Bringe v. Collins

Eldridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents questions concerning the right to a jury trial in an action by a landlord to recover possession of his real estate from a tenant holding over after the expiration of the term of the lease. In October 1973, the respondent landlord, Wayne C. Collins, brought an action in the District Court of Maryland, in Prince George’s County, to recover possession of his real estate from the petitioner tenant, John Bringe, who was allegedly holding over beyond the term of the lease. The statutory basis for the action was Maryland Code (1957, 1973 Repl.

Vol.), Art. 21, § 8-402 (b), now recodified as Code (1974), § 8-402 (b) of the Real Property Article. In that district court action, neither party sought money damages, and neither party claimed that the right to possession had any particular monetary value. Moreover, there was no request for a jury trial. The district court granted a judgment for the restitution of the possession of the premises, and the tenant appealed.

The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on March 8, 1974, affirmed the judgment ³⁴⁰ of the district court, and this Court thereafter denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. About seven weeks after the circuit court’s affirmance of the district court’s judgment granting possession of the premises to the landlord, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U. S. 363 , 94 S. Ct. 1723 , 40 L.Ed.2d 198 (1974), holding that under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a party had the right to demand a jury trial in an action brought in the District of Columbia by a landlord to recover possession of real estate. At the time that the Pernell decision was rendered, a writ of eviction had not yet issued upon the district court’s judgment granting possession of the real estate to the respondent Collins. The Pernell decision prompted the tenant, petitioner John Bringe, to commence a new proceeding in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, for a declaratory judgment that Code (1974), § 8-402 (b) of the Real Property Article, was in violation of both the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article XV, § 6, of the Maryland Constitution because it failed to provide for a jury trial in an action by a landlord to recover possession of property.

The tenant John Bringe also sought an injunction to restrain the landlord from presenting a writ of eviction to the court for signature, to restrain the clerk of the court from issuing a writ of eviction, and to restrain the sheriff from serving a writ of eviction. Named as defendants were the landlord Wayne C. Collins, the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the Sheriff of Prince George’s County, and the Attorney General of Maryland. After the submission of briefs and a hearing, the circuit court (Couch, J.) denied the relief sought by the tenant. The circuit court held: First, that the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution did not apply to proceedings in state courts; second, that under Art. XV, § 6, of the Maryland Constitution and Code (1974), § 4-402 (e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, there was a right to a jury trial in landlord-tenant actions where the amount in ³⁴¹ controversy exceeded $500.00, and that the tenant John Bringe would have been entitled to a jury trial if he “could have demonstrated that his right to possess the premises in dispute involved a valuable right of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) or more . . and third, that in any event the tenant waived his right to a jury trial in the prior district court action by failing to demand a jury trial in accordance with Maryland District Rule 343.

The tenant John Bringe took an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and this Court then granted a writ of certiorari prior to a decision by the Court of Special Appeals. See Code (1974), §§ 12-201 and 12-203 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Finding ourselves in agreement with the decision of the circuit court, we affirm. (1) The petitioner’s initial argument is that the principles of the Seventh Amendment are incorporated in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and are, therefore, applicable to proceedings in the state courts. 1 Since, petitioner argues, the Supreme Court in Pernell v. Southall Realty, supra, held that the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial in a District of Columbia action by a landlord to recover possession of his property even though (under petitioner’s interpretation of Pernell) no particular sum of money was involved in that controversy, there was similarly a right to a jury trial in the subject state court action despite the fact that no monetary claim was made.

The major problem with the petitioner’s argument is that the Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that the Seventh Amendment is not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and consequently is not applicable to state court proceedings. Almost one hundred ³⁴² years ago, Chief Justice Waite said for the Court in Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 92-93 , 23 L. Ed. 678 (1876): “By art. 7 of the amendments, it is provided, that ‘in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.’ This, as has been many times decided, relates only to trials in the courts of the United States. Edwards v. Elliot, 21 Wall. 557 . The States, so far as this amendment is concerned, are left to regulate trials in their own courts in their own way.

A trial by jury in suits at common law pending in the State courts is not, therefore, a privilege or immunity of national citizenship, which the States are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to abridge. A State cannot deprive a person of his property without due process of law; but this does not necessarily imply that all trials in the State courts affecting the property of persons must be by jury.” The Seventh Amendment has been held inapplicable even though the state court proceedings were for the purpose of enforcing rights created by federal statute, Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211, 219-220 , 36 S. Ct. 595, 597 , 60 L. Ed. 961 (1916). See also Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U. S. 476, 479 , 64 S. Ct. 232, 234 , 88 L. Ed. 239 (1943); Hardware Dealers’ Mut.

Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 158 , 52 S. Ct. 69, 71 , 76 L. Ed. 214 (1931); Wagner Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U. S. 226, 232 , 43 S. Ct. 589, 591 , 67 L. Ed. 961 (1923); St. Louis & K. C. L. Co. v. Kansas City, 241 U. S. 419, 431 , 36 S. Ct. 647, 652 , 60 L. Ed. 1072 (1916); Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. (88 U. S.) 532, 557, 22 L. Ed. 487 (1874).

Petitioner, while acknowledging that prior to the 1974 decision in Pernell v. Southall Realty, supra, the Supreme Court consistently held that the Seventh Amendment was inapplicable to state court proceedings, argues that Pemell overruled the above-cited cases and, for the first time, held that the Seventh Amendment was incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner ³⁴³ relies upon the following passage from Mr. Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in Pernell, supra, 416 U. S. at 385 (emphasis supplied): “Some delay, of course, is inherent in any fair-minded system of justice. A landlord-tenant dispute, like any other lawsuit, cannot be resolved unth due process of law unless both parties have had a fair opportunity to present their cases. Our courts were never intended to serve as rubber stamps for landlords seeking to evict their tenants, but rather to see that justice be done before a man is evicted from his home.” Petitioner contends that the reference to “due process of law” in the quoted passage discloses the Supreme Court’s belief that the right to a jury trial according to the requirements of the Seventh Amendment is an integral part of the “due process of law” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

However, a phrase in a judicial opinion must be viewed in the context in which it appears. Mr. Justice Marshall, in the above-quoted passage, was not addressing himself to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, or to state court proceedings, or to the various considerations and problems involved if the Court were to hold that the Seventh Amendment were applicable to the states. Instead, he was responding to an argument, which had been accepted by the lower court, that jury trials in landlord-tenant cases would impose a heavy burden upon the District of Columbia’s court system. There is nothing in the Pemell opinion that even suggests an intention on the part of the Supreme Court to overrule numerous previous cases and hold that the Seventh Amendment governs civil proceedings in the state courts.

Pemell did not involve a state court action or the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the Court was concerned with landlord-tenant cases in the District of Columbia, a federal jurisdiction to which the Seventh Amendment is directly applicable. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 5 , 19 S. Ct. 580, 582 , 43 L. Ed. 873 (1899). It is almost inconceivable that the Supreme Court would use Pemell as a vehicle to ³⁴⁴ overrule a consistent line of cases directly dealing with the issue of whether the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial in state court civil proceedings.

This is particularly true considering, that the Court has very recently indicated that it adheres to its prior holdings concerning the reach of the Seventh Amendment. Thus in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 192, n. 6 , 94 S. Ct. 1005, 1007 , 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974), decided just two months before Pernell , Mr. Justice Marshall, also the author of Pernell , stated for the Court: “The Court has not held that the right to jury trial in civil cases is an element of due process applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Just the previous year, in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U. S. 149, 169, n. 4 , 93 S. Ct. 2448, 2459 , 37 L.Ed.2d 522 (1973), which involved the constitutionality under the Seventh Amendment of six-member juries in federal trials, Mr. Justice Marshall had observed (dissenting opinion): “Indeed, the Seventh Amendment is one of the few remaining provisions in the Bill of Rights which has not been held to be applicable to the States. See, e.g., Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U. S. 151, 158 , 52 S. Ct. 69, 71 , 76 L. Ed. 214 (1931); Wagner Electric Mfg.

Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U. S. 226, 232 , 43 S. Ct. 589, 591 , 67 L. Ed. 961 (1923).” Also a year before Pemell, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision of a three-judge federal district court in Louisiana which had held, in an opinion by Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom, that the requirements of the Seventh Amendment were not incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore were not applicable to state court civil proceedings. Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 409 U. S. 943 , 1098, 93 S. Ct. 289 , 290, 908, 34 L.Ed.2d 214, 679 (1973). 2 ³⁴⁵ We therefore reject petitioner’s contention that the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution required that he be afforded a jury trial in a landlord-tenant action in the Maryland courts. (2) Petitioner also argues that Article XV, § 6, of the Maryland Constitution guaranteed him the right to a jury trial in the suit by the landlord Collins to evict him. Article XV, § 6, provides: “The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be inviolably preserved.” Petitioner contends that an action by a landlord to recover possession of real estate was historically an action at law to which the right to a jury trial attached, and that this is the sole test for applying Article XV, § 6.

As to the $500.00 requirement of Article XV, § 6, petitioner concedes that neither side in the landlord-tenant action claimed any money damages, and neither side claimed that the right to possess the premises had any particular monetary value. Nevertheless, petitioner argues that “[j]ust as the Court in Pemell disregarded the twenty dollar clause of the Seventh Amendment, so too should this Court [disregard the $500.00 clause of Art. XV, § 6] in deciding whether Section 8-402 [of the Real Property Article has] . . . abrogated the . . . right to trial by jury.” However, the clear language of Art. XV, § 6, of the Maryland Constitution preserves the right to a jury trial only “where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of ³⁴⁶ five hundred dollars . . . .” As we recently stated with respect to an argument that we disregard certain language in the Maryland Constitution, “We have no such authority to re-write a constitutional provision.” Johnson v. State, 271 Md. 189, 194 , 315 A. 2d 524 (1974). Assuming arguendo that petitioner is correct in asserting that the Supreme Court in Pemell disregarded the twenty dollar clause of the Seventh Amendment, such an approach would only be binding upon other courts in applying the Seventh Amendment. It would have no bearing upon our obligation to give effect to the clear language of the Maryland Constitution where no federal law issue is involved.

Furthermore, the premise for petitioner’s argument,