C & R CONTRACTORS v. Wagner

CATHELL, Judge. Appellee, Robert A. Wagner, was awarded a lump-sum payment of $60,000 by the Workers’ Compensation Commission on April 19,1991, pursuant to Article 101, section 49 of the Maryland Annotated Code (1985) (repealed and reenacted 1991). 1 The award was subsequently affirmed by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. A timely appeal was noted by appellant, C & R Contractors. The appellant alleges here: I. The trial court erred in finding that the Workers’ Compensation Commission did not abuse its discretion by awarding the claimant a lump sum for sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) for reasons that were not either a business or living necessity and which would reduce his weekly benefits to an unacceptably low amount. ⁸⁰⁴ II.

The trial court erred in finding that the Workers’ Compensation Commission had the legal authority and/or jurisdiction to award a lump sum payment for sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) to a claimant found to be permanently totally disabled when the initial forty five thousand dollars ($45,000) had not been paid.

III

The circuit court erred in denying the appellants’ motion for summary judgment. Facts Appellee was injured on January 8, 1980. After first receiving temporary total disability and vocational rehabilitation, he was ultimately found to be permanently totally disabled and awarded benefits at the rate of $106 per week. Thereafter, pursuant to the provisions of section 49, he requested and was awarded a lump-sum payment in the amount of $60,000. 2 During the proceedings for the requested lump-sum payment, the appellee primarily proffered that a lump sum was required to facilitate the purchase of a $159,000 house.

He proffered that the house was necessary because he had been living with his wife and two children in a house with his parents. This living arrangement, according to appellee, forced him and his wife to sleep in the same room with their children separated only by a partition. 3 He also stated that he wanted to buy a house in order to build equity for his wife in case he died, given that he could not procure life insurance. Additionally, the lump-sum award was to be used to pay off his debts. As we have said, the Commission ultimately awarded a lump-sum payment that was later affirmed on appeal by the circuit court.

We shall first address appellant’s second issue. ⁸⁰⁵ II. Did the trial court err in finding that the Workers’ Compensation Commission had the legal authority and/or jurisdiction to award a lump-sum payment for sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) in a permanent total disability case where the initial forty five thousand dollars ($45,000) had not been paid? Appellant argues that “a lump sum may not be granted for a sum which exceeds the compensation benefits awarded to the Claimant and allowed by law.” In support of this contention, appellant cites to section 36(l)(a) of Article 101 4 which states that payments under that section cannot exceed $45,000. That section, however, also provides that if total disability shall continue after a total of $45,000 has been paid, then “further weekly payments ... shall be paid to him during such disability.” Md.Ann.Code art. 101, § 36 (1985) (repealed and reenacted 1991).

It is the interplay of these two provisions that gives rise to the question raised by appellant. To resolve the question, we must determine the result of this intrasectional interaction. In State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92-93 , 581 A.2d 9 (1990), the Court of Appeals recently reviewed the standards of statutory construction, saying: When interpreting a statute, the starting point is the wording of the relevant provisions. If “the language in question [is] so clearly consistent with apparent purpose (and not productive of any absurd result) ... further research [is] unnecessary.” ...

Resultant conclusions are to be reasonable, logical and consistent with common sense. When several statutes are in pari materia, any interpretation must be made with full awareness of all the relevant enactments. It is presumed that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of prior legislation and intended statutes that affect the same subject matter ⁸⁰⁶ to blend into a consistent and harmonious body of law. Therefore, various consistent and /elated enactments, although made at different times and without reference to one another, nevertheless should be harmonized as much as possible. [Citations omitted, emphasis added, bracketed material in original.] See Richmond v. State, 326.

Md. 257, 262, 604 A.2d 483 (1992) (“[W]e approach the analysis ... from a ‘commonsensical,’ ... perspective....”) (citations omitted); Crawford v. Leahy, 326 Md. 160, 166 , 604 A.2d 73 (1992); Ball v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 325 Md. 652, 656 , 602 A.2d 1176 (1992); Stambaugh v. Child Support Enforcement Admin., 323 Md. 106, 110 , 591 A.2d 501 (1991); Privette v. State, 320 Md. 738, 744 , 580 A.2d 188 (1990); Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185 , 567 A.2d 126 (1989); NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 313 Md. 118, 125 , 544 A.2d 764 (1988) (“[legislative history may help to provide the appropriate context.”); Heileman Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746, 754 , 521 A.2d 1225 (1987); Vallario v. State Rds. Comm’n, 290 Md. 2, 6 , 426 A.2d 1384 (1981). In Swarthmore Co. v. Kaestner, 258 Md. 517, 527 , 266 A.2d 341 (1970), the Court of Appeals said: “We should not presume that the legislative body intended to enact an ineffective and invalid law.” See Bright v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Bd., 275 Md. 165, 169 , 338 A.2d 248 (1975) (“This is true ... even if ... the policy or impact of the legislation is unwise or harsh.”); Cox v. Prince George’s County, 86 Md.App. 179, 190 , 586 A.2d 43 (1991) (“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature.”) (emphasis added); Berdych v. Dep’t of Employment and Training, 69 Md.App. 484, 493 , 518 A.2d 462 (1986) (“A court’s function is to interpret the statute and not to rewrite it to mitigate its possible harsh consequences.); Kline v. Fuller, 56 Md.App. 294, 309 , 467 A.2d 786 (1983); Brown v. Hornbeck, 54 Md.App. 404, 408 , 458 A.2d 900 (1983), cert. denied, 297 Md. 108 (1983). See also Tucker v. Fireman’s ⁸⁰⁷ Fund, Ins.

Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986); Coerper v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 265 Md. 3, 6 , 288 A.2d 187 (1972); Pan American Sulphur Co. v. State Dep’t of Assessments and Taxation, 251 Md. 620, 627 , 248 A.2d 354 (1968); Woodmont Country Club, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 61 Md.App. 229, 236 , 486 A.2d 218 (1985). We said in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. State, 87 Md.App. 287, 292-93 , 589 A.2d 569 (1991): "[A] court should neither resort to subtle or forced interpretations for the purpose of extending or limiting the operation of the statute____” (Citations omitted.) In Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 318 Md. 624, 627-28 , 569 A.2d 697 (1990), the Court of Appeals reiterated the purpose of the worker’s compensation statute: “We have not addressed this issue before, and, to resolve it, we rely on the language of the statute in the context of the goals and objectives it seeks to achieve.” (Citations omitted.) It noted that: The Workman's Compensation Act was passed to promote the general welfare of the State and to prevent the State and its taxpayers from having to care for injured workmen and their dependents, when under the law as it previously existed, such workmen could not recover damages for their injuries. Id. at 628 , 569 A.2d 697 (quoting Paul v. Glidden Co., 184 Md. 114, 119 , 39 A.2d 544 (1944)) (emphasis added).

The Court further opined: The short of it is that the Act should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant. Victor, 318 Md. at 629 , 569 A.2d 697 (quoting Howard County Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530 , 418 A.2d 1210 (1980)). It then emphasized that the act’s general purpose is to provide compensation for loss of earning capacity.

Id. at 630, 569 A.2d 697 . ⁸⁰⁸ We said in Montgomery County v. Lake, 68 Md.App. 269, 273 , 511 A.2d 541 (1986): The Act is to be liberally and broadly construed in furtherance of the benevolent purpose which prompted its enactment. While the Act is to be liberally construed, a court is not at liberty to disregard its plain meaning. [Citations omitted.] We also stated that “no presumption of correctness attaches to the Commission’s interpretations of the pertinent provisions of the statute.” Id. at 273-74 , 511 A.2d 541 . See also Symons v. R.D. Grier & Sons Co., 10 Md.App. 498, 500 , 271 A.2d 398 (1970) (explaining that factual decisions of the Commission are prima facie correct while decisions involving questions of law are not). Prior to 1973, the Worker’s Compensation Act did not contain a provision for continuing payment.

By Chapter 671 of the Acts of 1973, the legislature added a provision to Section 36 providing that irrespective of $45,000 being stated as a maximum: “if the employee’s total disability shall continue after a total of $45,000.00 has been paid, then further weekly payments at the rate previously paid shall be paid to him during such disability.” Act approved May 24, 1973, ch. 671, 1973 Md.Laws 1400. The purpose clause of Chapter 671 stated that it was “making provision for payment of additional benefits for total disability above the statutory limit under certain conditions____” Id. at 1399. The only condition mentioned in the body of the act was that total disability must be continuing. Id. at 1400.

At the same time, the legislature substantively changed section 49 as a result of the modification of section 36. Section 49 was modified to prohibit the inclusion of any of the continuing payments (after the $45,000) in a lump-sum award: “[H]owever, that no lump sum may be granted from compensation payable after the sum of $45,000.00 has been paid.” Id. at 1404. As of 1973, it is clear that the two provisions, i.e., the provision for payments in excess of the $45,000 cap and the provision that they cannot be included in a lump-sum award, were interconnected and were to be ⁸⁰⁹ construed together in order to achieve a harmonious result. Thus, the statutes then extant explicitly forbade that which appellant claims is inherently prohibited in the statutes as they now exist.

Had the statutes remained explicit, the resolution of this issue would be clear. The prohibition, however, is no longer contained in the code. The Worker’s Compensation Act was amended in 1986. Act approved May 27,1986, ch. 767,1986 Md.Laws 2929.

One of the amendments was an express repeal of the provision in section 49 prohibiting the inclusion of compensation recoverable after $45,000 has been paid in a lump-sum award. Id. As we perceive the legislative history of the related sections, it is clear that when the legislature first provided for the continuation of payments beyond the amount of $45,000 it realized the potential impact it might have on section 49. In accordance with this recognition, it amended section 49 to express its legislative intent to prohibit such awards.

Act approved May 24, 1973, ch. 671, 1973 Md. Laws 1404 . Thereafter, the legislature repealed the prohibition. Act approved May 27, 1986, ch. 767, 1986 Md. Laws 2929 . In In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 689 , 516 A.2d 976 (1986), the Court said: “Generally, a substantive amendment to an existing statute indicates an intent to change the meaning of that statute.” (Citations omitted.) By creating a prohibition and then repealing it, the legislature appears to have spoken.

Thus, to a point, the legislative intent is clear. Lump-sum awards of compensation payable after the payment of $45,000 are no longer absolutely prohibited. That, however, does not fully answer the question raised by appellant that we now rephrase as: Must the period for which the $45,000 cap exists (regardless of whether the $45,000 is paid in periodic payments or a lump sum payment) have elapsed before a lump sum may be awarded for benefits payable after that period. Appellant attempts to argue in its brief that certain occurrences could transpire, such as recovery of the claimant or death of the claimant, resulting in a lump-sum award ⁸¹⁰ in excess of benefits otherwise ultimately payable in periodic payments.

A similar argument was made in Victory Fireworks & Specialty Co. v. Saxton, 170 Md. 446, 450 , 185 A. 123 (1936), where the employer claimed, irrespective of the fact that the statute permitted lump-sum awards, that they could not be awarded: (a) Because of the possibility of partial or total recovery of the claimant during the compensation period; and (b) because the claimant may die before the time when he would normally have received the maximum amount of such award. 5 The Court said that lump-sum awards were permitted under the statute, even in light of the concerns of the employer, and then opined: “[T]he statute was designed to benefit both parties: the employers, by making it impossible to have exorbitant and unreasonable judgments obtained against them; and the employees, by providing for them definite and certain compensation____” Id. at 453-54 , 185 A. 123 . Appellant also asserts that the sum payable after the $45,000 cap is otherwise purely speculative. We note that it is no more speculative than any portion of the compensation payable at the time of the initial award except that the statute specifically limits the initial amount to $45,000. The claimant’s survivors would be limited 6 by that amount, if the claimant expired prior to receiving $45,000.

See Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. § 9-640 (1991) (“Survival of Compensation”). This is not to say that the Commission has unlimited power to make lump-sum awards in respect to the post $45,000 benefits once the right to the latter benefits has accrued. The Commission’s discretion in respect to lump- ⁸¹¹ sum amounts is not unbridled. It is clear that the Commission must have an evidentiary basis supporting the extraordinary aspect of need expressed by the claimant and the amount of any such award.

We shall later address these sub-issues of need and amount. We are first constrained to conclude that while a lump-sum award may be authorized in respect to benefits due after a total of $45,000 has been paid, that lump-sum award may not be made until the termination of the period for which the original $45,000 is awarded. We explain. We have noted that until 1986 lump-sum awards with respect to the additional period of benefits were expressly prohibited, and that by Chapter 767 of the Acts of 1986 this prohibition was repealed and removed from section 49.

While that repeal operates to remove the absolute prohibition, the available legislative history does not indicate that the General Assembly intended to affect the time when such an award can be made. Our examination of the available legislative history indicates that the primary purpose of Chapter 767 of the Acts of 1986 was to clarify that when lump-sum awards were made from the Subsequent Injury Fund that the Fund be entitled to a reduction in weekly benefits payable to reflect the amount of the lump-sum award previously paid by it. Constitutional & Administrative Law Committee, House Bill No. 1063, B.F. (1986).

The bills were apparently first prepared and presented by the Subsequent Injury Fund. Id. (see letter of Sophia L. Swope, supervising attorney for the Fund, dated January 13, 1986, to Diana Vincent of the AFL-CIO). The Fund asserted that the purpose of the bill(s) was to correct a problem resulting from the Fund’s termination of weekly payments when it had to make lump-sum payments, by providing for weekly deduction amounts applicable to the awards.

Constitutional & Administrative Law Committee, House Bill No. 1063, B.F. (1986). Another report, prepared prior to the bill’s passage, indicated that the bill provided for a weekly “rate” reduction when lump-sum awards were made and further noted that the bill ⁸¹² applied to payments made by the Subsequent Injury Fund. Id 7 The Department of Fiscal Services summarized the bill as applicable to awards “in cases where prior awards have been made by the Subsequent Injury Fund,” and that the bill’s purpose was to provide a method for authorizing and computing the deductions in weekly benefits of prior awards.

Id. Those deductions are required when lump sums are awarded. Throughout the progress of the bill, the general thrust was to accommodate the needs of the Subsequent Injury Fund for recoupment. Id.

It was not until March 20, 1986, that the House adopted an amendment that stated “On page 2, strike beginning with ‘However’ in line 3 down through ‘paid’ in line 4.” Id. The matter stricken by that amendment was the prohibition that had been in the statute since 1973: “[Hjowever, no lump sum may be granted from compensation payable after the sum of $45,000 has been paid.” Id. The only explanation for the repeal of the prohibition clause that we have discovered in the legislative history files was a letter written to the chairman of the committee on Constitutional and Administration Law, dated just two days before the amendment, from the Executive Assistant to the President of the Maryland State & D.C. AFL-CIO, Diana K. Vincent. That letter, as pertinent to the issue in the case sub judice, stated: In working with H.B. 1063, it occurred to me that one sentence on page 2 of the bill, if the new language is adopted, will become archaic. ⁸¹³ Page 2 Lines 3 and 4: “However, no lump sum may be granted from compensation payable after the sum of $45,000 has been paid.” This limitation of $45,000 was included because there was no mechanism to recover an amount over the $45,000 paid out in a lump sum.

The new language establishes a mechanism____to get credit for a lump sum paid. Example: Claimant is permanently and totally disabled--- [A]fter six or seven years, he has “used-up ” the guaranteed amount of $45,000. Now he needs a lump sum amount for some justifiable reason. Under current law, he is not eligible for a lump sum payment because there is no mechanism ... to get credit for the lump sum payment.

The new language provides the mechanism____ Mark touched base with Commissioner Rosenbaum and the Commissioner agreed that the reference to the $45,-000 limit should be deleted. [Emphasis added.] Id. It thus appears that the prior prohibition was eliminated because the Legislature perceived that it was no longer necessary because it was, by Chapter 767, providing a means for employers and the Fund to reduce weekly benefits in respect to the recovery of any sums paid by them for the post $45,000 period under the lump-sum provisions of the Worker’s Compensation Act. As we perceive the intent of the Legislature generally, and as specifically reflected by the Subsequent Injury Fund amendments of 1986, it is concerned with insuring that weekly benefits inure to a claimant, both to assist a claimant and to keep her/him from requiring public assistance. 8 ⁸¹⁴ As we see it, and as we have previously stated, the primary purpose of the Act is to provide for periodic maintenance payments. In light of the legislative history we have reviewed, the 1986 amendments, though they eliminated the prohibition, have not changed that primary thrust of the Act, i.e., periodic payments.

With that in mind, we must attempt to find a logical interpretation of section 36 that provides for a $45,000 cap, and immediately thereafter provides for continuing payments irrespective of the cap. We must then construe that section with section 49 to determine the appropriateness of the award in the case at bar. We hold that lump-sum awards, if factually warranted, may be made with respect to benefits that accrue after the $45,000 cap is paid. Because the primary purpose of the Act is to provide for periodic payments to keep a claimant from requiring public assistance and for the further reason that lump-sum awards are not favored, we further hold that the post $45,000 benefits do not accrue and are not payable to a claimant until the expiration of the entire period of initial benefits reflected by the limit of $45,000 contained in the statute, whether those prior benefits are paid throughout that period or in a lump sum.

No other interpretation we have been able to conceptualize gives meaning to the cap, the additional benefits irrespective of the cap, and the applicability of lump-sum awards to the post-cap period. Because the additional benefits provided for in section 36 do not become payable until the period of the initial award has passed, the subsequent benefits (that may never be payable) may not be subject to a lump-sum award until that time. While we acknowledge the “murky depths” in which we labor, our holding is, we suggest, the most logical interpretation of facially illogical provisions. 9 ⁸¹⁵ The Commission may not, therefore, make a lump-sum award that would include benefits that might accrue after the initial $45,000 is exhausted until the period for which a claimant is entitled to receive the original benefits has expired. Thus, to the extent that the Commission’s granting of the lump-sum award exceeds $45,000, its action was unauthorized and erroneous.

As we