Cannon v. Cannon

DAVIS, Judge. On July 3, 2002, appellee Wendy J. Cannon filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce in the Circuit Court for Frederick County. After filing an Answer to the Complaint on July 22, 2002, appellant John A. Cannon requested a hearing to determine the validity of a Pre-Nuptial Agreement executed by the parties prior to their marriage. At the hearing, appellant filed a notice of appeal prematurely on ³⁹³ April 25, 2003.

On September 15, 2003, the court issued an order directing appellant to pay alimony pendente lite. Appellant noted an appeal from that order on October 2, 2003. 1 Appellant presents three questions 2 for our review, which we consolidate and rephrase as follows: Did the trial court err in its determination that the PreNuptial Agreement executed by the parties was not valid or enforceable? We answer appellant’s question in the affirmative and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Appellant and appellee were married on June 25, 1994; there were no children born of the marriage.

The parties ³⁹⁴ separated on May 3, 2001. Prior to the marriage between the parties, appellee had been previously married on April 10, 1976. Two children were born of that union, which ended in a divorce on October 4, 1990. As part of the divorce decree, a Separation Agreement, which was incorporated but not merged into the decree, provided that appellee would have custody of the two minor children and would receive child support payments from her former husband in the amount of $300 per month.

Appellant and appellee met in 1977 and maintained a friendship for several years. Their relationship became more intimate in December 1986, at a time when appellee was still married to her former husband. In July 1990, appellant and appellee commenced cohabiting with each other. Appellee and her children, then eight and twelve years old, moved into appellant’s townhouse.

In the latter part of 1992, the parties became engaged to marry and agreed to set the marriage date for some time in 1994. In 1993, appellant, appellee, and her children moved into a single-family home located on Samuels Road in New Market, Frederick County (Samuels Road Home). The house was purchased by appellant with proceeds from the sale of his townhouse and titled solely in appellant’s name. In 1994, appellant was employed by GE Global Exchange Services and had earned approximately $40,000 per year in the previous two years.

Appellee was employed by Images Hair Design, Inc., where she had worked since 1986, as an assistant secretary earning a yearly income between $15,000 and $19,000. In April 1994, appellant approached appellee about the possibility of executing a pre-nuptial agreement because of his concern about the bankruptcy proceedings commenced against appellee and her former husband. Specifically, appellant stated that creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding would attempt to go after his assets once he and appellee were married. On May 27, 1994, approximately one month before their wedding, appellant and appellee executed a Pre-Nuptial ³⁹⁵ Agreement (Agreement).

Pursuant to the Agreement, the parties agreed that each party would retain sole title to any property acquired prior to and during the marriage and any debts incurred prior to and during the marriage would remain the debt of the party who had incurred the debt. Additionally, the parties made a series of acknowledgements 3 and ³⁹⁶ thereafter waived certain rights, including those relating to alimony payments, a monetary award, and retirement benefits. The parties were married on June 25, 1994. By late 1998, their relationship had started to deteriorate.

As noted, they separated in 2001. Appellee and her children moved out of the Samuels Road house. On July 3, 2002, appellee filed a Complaint for Absolute Divorce, 4 which alleged, inter alia, that the Agreement was no longer valid and, as a result, she was entitled to her share in the marital estate and monetary support from appellant. Subsequent to his timely answer, appellant requested a hearing on the validity of the Agreement.

On March 26, 2003, a hearing was conducted after which the trial court rendered its oral opinion, in which it made its factual findings regarding the validity of the Agreement. It began with an analysis of evidence pertaining to the existence of a confidential relationship: And I’ll start with confidentiality of the relationship, and I will tell you right away it doesn’t cause me to focus on the burden of proof. These parties lived together for a period of time. About, about four years.

They moved in together in 1990. I don’t [sic] whether it was the beginning or the later part of the year. But they got married in the middle of '94. June 25th.

So they lived together and that in itself doesn’t establish a confidential relationship but it seems to me that it’s clear that even before the marriage and before this agreement came on the scene, [appellee] was giving $500 to $800—that’s not contested—to [appellant] every month and he was paying the bills. The intent then became that under this agreement she would give him a thousand [dollars] a month. He would pay all of the bills. I think the agreement provides, specifies what he’s going to pay al ³⁹⁷ though he testified that he paid, ah, I believe it was something toward her car and some other items.

So to that extent I believe that [appellee] accepted the guidance, I’ll put it, of [appellant] in terms of surrendering to him some of her financial independence, if not all of it, and relying on him to make financial decisions and, and take care of the two of them, and that continued into the marriage. That doesn’t matter because it was after the agreement was signed, but I think that supports, a piece of evidence that supports the conclusion that that’s what was going on before the marriage. So there was an element of confidentiality. She trusted.

He managed the funds. Interestingly enough, her testimony was, and I think not contradicted, she made between 15 to 18 or $19,000 a year, a, a month. I’m sorry. Fifteen to 18 or $19,000 a year.

Now that ends up somewhere in the neighborhood of $1,500 a month or less. Yet she was gonna [sic] pay him a thousand [dollars] a month toward these household expenses. Now 1, I understand that while the children were minors she was to receive $800 per child per month so she had more than just her salary at least during part of this time. But at some point they pass that age.

She didn’t get child support. Going back to the day of the signing, however, from her salary she was paying him about two-thirds under this agreement. Going to pay him about two-thirds of her income, gross income, for him to pay the bills and take care of things. She accepted that he was going to own the house that he purchased.

That doesn't establish confidentiality, but it seems to me that that at least suggests some reliam,ce on [appellant]. Addressing the intended purpose of the Agreement, the court opined: What persuades me to cone, [sic] to reach the final answer in this case is this. It is absolutely certain as far as I’m concerned both from the testimony of [appellee], from the answer to interrogatory of [appellant] and from his own testimony, that they talked about this, the purpose of this agreement, the impetus—let me say that. The impetus for this agreement was concern, ..., but it led [appellant] to be ³⁹⁸ very concerned that he might somehow have to defend himself or his assets from some claim of creditor of [appel-lee] and he wanted to avoid that.

So he asked that she enter this agreement. And Ms Cannon said by all means. She didn’t want him to be in that position and she was willing to enter that agreement. She said something about it being, her bankruptcy being cleared up in February of '96.

I don’t know. But here’s what strikes me and what causes me to reach the conclusion. When asked on cross[-]examination, [appellant] again confirmed—I shouldn’t say again—[appellant] confirmed that the primary purpose of the contract was to prevent him from any claims of her creditors coming out of the bankruptcy. He said he didn’t know when the bankruptcy was filed.

He didn’t know when that threat would end. But because of the various disputes they had, he didn’t see any reason to go along with any termination to that agreement. I believe that it was understood that the agreement was to be in place for that protection. Once that protection went, it was not to be in effect, and I think that is a finding that’s consistent with the law that I recited at the beginning of, of my remarks.

The fact that there was a confidential relationship I don’t believe in itself is dispositive. But I believe that it, I should take that into account with the fact that there was a confidential relationship to the extent that [appellee] was justified or I’d say should, ah, maybe it’s not justified is the right word. But [appellee] understandably believed that the purpose was to get through this bankruptcy issue and then the matter would be at an end. I think she believed that in May of 1994.

She trusted [appellant] as I commented before and so she signed what then would seem to be a, what then was I believe an agreement that was not fair and equitable. Regarding whether there was disclosure or actual knowledge of appellant’s property and resources, the court found: What really counts, I think, is did the parties know what they were doing, and it’s not just a matter of saying well, gee, if you were slightly mislead [sic] or slightly misunder ³⁹⁹ stood I should say, it’s over. The point is we treat these people as adults. They were free to enter into, enter into [sic] a contract.

And the contract is otherwise enforceable. It shouldn’t be undone I don’t believe because it slightly favors one side or the other this much later. What’s really key is do the parties know what they were doing and if someone is ignorant, he or she just can’t say well, I don’t have any clue but I’ll sign this and then later blow the whole thing apart. So it’s not just simply a matter of, I think, of knowing what’s being done.

One has an obligation at least to make some reasonable inquiries. There’s a question of frank, full, and truthful disclosure. [Appellant] has testified that he filled out a form stating his assets when he was applying to qualify for a loan for the new house. I frankly don’t recall him ever saying I showed this to [appellee], but I do recall he said there was some discussion of the matter, and I accept that she had some knowledge at least that he had the ability to own a house and a car and have a full time job and know some money, but make some pretty good money by working Sunday nights, Sunday mornings from midnight to eight and getting double overtime. So there was some disclosure, and, and perhaps if that were the only element in question it wouldn’t make much difference.

The court made a factual and a credibility determination with respect to appellee’s knowledge of the meaning and effect of the Agreement and her opportunity to acquire an understanding of the legal ramifications of the Agreement: The issue of voluntary, free, full knowledge of, of [sic] the meaning and effect of the agreement, well, again I want to be careful. One can’t just remain ignorant, hide their eyes, and say well, gee, I didn’t know what this was all about so it’s got to be undone. One has some obligation to exercise ⁴⁰⁰ some independent learning as to what’s going on. I don’t think that anything prevented [appellee] from having an understanding. [Appellee] testified in her direct examination, ... that [appellant] brought this agreement home on the 27th of May, told her what it was for, she read it over briefly, leafed through it, he pointed a few things out, and she signed it that day.

On rebuttal [appellee] said well, he brought it home. He didn’t really bother her every day about it. He asked a couple of times. I want to be very clear.

The benefit of telling the truth is you don’t have to remember what you said. I, I [sic] think [appellee’s] not being candid with the [c]ourt and I’m being real blunt. Addressing appellee’s failure to seek independent legal advice, the following observations were made in conjunction with the issue of whether there was knowledge of the effect of the Agreement: One of the elements, another element is the importance of independent legal advice. The testimony is that [appellee] didn’t seek independent legal advice.

She candidly testified that she wasn’t discouraged from doing that. She says she wasn’t encouraged, but she wasn’t discouraged either from seeking independent legal advice, and as I said a moment ago, one can’t just say well, gee, I chose to remain ignorant and rely on that. So I think as [appellant’s counsel] argues that it doesn’t establish in itself anything. Speaking to the fairness of the Agreement, the court said: The fair and equitable nature of the agreement and I’m going, want to be as clear as I can, and I’m trying to look at this from the 24th of, or 27th of May of 1994 when [appellee] signed this agreement and when it became a binding agreement by [appellant’s] signature she had waived her right to alimony, any, any death benefits that might come her way including her spousal rights other than what might come in her will executed later after this agreement, any claim of ⁴⁰¹ retirement benefits, a waiver of a monetary award, and she could be told to leave, put out of the house on fsixty-jdaysf’] notice.

That probably was as gently written a provision as it could be given it’s one day one could wake up and be told you’re out of here. I’ll be back in in [sixty] days. So I find that, that frankly even at the time of the signing this was a pretty draconian set of terms. So that, those are the, that’s the way I look at this agreement.

Now, you know, it wouldn’t be so bad to give up your right to claim either alimony or death benefits or any of those things for a period of time, a short period of time. So it makes sense to say in May of 1994, yeah, I have to get through this bankruptcy for the next two or three years. The marriage is just starting. I’ll give up those rights.

But when looked at over the context of what it means from May of 1994 for what might be a lifetime, whatever that might be, it, it certainly is pretty draconian and I think that the, given the nature of the relationship of these parties, and given the purpose of the agreement, they at least—not the purpose, the initial impetus for this agreement, [appel-lee] could rightfully understand that this was going to go into effect until we got through that period. They got through that period,. I think there is some justification therefore for her not spending as much time dwelling on it, and I accept the fact that she, under those circumstances, made, knew as much as she needed to know. If they had gotten, if they had separated and there ivas a, divorce coming up in 1995, I think she’d be bound by this.

Probably in 1996. But after that period of time they had both anticipated this agreement would be at an end. So I’ve done my best to (indiscernible) fully my reasons. Whether anyone agrees with me or not, that’s why 1 decide that this, in this case, this prenuptial agreement should be set aside.

(Emphasis added.) The trial court then ruled that, for the reasons stated, the Agreement “should be set aside.” The court issued a written order to that effect on May 5, 2003. As explained above, after ⁴⁰² appellant was ordered to pay pendente lite alimony, he noted this appeal. Additional facts will be supplied as warranted. LEGAL ANALYSIS Appellant contends that the court’s ruling was an act of contract interpretation, and that the court incorrectly used extrinsic evidence to interpret the Agreement as having terminated when appellee’s assets were no longer subject to levy by her bankruptcy creditors.

He asserts that the Agreement is unambiguous and did not have a termination date and, therefore, the court’s ruling was legally incorrect. More specifically, he claims that, [u]nder Maryland’s Law of Objective Interpretation of Contracts, the Unambiguous Language of an Agreement, Such as the Parties[’] May 27, 1994 Pre-Nuptial Agreement, Will Not Give Way to What a Party Thought the Agreement Meant or Was Intended to Mean, and in the Absence of Ambiguity the Court is Limited to the Four Corners of the Contract While Disregarding Parol and Other Extrinsic Evidence. Appellee, for her part, readily concedes that the Agreement is unambiguous in its terms and, therefore, no additional evidence is needed to interpret it. Appellee contends, however, that the lower court correctly considered parol or extrinsic evidence “not for the purpose of interpreting the Agreement, but rather to test [appellee’s] claim that that Agreement was fraudulently induced.” In support of her position, appellee cites Trupp v. Wolff, 24 Md.App. 588 , 335 A.2d 171 (1975).

We think it helpful, in framing the issue, to set forth the passage from Trupp , upon which appellee relies: “No rule is more firmly established or more generally recognized than that which excludes parol evidence offered to vary, contradict, add to or take from a written instrument. But in our opinion that rule, in cases where the execution of a written instrument has been induced by false or fraudulent statements or promises, does not prevent the introduction of evidence showing such facts in any action on ⁴⁰³ the instrument, because such evidence is not offered to vary or to contradict the instrument but to destroy it, and cases dealing with evidence which, while conceding the validity of such an instrument, nevertheless is offered to contradict or vary it, are parallel to the question.” Id. at 604 , 335 A.2d 171 (citing Councill v. Sun Ins. Office, 146 Md. 137, 149 , 126 A. 229 (1924)); accord Schmidt v. Millhauser, 212 Md. 585, 594 , 130 A.2d 572 (1957). Trapp goes on to explain that “the gist of the fraud in such cases is not the failure to perform the agreement, but the fraudulent intent of the promisor, the false representation of an existing intention to perform where such intent is in fact non-existent and the deception of the promisee by such false promise.” Id.

Appellee, alternatively, asks that, if we should reject her theory that she was wrongfully induced to enter into the Agreement, we decide whether the Agreement, as written, is valid. We shall begin our analysis by addressing appellant’s claim that the Agreement is unambiguous, that the lower court was limited to the four corners of the Agreement, and that the court was required to disregard parol and other extrinsic evidence. We shall then consider whether the trial judge’s findings of fact concerning the validity of the Agreement were clearly erroneous and, therefore, did not support the conclusion that the Agreement was invalid. Finally, we shall consider appellee’s claim of fraud in the inducement based on appellant’s alleged representation that the Agreement would end when he was no longer subjected to the claims of her creditors.

STANDARD OF REVIEW It is within the “exclusive prerogative” of the trial judge, when making findings of fact, to “ ‘judge the credibility of the witnesses’ ” and weigh the evidence. Shallow Run Ltd. Partnership v. State Highway Admin., 113 Md.App. 156, 173 , 686 A.2d 1113 (1996)(quoting Nixon v. State, 96 Md.App. 485, 491-92 , 625 A.2d 404 (1993)). Maryland Rule 8-131(c) man ⁴⁰⁴ dates that we review a trial court’s factual findings under the “clearly erroneous” standard, which means that, “ ‘if there is any competent, material evidence to support the factual findings below, we cannot hold those findings to be clearly erroneous.’ ” Id. at 174, 686 A.2d 1113 (quoting Staley v. Staley, 25 Md.App. 99, 110, 335 A.2d 114 (1975)). However, for conclusions of law, we afford no deference to the trial judge.

Himelstein v. Arrow Cab, 113 Md.App. 530, 536 , 688 A.2d 491 (1997). Thus, we may exercise our independent judgment to determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial judge are “legally correct.” Id. Objective Interpretation of Contracts Citing Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490 , 784 A.2d 1086 (2001), appellant principally relies on the objective law of contract interpretation. He contends that, “because the parties’ May 27, 1994 pre-nuptial agreement has no provision reflecting the side agreement asserted by appellee, one should not be read into the agreement as a matter of interpretation.

Accordingly, the agreement did not expire, and is presently enforceable.” A pre-nuptial agreement is measured against the same rules of interpretation as other contracts. As the Court of Appeals explained in Herget v. Herget, 319 Md. 466, 470 , 573 A.2d 798 (1990): An antenuptial agreement is a contract, subject to the general rules of contract interpretation. It is well settled that Maryland follows the objective law of contracts. We explained, in Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Ins.

Comm’r, 293 Md. 409, 420 , 445 A.2d 14 (1982), the procedure to be followed in interpreting a contract: In Maryland, under the objective law of contracts, a court, in construing an agreement, must first determine from the language of the agreement itself, what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was effectuated. Where the language of the contract is unambiguous, its plain meaning-will be given effect. There is no need for further construction. (Citations omitted). ⁴⁰⁵ In the particular context of the case before us, our task is perhaps most aptly stated by the language of Judge Boyd in Joffe & Mankowitz v. Niagara Ins.

Co., 116 Md. 155, 160 , 81 A. 281 (1911): Courts have no right to make new contracts for the parties, or ignore those already made by them simply to avoid seeming hardships. (Other citations omitted.) See generally also Young v. Anne Arundel County, 146 Md.App. 526, 586 , 807 A.2d 651 (2002). He correctly contends that extrinsic evidence of an oral agreement cannot be considered when a contract, read as a whole, is determined by a fact finder to be unambiguous. His premise, however, does not preclude a determination, as appellee claims, that the Agreement was not fairly and equitably procured and, as a result, was invalid from its inception.

See id. at 587 , 807 A.2d 651 ; PaineWebber Inc. v. East, 363 Md. 408, 414 , 768 A.2d 1029 (2001). The lower court’s opinion did not interpret the terms of the Agreement, nor do the parties disagree as to the legal import of any of its provisions. Moreover, as noted, the parties agree, and the court so held, that the language of the Agreement is unambiguous. The lower court appeared to apply the objective law of contracts only insofar as the provisions and their undisputed legal effect measure up to Frey v. Frey, supra, and its progeny.

The court, however, did not squarely address appellant’s claim that the parol agreement grafted onto the Agreement a termination provision that the court believed reflected the parties’ true intentions. The lower court found that appellee “understandably believed that the purpose was to get through this bankruptcy issue and then the matter would be at an end.... [Appellee] could rightfully understand that this was going to go into effect until we got through that period.” At the outset, the court’s finding focused on appellee’s subjective belief that the Agreement would terminate sometime in early 1996. When asked when appellee expected the Agreement to expire, she responded that she expected it to expire in February 1996 ⁴⁰⁶ “based upon, at that time the bankruptcy would be off of my credit, and I would have, you know, [sic] credit back.” Appellant acknowledged that the reason he sought a pre-nuptial agreement was because of appellee’s bankruptcy, but insisted he had had no idea when her bankruptcy would end and responded, “absolutely not,” when asked whether he had told appellee that the Agreement would be terminated “when that period of time was over.” The trial judge concluded that appellee had a “belief’ that the Agreement would expire. There was no testimony, however, from which the lower court could find that appellant made a promise that the Agreement would expire at some point in the future.

Appellee’s subjective belief that the Agreement would expire without evidence that there had been a promise, in the first instance, is insufficient to establish the parol agreement. The court erred in its conclusion that appellee had a right to expect appellant to rescind the Agreement in the absence of such a promise. Moreover, the Agreement was executed in contemplation of a divorce between the parties. In other words, absent an express provision to the contrary, it is the nature of the Agreement which makes the termination implicitly the dissolution of the marital relationship.

The potential of such dissolution or death is le raison d’etre for the Agreement. (See Moore v. Jacobsen, 373 Md. 185, 194-95 , 817 A.2d 212 (2003)), where Court of Appeals held that, because alimony is an obligation incidental to the duty to provide maintenance to a former spouse, growing out of the marriage relationship, where a non-modifiable separation agreement fails to provide otherwise, alimony terminates upon remarriage. Likewise, the subject Agreement implicitly and explicitly contemplates performance upon the conditions of death or dissolution of the marriage. Virtually every provision of the Agreement references its contemplated duration, i.e., “during the marriage.” Furthermore, Section Seventeen provides that it may not be changed in any manner except by written instrument duly executed and acknowledged by both parties.

As such, the ⁴⁰⁷ purported parol agreement, in this case, engrafts onto the Agreement a term not consistent with the implicit and explicit terms as to the duration of the instrument. The trial judge never squarely addressed appellant’s contention that, as a matter of contract interpretation, the Agreement did not terminate because the expiration term in the “oral side agreement” should not be read into the written Agreement. The court, we think, erred in its view of what appellee understood or believed as one of the factors in its determination of the validity of the Agreement, viz., it factored in her understanding as indicative of the unfairness of the Agreement. In conflating what appellee “understandably believed” was the purpose of the Agreement with a Frey/HaHz determination of fairness, it accorded weight that was not due the latter.

Validity of Agreement Turning to the validity of the Agreement, in Frey, the Court of Appeals, for the first time, held that under Maryland law a pre-nuptial agreement executed in contemplation of divorce was not void as being against public policy. See Frey, 298 Md. at 563, 471 A.2d 705 . The Court then adopted a five-factor test from Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47 , 234 A.2d 865 (1967), to evaluate whether a pre-nuptial agreement is valid: The agreement must be fair and equitable in procurement and result. The parties must make frank, full and truthful disclosure of all their assets.

The agreement must be “entered into voluntarily, freely and with full knowledge of its meaning and effect.” Further, [the Court] ... emphasized the importance of independent legal advice in evaluating whether the agreement was voluntarily and understandingly made. Also, in evaluating the disclosure and procurement of the agreement, the trial judge must remember that the parties stand in a confidential relationship. Frey, 298 Md. at 563 , 471 A.2d 705 (citing Hartz, 248 Md. at 57 , 234 A.2d 865 ). The Court of Appeals summarized thusly: ⁴⁰⁸ “The real test in a determination of the validity of a [pre-]nuptial agreement is whether there was overreaching, that is, whether in the atmosphere and environment of the confidential relationship there was unfairness or inequity in the result of the agreement or in its procurement.

Frank, full and truthful disclosure of what is being relinquished (or in lieu thereof actual knowledge otherwise available or obtained) is the key that turns the lock of the door leading to impregnable validity.” Id. at 564, 234 A.2d 865 (quoting Hartz, 248 Md. at 57 , 234 A.2d 865 ). In Harbom v. Harbom, 134 Md.App. 430, 441-42 , 760 A.2d 272 (2000), we discussed the nature of the relationship between parties negotiating an antenuptial agreement and the burden of proof when the validity of such an agreement is challenged: Levy [v. Sherman, 185 Md. 63 , 43 A.2d 25 (1945),] and Ortel [v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594 , 116 A.2d 145 (1955),] establish the law of Maryland to be that there is a confidential relationship between a man and a woman who are about to enter into an antenuptial agreement whether or not they are then engaged and whether or not the marriage is to be one of convenience; that this confidential relationship calls for frank, full and truthful disclosure of the worth of the property, real and personal, as to which there is a waiver of rights in whole or in part, so that he or she who waives can know what it is he or she is waiving. If there is adequate knowledge of what that frank, full and truthful disclosure would reveal, this may serve as a substitute though there has been no such disclosure. If there is neither proper disclosure nor actual knowledge and the allowance made to the one who waives is unfairly disproportionate to the worth of the property involved at the time the agreement is made, the burden is cast upon the one who relies on the agreement to prove that it was entered into voluntarily, freely and with full knowledge of its meaning and effect.

The reviewing court is much more apt to find there was voluntary and ⁴⁰⁹ understanding execution if the one who later asserts invalidity had independent legal advice as to the execution.... Id. at 441-42, 760 A.2d 272 (citing Hartz, 248 Md. at 56-57 , 234 A.2d 865 ). To recapitulate, the parties may insulate an agreement from a subsequent challenge on the basis of overreaching simply by making antecedent full, frank, and truthful disclosure. Such disclosure renders the agreement “ ‘impregnable.’ ” Harbom, 134 Md.App. at 444 , 760 A.2d 272 .

Proof that the disgruntled party had a “ ‘general idea’ ” of the spouse’s property and resources will suffice as an alternative to full disclosure. If there is frank, full, and truthful disclosure or actual knowledge and the allowance to the one who waives is proportionate to the property involved, the inquiry, for all intents and purposes, is concluded. Only when proper disclosure has not been made and the allowance is disproportionate must a proponent of the agreement shoulder the burden of proving that it was entered into voluntarily, freely, and with full knowledge of its meaning and effect. Independent legal advice provided to a party claiming invalidity supports a finding of validity.

Under extraordinary and rare circumstances an agreement may always be set aside on the basis that it is unconscionable. With these principles in mind, we review the lower court’s findings with respect to the factors establishing validity of the Agreement. Full, Frank, and Truthful Disclosure of Assets The trial judge found that, even in the absence of any financial statements exchanged between the parties before the execution of the Agreement, there was information available to the parties that would disclose the value of each spouse’s property and resources. Prior to the marriage, appellant and appellee lived together for approximately four years.

Appellee had, if not actual knowledge, at least a “ ‘general idea’ ” of appellant’s job, his hourly wage, his double-overtime pay for working night hours on Sundays, the type of car he owned, and the fact that, in 1993, he was financially able to purchase ⁴¹⁰ the house on Samuels Road. See Harbom, 134 Md.App. at 444 , 760 A.2d 272 (holding that “[t]he alternative to full disclosure is proof that the disgruntled