Crane v. Dunn

GREENE, J. “In Maryland, a guilty plea to a traffic citation is admissible in a civil trial; its probative value is deemed to outweigh any prejudicial effect. An express acknowledgment of guilt to the charged offense in open court is far more probative than a questionable acknowledgment of culpability that might be inferred from paying a preset fine in lieu of going to court.” Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133, 139 , 586 A.2d 15, 18 (1991). In this case we must decide whether the trial judge correctly excluded evidence of a party’s guilty plea, in traffic court, to the charge of negligent driving when that evidence was offered at a subsequent civil trial. We hold that the trial judge ⁸⁸ misinterpreted our decision in Briggeman and erroneously excluded a party opponent’s prior admission of guilt.

FACTS Linda J. Crane (“ Crane”] and Annie V. Dunn (“ Dunn”J were friends and co-workers who were involved in a single vehicle accident on August 19, 1998. The accident occurred while Crane and Dunn traveled home together after an evening at Midway Slots in Harrington, Delaware. 1 Dunn was driving her Toyota pickup and Crane was her passenger. No other people or vehicles were involved in the accident. Both parties testified and gave conflicting versions as to how the accident happened.

Although they agree that Dunn left the main traveled portion of the roadway to avoid striking a deer, that the accident happened between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., and that Dunn drove either below or at the posted speed of 50 mph, they gave contradictory versions of the specific details of the accident. According to Crane, as Dunn drove along Whiteleysburg Road, Rt. 314 in Maryland, a deer ran parallel to the right side of the road and the pickup truck. Dunn swerved sharply to the left to avoid a collision and drove into a field, through a ditch, a fence and into another ditch before the vehicle came to rest. The vehicle traveled off the roadway approximately 50 feet.

Crane explained that the deer was actually a car length away in front of them before it came across the road in front of the truck. On the other hand, Dunn testified that, as she drove along Rt. 314, Crane yelled, “watch out,” and then she saw the deer for the first time, “coming out in front and that’s when [she] swerved to the left.” According to Dunn the deer did not run parallel with the truck until she swerved left. Dunn pointed out that her evasive actions were taken to “get around the deer,” so she, “intentionally drove off the road” ⁸⁹ into a field “to avoid the deer,” and at no time applied her brakes to avoid striking the deer. Prior to the civil trial in the Circuit Court for Caroline County, Dunn appeared in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Caroline County on December 17, 1998, and pleaded guilty to negligent driving, Md.Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 21-901.1(b) of the Transportation Article.

The additional traffic citations for driving while intoxicated and driving under the influence, Md.Code (1977, 2002 Repl.Vol.), §§ 21-902(a) and (b) of the Transportation Article, respectively, were abandoned in the District Court proceedings. 2 The maximum penalty for negligent driving is $500, including administrative sanctions. Md.Code (1977, 2002 RepLVol.), §§ 27-101 and 16-402 of the Transportation Article. Crane sued Dunn in the Circuit Court for Caroline County for damages resulting from Dunn’s negligent operation of her motor vehicle. Dunn moved, in limine, to exclude any reference to her guilty plea to negligent driving.

Even though Dunn pleaded guilty to negligent driving, the trial judge did not believe the plea constituted an express acknowledgment of responsibility for the accident and, instead, accepted Dunn’s explanation, as recorded in her deposition answers, that she ⁹⁰ was not admitting guilt when she pleaded guilty, but that she pleaded guilty only to avoid prosecution for more serious charges. 3 The trial judge concluded that the facts of the District Court traffic proceedings were ambiguous as to whether Dunn admitted guilt. In granting Dunn’s motion in limine to exclude evidence the trial judge stated: [T]he Court’s going to grant Defense’s Motion, based upon Briggeman , in reading the deposition as well as reading the case. I do agree Mr. Farina that in certain context if someone says, on the record and I doubt the guilt, there was any guilty plea on the record in District Court even if there was I don’t have it in front of me. If she admitted her ⁹¹ guilt, on the record at, in District Court that really would have been an admission, that would have been admissible despite Briggeman .

But based upon her own deposition testimony at page 14, she talks about she specifically says, she wasn’t admitting her responsibility, it was a plea they offered me, they dropped other charges, just to hasten everything. That in and of itself is enough ambiguity to me, to cloud or to cause me to doubt whether her payment of the fine or the acceptance of the plea was an admission of the guilt or as you said she wanted to take the benefit of the bargain, so as not to be exposed to the greater penalties that she may have been exposed ... to for DUI.... At the conclusion of the trial in the Circuit Court the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dunn on the issue of liability. Crane filed a motion for new trial which the court denied.

Subsequently, Crane filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Before argument in the intermediate appellate court, this Court granted Crane’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Crane v. Dunn, 379 Md. 224 , 841 A.2d 339 (2004). Standard of Review The exclusion of competent, relevant and material evidence may constitute prejudice and result in reversible error.

Stacy v. Burke, 259 Md. 390 , 269 A.2d 837 (1970); see also Regal Const. Co. v. West Lanham Hills Citizen’s Ass’n., 256 Md. 302 , 260 A.2d 82 (1970). It is the policy of this Court not to reverse for harmless error and the burden is on the appellant in all cases to show prejudice as well as error. Rippon v. Mercantile Safe Deposit Co., 213 Md. 215, 222 , 131 A.2d 695, 698 (1957) (quoting Sieland v. Gallo, 194 Md. 282 , 71 A.2d 45 ; Balto.

Transit Co. v. Castrando, 194 Md. 421 , 71 A.2d 442 ). Prejudice will be found if a showing is made that the error was likely to have affected the verdict below. “It is not the possibility, but the probability, of prejudice which is the object of the appellate inquiry.” State Deposit Ins. Fund Corp. v. Billman, 321 Md. 3, 17 , 580 A.2d 1044, 1051 (1990) ⁹² (citing Harford Sands, Inc. v. Groft, 320 Md. 136, 148 , 577 A.2d 7, 12-13 (1990)). “Courts are reluctant to set aside verdicts for errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence unless they cause substantial injustice.” Hance v. State Roads Comm., 221 Md. 164, 176 , 156 A.2d 644, 650-651 (1959). Substantial prejudice must be shown.

Id. To justify the reversal, an error below must have been “... both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious.” Rotwein v. Bogart, 227 Md. 434, 437 , 177 A.2d 258, 260 (1962) (quoting 2 Poe on Pleading and Practice (Tiffany’s ed.), § 287, p. 249.) Maryland Rule 5-103(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “error may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless the party is prejudiced by the ruling____” Maryland Rule 5-104(a) entrusts to the court questions of admissibility of evidence. Likewise, pursuant to Rule 5-104(a) “[pjreliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.” Thus, the court’s duty is to determine whether such preliminary facts exist to support the admissibility of evidence. The court generally applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in making that determination.

See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 , 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2778-79 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 152-53 (1987). Judge Harrell, on behalf of this Court, explained the difference between our review under the abuse of discretion standard and legal error. He said: Application of [the abuse of discretion] standard, however, depends on whether the trial judge’s ruling under review was based on a discretionary weighing of relevance in relation to other factors or on a pure conclusion of law. When the trial judge’s ruling involves a weighing, we apply the more deferential abuse of discretion standard.

On the other hand, when the trial judge’s ruling involves a legal question, we review the trial court’s ruling de novo. J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park, 368 Md. 71, 91-92 , 792 A.2d 288, 300 (2002) (footnote and internal citations omitted). ⁹³ Admissibility of guilty pleas to minor traffic offenses in subsequent civil litigation arising out of the same occurrence In Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 276 Md. 396 , 347 A.2d 842 (1975), we acknowledged that a plea of guilty to the crime of assault may be introduced in a subsequent civil proceeding, emphasizing that the guilty plea may be rebutted or explained in the subsequent proceeding. We reaffirmed the general proposition and the rationale for the introduction of the plea in the civil context: A plea of guilty to a criminal charge may be introduced in a subsequent civil proceeding as an admission. Campfield v. Crowther, 252 Md. 88, 100 , 249 A.2d 168 (1969).

But this admission does not conclusively establish liability. Instead, it may be rebutted or explained in the subsequent civil case in which it is admitted. Nicholson v. Snyder, 97 Md. 415, 425 , 55 A. 484 (1903); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Insurance Company, 58 Cal.2d 601 , 25 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). Justice Traynor, for the Supreme Court of California, explained the reasons underlying this rule in the Teitelbaum case ( 25 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 375 P.2d at 441 ): When a plea of guilty has been entered in the prior action, no issues have been “drawn into controversy” by a “full presentation” of the case.

It may reflect only a compromise or a belief that paying a fine is more advantageous than litigation. Considerations of fairness to civil litigants and regard for the expeditious administration of criminal justice ... combine to prohibit the application of collateral estoppel against a party who, having pleaded guilty to a criminal charge, seeks for the first time to litigate this cause in a civil action. Brohawn, 276 Md. 396, 403-404 , 347 A.2d 842, 848 . Although Brohawn involved a guilty plea to assault which was given in exchange for dismissal of kidnapping charges against Mrs. Brohawn, we find no support in our case law for ⁹⁴ drawing a distinction between pleas of guilty to serious crimes and traffic or other minor crimes. 4 We have decided three cases involving the issue of admissibility of a guilty plea entered in traffic court as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding arising out of the same occurrence.

The most expansive discussion of the issue can be found in Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133 , 586 A.2d 15 (1991). Although the discussion of the issue is limited in the other two cases, the cases are, nonetheless, relevant to our discussion. See Campfield v. Crowther, 252 Md. 88 , 249 A.2d 168 (1969) (holding that a guilty plea to a criminal charge may be introduced in a subsequent civil proceeding as an admission) and Miller v. Hall, 161 Md. 111 , 155 A. 327 (1931) (holding that the testimony of the defendant, at his subsequent civil trial for negli ⁹⁵ gence, in which he pleaded guilty in traffic court to failure to yield the right of way, was an admission of fault and relevant). In Briggeman we held that payment of a traffic fíne is neither a guilty plea nor an express acknowledgment of guilt.

Therefore, the payment of a traffic fine has no relevance to the subsequent civil proceeding arising from the same occurrence. Briggeman, 322 Md. at 137 , 586 A.2d at 17 . Briggeman involved a single vehicle accident that occurred when Phillip K. Albert, Jr. was driving his automobile in Ocean City and struck Betty L. Briggeman, a pedestrian. Briggeman, 322 Md. at 134 , 586 A.2d at 15 .

At the scene, a police officer issued Mr. Albert a citation for failure to exercise due care for a pedestrian. Id. Mr. Albert had the option of paying the citation in lieu of appearing for trial in court. Id.

Because the accident occurred in Worcester County and Mr. Albert resided in Howard County, he paid the fine to avoid a trial in Worcester County, which was a considerable distance from his home. Id. In a civil tort proceeding regarding the same accident, the pedestrian sought to introduce Mr. Albert’s payment of the fine as evidence that he admitted guilt for the accident. Id.

The trial judge ruled that the evidence was inadmissible and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Briggeman, 81 Md.App. 482 , 568 A.2d 865 . We reviewed the matter, affirming the intermediate appellate court and holding that the payment of a traffic fine is not an admission of guilt because Mr. Albert “merely chose to exercise his statutory right ... to dispose of a traffic citation without appearing in court.” Briggeman, 322 Md. at 136 , 586 A.2d at 16 . We pointed out that payment of a fine “is not the evidentiary equivalent of a guilty plea in open court.” Id.

Briggeman draws a distinction between two categories of convictions — those that are admissible in evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding arising out of the same accident and those that are not. In the first category are guilty pleas, which support an admission of guilt: ⁹⁶ Admissions, in the form of words or acts of a party-opponent, may be offered as evidence against that party. It is reasoned that allowing such an admission into evidence is fair, as the party-opponent’s case cannot be prejudiced by an inability to cross-examine him or herself. Generally, when a guilty plea to a criminal charge is admitted in a subsequent civil action, it is under the auspices of an admission by a party-opponent.

For this reason, a defendant may choose to plead nolo contendere in order to avoid the admissibility of the plea. Briggeman, 322 Md. 133, 135 , 586 A.2d 15, 16 . (Footnote and citations omitted.) Admissions are “the words or acts of a party-opponent, or of his predecessor or representative, offered as evidence against him.” McCormick on Evidence, § 262 at 628. Admissions are considered to be substantive evidence of the facts admitted.

Smith v. Branscome, 251 Md. 582 , 248 A.2d 455 (1968); Terry v. O’Neal, 194 Md. 680 , 72 A.2d 26 (1950); Lambros v. Coolahan, 185 Md. 463 , 45 A.2d 96 (1945); Kirk & Sons v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383 , 35 A. 1089 (1896); Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 (1880). A party may offer into evidence against his opponent anything said by him as long as it illustrates some inconsistency with the facts now asserted by the opponent in pleadings or in testimony. U Wigmore on Evidence § 10U8, at p. 4 (Chadbourne rev. ed.1972). Admissions do not have to be against the speaker’s interest when made and may even be made by someone not having personal knowledge of the fact admitted.

Unlike some hearsay exceptions, the speaker need not be, and rarely is, unavailable. McCormick on Evidence, § 254 at 136. Dunn’s plea in District Court fits into this category of guilty pleas which are admissible under Briggeman. Evidence of Dunn’s plea in traffic court is contained in her answer to interrogatory number 26.

In accordance with Maryland Rule 2-421 (d), answers to interrogatories may be used for any purpose to the extent permitted by the Rules of Evidence. Under Maryland Rule 5-803(a) an admission of a party- ⁹⁷ opponent is admissible and is considered an exception to hearsay. Here, the trial judge noted that under Briggeman, “[if] [Dunn] admitted her guilt ... on the record, in District Court that really would have been an admission, that would have been admissible.” Despite the clear statement of her admission of guilt as embodied in Dunn’s answer to interrogatory number 26, the trial court erroneously determined that Dunn’s guilty plea was ambiguous and, thus, inadmissible. In order to reach this