Brown v. State

Getty, J. In this case, we are asked to determine whether a defendant charged with misdemeanors by information, in circuit court, is entitled to a preliminary hearing pursuant to § 4-102 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) of the Maryland Code. For the following reasons, we answer in the negative and hold that CP § 4-102 provides that in a circuit court proceeding a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing when charged ⁵⁴⁹ by information with felonies, but not when the defendant is charged by information with misdemeanors. BACKGROUND On April 3, 2015, two police officers observed Damar Brown walking in a manner that led the police to believe that Mr. Brown was carrying a concealed weapon. The officers approached Mr. Brown and a scuffle ensued—an officer was struck in the face and the officers recovered a loaded .22 caliber revolver from the left front pocket of Mr. Brown’s sweatpants.

The officers also recovered a black ski mask from Mr. Brown’s hooded sweatshirt pouch pocket. As a result, the officers arrested Mr. Brown. On April 4, 2015, the State charged Mr. Brown by a statement of charges in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore City with wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun, second-degree assault, and resisting or interfering with arrest, all of which constitute misdemeanor offenses. 1 On April 24, 2015, the State filed an information in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City charging Mr. Brown with the same offenses. Mr. Brown did not receive a preliminary hearing in district court prior to being charged in circuit court or thereafter.

In the circuit court, on May 20, 2015, Mr. Brown moved for dismissal of the charges, arguing that the case was improperly before the circuit court because Mr. Brown had been charged with misdemeanors by means of criminal information without a preliminary hearing resulting in a finding of probable cause. Mr. Brown contended that this procedure violated Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), CP § 4-102(2) and Maryland Rule 4-201(c)(2)(A). The State responded that Mr. Brown was not entitled to a preliminary hearing because he was only ⁵⁵⁰ charged with misdemeanors.

The circuit court granted Mr. Brown’s motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. The State appealed the circuit court’s dismissal of charges. In the Court of Special Appeals, Mr. Brown again argued that the controlling statute entitled him to a preliminary hearing. In response, the State interpreted CP § 4-102(2) as entitling defendants to preliminary hearings if charged by information with a felony within the jurisdiction of the district court, but not when charged with misdemeanors.

Therefore, the State argued that Mr. Brown was not entitled to a preliminary hearing and the circuit court improperly dismissed the charges against Mr. Brown. In an unreported opinion filed on September 2, 2016, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court improperly construed CP § 4-102(2) to require preliminary hearings in cases involving misdemeanors charged by information in circuit court. State v. Brown, No. 1094, 2016 WL 4591529 , at ⁸-9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 2, 2016). 2 Mr. Brown then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on December 2, 2016.

Brown v. State, 450 Md. 660 , 150 A.3d 817 (2016). Mr, Brown presents one question for our review: “Did the Court of Special Appeals err in concluding that when the State charges misdemeanors by criminal information in the circuit court no preliminary hearing is required?” STANDARD OF REVIEW The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo, Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 480-81 , 157 A.3d 272 (2017). Furthermore, [t]his Court provides judicial deference to the policy decisions enacted into law by the General Assembly. We assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory ⁵⁵¹ language and thus our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the language of the statute to determine the purpose and intent of the General Assembly.

We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute’s plain language. In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.

Phillips v. State, 451 Md. 180, 196-97 , 152 A.8d 712 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 178 , 31 A.3d 250 (2011)). We view the plain language of a statute in the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, with a focus on ascertaining the intent or underlying policy of the General Assembly in the statute’s enactment. Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207, 213 , 77 A.3d 1049 (2013). [T]he meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears. As this Court has stated, because it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered.

Thus, not only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. Stickley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 431 Md. 347, 359 , 65 A,3d 141 (2013) (quoting Centre Ins. Co. v. J.T.W., 397 Md. 71, 81 , 916 A.2d 235 (2007)).

Therefore, we shall analyze the plain language of CP § 4-102 in the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, and determine in which cases defendants ⁵⁵² are entitled to preliminary hearings when charged by information in circuit court. DISCUSSION Pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-201(a), an “offense shall be tried only on a charging document.” A charging document is defined as “a written accusation alleging that a defendant has committed an offense. It includes a citation, an indictment, an information, and a statement of charges.” Md. Rule 4-102(a). An information is defined as “a charging document filed in a court by a State’s Attorney.” Md. Rule 4-102(e).

CP § 4-102 establishes when the State may charge by information: A State’s Attorney may charge by information: (1) in a case involving a felony that does not involve a felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court, if the defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing but does not request a hearing within 10 days after a court or court commissioner informs the defendant about the availability of a preliminary hearing; or (2) in any other case, if a court in a preliminary hearing finds that there is probable cause to hold the defendant. The issue in this case is whether the phrase “any other case” of CP § 4-102(2) includes cases involving misdemeanors brought in the circuit court, or whether that subsection of the statute is limited to cases where a defendant is charged by information with felonies within the jurisdiction of the district court. Mr. Brown argues that the phrase “any other case” subsumes instances where defendants are charged with misdemeanors by information in circuit court. Therefore, according to Mr. Brown, the circuit court correctly dismissed his charges, and the Court of Special Appeals erred in its reversal.

Mr. Brown also contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred by performing statutory interpretation in a vacuum, ignoring relevant statutes and Maryland Rules in its construction of CP § 4-102. The State responds that the phrase “any other case” does not include misdemeanors and is ⁵⁵³ limited to felonies within the jurisdiction of the district court. Therefore, the State contends that the circuit court improperly-dismissed the charges against Mr. Brown because he was not entitled to a preliminary hearing and the Court of Special Appeals correctly reversed the dismissal. The State has discretion to bring certain charges in district or circuit court, depending upon which crimes are charged. 3 Maryland Rule 4-201 governs the use of charging documents, expressly stating in which instances an offense may be tried by charging document.

The Rule indicates that, in district court, “an offense may be tried (1) on an information, (2) on a statement of charges filed pursuant to section (b) Rule 4-211, or (3) on a citation in the case of a petty offense or when authorized by statute.” Md. Rule 4-201 (b). Pursuant to this Rule, the State was authorized to initially charge Mr. Brown with misdemeanors in the district court by a statement of charges. In contrast, in the circuit court, an offense may be tried (1) on an indictment, or (2) on an information if the offense is (A) a misdemeanor, or (B) a felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court, or (C) any other felony and lesser included offense if the defendant requests or consents in writing to be charged by information, or if the defendant has been charged with the felony and a preliminary hearing pursuant to Rule 4-221 has resulted in a finding of probable cause, or if the defendant has been charged with the felony as to which a preliminary hearing has been waived, or (3) on a charging document filed in the District Court for an offense within its jurisdiction if the defendant is entitled to ⁵⁵⁴ and demands a jury trial or appeals from the judgment of the District Court. Md. Rule 4-201(c).

Therefore, the State was also authorized to charge Mr. Brown with misdemeanors in circuit court by means of criminal information^ This Rule indicates that the State may charge an accused by information with both felonies and misdemeanors in circuit court. Where an accused is charged by information in circuit court, the Rule makes clear that he or she is entitled to a preliminary hearing when charged with felonies. However, the Rule does not indicate that a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing when charged with a misdemeanor by information in circuit court. Mr. Brown attempts to argue that Rule 4-201(c) is consistent with his interpretation of OP § 4-102, because the Rule and statute are intended for different purposes.

However, upon closer examination, this distinction quickly dissolves. Mr. Brown points out that Rule 4-201(c) governs trial courts and indicates the types of charging documents on which a case “may be tried.” Whereas, CP § 4-102 concerns when “[a] State’s Attorney may charge by information.” However, the interaction of the statute and the Rule acts as two sides of the same coin. Rule 4-201(c), among other things, indicates in which situations a defendant may be tried when charged by information. Because, pursuant to Rule 4-102(e), an information is “a charging document filed in a court by a State’s Attorney,” it is implicit that any defendant tried for an offense that was charged by information was necessarily charged by a State’s Attorney.

Therefore, Rule 4-201 (c) does not support the interpretation that CP § 4-102 requires preliminary hearings in cases where a defendant is charged with misdemeanors by information in circuit court. A review of the historical purpose of preliminary hearings further supports our conclusion that a defendant is not entitled to a preliminary hearing when charged with misdemeanors by information in circuit court. This Court has held that, absent a constitutional or statutory mandate requiring that a ⁵⁵⁵ defendant receive a preliminary hearing, a preliminary hearing is not necessary. Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 543 , 207 A.2d 83 (1965), There is no specific constitutional provision in the federal or Maryland constitutions that affords defendants a right to a preliminary hearing.

Id. at 543 , 207 A.2d 83 ; see also Crawford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 220-21 , 383 A.2d 1097 (1978) (“While there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, the accused is entitled to such a hearing by statute if, as here, he makes a timely request for it.”). This Court has previously framed the purpose of preliminary hearings in several ways. Crawford, 282 Md. at 220-21 , 383 A.2d 1097 . First, we have indicated that the purpose of preliminary hearings is to determine “whether the accused should be held for action of the Grand Jury or charged by the State’s Attorney on information.” Id. at 220 , 383 A.2d 1097 (citing Arrington v. Warden, 232 Md. 672 , 195 A.2d 38 (1963); Kochel v. State, 10 Md.App, 11, 267 A.2d 755 (1970)).

In addition, we have noted that preliminary hearings are “primarily for the benefit of the accused, insuring him against being committed to jail or being required to furnish bail pending grand jury action, unless the State establishes that there is probable cause for maintaining [ ] criminal proceedings against him.” Kardy, 237 Md. at 543 , 207 A.2d 83 (citing Lester B. Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 49, et seq (1947)). The Court of Special Appeals has echoed this sentiment, stating, “Prior to the expansion of the State’s information authority, the primary purpose of the preliminary hearing was to protect the accused from a unilateral decision to arrest with the accompanying likelihood of incarceration while awaiting grand jury action.” Perkins v. State, 26 Md.App. 526, 530-31 , 339 A.2d 360 (1975). In short, the requirement of a preliminary hearing is aimed at preventing defendants from being incarcerated without a determination of probable cause while grand jury action is pending. The Court of Special Appeals has also previously considered a defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing when charged by information and held that, “[w]hen charging a prospective ⁵⁵⁶ defendant with a felony, other than a felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court, the State may proceed by way of criminal information, subject to the defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing.” Id. at 530 , 339 A.2d 360 .

Thus, the intermediate appellate court indicated that a defendant has an absolute right to preliminary hearing only when charged with a felony outside of the jurisdiction of the district court. Id.; accord CP § 4-103(c). As we will discuss in more detail below, this proposition stands in accordance with the statutes and Rules controlling the use of criminal information as a charging-document and the right to a preliminary hearing. Therefore, as the Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded with regard to the circuit court’s dismissal of Mr. Brown’s charges, “the language requiring a preliminary hearing was aimed at felonies for which a grand jury indictment otherwise would be required.” Brown, No. 1094, 2016 WL 4591529 , at ⁴.

Here, Mr. Brown was charged with misdemeanors and was never incarcerated awaiting grand jury indictment, for which a preliminary hearing establishing probable cause would have been necessary. Thus, Mr. Brown’s case falls outside the judicially announced purpose of preliminary hearings.