Brown v. State

KARWACKI, Judge. On April 6, 1981, Mary A. Brown, the appellant, was convicted of two counts of assault in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City (now a part of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City). The court imposed concurrent two year sentences on each count and suspended execution of both in favor of two years supervised probation. At a hearing conducted on February 10, 1983, the appellant was found to be in violation of her probation because she was convicted of theft on October 13, 1982.

Although the record on appeal does not contain a copy of the transcript of that proceeding, the trial judge wrote by hand, on a pre-printed Order of Probation, which is part of the record, the following disposition: Probation is extended 1 yr. + all other conditions of prob. imposed on 4-6-81 are still in effect. On March 12, 1984, the lower court again found that the appellant violated her probation for acts occurring before February 10, 1984. 1 The court reimposed the appellant’s ⁷⁶ original two year sentences, directing that they run concurrently. The sole issue the appellant raises on appeal is whether the trial judge on February 10, 1983 lacked the statutory authority to “extend” her term of probation for the additional year. The appellant contends that since the court then lacked the power to extend her term of probation her probation expired on April 6, 1983.

Thus, she argues, the court could not violate that probation for acts which she committed after April 6, 1983, and could not reimpose the sentences which were originally suspended. The appellant cites Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1984 Supp.), Art. 27, § 641A(a) and (b), which states in pertinent part: (a) Suspension of sentence; probation. — Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. The court may impose a sentence for a specified period and provide that a lesser period be served in confinement, suspend the remainder of the sentence and grant probation for a period longer than the sentence but not in excess of 5 years____ (b) Probation when offense punishable by fine and imprisonment; limitation, revocation or modification. —Probation may be granted whether the offense is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.... The court may revoke or modify any condition of probation or may reduce the period of probation.

Specifically, the appellant points to the last sentence of § 641A(b) quoted above. She argues that this sentence implicitly denies the court the power to increase the term of probation since it explicitly grants the power to reduce it. ⁷⁷ Although novel, we find the appellant’s argument flawed. We believe § 641A must be read in conjunction with § 642 which states: Whenever any person is convicted of any offense in any of the courts of record of this State, having criminal jurisdiction, and the judge presiding does not impose sentence or suspends sentence generally or for a definite time places the offender upon probation, or makes another order and imposes other terms as she or he may deem proper, and that person at any time thereafter is brought before the court to be sentenced upon the