Matoumba v. State

RAKER, J. The question presented in this case is whether a police officer, testifying at a suppression hearing, is required to be qualified as an expert witness regarding facts that gave rise to ⁵⁴⁶ a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop and frisk of a suspect. We shall answer that question in the negative and affirm. I. Kobie Matoumba, petitioner, was convicted in a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of the offense of possession of a handgun by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence. He filed a motion to suppress the handgun the police seized from him following a traffic stop.

The following facts underlie the charges. Petitioner was a passenger in the back seat of a vehicle driven by his friend. Lieutenant Palmero of the Baltimore City Firearms Apprehension Strike Team and Officer Moynihan of the Tactical Quick Response Team stopped the car for exceeding the speed limit. Based on his observations of petitioner, Officer Moynihan ordered petitioner out of the vehicle and then frisked him.

He recovered a handgun in petitioner’s back pocket. At the hearing on petitioner’s motion to suppress, both officers were questioned about their belief that petitioner was armed. Neither officer was qualified as an expert. The Circuit Court accepted the officers’ testimony, implicitly finding that Officer Moynihan had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to frisk petitioner.

Petitioner waived a jury trial, pled not guilty, and proceeded on an agreed statement of facts. He was convicted and sentenced to a mandatory term of incarceration of five years, without the benefit of parole. Petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court affirmed.

Matoumba v. State, 162 Md.App. 39 , 873 A.2d 386 (2005). We granted certiorari to consider the question of whether a police officer is required to be qualified as an expert when testifying at a suppression hearing as to his or her basis for conducting a frisk pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Matoumba v. State, 388 Md. 404 , 879 A.2d 1086 (2005). ⁵⁴⁷ II. Before this Court, petitioner argues that, based upon this Court’s recent case of Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706 , 870 A.2d 609 (2005), in the context of a Terry frisk, Maryland Rules of Evidence 5-104(a), 5-701, and 5-702 require that the State qualify a police officer as an expert prior to eliciting an opinion as to the reasons justifying a frisk of a suspect.

Petitioner reasons that in order to justify a frisk of a person, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the officer’s articulated reasons for suspecting that an individual is armed and dangerous must be evaluated in light of his experience. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 . These opinions, petitioner continues, are not within the realm of the general knowledge of lay persons and hence, come under the ambit of Md. Rule 5-702, testimony by experts. Petitioner concludes that the rationale of Ragland v. State, 385 Md. 706 , 870 A.2d 609 (2005) requires that, before a police officer may testify as to the reasons underlying the basis for conducting a frisk of a suspect, he must first be qualified as an expert witness, because he is relying upon his specialized training, skill, and expertise to justify his actions.

The State argues that a police officer need not be qualified as an expert in order to give testimony at a suppression hearing on whether a frisk is justified because the Rules of Evidence do not apply to suppression hearings. In the alternative, the State argues that, even if the Rules of Evidence do apply, in matters concerning the determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under Rule 5-104(a), the trial court has the discretion under Md. Rule 5-101(c)(l) to decline to require strict application of the Rules of Evidence.

III

The Court of Special Appeals rejected Matoumba’s argument, finding “nothing in Rule 5-702, Maryland case law, or Terry that could be remotely construed to mandate that a police officer be qualified as an expert in order to render an ⁵⁴⁸ opinion on his or her basis for reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct a pat-down.” Matoumba, 162 Md.App. at 51 , 873 A.2d at 392 . We agree. The genesis of petitioner’s argument is found in Ragland . In Ragland , two police officers testified at trial as lay witnesses that conduct they had observed amounted to a drug transaction involving Ragland and another person.

Ragland, 385 Md. at 709-14 , 870 A.2d at 611-14 . We reversed, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony as lay opinion evidence and that the officers should have been qualified as expert witnesses under Rule 5-702. See id. at 725 , 870 A.2d at 620 . We reasoned as follows: “We think the better view in interpreting the rule regarding opinion testimony is the more narrow one, and the view as expressed in the amended Fed.R.Evid. 701.

We also agree with the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and those courts that have found that by permitting testimony based on specialized knowledge, education, or skill under rules similar to Md. Rule 5-701, parties may avoid the notice and discovery requirements of our rules and blur the distinction between the two rules. Accordingly, we will follow the approach as reflected in the 2000 amendment to Fed. R.Evid. 701 and hold that Md. Rules 5-701 and 5-702 prohibit the admission as ‘lay opinion’ of testimony based upon specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.” Id. Ragland was directed to trial proceedings, and not pretrial proceedings. Petitioner asks us to extend our Ragland holding to suppression hearings.

We decline to do so. Md. Rule 5-101 establishes the applicability and scope of the Rules of Evidence. The 2003 version of the Rule, effective at the time of petitioner’s hearing, provides as follows: “(a) Generally. Except as otherwise provided by statute or rule, the rules in this Title apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of this State. ⁵⁴⁹ (b) Rules inapplicable.

The rules in this Title other than those relating to the competency of witnesses do not apply to the following proceedings: (1) Proceedings before grand juries; (2) Proceedings for extradition or rendition; (3) Direct contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily; (4) Small claim actions under Rule 3-701 and appeals under Rule 7-112(c)(2); (5) Issuance of a summons or warrant under Rule 4-212; (6) Pretrial release under Rule 4-216 or release after conviction under Rule 4-349; (7) Preliminary hearings under Rule 4-221; (8) Post-sentencing procedures under Rule 4-340; (9) Sentencing in non-capital cases under Rule 4-342; (10) Issuance of a search warrant under Rule 4-601; (11) Detention and shelter care hearings under Rule 11-112; and (12) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of the rules in this Title, the court was traditionally not bound by the common-law rules of evidence. (c) Discretionary application. In the following proceedings, the court may, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict application of the rules in this Title other than those relating to the competency of witnesses: (1) The determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under Rule 5-104(a); (2) Proceedings for revocation of probation under Rule 4-347; (3) Hearings on petitions for post-conviction relief under Rule 4-406; (4) Plenary proceedings in the Orphans’ Court under Rule 6-462; (5) Waiver hearings under Rule 11-113; ⁵⁵⁰ (6) Disposition hearings under Rule 11-115; (7) Modification hearings under Rule 11-116; and (8) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of the rules in this Title, the court was authorized to decline to apply the common-law rules of evidence.” Md. Rule 5-104(a), Preliminary Questions, provides as follows: “(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of section (b).

In making its determination, the court may, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict application of the rules of evidence, except those relating to privilege and competency of witnesses.” This Court adopted the Maryland Rules of Evidence in 1994. Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, evidentiary rules did not apply strictly