Brooks v. State

RODOWSKY, Judge. This case involves the Intrastate Detainers Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 616S (IDA). Detainees who desire to invoke the IDA must deliver to the ¹⁰¹ “appropriate court” their requests for disposition of the untried charges. § 616S(b). The question presented here is which court is the “appropriate” one where the detainer is lodged based on a statement of charges issued by the District Court of Maryland, but the offense charged may be tried only by a circuit court.

Section 616S(b) provides, in relevant part: “Whenever the Division of Correction[,] ... Patuxent Institution ... or ... any county or city jail receives notice of an untried indictment, information, warrant, or complaint against a prisoner ..., the prisoner shall be brought to trial within 120 days after he has delivered (1) to the State’s Attorney of the City of Baltimore or of the county in which the indictment, information, warrant, or complaint is pending and, (2) to the appropriate court, his written request for a final disposition____ The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a statement from the [party] having custody of the prisoner, setting forth [details about the prisoner’s commitment].” On May 30, 1990, the petitioner, John Roland Brooks, Jr. (Brooks), was charged in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Anne Arundel County at Annapolis, with common law robbery. The District Court does not have jurisdiction to try a prosecution for that common law felony. See Md.Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), §§ 4-301 and 4-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJ).

Brooks was incarcerated at the time with the Division of Correction, and a detainer was lodged against him. To invoke the IDA, Brooks sent by certified mail a request for final disposition of the charges within 120 days and a Certificate of Inmate Status to the State’s Attorney for Anne Arundel County and to the District Court at Annapolis. The correspondence to the District Court was dated June 29, 1990, and the correspondence to the State’s Attorney was dated July 2, 1990. Both sets of documents were received by the addressees. ¹⁰² After an August 15 preliminary hearing in the District Court, the State’s Attorney filed a criminal information against Brooks in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on September 17, 1990, charging offenses arising out of the same incident involved in the statement of charges. 1 On September 26, the District Court record was transferred to the circuit court pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-221(h).

That record includes Brooks’s inmate status report. Brooks’s speedy disposition request does not appear in the record, but the parties have stipulated that notice was given to the State’s Attorney and to the District Court. When Brooks was not brought to trial within the 120-day period, he filed, pro se, a motion to dismiss the information. That motion was denied in December.

Several months later Brooks again moved to dismiss, a hearing took place on June 10,1991, and the motion was denied. The circuit court concluded that Brooks had failed to serve the “appropriate court” with his request for speedy resolution, because an information had been filed in the circuit court and because the District Court was without jurisdiction to try the crime initially charged there. On June 20, 1991, Brooks was tried in the circuit court, found guilty of robbery and related offenses, and sentenced to eight years. He appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed in an unreported opinion, holding that Brooks had not notified the appropriate court.

This Court granted certiorari. Because outstanding charges can “produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation, and cause a prisoner ... to suffer serious disadvantages,” the IDA was enacted “to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of ... charges” against incarcerated individuals. § 616S(a). The IDA notice re ¹⁰³ quirements ensure that the proper state officials are made aware of the accused’s request in order that they can set the judicial machinery in motion for a speedy disposition. State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 209 , 328 A.2d 737, 745-56 (1974).

Although the statute is to be “liberally construed,” see id. at 208 , 328 A.2d at 745 , its notice provisions are “mandatory and not directory,” and the defendant bears the burden of making an appropriate request for speedy disposition. Thurman v. State, 89 Md.App. 125, 131 , 597 A.2d 997, 1000 (1991), cert. denied, 325 Md. 397 , 601 A.2d 130 (1992). The defendant must present “competent evidence of those conditions precedent necessary for bringing the provisions of the statute into play.” Barnes, 273 Md. at 209 , 328 A.2d at 745 ; Bey v. State, 36 Md.App. 529, 533 , 373 A.2d 1291, 1294 (1977). Once the request is properly made, however, the defendant must be brought to trial within 120 days of the request, absent good cause for the granting of a continuance. § 616S(b).

The burden rests on the State timely to bring the defendant to trial. People v. Walker, 113 A.D.2d 448 , 496 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874 (1985); State v. Ferguson, 41 Ohio App.3d 306 , 535 N.E.2d 708, 713 (1987); Commonwealth v. Thornhill, 411 Pa.Super. 382 , 601 A.2d 842, 845 (1992); Nelms v. State, 532 S.W.2d 923, 926-27 (Tenn.1976). Failure timely to bring the defendant to trial results, upon the defendant’s request, in dismissal without prejudice. § 616S(e). The State argues that the “appropriate court” was the circuit court, because the District Court did not have jurisdiction to try the original felony charges against Brooks.

The State argues further that “[e]ven if Brooks’s original filing was made with the appropriate court, once he was notified of the new charging document in circuit court, the burden was on him to notify the circuit court of his intent to invoke the speedy trial provisions of the IDA.” Brief of Respondent at 5. Both of these arguments fail. We hold that Brooks filed his request in the appropriate court when, on June 29, 1990, he sent his request to the District Court. The detainer lodged against Brooks was ¹⁰⁴ based solely on the statement of charges issued by the District Court.

As of June 29, 1990, the District Court was the only court in which charges arising out of the underlying incident were pending against Brooks. Although “appropriate court” is not defined in the IDA, it is defined in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Art. 27, §§ 616A through 616R. The provisions of the IDA are to be construed in harmony with, and supplemented by, the Interstate Detainer Act. Barnes, 273 Md. at 206-07 , 328 A.2d at 744 .

In Barnes , this Court stated that because “appropriate court” was not defined in the IDA, the definition in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act was to be applied. Id. at 207-08 , 328 A.2d at 744 . Section 616K(a) defines “appropriate court” to mean “any court in this State having criminal jurisdiction which is part of the circuit court of a county, the District Court or any other court than these specified courts.” The definition does not require that an appropriate court have jurisdiction to try the particular charges at issue; rather, an appropriate court need only have some form of “criminal jurisdiction.” Reflection on the State’s argument manifests a number of reasons why the General Assembly could not have intended the “appropriate court” to be the circuit court under the facts presented here. First, limiting the “appropriate court” to the court that would have jurisdiction to try the charges requires that the detainee understand not only that jurisdiction to try the charges is determinative, but also how the line of division is drawn between the jurisdiction of the District Court and of the circuit courts in criminal causes.

A glance at CJ §§ 4-301 and 4-302 demonstrates that locating that line with respect to any particular charge or series of charges requires a degree of