Brown v. State

MURPHY, C.J. This appeal from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County requires that we determine whether that court erred in refusing to suppress incriminating evidence that resulted from an encounter between (1) law enforcement officers conducting a search of a residence under the authority of a search warrant, and (2) a person who knocked at the front door of the residence while the officers were still inside. On the basis of “an agreed statement of facts,” Randy Paul Brown, Jr., appellant, was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Appellant concedes that the State’s evidence was sufficient to establish that he committed this offense, but he argues that this Court must reverse his conviction on the ground that THE [HONORABLE DAVID S. BRUCE, WHO PRESIDED AT THE HEARING ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE] ERRED WHEN [HE] DENIED MR. BROWN’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION TO JUSTIFY THE INITIAL SEIZURE IN VIOLATION OF HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, although a person who knocks on the door of the residence being searched may not be frisked (or searched) pursuant to a procedure under which “everybody who shows up gets frisked (or searched),” that person may be (1) ushered inside the residence and detained there for a reasonable period of time, and (2) subjected to a Terry frisk, 1 provided that the law ⁴⁰⁵ enforcement officers have “reasonable articulable suspicion” for their decision to conduct the frisk. Applying these conclusions to Judge Bruce’s non-clearly erroneous findings of fact in the case at bar, 2 we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Factual Background Late on the evening of December 4, 2003, Anne Arundel County police officers executed a search warrant at the premises of 6415 Cedar Furnace Circle in Glen Burnie, Maryland. About 1:00 a.m., appellant walked up to the premises and knocked on the front door.

At this point (in the words of appellant’s brief): [T]he police were in the process of collecting evidence and recording it for the evidence inventory and transporting people to the police station. Only one or two suspects ⁴⁰⁶ remained in the house. They had been handcuffed and were sitting on a couch in the living room.... Detective [Daniel] Devoe opened the door and took Mr. Brown by the arm.

He asked Mr. Brown if he had any weapons or drugs on his person. Mr. Brown replied that he had a “quarter pound in his waist.” Detective Devoe believed that the suu. tance Mr. Brown was referring to was marijuana. The bag was removed from Mr. Brown’s waist and he was escorted into the kitchen and placed into handcuffs. Detective Devoe and Detective Clark [who had been “monitoring the exterior of the residence,” and who had “transmitted a radio message ... that a white male was approaching the residence,”] then went to the car that Mr. Brown had exited, which was parked near the front of the residence.... [A search of that vehicle turned up] various items of contraband ... including a black book bag ... which contained contraband, [and which appellant admitted] belonged to him.

During the suppression hearing, appellant established that (1) his name was not mentioned in the application for the search warrant, and (2) he did not live at the premises described in the search warrant. At the conclusion of the hearing, after hearing argument of counsel, Judge Bruce denied appellant’s motion for suppression in an oral opinion that included the following findings and conclusions: I do agree with [appellant] that ... he had no choice but to come into the house one way or another. On the other hand, I do agree with [the prosecutor’s argument] that at that point the police were justified in escorting him into the house whether he wanted to or not given the fact that he had just come up to the home where the search warrant was ongoing. * * * The [constitutional issue] turns on whether or not [appellant] voluntarily told them as an impulse at the time that he ⁴⁰⁷ was ushered into the house and disclosed to them that I ... do have drugs[, but] no weapons[.] * * * ... I disagree with [defense counsel] to the extent that they had to ask him first and politely well why are you coming here tonight in the middle of an executed search warrant.

When they have many officers involved, they have [to] be concerned about their own safety, not to mention the safety of people that are in the premises. They have got people lined up on the couch that are apparently in handcuffs. And I think skipping the formalities of asking why you are here I think was probably justified under the circumstances of the ongoing warrant. And to [ask] do you have any weapons or drugs on you I don’t think was inappropriate.

As stated above, appellant was convicted on an agreed statement of facts, and this appeal followed. I. Appellant argues that, because Detective Clark could have prevented him from reaching the front door and/or Detective Devoe could have prevented him from entering the residence, (1) appellant’s Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when he was forced to enter the residence, and (2) the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine required suppression of the contraband seized as a result of appellant’s answer to the question of whether he was in possession of weapons or drugs. In support of this argument, appellant calls our attention to People v. Gallant, 225 Cal.App.3d 200 , 275 Cal.Rptr. 50 (1990), in which the California intermediate appellate court reversed the conviction of one William Gallant, whose person and automobile were ultimately searched after he knocked on the front door of a residence being searched “[e]arly on a September evening.” Noting that “[t]here was nothing in the manner ⁴⁰⁸ of [his] approach to the door which made the police suspect him of any criminal conduct,” the Gallant Court stated: The law does not permit a person to be detained unless the police have articulable facts making it objectively reasonable to suspect that particular person of criminal activity. From the fact that drugs in a saleable quantity have been found in a house, police may reasonably assume that some people come to that house to either deliver or buy drugs.

However, a police officer may not reasonably conclude from that same fact that everyone approaching that house is involved in the drug trade. In the absence of evidence of their particular involvement in the illegal activity, friends, family, and the Fuller brush man should be free to knock on the door without being ordered at gunpoint and frisked. Id. at 208 , 275 Cal.Rptr. 50 . Our holding in the case at bar is entirely consistent with Gallant, 3 as well as with Cotton v. State, 386 Md. 249, 258-59 , 872 A.2d 87 (2005), in which the Court of Appeals stated: [I]n executing a search warrant ... for a premises ... where the police are likely to encounter people who may well be dangerous, they are entitled, for their own safety and that of other persons, to take command of the situation and, except for persons who clearly are unconnected with any criminal activity and who clearly present no potential danger, essentially immobilize everyone until, acting with reasonable expedition, they know what they are confronting. ...

It would be decidedly unreasonable to expect the police simply to give a friendly greeting to the folks there and proceed to search the house without another thought as to who those people are or what they may do. ⁴⁰⁹ We are persuaded that, in the case at bar, it would be unrealistic to conclude that appellant’s 1:00 a.m. arrival at the residence (1) was clearly unconnected with the criminal activity, and/or