or herself. Kirkland v. State, 75 Md.App. 49, 57 , 540 A.2d 490, 493 , cert. denied, 313 Md. 506 , 545 A.2d 1344 (1988).

Generally, when a guilty plea to a criminal charge is admitted in a subsequent civil action, it is under the auspices of an admission by a party-opponent. Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 403 , 347 A.2d 842, 848 (1975); McCormick on Evidence, supra § 265 at 783. For this reason, a defendant may choose to plead nolo contendere in order to avoid the admissibility of the plea.

Agnew v. State, 51 Md.App. 614, 651-53 , 446 A.2d 425, 445-46 , cert. denied, 294 Md. 441 (1982); 6 L. McLain, Maryland Evidence § 801(4).2 at 310 (1987). “[A]n admission of guilt in the traffic court is admissible in evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding arising out of the same accident.” (Emphasis added.) Campfield v. Crowther, 252 Md. 88, 100 , 249 A.2d 168 , 176 ¹³⁶ (1969) (citing Miller v. Hall, 161 Md. 111, 113-14 , 155 A. 327, 329 (1931)). The submission of payment personally or by mail in satisfaction of a traffic fine, however, is not the evidentiary equivalent of a guilty plea in open court. In the instant case, Albert claims that, rather than travel from his home in Howard County to traffic court in Worcester County, he paid the $30.00 fine for the sake of convenience and economy. The traffic citation issued to Mr. Albert states: “You may pay the amount of fine ... and not stand trial. [Mail payment to the court.] The payment of a fine shall be considered as a conviction.

Points will be assessed on a driver’s record after conviction of a violation of the motor vehicle laws of this state, or after payment of the fine as established by the court. If payment is not received, you will be notified of a trial date.” (Emphasis added.) The payment of a traffic fine is neither a guilty plea nor an express acknowledgment of guilt; it is at most a consent to conviction, closely analogous to a plea of nolo contendere. Albert merely chose to exercise his statutory right, under Md.Code (1977, 1987 Repl.Yol.) Transportation Art., § 26-407(c), 2 to dispose of a traffic citation without appearing in court. He did not admit his guilt by paying the fine.

We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ reasoning in the instant case: “[I]t is tenable that the defendant may ... [pay] the fine by mail without the intention of admitting to having committed a driving infraction.” Briggeman v. Albert, 81 Md.App. at 487 , 568 A.2d at 868 . Nowhere on ¹³⁷ the ticket does it state that payment of the fine constitutes an express admission of culpable conduct. It is not a guilty plea and, therefore, not an express admission by a party-opponent. The payment is a consent to conviction.

The classification of a traffic fine payment as a consent to conviction rather than a guilty plea is an important distinction. In Maryland, evidence of a conviction is inadmissible as substantive proof in a subsequent civil suit arising from the same incident as the criminal charge. Aetna Casualty, 296 Md. at 450 , 463 A.2d at 825 (“It is a well-settled rule in Maryland that a criminal conviction is inadmissible to establish the truth of the facts upon which it is rendered in a civil action for damages arising from the offense for which the person is convicted”). See also 6 L. McLain, supra, § 803(22).1 at 428.

Payment of a traffic fine is a consent to conviction, and a conviction, even when entered by consent, is not admissible to prove liability. 3 There may be legitimate, plausible reasons for choosing to pay the fine, by mail or