In Re W.Y.

NAZARIAN, J. Section 5-607 of the Family Law Article (“FL”) of the Maryland Code allows a court to order an out-of-state placement for a child who has been adjudicated delinquent so long as the child is given a hearing with notice to his parent or guardian and, after that hearing, the juvenile court makes specific findings. W.Y. (“W”) was a juvenile (he’s now over 18) who pled involved to his most recent set of charges and ⁶⁰⁰ was adjudicated delinquent. Using a form order edited by hand, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County ordered W placed in a facility in Pennsylvania; he contends on appeal that the process and findings underlying the placement decision failed to comply with FL § 5-607.

In the time since the court entered its order, W completed the out-of-state program, and we agree with both parties that the case is moot. Nevertheless, there are no reported Maryland appellate opinions to guide the juvenile courts in their application of this statute, and because the issues are important and likely to evade review, we find this an appropriate case to exercise our discretion to address the merits of W’s contentions. I. BACKGROUND W has a long history with the juvenile justice system. He was first adjudicated delinquent on March 13, 2012, also by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, after pleading involved to a count of robbery.

While wearing a black ski mask and wielding what the victim believed to be a handgun (later found to be a BB gun), W demanded the victim’s book bag and laptop. The victim recognized W from prior encounters, and even called W by name during the robbery. When police officers stopped him shortly after the incident, W admitted to the robbery and consented to a search of his home, during which the victim’s property was recovered. The court, sitting as a juvenile court, committed W to the Department of Juvenile Services (“DJS”) and recommended a Level B placement, which in Prince George’s County meant a staff-secured, non-community residential facility. 1 DJS placed W at the Victor Cullen Center 2 in Sabillasville, Frederick County, ⁶⁰¹ Maryland, where he remained from May 2, 2012 until he was successfully discharged on October 17, 2012.

Upon discharge, the juvenile court rescinded the commitment order and placed W on probation. W was arrested again in the early hours of May 26, 2014. Police found W sitting on the steps of a townhome in Land-over, Maryland, and approached him because he matched the description of the suspect in a nearby robbery. As they neared, W stood up, drew a .38 caliber handgun (containing three live rounds) from the waistband of his pants, threw the gun to the ground, and began to walk away.

When questioned by the officers, W said the weapon was his, but “[he] wasn’t going to do anything with it” and further stated that he had no knowledge of or involvement in the robbery. He was indicted as an adult, but his case was waived to the juvenile court. W again admitted to his actions, and again pled involved, this time to possession of a regulated firearm by a person under age 21. The court also found W in violation of his probation.

The court held a hearing 3 on October 20, 2014 to review W’s detention status; W was present with his attorney. The judge told W’s attorney to “let [W] know he may not be going home.” W then interjected: “And I’m getting a lot better, out of the prison.” The court turned its attention to the attorneys to schedule a hearing for the following month, then adjourned. At an adjudicatory hearing on November 18, 2014, the court accepted W’s plea of involved, and asked him to explain his actions: THE COURT: Okay. Young man, why did you do this? [W]: It was an honest mistake, Your Honor.

I really - shouldn’t have done this. THE COURT: Okay. So, why did you do this? ⁶⁰² [W]: There is no explanation for why I did it. THE COURT: Okay.

So, why did you do it? [W]: I just — I made an honest mistake. I tell you the reason why I did it would be an excuse ... and there is no excuse for that. THE COURT: So, why did you do it? [W]: I was being a bonehead. THE COURT: Pardon me? [W]: I was being a knucklehead, thinking that I could get away with things I can’t get away with.

THE COURT: Well, so why did you do it? You already had a robbery with a deadly weapon charge.... Now you [have] possession of a gun. Another one. [THE STATE]: There was not a gun in the prior— [W]: I understand, Sir.

I understand what I done. I apologize for— THE COURT: No, I am just asking why did you do it. Because you are going to — you went to a placement, didn’t you? [W]: Yes, Sir. THE COURT: How can I release you back into the community?

THE COURT: No, let me stop you. I just asked — because if you don’t change your lifestyle in what you are doing, you will end up dead out here____Or you going to end up killing somebody____ [L]ast time I asked you the same thing, why you walking around with a ski mask in the middle of the summer ... with a deadly weapon. I am just saying — you got to change. Would I give you a break and put you back in the community— [W]: If I could say one thing on my behalf is that this charge and that I went to [detention] and understand that I could have faced even wors[e] charges and time for it.

I[’m] really mature, and my age and I know that it’s time to stop playing games and do something with my life or ⁶⁰³ I’m going to throw it away. And I really don’t — I’m not ready for my life — I got dreams and goals and things that I need to do. And with the support from my family that — I can’t keep doing this. The judge then scheduled a December hearing with counsel and ordered W’s detention in the interim.

W’s disposition hearing — the purpose of which was to determine W’s level of placement, ie., whether he should remain in a level B facility or move to level A — took place on December 11, 2014. After an inaudible bench conversation, the State and W’s attorney agreed that W should maintain his level B placement, while DJS requested a level A commitment. The judge questioned W about the incident, again emphasizing the similarities between his two arrests: THE COURT: I am asking him a question because when is he going to learn his lesson. [W]: I mean I can’t make you believe me but — I honestly feel like that the lesson I learned when I was up in [detention] facing that— THE COURT: Wait, whoa, whoa, wait, how long were you gone the other time? [W]: Eight months. THE COURT: And you didn’t learn you lesson then? [W]: I did.

I just — I am telling you — I made a mistake, I— THE COURT: No, no, no. It is not a mistake when you ... put a gun in your hand. That’s not a mistake. [W]: It wasn’t a mistake, it was more of a defense. But I should have went about it differently than what I did.

And I can’t really take it back now, I mean. THE COURT: So, what am I supposed to do with — the mistakes that you keep making? [W]: I accept any consequences, Sir. (Inaudible) on behalf of the mistakes that I know that (Inaudible). THE COURT: You have any — the problem is you are putting yourself in harm’s way. ⁶⁰⁴ [W]: Exactly.

THE COURT: I am not asking for a response. I am just— this is ridiculous. [W]: I am ashamed of myself, too, Sir. THE COURT: Madam Clerk, the Court will in fact commit [W] to Level A. I agree, you got to stop this, young man. You are going to wind up getting yourself killed out here.

And since he has already been at Victor [Cullen Center] he is not going back to Victor [Cullen Center]. [THE STATE]: Your Honor, can we have a review [hearing] for placement, it is just today — I am sorry, I just realized that— THE COURT: No problem. You got [January 13, 2015]. After the hearing, the court issued a written Disposition Order, dated December 11, 2015, which ordered that W “be and hereby is placed in Level A____” The Order consisted of a template that stated the three classification levels for placement facilities — level A, B, and C — into which the judge inserted an additional limitation (which we have italicized): A — Secured Facility — [W] is not be placed at Victor Cullen because he was placed there in 2012. * ^Equivalent facilities for the juvenile are not available in the State of Maryland; and institutional care in the other jurisdiction is in the best interest of the juvenile and will not produce undue hardship.* * At the follow-up hearing on January 13, 2015, in a broken and mostly inaudible transcript, the court confirmed that DJS had not yet placed W, and the case was continued until January 20, 2015. On January 16, W filed a Motion to Modify Court Order and Request for a Hearing pursuant to Md. Rule 11-116, asking the court to strike the language italicized above from the Disposition Order.

In this sixteen-page Motion, W asked the court to place him at the Victor Cullen Center, disputed the findings in the juvenile judge’s Disposition Order, ⁶⁰⁵ and asked to be heard regarding his placement. We will discuss the facts and arguments set forth in this Motion in greater detail in the Discussion. At the January 20 hearing, counsel for W obtained a continuance to provide the juvenile judge an opportunity to review the January 16 motion. After agreeing on a hearing date, counsel for the State initiated another broken and inaudible— yet seemingly important — conversation regarding W’s placement: [THE STATE]: Your Honor, may I ask a quick question.

It is about, [W] is likely to be placed at Mid-Atlantic prior to that, would he need to appear for [the next] hearing or if he can— THE COURT: If he is placed, no. [THE STATE]: So, no. THE COURT: Counsel, would you approach? (Whereupon, a Bench Conference [begins].) THE COURT: Well, frankly I (Inaudible) placement. Anything?

MS. 4 : (Inaudible) THE COURT: I know. MS.: (Inaudible) THE COURT: Yes. I will probably rule on it some time this week. MS.: Okay.

THE COURT: Yes. And that (Inaudible) do whatever they want to do? [THE STATE]: (Inaudible) THE COURT: Okay. ⁶⁰⁶ [THE STATE]: (Inaudible) MS.: (Inaudible) THE COURT: No, (Inaudible). Somebody, it looked like it was filed late Friday, yes. Okay.

Thank you. MS.: (Inaudible) THE COURT: Yes. (Whereupon, the Bench Conference was concluded.) THE COURT: I am going to have it sent to Chambers today, [counsel]. [COUNSEL FOR W]: Thank you. (Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.) At the conclusion of this January 20 hearing: (1) W had yet to be placed; (2) the juvenile judge had not reviewed W’s Motion, nor addressed the requested hearing; (3) the parties agreed to return on February 2, 2015; and (4) the State indicated that W would be placed prior to the hearing.

On January 28, 2015, W was placed by DJS at the Mid-Atlantic Youth Service’s Secure Male Program (“MAYS”) in Pittston Township, Pennsylvania. Two days later, the juvenile judge ruled on W’s Motion to Modify Court Order and Request for a Hearing. When W filed the Motion on January 16, he had included a proposed order; the judge used the proposed order as a template, but modified it by crossing out portions shown below: Having reviewed Respondent’s Motion to Modify Court Order and Request For A Hearing and that Motion having merit, Respondent’s Motion is hereby GRANTED. The following language shall be stricken from this Court’s [Disposition Order]: “Respondent not to be placed in Victor Cullen.” ⁶⁰⁷ [[Image here]] The court signed the area indicated by the gray circle and at the bottom of the page, then dated the order January 30, 2015; it was entered on the docket on February 5, 2015.

As directed, the parties reconvened on February 2. By this point, W was in Pennsylvania, but his counsel was present. After the State disclosed that W had been placed at MAYS, the court reset the case for October 15, 2015 for a permanency hearing. W filed a timely notice of appeal. 5 Then, on October 7, 2015, the court rescinded the December 11, 2014 commitment order and placed W on probation, with conditions, and ordered him released on electronic monitoring. ⁶⁰⁸ II.

DISCUSSION W does not dispute the finding of delinquency. Instead, he challenges his out-of-state placement, and specifically whether the disposition proceedings complied with FL § 5-607 and afforded him due process before the court placed him out of state. 6 First, W argues that he was denied due process because the court failed to notify him or his parents that it was contemplating an out-of-state placement, and thus denied him and his parents a meaningful opportunity to be heard on whether the contemplated placement was in his best interest or would pose an undue hardship on his family. Second, W claims that the juvenile court ignored the requirements of FL § 5-607 when it did not hear evidence or consider any facts before concluding that there was no equivalent facility in Maryland, that the MAYS placement was in his best interest, and that sending him to MAYS would not cause any undue hardship for his family. In reviewing the circuit court’s decision in a juvenile delinquency matter, “[w]e review any conclusions of law de novo, but apply the clearly erroneous standard to findings of fact.” In re Elrich S., 416 Md. 15, 30 , 5 A.3d 27 (2010).

A decision regarding disposition is committed to the discretion of the trial judge and will be reversed only if there has been an abuse of discretion. In re Hamill, 10 Md.App. 586, 592 , 271 A.2d 762 (1970). An abuse of discretion occurs “ “where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court,’ or when the court acts ‘without reference to any ⁶⁰⁹ guiding rules or principles.’ ” Pickett v. State, 222 Md.App. 322, 331 , 112 A.3d 1078 (2015) (quoting Nash v. State, 439 Md. 53, 67 , 94 A.3d 23 (2014)). A. This Appeal Is Moot.

Initially, though, we have to confront the ongoing justiciability of the case in light of the fact that the order from which W appeals is no longer in force. The State filed its brief in this Court on October 13, 2015, six days after the circuit court rescinded the commitment order, and argues that this development mooted W’s appeal. W acknowledges that the appeal is moot, but urges us to “address the merits of the issues raised because they are unresolved issues of important public concern on which guidance would be helpful,” and because the error he asserts “is not merely capable of repetition; it has been repeated in numerous cases.” Courts decide live disputes, and we normally should decline to address the merits of a moot case. Lloyd v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Elections of Balt.

Cty., 206 Md. 36, 41 , 111 A.2d 379 (1954) (citations omitted). “A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties at the time it is before the court so that the court cannot provide an effective remedy.” Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 , 674 A.2d 951 (1996). And that is the case here: the juvenile court’s partial denial of W’s motion to modify that Order was effectively granted at the time of rescission, so there is no relief for us to grant him. In rare instances, however, courts can decide to address the merits of a moot case when the issues concern matters of great importance, the public interest will be affected, or there is a likelihood that the wrongdoing will soon be repeated if not immediately resolved. Lloyd, 206 Md. at 42-43 , 111 A.2d 379 (requiring a “concurrence in sufficient weight of the[se] factors which together add up to the exception”).

And this is such a case. ⁶¹⁰ First, this case raises matters of great public importance. “This Court ... may address the merits of a moot case if we are convinced that the case presents unresolved issues in matters of important public concern that, if decided, will establish a rule for future conduct.” Coburn, 342 Md. at 250 , 674 A.2d 951 (citing State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82-83 , 553 A.2d 672 (1989)). Section 5-607 involves critical due process and liberty interests for juvenile defendants and their families. Although the language of FL § 5-607 seems straightforward, no Maryland appellate court has interpreted or applied it. And the allegations underlying this case — that the mandatory findings required by FL § 5-607 are being inserted verbatim into form orders and juveniles placed out-of-state without the required findings — are serious.

W argues that “the effect of these boilerplate findings is that they pave the way for DJS to place a child out-of-state, even though the issue was never raised in the hearing.” If true, such a practice raises due process concerns that deserve appellate attention. Second, this issue is likely to recur, but will escape appellate review due to the limited duration of most juvenile commitments and the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court to modify or rescind commitment orders. Secure residential treatment programs, including the programs at Victor Cullen Center and MAYS, typically last six to nine months. See DJS: Victor Cullen Center, www.djs.maryland.gov/victor-cullen. asp; MAYS: Secure Residential Treatment, www.mid atlanticyouth.com/programs/ residentialshtml.

We agree with W that “[bjetween the time it takes for the record to be compiled and transmitted, the time involved in briefing and argument, and the time necessary for the Court to generate its opinion and mandate, the appellate process will often last longer than the juvenile commitment.” We have, in fact, seen this issue present itself repeatedly in recent months, and we are persuaded it is worthy of a reported appellate opinion. 7 ⁶¹¹ B. The Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion By Limiting The Commitment Beyond The Type Of Facility. W does not challenge his level A placement, a decision grounded in and supported by the evidence and testimony the court considered during the December 11, 2014 hearing. Both W and the State accepted a level B commitment, but DJS pressed for a level A commitment, not least because W had previously completed a level B commitment at Victor Cullen for eight months. The court gave W an opportunity to speak about the incident underlying these charges and his prior commitment, and concluded that W had been insufficiently rehabilitated after eight months in a level B commitment at Victor Cullen and should be sent to a level A facility.

That’s fine as far as it went. But accompanying the level A indication on the Disposition Order was a direction that W was “not to be placed at Victor Cullen because he was placed there in 2012.” Relying on In re Demetrius J., 321 Md. 468 , 583 A.2d 258 (1991), W argues that the juvenile court “exceeded its authority and interfered with a prerogative of DJS when it prohibited placing [him] at the Victor Cullen facility.” The State does not address this contention. We agree with W that the juvenile court abused its discretion by limiting the commitment beyond the type of facility. Pursuant to the Juvenile Cases subtitle of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), a juvenile court may place a child on probation, under supervision in his own home, or in custody or care outside of his home “upon terms the court deems appropriate____” Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl.

Vol., 2015 Supp.), § 3-8A-19(d)(l)(i) of the CJP Article. If committing the child to custody or guardianship outside of his own home, the court may assign the child to DJS, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“DHMH”), or an agency “to meet the priorities set forth in CJP § 3-8A-02 [8] of this ⁶¹² subtitle, including designation of the type of facility [9] where ⁶¹³ the child is to be accommodated.... ” Id., (d)(1)(h). But the precise scope of the juvenile court’s authority under this subtitle has received little appellate attention. In the consolidated appeal of In re Demetrius J., 321 Md. 468 , 583 A.2d 258 (1991), a juvenile court committed three delinquent juveniles to DJS, and further directed that they be placed at a specific private Pennsylvania facility.

At the bottom of each disposition order was a handwritten command: “Respondent to be placed at the Glen Mills School.” Id. at 477 , 583