Cathcart v. State

SHARER, J. Following a jury trial, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, appellant, Robin Tyronne Cathcart, was found guilty of first degree assault, second degree assault, and ³⁸² false imprisonment. 1 After merging the two assault convictions, appellant was sentenced to ten years in prison for first degree assault. For the false imprisonment conviction, he received a consecutive life sentence, with all but ten years suspended. The court did not impose a period of probation in addition to the executed sentences. In his timely appeal, appellant presents two issues for our review, which, as slightly rephrased, are: 2 1.

Whether the sentence imposed for common law false imprisonment was unconstitutionally disproportionate. 2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction for first degree assault. For the reasons that follow, we find that the sentence imposed for false imprisonment was not unconstitutionally disproportionate, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant’s first degree assault conviction. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgments of the trial court.

BACKGROUND At approximately 1:00 a.m. on December 28, 2003, appellant met Antoinette Drayton, his former live-in girlfriend and mother of their seven month old daughter, outside of her apartment, in order to return her keys. Once inside the apartment, appellant informed Drayton that he wanted to talk about their relationship and her use of drugs in the presence ³⁸³ of their daughter. Drayton told appellant that she had been using drugs all day and did not want to talk. She suggested that they walk to the store, but appellant said that they were not going anywhere, and smacked her.

According to Drayton’s testimony at trial, appellant forced her to perform various sex acts and, when she again tried to leave, appellant smacked her two more times. While Drayton was lying on her back on the floor, and appellant was sitting on her stomach, appellant grabbed her by the throat with his left hand, and began punching her in the face. Drayton lost consciousness during the beating and reported having the sensation “like I didn’t even know I was there.” Drayton’s injuries included two fractures to her jaw, a broken nose, a dislocated chin, multiple hematomas to her face, and a swollen hand. Photographs of Drayton’s injuries and her medical records were introduced into evidence at trial.

Following the beating, appellant began “[wjhooping and hollering” that he was “going to go to jail for this shit.” Drayton tried to tell appellant that she needed to go to the hospital “before I die.” When appellant noticed that Drayton was “bleeding all over the damn place,” he got her a towel. Drayton, her eyes swollen, felt around on the floor for her clothes, but appellant told her, “[N]ot yet. We ain’t leaving yet.” About 45 minutes to an hour passed before appellant agreed to permit Drayton to leave the apartment. With assistance from appellant, Drayton was allowed to get dressed and was led outside the apartment.

Drayton “tried to keep walking,” but appellant grabbed her by the arm and asked her what she wanted him to do. Appellant ultimately told Drayton to go to her friend’s apartment across the street and not look back. Drayton felt her way to her friend’s apartment door at about 3:30 a.m. Thereafter, she was taken to a hospital for treatment.

Additional facts will be set forth as they become necessary to our discussion of the issues. ³⁸⁴ 1. Whether the sentence imposed for common law false imprisonment was unconstitutionally disproportionate. Excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment are expressly prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 3 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions have also been interpreted by the Supreme Court as encompassing a narrow proportionality principle, which forbids sentences “that are ‘grossly5 or ‘significantly5 disproportionate in length to the crime being punished.” State v. Bolden, 356 Md. 160, 165 , 737 A.2d 1086 (1999)(citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 287-88 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)). The Supreme Court’s decisions outlining the narrow scope of proportionality review were summarized by Judge Raker in State v. Stewart, 368 Md. 26, 31-32 , 791 A.2d 143 (2002): 4 In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), the Supreme Court held a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a seven-time non-violent felony recidivist unconstitutionally disproportionate.

In so finding, the Court emphasized that successful challenges to the proportionality of a particular sentence are exceedingly rare.... The Court stated that appellate courts’ proportionality review should be guided by objective criteria, including: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the ³⁸⁵ sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. at 292 , 103 S.Ct. at 3011 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 . In Harmelin v. Michigan, [ 501 U.S. 957 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)] the Supreme Court revisited its decision in Solem . Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, and writing for himself and three other justices, clarified that “the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence.

Rather it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 , 111 S.Ct. at 2705 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ____Therefore, a detailed proportionality review based on the criteria set out in Solem is “appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 , 111 S.Ct. at 2707 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (Kennedy, J., concurring). (Footnotes omitted). In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 , 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003), the Supreme Court further limited proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment. There, the Court held that a sentence of 25 years to life in prison, for felony grand theft under California’s three strikes law, was not grossly disproportionate and therefore did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.

Id. at 30-31 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 . In affirming the sentence, Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality of the Court, emphasized the importance of deferring to the legislature on sentencing matters: Our traditional deference to legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution “does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.” A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation. Some or all of these justifications may play a role in a State’s sentencing scheme. Selecting the sentencing rationales is ³⁸⁶ generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts.

Id. at 25 , 123 S.Ct. 1179 . (citations omitted). Along with the criteria set forth in Solem and Harmelin , therefore, appellate courts must also show deference to the legislature in reviewing the proportionality of a sentence. 5 While Ewing may have narrowed the Supreme Court’s proportionality review, its holding simply reiterated the considerations utilized by the Court of Appeals in reviewing the proportionality of non-capital sentences challenged on Eighth Amendment grounds. In order to provide context for appellant’s argument, we shall briefly address and distinguish the cases upon which he relies.

In Thomas v. State, 333 Md. 84, 88 , 634 A.2d 1 (1993), issues of cruel and unusual punishment were raised after Thomas was sentenced to consecutive terms of 20 and 30 years in prison for separate batteries committed upon his wife. In vacating the 20 year sentence for battery, the Court considered several factors—that Thomas was not a recidivist, that previously approved 20 year sentences for common law assault were far more aggravated, and that the maximum sentence for certain other statutory aggravated assaults was less than the sentence imposed upon Thomas. Id. at 98-100 , 634 A.2d 1 . In the final analysis, the Court concluded that the 20 year sentence was disproportionate.

Id. at 100-01 , 634 A.2d 1 . As an example, the Court compared the sentence for the battery committed by Thomas with the statutory offense of assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable, for which the maximum sentence was 15 years in prison, and noted: When it is clear ... that the conduct underlying the simple assault or battery is in fact less serious than the assaultive ³⁸⁷ conduct for which the legislature has fixed a maximum penalty, a penalty that exceeds the statutory maximum suggests disproportionality, and we give that fact heavy weight in this case. Id. at 100 , 634 A.2d 1 . In Stewart, supra, 368 Md. at 33 , 791 A.2d 143 , the Court observed: “In Thomas we harmonized our conclusions concerning the breadth and depth of Eighth Amendment proportionality review with Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin.” There, the Court of Appeals noted that, “[i]n order to be unconstitutional, a punishment must be more than very harsh; it must be grossly disproportionate.

This standard will not be easily met.” Thomas, supra, 333 Md. at 96 , 634 A.2d 1 . (Emphasis in original). Thus, “challenges based on proportionality will be seriously entertained only where the punishment is truly egregious.” Id. at 97 , 634 A.2d 1 ; see also Schlamp v. State, 161 Md.App. 280, 298 , 868 A.2d 914 (2005), rev’d on other grounds, 390 Md. 724 , 891 A.2d 327 (2006). The Court of Appeals has also considered disproportionality issues in Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712 , 421 A.2d 957 (1980), and Epps v. State, 333 Md. 121 , 634 A.2d 20 (1993).

In Simms, supra, 288 Md. at 719 , 421 A.2d 957 , the argument was advanced that, having been acquitted of assault with intent to rob, the sentence for which was ten years, Simms ought not have been sentenced to a term of 12 years for common law assault. In vacating the 12 year sentence for assault, the Court stated: [W]hen a defendant is charged with a greater offense and a lesser included offense based on the same conduct, with jeopardy attaching to both charges at trial, and when the defendant is convicted only of the lesser included charge, he may not receive a sentence for that conviction which exceeds the maximum sentence which could have been imposed had he been convicted of the greater charge. Id. at 724 , 421 A.2d 957 . Here, appellant posits that, had he been charged with, and convicted of, kidnaping, he would have faced a sentence of only ³⁸⁸ 30 years.

Hence, he argues that, under the rale of Simms , the sentence for false imprisonment, a lesser included offense, should not exceed the maximum sentence for kidnaping, the greater offense. We reject that argument, for appellant was not charged with kidnaping; thus, jeopardy did not attach as to the greater offense. Finally, appellant relies on Epps, supra, 333 Md. at 130, 634 A.2d 20 , wherein the Court of Appeals, after conducting a proportionality review, vacated the 20 year sentence imposed upon Epps for assault on a correctional officer. There, the Court found a “suggestion of gross disproportionality” and then engaged in a comparative intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis of the penalty.

Id. at 129-30 , 634 A.2d 20 . Appellant here urges that we do likewise. For the reasons to be explained, we decline the invitation. Life Sentence Appellant contends that the trial court’s imposition of a life sentence for common-law false imprisonment “is disproportional in a way that is violative of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” We disagree because we believe it appropriate to focus on the actual sentence—ten years—and not the life sentence, of which, actuarially, a substantial portion was suspended.

At sentencing in the ease sub judice, the court stated, in pertinent part: For the first-degree assault, Count 1, I sentence you to ten years in the State penitentiary. And I give you credit for the 324 days that you’ve already spent toward that. Count 2, the second-degree assault, merges