Cathey v. DEPT. OF HEALTH

ADKINS, J. In this case we must determine whether a developmentally disabled adult with an interstate custody arrangement qualifies for Developmental Disability Administration (“DDA”) services in Maryland. Petitioner Megan Cathey is a developmentally disabled adult whose custody traverses state lines. Pursuant to a New Jersey court order, Petitioner lives with her mother in New Jersey for two weeks a month and with father in Maryland for the remaining two weeks. With this arrangement in mind, Petitioner’s father applied for DDA services several years ago, but the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“Department”) determined that her interstate custody did not give her the requisite Maryland residency to qualify for such services.

The Department’s Board of Review affirmed, and the Circuit Court for Baltimore City upheld the Board’s decision. Petitioner sought relief from this Court, and we granted ceriiorari on April 22, 2011. See Cathey v. Bd. of Review, 418 Md. 586 , 16 A.3d 977 (2011). Petitioner presented the following question for our review: Is a developmentally disabled individual eligible for services provided or funded by the DDA during the time she resides with her father in Maryland in accordance with a court order granting the father joint legal and residential custody, and directing that the individual alternate her time equally with each parent in successive two-week intervals? ⁶⁰⁰ For the reasons explained below, we shall hold that the Petitioner is eligible for DDA services during the time she lives with her father in Maryland.

We shall also hold that the concept of “residence” as presented in the relevant portion of the Code of Maryland Regulations is not as exacting as the legal concept of “domicile.” FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Petitioner Megan Cathey was born November 21, 1977. She is developmentally disabled, and her diagnoses have included mental retardation, neurological impairment, and bipolar disorder. She requires regular care and supervision to perform many day-to-day tasks, such as meal-planning, budgeting, and accessing community resources. In 1990, Petitioner’s parents divorced.

Her father, Joe Cathey, has lived in Maryland since 1989. He lives with his wife in Maryland, and Petitioner’s mother, Virginia, lives in New Jersey. The initial divorce decree gave primary residential custody of Petitioner to her mother, subject to visitation rights. In accordance with this decree, Petitioner had a monthly Wednesday-to-Sunday visit with her father.

In 2005, Dr. Charles Diament, a psychologist, was appointed by the New Jersey courts to evaluate Petitioner’s custody arrangements. Dr. Diament concluded that Petitioner’s parents should share “joint legal custody” and “should share physical custody on an equal basis.” Dr. Diament reasoned that Petitioner “should have extensive contact with both parents.” Based on Dr. Diament’s report, the Superior Court of New Jersey modified the initial divorce decree. Concluding that Petitioner’s father had “shown a change in circumstances that would warrant a reevaluation of custody,” the court issued a post-judgment order, effective February 25, 2006, giving Petitioner’s parents joint legal and residential custody. The court ordered that Petitioner spend her time with each parent equally in alternating two-week blocks.

Petitioner’s parents implemented the new arrangement in March 2006. Since ⁶⁰¹ then, Petitioner has alternated her time living with her father in Maryland and her mother in New Jersey. When Petitioner is in New Jersey, she receives funding and services from the New Jersey Division of Developmental Disabilities, and she attends an Easter Seals care program. When she is in Maryland, she participates in the day program at a facility known as The Arc Carroll County, Monday through Friday.

She has received no state funding in Maryland, however, and her father pays for services at the Arc. New Jersey does not pay for any of Petitioner’s services while she is in Maryland. In December 2005, Petitioner’s father applied for DDA services, citing the pending revisions to the custody arrangement and the receipt of comparable services in New Jersey. Portions of both the Maryland Developmental Disabilities Law and the Code of Maryland Regulations govern such an application.

The Developmental Disabilities Law mandates that applicants receive an evaluation to determine whether they have a developmental disability or otherwise meet the eligibility requirements for services. Md.Code (1986, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 7-404 of the Health-General Article. 1 The statute empowers the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene to promulgate rules and regulations governing such evaluations, see §§ 1-101, 7-401, 7-404, which are found in the Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”), see COMAR 10.22.12. The regulations provide that “¡t]o be eligible for services funded by the DDA as an individual with developmental disability, that individual shall: (1) Be a resident of Maryland; and (2) Have an evaluation that finds that a developmental disability is present.” COMAR 10.22.12.05.A. Both parties have agreed throughout these proceedings that Petitioner has a developmental disability, as defined by the statute. ⁶⁰² The focus of this dispute is whether she is a “resident” of Maryland. The relevant regulations further define a resident: “Resident” means an individual who: (a) Demonstrates that that individual is living in the State voluntarily with an intent to remain on a permanent basis, including children with parents or guardians who reside out of the State; (b) Resides out-of-State but whose parents or guardians are residents of Maryland; or (c) Is a migrant worker and, while in the State, needs medical care and is not receiving assistance from any other state or political jurisdiction.

COMAR 10.22.12.03.B(27). In response to the application by Petitioner’s father, the DDA concluded in November 2006 that Petitioner was “not eligible for services funded by DDA due to the [COMAR] residency requirement.” Petitioner then appealed the decision. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on March 7, 2007, and then issued a proposed decision on June 4 of that year, upholding the DDA’s determination. The ALJ interpreted the term “resident” in COMAR as analogous to the legal concept of a “domicile,” which requires that the person voluntarily intend to live in Maryland indefinitely.

See, e.g., Blount v. Boston, 351 Md. 360 , 718 A.2d 1111 (1998). The ALJ ruled that Petitioner had her “primary residence” in New Jersey and was therefore ineligible for benefits in Maryland. 2 ⁶⁰³ Petitioner requested that the Secretary review the ALJ’s proposed decision. 3 In response, the Secretary’s designee affirmed the ALJ’s ruling in a final decision on February 1, 2010. The final decision quoted Blount for the proposition that “[ajlthough a person may have several places of abode or dwelling, he or she can have only one domicile at a time.” See Blount, 351 Md. at 367 , 718 A.2d at 1115 . The Secretary’s designee said the principle in Blount “has broad application and is not subject to any exceptions” and therefore adopted the ALJ’s conclusions of law and findings of fact in full.

Petitioner then appealed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s Board of Review (“Board”), the Respondent in this case, which held hearings on April 22, 2010, and affirmed the Secretary’s final decision on May 4, 2010. Petitioner sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that it was “based on substantial evidence and consistent with Maryland law....” Petitioner’s petition for certiorari followed, which we granted. Cathey, 418 Md. 586 , 16 A.3d 977 (2011). STANDARD OF REVIEW Nowhere in the Maryland Developmental Disabilities Law is the term “resident” defined.

See § 7-101. Nor is it defined in the definition section of the Health-General Article. See § 1-101. The statute is generally silent on eligibility for disability services; instead, it authorizes the Department Secretary to promulgate appropriate regulations.

See § 7-401, et seq. The definition of “resident” thus appears in COMAR 10.22.12.03.B(27), and in this case, the Department interpreted its own regulations to provide that “resident” is akin to the well-established concept of a “domicile.” We are therefore tasked with reviewing the Department’s interpretation of its own regulation. ⁶⁰⁴ In reviewing the Department’s decision, we must consider several principles. For cases in which an agency interprets its own regulations, we have held that “questions of law are completely subject to review by the courts,” and that this Court “is not bound by the agency’s legal conclusions; we are, in short, under no constraints in reversing an administrative decision which is premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Campbell, 364 Md. 108, 118 , 771 A.2d 1051, 1057 (2001) (quotations omitted). We have also indicated, however, that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to some deference. “Because an agency is best able to discern its intent in promulgating a regulation, the agency’s expertise is more pertinent to the interpretation of an agency’s rule than to the interpretation of its governing statute.” Comm’n on Human Relations v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 295 Md. 586, 593 , 457 A.2d 1146, 1150 (1983).

This deference, though, has limits. “Deference to the interpretation of the agency, however, does not mean acquiescence or abdication of our construction responsibility. Despite the deference, it is always within our prerogative to determine whether an agency’s conclusions of law are correct.” Adventist Health Care, Inc. v. Health Care Comm’n, 392 Md. 103, 121 , 896 A.2d 320, 331 (2006). The decision to interpret “resident” as “domicile” is a conclusion of law, so we shall therefore consider whether the agency was erroneous in its decision making. DISCUSSION In interpreting an agency’s conclusions of law, we must also consider our principles regarding remedial statutes.

As the Board conceded at oral argument, the Maryland Developmental Disabilities Law is a remedial statute. 4 ⁶⁰⁵ Generally, remedial statutes are those which provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries .... The definition of a remedial statute has also been stated as a statute that relates to practice, procedure, or remedies and does not affect substantive or vested rights. 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, supra, § 60.02, at 152; see also 2 id. § 41.09, at 399 (‘The statutes which fall into this category [of remedial statutes] are ones that describe methods for enforcing, processing, administering, or determining rights, liabilities or status.’). (Quotations omitted.) Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 324-25 , 835 A.2d 1185, 1190-91 (2003) . We have repeatedly held that remedial statutes are to be construed “liberally” in favor of claimants, to suppress the evil and advance the remedy.

See, e.g., Lark v. Montgomery Hospice, Inc., 414 Md. 215, 228 , 994 A.2d 968, 976 (2010); Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 495 , 914 A.2d 735, 750-51 (2007); Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 383 Md, 527, 544, 860 A.2d 909, 919 (2004) . The “evil” in this context is the disability that causes Cathey to be unable to live independently, and the “remedy” is the services that are provided by the state to assist the disabled adult. ⁶⁰⁶ Here, the Secretary is given the power under the statute “to adopt rules and regulations” establishing evaluation procedures for developmentally disabled adults. See § 7-401.

Exercising this authority, the Secretary adopted the regulation requiring that an individual be a resident in order to qualify for the services, defining resident status as set forth above. We have previously held that statutes “are remedial in nature if they are designed to ... introduce regulations conducive to the public good.” Pak, 378 Md. at 325 , 835 A.2d at 1190 (2003) (quotations omitted); see Doe v. Roe, 419 Md. 687, 703 , 20 A.3d 787, 797 (2011); Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 408-09 , 754 A.2d 389, 395-96 (2000). If statutes are remedial because they authorize regulations conducive to the public good, then manifestly we should interpret those regulations liberally as well, to “suppress the evil and advance the remedy.” See Lark, 414 Md. at 228 , 994 A.2d at 976 ; see also Carven v. State Ret. & Pension Sys., 416 Md. 389, 416 , 7 A.3d 38, 55 (2010) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Because the ambiguous COMAR regulation at issue applies to a remedial statute, the regulation should be liberally construed in favor of the claimant.”). The ALJ interpreted “resident” as used in COMAR to be synonymous with “domicile,” as that term is interpreted under common law.

The ALJ ruled that because Petitioner is not domiciled in Maryland, she is therefore not eligible for DDA benefits. The ALJ held that residence “requires the voluntary intent to make Maryland a permanent home,” adding that although Petitioner “is a Maryland resident for two weeks out of every month, there is no evidence that she is either voluntarily or permanently residing in Maryland.” This initial ruling has hounded Petitioner throughout multiple affirmations on review. Because there are no disputes of fact, we shall review the AL J’s decision as a matter of law. The Board urges us to apply the principle from Bainum v. Kalen that “the words ‘reside’ or ‘resident’ in a constitutional provision or statute delineating rights, duties, obligations, privileges, etc., would be construed to mean ‘domicile’ unless a contrary intent be shown.” See Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490, 496 , 325 A.2d 392, 396 (1974).

In Bainum , the Petitioner ⁶⁰⁷ was ruled ineligible to run for the Maryland Senate because he was not domiciled in Maryland under a state constitutional provision requiring him to have “resided” in Maryland for three years before the election. See id. at 493, 501 , 325 A.2d at 394, 398 . A very recent case by this Court, however, illustrates the principle that “residence” and “domicile” are distinct concepts. In Boer v. Univ.

Specialty Hosp., this Court determined that “residency” under a statute was not synonymous with “domicile.” Determining residency required analysis of objective indicia without the requisite subjective intent inherent in determining domicile. See Boer, 421 Md. 529 , 27 A.3d 175