Nichols v. State

Watts, J. Under the law of the case doctrine, "a decision [that is] rendered in a [prior] appeal ... is binding in a later appeal." Law of the Case , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). In other words, once an appellate court has ruled upon a question [that is] properly presented [in] an appeal[-]or, if the ruling [is] contrary to a question that could have been raised and argued in that appeal on the then[-existing] state of the record[-]such a ruling becomes the law of the case[,] and is binding on the [parties, the appellate court,] and [lower] courts alike, unless changed ..., and neither the questions [that were] decided[,] nor the ones that could have been raised and decided[,] are available to be raised in a subsequent appeal. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr.

Servs. v. Doe , 439 Md. 201 , 216-17, 94 A.3d 791 , 800 (2014) (cleaned up). The law of the case doctrine's "purpose is to prevent piecemeal litigation[;] without it[,] any party ... could institute as many successive appeals as ... his [or her] imagination could produce new reasons to assign as to why his [or her] side ... should prevail, and the litigation would never terminate." Dabbs v. Anne Arundel Cty. , 458 Md. 331 , 345 n.15, 182 A.3d 798 , 806 n.15 (2018) (cleaned up). In this case, a defendant unsuccessfully challenged a sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment in an appeal, then challenged the sentence and sought resentencing on the count on a different ground at a resentencing proceeding. We must determine, among other issues, whether the law of the case doctrine barred the trial court from considering the defendant's new challenge to the sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment.

In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, the State, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, charged Darryl Nichols, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, with multiple crimes. After Nichols was convicted, the circuit court sentenced him to: life imprisonment, with all but fifty years suspended, for first-degree felony murder; life imprisonment, with all but fifty concurrent years suspended, for false imprisonment; fifty concurrent years of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment; five concurrent years of imprisonment for extortion; five concurrent years of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit extortion; followed by five years of supervised probation. Thus, Nichols's original aggregate sentence was life imprisonment, with all but fifty years suspended, followed by five years of supervised probation. Nichols appealed.

The Court of Special Appeals vacated Nichols's life sentence, with all but fifty years suspended, for false imprisonment, holding that, under this case's circumstances, the maximum sentence for false imprisonment was thirty years of imprisonment. See Darryl Nichols v. State , No. 169, Sept. Term, 2014, 2016 WL 1622079 , at ⁵ (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 4, 2016). 1 The Court of Special Appeals also vacated Nichols's convictions for first-degree felony murder and conspiracy to commit extortion, affirmed the rest of his convictions and sentences, and remanded for resentencing as to false imprisonment. See Nichols , 2016 WL 1622079 , at ⁶.

The Court of Special Appeals rejected Nichols's contention that his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment must be vacated because conspiracy to commit false imprisonment is a lesser-included offense of conspiracy to commit kidnapping. See id. at ⁵ n.5. At a resentencing proceeding, Nichols's counsel challenged his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment on a different ground-namely, that his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment violated Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl.

Vol.) ("CR") § 1-202, which states: "The punishment of a person who is convicted of conspiracy may not exceed the maximum punishment for the crime that the person conspired to commit." Nichols's counsel contended that, under CR § 1-202, given that Nichols's sentence for false imprisonment could not exceed thirty years, neither could his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment. The circuit court reasoned, however, that it lacked the authority to resentence Nichols for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, as the Court of Special Appeals had remanded for resentencing only as to false imprisonment. The circuit court resentenced Nichols to thirty years of imprisonment for false imprisonment, consecutive to the existing fifty-year sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment. Nichols's new aggregate sentence was eighty years of imprisonment.

Nichols's counsel argued that, by making Nichols's new sentence for false imprisonment consecutive to the existing sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, the circuit court had impermissibly increased his aggregate sentence above the original aggregate sentence of life imprisonment with all but fifty years suspended. The circuit court was unpersuaded. For comparison of Nichols's original sentences to the status of his sentences after the resentencing proceeding, we set forth the following table: Crime: Original Sentence: Status After Resentencing Proceeding: First-degree Life imprisonment, with all but N/A (conviction vacated) felony murder fifty years suspended False Life imprisonment, with all but Thirty consecutive years of imprisonment fifty concurrent years suspended imprisonment Conspiracy to Fifty concurrent years of Fifty years of imprisonment commit false imprisonment imprisonment Extortion Five concurrent years of Remained the same imprisonment Conspiracy to Five concurrent years of N/A (conviction vacated) commit extortion imprisonment Life imprisonment, with all but Aggregate fifty years suspended, followed by Eighty years of imprisonment sentence: five years of supervised probation Nichols appealed again. The Court of Special Appeals determined that the law of the case doctrine barred the circuit court from considering Nichols's second challenge to his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment.

See Darryl Nichols v. State , No. 1277, Sept. Term, 2016, 2017 WL 6492681 , at ³ (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 19, 2017). But, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with Nichols that, under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.

(1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.) ("CJ") § 12-702(b) -which states that, generally, on remand, a trial court "may not impose a sentence more severe than the sentence previously imposed for the offense"-the circuit court had impermissibly increased his aggregate sentence by making his new sentence for false imprisonment consecutive to his existing sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment for a total of eighty years of active incarceration. See Nichols , 2017 WL 6492681 , at ⁶. The Court of Special Appeals vacated Nichols's sentence for false imprisonment, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded with instructions to impose a new sentence for false imprisonment that would not result in a new aggregate sentence of more than fifty years of active incarceration.

See id. Before us, Nichols contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the law of the case doctrine barred the circuit court from considering at the resentencing proceeding his second challenge to his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment. Nichols argues that his fifty-year sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment violates CR § 1-202 because it exceeds the thirty-year maximum sentence that he received for false imprisonment. The State disagrees with Nichols, and asserts that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that the circuit court had impermissibly increased Nichols's sentence by imposing a new aggregate sentence of eighty years of imprisonment where Nichols had been originally sentenced to life imprisonment with all but fifty years suspended.

Below, in Part I, consistent with existing case law, we hold that the law of the case doctrine does not bar a trial court from considering under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) an issue as to a sentence's legality that an appellate court has not resolved. Here, the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the law of the case doctrine barred the circuit court from considering Nichols's second challenge to his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, as the Court of Special Appeals did not resolve that challenge in the first appeal. In Part II, addressing the merits of that challenge, we hold that, under CR § 1-202, where a defendant is convicted of both a crime and conspiracy to commit that crime, a trial court cannot impose for the conspiracy a sentence that exceeds the maximum sentence that the trial court imposed for the crime that the person conspired to commit. The plain language of CR § 1-202 requires this result.

And, although there is no ambiguity as to CR § 1-202's language, its legislative history confirms the General Assembly's intent that a defendant's punishment for conspiracy to commit a crime not exceed the punishment that the defendant received for the crime that the defendant conspired to commit. Here, given that the circuit court sentenced Nichols to thirty years of imprisonment for false imprisonment, the circuit court could not impose a sentence of more than thirty years of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment. In Part III, we hold that, under CJ § 12-702(b), an aggregate sentence of a certain number of years of imprisonment is more severe than a sentence of life imprisonment, with all but a lower number of years suspended. Here, given that Nichols's original aggregate sentence was life imprisonment with all but fifty years suspended, followed by five years of supervised probation, the circuit court impermissibly increased his aggregate sentence at the resentencing proceeding by imposing a thirty-year sentence for false imprisonment consecutive to the fifty-year sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, for a new aggregate sentence of eighty years of imprisonment.

In Part IV, we grant the State's request to vacate all of Nichols's sentences, and to remand for resentencing as to the remaining convictions. BACKGROUND Charges and Underlying Events In the circuit court, the State charged Nichols with first-degree murder, kidnapping, false imprisonment, extortion, and conspiracy to commit each of these crimes. The indictments identified Nichols's co-conspirators as Donta Vaughn and Sherelle Ferguson, and identified the victim as Eric Pendergrass. At trial, as a witness for the State, Wayne Price testified that, in late January 2009, he, Vaughn, Ferguson, and a friend whom he knew as "Ty," met and discussed ways to try to make $50,000.

Subsequently, Price, Ty, Vaughn, Ferguson, and Nichols met. At that meeting, Vaughn proposed a plan "to grab" an acquaintance of his, obtain money from the acquaintance's "girl[,]" and then kill the acquaintance. Price said that he wanted no part of the plan and left. As a witness for the State, Tiara Felder testified that Pendergrass had been her boyfriend and roommate.

On February 1, 2009, between 12 a.m. and 1 a.m., Pendergrass telephoned Felder and told her to go to a closet, get a bag, and take it to his mother's house. Felder got the bag, looked inside, and saw cash, which she estimated to be $15,000. After Felder arrived at Pendergrass's mother's house, someone knocked on the door. Pendergrass's cousin answered the door, and Felder saw a woman outside.

The woman said that she was there for Pendergrass. Felder gave the bag of cash to the woman. On February 1 or 2, 2009, Felder received a text message from a phone number that she did not recognize. For approximately two or three days, Felder exchanged text messages with the unknown number.

As a result of the text messages, Felder took another bag, containing between $25,000 and $30,000 in cash, to a certain location. Afterward, Felder learned that Pendergrass had been killed. Verdicts, Original Sentences, and First Appeal A jury found Nichols guilty of first-degree felony murder, false imprisonment, conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, extortion, and conspiracy to commit extortion. 2 The circuit court sentenced Nichols to: life imprisonment, with all but fifty years suspended, for first-degree felony murder; life imprisonment, with all but fifty concurrent years suspended, for false imprisonment; fifty concurrent years of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment; five concurrent years of imprisonment for extortion; five concurrent years of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit extortion; followed by five years of supervised probation. Nichols's original aggregate sentence was life imprisonment, with all but fifty years suspended, followed by five years of supervised probation.

Nichols appealed. On October 13, 2015, the Court of Special Appeals: vacated Nichols's conviction for first-degree felony murder, his sentence for conspiracy to commit extortion, 3 and his sentence for false imprisonment; affirmed the balance of Nichols's convictions and sentences; and remanded for resentencing as to false imprisonment with instructions not to impose a sentence that exceeded thirty years of imprisonment. See Darryl Nichols v. State , No. 0169, Sept. Term, 2014, 2015 WL 5944381 , at ⁶ (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 13, 2015).

The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court erred in sentencing Nichols to life imprisonment, with all but fifty years suspended, for false imprisonment, as, under this case's circumstances, the maximum sentence for false imprisonment was thirty years of imprisonment. See id. at ⁵-6. Before the Court of Special Appeals, Nichols contended that conspiracy to commit false imprisonment is a lesser-included offense of kidnapping. See id. at ⁵.

The Court of Special Appeals rejected this contention, as each crime includes an element that the other does not. See id. Specifically, one element of kidnapping is that the defendant transports the victim to another place, while conspiracy to commit false imprisonment does not include this element. See id.

One element of conspiracy to commit false imprisonment is that the defendant agreed with at least one other person to commit the crime of false imprisonment, while kidnapping lacks this element. See id. Nichols moved for reconsideration. On February 4, 2016, the Court of Special Appeals issued a superseding opinion that was identical to the original one, except that, in the new opinion: two footnotes were added to address the motion for reconsideration; typographical errors were fixed; and the Court vacated not only Nichols's sentence, but also his conviction, for conspiracy to commit extortion.

Compare Nichols , 2015 WL 5944381 , with Nichols , 2016 WL 1622079 , at ⁴ n.4, ⁵ n.5, ⁶. Resentencing Proceeding On August 18, 2016, the circuit court conducted a resentencing proceeding. At the proceeding, Nichols's counsel asked the circuit court "to consider [an issue] that the Court of Special Appeals [had] not consider[ed.]" Nichols's counsel advised that CR § 1-202 states: "The punishment of a person who is convicted of conspiracy may not exceed the maximum punishment for the crime that the person conspired to commit." Nichols's counsel pointed out that the Court of Special Appeals had held that, under this case's circumstances, the maximum sentence for false imprisonment was thirty years of imprisonment. See Nichols , 2016 WL 1622079 , at ⁴-5.

Nichols's counsel contended that, accordingly, the sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment could not exceed thirty years of imprisonment. Nichols's counsel acknowledged that Nichols had not raised, and the Court of Special Appeals had not addressed, the issue of whether his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment could exceed the maximum sentence for false imprisonment. The prosecutor responded that the Court of Special Appeals had affirmed Nichols's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment. The prosecutor contended that, if the Court of Special Appeals had intended for Nichols's sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment to be capped at thirty years of imprisonment, it would have stated as much.

The circuit court concluded that it lacked the authority to resentence Nichols for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment. The circuit court observed that the Court of Special Appeals had remanded only for resentencing as to certain of Nichols's convictions, which did not include his conviction for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment. The circuit court stated that the only issues that were before it were the ones that the Court of Special Appeals had addressed. The circuit court observed that it was conducting a resentencing proceeding, not a hearing on a motion to modify a sentence.

The circuit court resentenced Nichols to thirty years of imprisonment for false imprisonment. The circuit court made Nichols's new thirty-year sentence for false imprisonment consecutive to his existing fifty-year sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment, making his new aggregate sentence eighty years of imprisonment. Nichols's counsel noted that his original sentence for false imprisonment had been concurrent to his sentence of life imprisonment, with all but fifty years suspended, for first-degree felony murder, and contended that the circuit court had impermissibly increased his aggregate sentence by imposing an aggregate sentence of eighty years of imprisonment-i.e., by making his new sentence for false imprisonment consecutive to his existing sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment. The circuit court did not agree.

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in This Appeal Nichols appealed again. On December 19, 2017, the Court of Special Appeals vacated Nichols's sentence for false imprisonment, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded for resentencing as to false imprisonment. See Nichols , 2017 WL 6492681 , at ⁶. The Court of Special Appeals held that the law of the case doctrine prevented Nichols from challenging the sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment on the ground that his sentence exceeded the maximum sentence for false imprisonment.

See id. at ⁴. The Court explained that the law of the case doctrine applied because the issue as to Nichols's sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment could have been raised or decided in the first appeal. See id. at ³. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that, under CJ § 12-702(b), the circuit court had impermissibly increased Nichols's aggregate sentence by imposing an active eighty-year sentence of incarceration.

See id. at ⁶. The Court of Special Appeals remanded for resentencing with instructions not to impose a new sentence for false imprisonment that would result in an aggregate sentence of more than fifty active years of imprisonment. See id. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and Conditional Cross-Petition On February 7, 2018, Nichols petitioned for a writ of certiorari , raising the following issue: "Whether, despite Maryland Rule 4-345 [ (a) ]'s provision that a court may correct an illegal sentence at any time, the law of the case doctrine may bar a claim of an illegal sentence for failure to properly raise the issue on appeal?" On February 21, 2018, the State conditionally cross-petitioned for a writ of certiorari , raising the following issue: "Is Nichols's total sentence of 80 years of imprisonment, which was imposed at resentencing, not an illegal increase from his previous total sentence of life with all but 50 years suspended?" On April 9, 2018, this Court granted the petition and the conditional cross-petition.

See Nichols v. State , 458 Md. 580 , 183 A.3d 156 (2018). DISCUSSION I. The Law of the Case Doctrine The Parties' Contentions Nichols contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the law of the case doctrine barred the circuit court from considering the issue of whether his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment is an illegal sentence because it exceeds the maximum sentence for false imprisonment. Nichols argues that the law of the case doctrine does not apply because the Court of Special Appeals did not decide that issue in the first appeal. Nichols asserts that, under Maryland Rule 4-345(a), a court may review an inherently illegal sentence at any time.

Nichols maintains that his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment is an illegal sentence because it violates CR § 1-202, which prohibits a sentence for conspiracy from exceeding the maximum sentence for the crime that the defendant conspired to commit. The State responds that the law of the case doctrine precluded Nichols from arguing that his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment is an illegal sentence. The State contends that the argument that Nichols pursued in the first appeal was the same as the argument that he pursued at the resentencing proceeding-namely, that his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment is an illegal sentence because it was subject to the thirty-year maximum sentence for false imprisonment. The State argues that, at the resentencing proceeding, Nichols did not raise a new issue, and instead simply relied on CR § 1-202 as additional support for the argument that he had made in the first appeal.

The State asserts that, although a defendant may raise the issue of a sentence's legality at any time under Maryland Rule 4-345(a), that does not mean that the defendant may re-raise an issue as to a sentence that an appellate court has resolved. Standard of Review An appellate court reviews without deference a lower court's conclusion as to whether the law of the case doctrine applies. See Balt. Cty. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Balt.

Cty. Lodge No. 4 , 449 Md. 713 , 731, 144 A.3d 1213 , 1224 (2016). Maryland Rule 4-345(a) and the Law of the Case Doctrine Maryland Rule 4-345(a) states: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time." In Smith v. State , 453 Md. 561 , 576, 162 A.3d 955 , 964 (2017), this Court explained where and how Maryland Rule 4-345(a) applies, stating: If a sentence is illegal within the meaning of [ Maryland Rule 4-345(a) -]that is, the illegality inheres in the sentence itself[-]then the defendant may file a motion in the trial court to correct it, notwithstanding that[:] (1) no objection was made when the sentence was imposed, (2) the defendant purported to consent to it, or (3) the sentence was not challenged in a timely-filed direct appeal or at some other previous procedural juncture. (Cleaned up).

In Scott v. State , 379 Md. 170 , 182-83, 840 A.2d 715 , 722 (2004), this Court held that Maryland Rule 4-345(a) does not "render[ ] the doctrine of law of the case inapplicable to motions to correct an illegal sentence." (Footnote omitted). In Scott , id. at 175 , 840 A.2d at 718 , a defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, contending that his two sentences of life imprisonment were unlawful for different reasons. Specifically, the defendant argued that his first sentence of life imprisonment was ambiguous because it was unclear whether he would be eligible for parole. See id. at 176 , 840 A.2d at 719 .

The defendant asserted that his second sentence of life imprisonment was ambiguous because it was unclear whether it was meant to be consecutive to or concurrent with his first sentence of life imprisonment. See id. at 177 , 840 A.2d at 719 . A trial judge denied the motion to correct an illegal sentence. See id. at 176-77 , 840 A.2d at 719 .

Years later, the defendant filed a second motion to correct an illegal sentence, repeating his previous contentions and arguing that new parole guidelines rendered his sentences of life imprisonment illegal. See id. at 179-80 , 840 A.2d at 720 . A second trial judge denied the motion to correct an illegal sentence, noting that the first trial judge had rejected the defendant's previous contentions, and concluding that the new parole guidelines did not render his sentences of life imprisonment illegal sentences. See id. at 180 , 840 A.2d at 720 -21 .

The defendant appealed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the second trial judge's determination, holding that the law of the case doctrine applies to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. See id. at 180-81 , 840 A.2d at 721 . Before this Court, the defendant contended that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the law of the case doctrine applies to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. See id. at 181 , 840 A.2d at 721 .

The defendant "argue[d] that, because [Maryland] Rule 4-345(a) allows a defendant to raise the illegality of a sentence at any time, it is inappropriate to use the doctrine of law of the case to give preclusive effect to earlier orders in a case denying relief." Id. at 181 , 840 A.2d at 721 . This Court held that the Court of Special Appeals erred in applying the law of the case doctrine-but not for the reason that the defendant contended. See id. at 182-83 , 840 A.2d at 722 . This Court explained that the law of the case doctrine does not apply to a trial court's ruling; thus, in Scott , contrary to the Court of Special Appeals's holding, the second trial judge was free to either adopt, or decline to adopt, the first trial judge's rejection of the contentions that the defendant made in both motions to correct an illegal sentence.

See id. at 184-85 , 840 A.2d at 723 -24 . This Court disagreed, however, with the defendant's argument that, under Maryland Rule 4-345(a), the law of the case doctrine does not apply to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. See id. at 182-83 , 840 A.2d at 722 . This Court explained the relationship between the law of the case doctrine and res judicata , 4 as well as the relationship between res judicata and Maryland Rule 4-345(a), as follows: The law of the case doctrine differs from res judicata in that it applies to court decisions [that are] made in the same, rather than a subsequent, case.... [B]ecause motions to correct an illegal sentence occur as part of the same criminal proceeding[,] and not a wholly independent action, ... res judicata might apply if such a motion was considered to be a wholly independent action.... [H]owever, [ ] this is unlikely to occur because, although Maryland Rule 4-345(a) provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence at any time," [ Maryland Rule 4-345(a) ] creates a limited exception to the general rule of finality by sanctioning a method of opening a judgment [that is] otherwise final and beyond the reach of the court. [Maryland] Rule 4-345(a) is a limited exception because it applies only to motions that occur as part of the same criminal proceeding.

Scott , 379 Md. at 182 n.6, 840 A.2d at 722 n.6 (cleaned up). In State v. Garnett , 172 Md. App. 558 , 562-63, 916 A.2d 393 , 395, cert. denied , 399 Md. 594 , 925 A.2d 633 (2007), the Court of Special Appeals held that the law of the case doctrine did not bar a trial court from considering a challenge to a sentence where the defendant had not raised the challenge in a prior appeal. In Garnett , 172 Md. App. at 560 , 916 A.2d at 394 , the defendant was found guilty but not criminally responsible of certain crimes, and the trial court ordered restitution. The State filed a Motion to Allow Garnishment, which the defendant opposed on the ground that the order of restitution was not a criminal sanction, and thus was dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding.

See id. at 560 , 916 A.2d at 394 . The trial court denied the Motion to Allow Garnishment, and the State appealed. See id. at 560 , 916 A.2d at 394 . This Court held that the trial court erred in denying the Motion to Allow Garnishment because the order of restitution was a criminal sanction, and was not dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding.

See id. at 560 , 916 A.2d at 394 . The defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Correct Illegal Sentence, requesting that the trial court dismiss the Motion to Allow Garnishment and vacate the order of restitution on the ground that the defendant had been found guilty but not criminally responsible. See id. at 560 , 916 A.2d at 394 . The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss and to Correct Illegal Sentence, and the State appealed again.

See id. at 560 , 916 A.2d at 394 . Before the Court of Special Appeals, the State contended that the law of the case doctrine barred the trial court from granting the Motion to Dismiss and to Correct Illegal Sentence. See id. at 561 , 916 A.2d at 394 . The Court of Special Appeals disagreed, observing that, in the first appeal, the defendant had not raised the issue of whether it was permissible to impose a criminal sanction on a defendant who had been found guilty but not criminally responsible.

See id. at 562-63 , 916 A.2d at 395 . The Court of Special Appeals addressed the relationship between the law of the case doctrine and Maryland Rule 4-345(a), stating: [Maryland] Rule 4-345(a) permits a defendant to assert an "illegal sentence" argument that was not previously addressed by an appellate court. Obviously, the law of the case doctrine would prevent relitigation of an "illegal sentence" argument that has been presented to[,] and rejected by[,] an appellate court.... On the other hand, [Maryland] Rule 4-345(a) would be meaningless if the law of the case doctrine were extended to sentences that could have been-but were not-challenged as illegal [when a defendant] filed his or her first appellate brief in this Court.

Id. at 561-62 , 916 A.2d at 395 (paragraph break omitted). Analysis Here, consistent with existing case law, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine bars a trial court from considering under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) an issue as to the legality of a sentence where an appellate court has previously resolved the same issue. The law of the case doctrine does not, however, bar a trial court from considering under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) an issue as to the legality of a sentence that an appellate court has not resolved. In addition, the law of the case doctrine does not prohibit consideration of an issue as to the legality of a sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) where a defendant could have raised, but failed to raise, the issue in a prior appeal.

The law of the case doctrine bars a trial court from considering an issue as to a sentence's legality that an appellate court has resolved. Maryland Rule 4-345(a) allows a defendant to raise a new issue as to a sentence's legality at any time; Maryland Rule 4-345(a) does not allow a defendant to re-raise an old issue as to a sentence's legality. In other words, "the law of the case doctrine [ ] prevent[s] relitigation of an 'illegal sentence' argument that has been presented to[,] and rejected by[,] an appellate court." Garnett , 172 Md. App. at 562 , 916 A.2d at 395 . As this Court held in Scott , 379 Md. at 183 , 840 A.2d at 722 , Maryland Rule 4-345(a) does not render the law of the case doctrine inapplicable to an issue as to a sentence's legality.

Turning to this case's circumstances, to determine whether the law of the case doctrine applies, we must ascertain whether, in the first appeal, the Court of Special Appeals resolved the contention that Nichols raised at the resentencing proceeding. In other words, we must determine whether, at the resentencing proceeding, Nichols raised a new issue by contending that his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment was an illegal sentence because it violated CR § 1-202. If, as Nichols argues, he raised a new issue, then the Court of Special Appeals did not decide the issue in the first appeal, and the law of the case doctrine did not bar the circuit court from considering the issue at the resentencing proceeding. But, if, as the State asserts, Nichols did not raise a new issue-and instead simply provided new support (namely, CR § 1-202) as to an issue that he had already raised in the first appeal-then the Court of Special Appeals decided the issue in the first appeal, and the law of the case doctrine barred the circuit court from considering the new support as to the issue at the resentencing proceeding.

To resolve the question of whether Nichols raised at the resentencing proceeding an issue that he had not raised in the first appeal, we review his contentions in the first appeal and at the resentencing proceeding. In his brief in the first appeal, Nichols listed multiple questions presented, including: "Did the [circuit] court err by imposing sentences for false imprisonment and conspiracy to commit false imprisonment that exceeded the statutory maximum penalty for the greater [ ] offense of kidnapping[, of] which [Nichols] was acquitted?" Brief of Appellant, Darryl Nichols v. State , No. 169, Sept. Term, 2014 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), 2014 WL 7717632 , at ³. Nichols contended that, where a defendant is charged with a lesser-included offense and a greater offense based on the same conduct, and is convicted only of the lesser-included offense, the trial court cannot impose a sentence that exceeds the maximum sentence for the greater offense.

See id. at ¹⁶. Nichols argued that false imprisonment is a lesser-included offense of kidnapping, and that his sentence for conspiracy to commit false imprisonment could not exceed the maximum penalty for conspiracy to kidnap, which is thirty years of imprisonment. See id. at ¹⁷-18. In its original opinion, the Court of Special Appeals rejected Nichols's contention, concluding that conspiracy to commit false imprisonment is not a lesser-included offense of kidnapping because each crime has an element that the other does not.

See Nichols , 2015 WL 5944381 , at ⁵. Nichols filed a motion for reconsideration in which he contended that conspiracy to commit false imprisonment is a lesser-included offense of conspiracy to commit kidnapping. See Nichols , 2016 WL 1622079 , at ⁵ n.5. In its superseding opinion, the Court of Special Appeals disagreed.

See id. The Court of Special Appeals determined, however, that a trial court may sentence a defendant for only one conspiracy based on the same conduct, no matter how many crimes the defendant agreed to commit. See id. The Court of