Broadway & Locust Point Ferry Co. v. Hankey

Bartol, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, granting an injunction to prohibit the appellant “ from closing the ferry gates at the foot of Broadway, or in any manner preventing free access to the wharf there situated.” The cause was heard below, and the injunction granted upon bill and answer. No question is raised upon the pleadings; and for the purpose of disposing of the ques ³⁴⁷ tions involved in this appeal, and argued at the bar, it is not necessary to recite particularly the several averments in the bill and .answer. The facts conceded on both sides are, that Broadway is a public highway, terminating at a public wharf, which extends into the harbor.

The appellee claims the right to run his steam ferry-boat from the end of this wharf, across the harbor to Ilauber street, and complains that the appellant excludes him from the use of the wharf for that purpose, by closing the ferry gates. The appellant is also engaged in running steam ferryboats between the same points, and claims the exclusive use of the end of the wharf, under the Act of Assembly of 1868, ch. 187. The decision of the case depends upon the true construction and effect of this Act of Assembly. The Act incorporates the appellant by the name of The Broadway and Locust Point Steam Ferry Company of Maryland, and after conferring general ferry rights, says, “ And the said company are hereby authorized and empowered to hold and use, as a wharf or landing, for the use of said ferry, the end of the wharf commonly known as the' County wharf, together with a right of way, in common with others, through the centre of said wharf, of the wddth of ten feet, ás a thoroughfare for travel to and from the end of said wharf.” It then imposes certain conditions, upon the performance of which, by the company, the privileges conferred by the Act are made to depend.

What rights have been conferred upon the company by this law ? Does it give them only the privilege of using the end of the wharf in common with others ? or was it intended to confer on them the exclusive use of the end of the wharf, and the use in common with others of the right of way ? ³⁴⁸ We think the latter is the true construction and the real intent of the law. Although somewhat unskilfully expressed, we think this is the natural meaning of the language employed. The words “ in common with others,” in the connection in which they are used, relate to and qualify the words immediately preceding, and refer to the right of way; not to the end of the wharf which the company is authorized and empowered to hold and use.

When we consider the intent and object of the Act, the correctness of this construction appears more obvious. The company is required, at its own cost, to construct the wharf so as to extend, with its present width, at least fifty feet beyond its present terminus, and to keep the entire wharf in repair; while they are excluded from the use of the sides of the wharf. They are required to carry firemen, together with their apparatus,, accoutrements and