Brooke v. Brooke

Ritchie, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellants contend, first, that Henry Brooke was not the person to whom the complainant was married; ■secondly, if he was, that the motives and intentions with which he became a party to the marriage rendered it invalid. That the complainant was united in marriage on the 29th of February, 1872, by the Catholic priest, Father ⁵³³ Wiget, at St. Joseph’s Church, in Washington City, to a man professing to be the Henry Brooke of whom complainant now claims to be the widow, is conceded. The fact that the marriage ceremony took place not being disputed, there is left to be determined only the simple question of whether the person who claimed to be Henry Brooke was really him or not.

Upon this question of fact we concur in the conclusion reached by the Court below. The discussion of the evidence by that Court is so clear and ample as to render it unnecessary for us to go in detail over the same ground; and we shall direct its opinion to be incorporated into the report of this case as a sufficient statement of the reasons why we consider the identity of Henry Brooke to have been fully established. As to the proposition of law contended for by the appellants, that, assuming Henry Brooke to have been the real party to the ceremony of marriage, his having remarked to the complainant just previous to its performance, “I will marry you, but understand, I will never live with you,” rendered the marriage ceremony an idle form without binding force, while we would remark we can give no countenance to the idea.that the solemn rites of marriage which it is the policy of the law and good morals to uphold, can be thus converted into a delusion and a fraud, there is in this case no foundation even to contend for the doctrine set up, as the evidence shows the facts do not exist to which it could be applicable. Even if Brooke made that declaration with the intention at the time of not treating the complainant as his wife, he nevertheless proceeded to take the vows that declared them man and wife ; and the evidence shows that he frequently visited her afterwards, and was the father of one or more of her children begotten after the marriage.

Nor do we deem it material to announce our agreement or dissent as to the opinion of the Court below that the ⁵³⁴ declarations of Brooke during his life-time that he was not married to complainant were admissible testimony; because, even giving to them their full effect, they are more than counterbalanced by the other testimony in the cause. In fact, his denials of the marriage are entitled to hut little weight, as it plainly appears thát although he was aware that a public report of his marriage was in circulation so early as 1874, and it was