Centre Insurance v. J.T.W.

CATHELL, J. This opinion addresses two cases before the Court which present a virtually identical issue. 1 The question to be re ⁷³ solved is: When, under Title 2 of Maryland’s Insurance Article, 2 does the 30-day filing period for a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision begin? 3 Centre Insurance Company, Inc., Z.C. Insurance Agency, Inc., and the Maryland Insurance Commissioner 4 (“Commissioner”) 5 argue that the plain language of the Insurance Article provides that the 30-day period begins when the order resulting from an administrative hearing is mailed. J.T.W. 6 argues that the 30-day period begins when the order resulting from an administrative hearing is received by the affected party. We hold that the plain language of the pertinent statutes provides that, in the context of the relevant sections of the Insurance Article, the 30-day filing period for a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision under §§ 2-204(c) and 2—215(d)(1) begins when the order resulting from a relevant administrative hearing is mailed. ⁷⁴ I. Facts This case arises out of the unfortunate occurrence of a tornado, which touched down in La Plata, Maryland on April 28, 2002. The tornado destroyed J.T.W.’s home and personal property.

In response to this incident, J.T.W. filed several claims with his homeowner’s insurance carrier and agent, respectively: Centre Insurance Company, Inc. and Z.C. Sterling Insurance Agency, Inc. J.T.W. received some benefits under his homeowner’s insurance policy, but was not satisfied with the companies’ response as a whole. As a result, J.T.W. filed administrative complaints with the Maryland Insurance Administration (“MIA”) charging that Centre violated the Insurance Article by the manner in which it handled his claims. No. 52 In October 2002, J.T.W. filed a complaint with the MIA, asserting that Centre violated Maryland law by the manner in which it handled his claims (in particular, the fact that some of his claims were denied). In January 2003, the MIA notified J.T.W. that it had failed to find any violations by Centre of the Maryland Insurance Article.

J.T.W. then sought review of the MIA’s decision. The parties entered into mediation before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). As a result of the mediation, on June 11, 2003, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. In October 2003 and February 2004, J.T.W. filed additional complaints with the MIA, asserting that Centre had failed to cover his claimed losses and had failed to comply with the settlement agreement.

The MIA notified J.T.W. in January and May 2004, respectively, that it had again failed to find any violations by Centre. J.T.W. requested administrative hearings in both instances. The claims were consolidated and referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). 7 ⁷⁵ On July 28 and 29, 2004, the OAH held a hearing. On September 27, 2004, the ALJ issued an order and decision, upholding in part and denying in part J.T.W.’s complaint.

The order was mailed to the parties on October 14, 2004. 8 It is uncontroverted that J.T.W. did not receive the order until October 20, 2004. On November 19, 2004, J.T.W. filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Charles County. Centre then filed a motion to dismiss J.T.W.’s petition. Centre argued that, pursuant to Maryland Code (1995, 2003 Repl.Vol.), § 2-215(d) of the Insurance Article, a petition for judicial review must be filed within 30 days after such a petitioner for judicial review is served with the order, 9 and that Maryland Code (1995, 2003 ReplVol.), § 2-204(c) of the Insurance Article defines service as the mailing of an order.

Therefore, Centre argued that J.T.W. filed his petition in an untimely manner, 36 days after the order had been mailed (October 14, 2004-November 19, 2004). J.T.W. asserted, conversely, that the operative date for service was his receipt of the order. That occurred on October 20, 2004, which would ⁷⁶ mean that he filed his petition within the required 30-day period. The Circuit Court found in favor of Centre, holding that service was effective upon mailing.

On April 20, 2005, the Circuit Court filed an order dismissing J.T.W.’s appeal of the administrative order. J.T.W. then timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. On April 28, 2006, the intermediate appellate court filed its opinion, reversing the Circuit Court’s decision. J.T.W. v. Centre Ins.

Co., 168 Md.App. 492 , 897 A.2d 288 (2006). The court agreed with J.T.W.’s argument that, under Maryland Rule 7-203(a)(3), 10 the 30-day time limit for filing a petition for judicial review began to run on the date that he received the ALJ’s order and decision. J. T.W., 168 Md.App. at 497 , 897 A.2d at 291 . The court referenced § 2-215(d) of the Insurance Article, finding that “J.T.W. was required to file a petition for judicial review within thirty days following service of the order resulting from the hearing.” J.T.W., 168 Md.App. at 497 , 897 A.2d at 292 .

Additionally, the intermediate appellate court cited to Rockwood Casualty Insurance Co. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 385 Md. 99 , 867 A.2d 1026 (2005), in support of the premise that “the term ‘serve’ implies actual receipt.” J.T.W., 168 Md.App. at 497 , 897 A.2d at 292 . The court concluded, stating: “The requirement that a petition for judicial review be filed within thirty days after the order Vas served on the persons entitled to receive it,’ implies that the party must have actually received the order. Ins. § 2-215(d)(l). Consequently, ‘notice [is] required by law to be received by the petitioner,’ and the thirty day limit begins to run ‘the date ⁷⁷ the petitioner receive[s] notice of the agency’s order or action.’ Md. Rule 7-203(a)(3).” J.T.W., 168 Md.App. at 498 , 897 A.2d at 292 .

The intermediate appellate court only briefly referenced § 2-204(c) of the Insurance Article (which defines “service”) and did not address any impact that it would have upon the court’s interpretation of § 2-215(d)(l) of the Insurance Article. Centre timely filed a petition for certiorari, which this Court granted on August 29, 2006. Centre Ins. v. J.T.W., 394 Md. 307 , 905 A.2d 842 (2006). No. 56 On September 14, 2004, J.T.W. filed another complaint with the MIA alleging that Centre violated the Insurance Article by failing to reimburse him for costs associated with the demolition of what remained of his La Plata home after the tornado.

The MIA found no violations by Centre. On May 4, 2005, J.T.W. requested an administrative hearing. A hearing was held by the OAH on September 15, 2005. On October 18, 2005, the ALJ issued and mailed an order and decision, finding in favor of Centre.

J.T.W. alleges that he received the order in the mail on October 21, 2005. 11 On November 18, 2005, J.T.W. filed a petition for judicial review with the Circuit Court for Charles County, 31 days after the order was mailed and 28 days after he received the order. On December 8, 2005, and January 13, 2006, Centre filed motions to dismiss, which the Circuit Court granted on March 30, 2006. J.T.W. then timely filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to the intermediate appellate court hearing the matter, Centre filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this ⁷⁸ Court.

On September 8, 2006, we granted certiorari. See Centre Ins. v. J.T.W., 394 Md. 307 , 905 A.2d 842 (2006).

II

Discussion The Circuit Court, in both instances, dismissed J.T.W.’s petitions for judicial review as untimely. Delineating when the 30-day time period for filing a petition begins under § 2-215(d) is key to our determination. Thus, the crux of this case is the definition of “service,” as applicable to § 2-215(d)(l) of the Insurance Article. Because we hold that J.T.W.’s petitions were not filed within the relevant 30-day time period, 12 the Circuit Court (in both instances) was without any recourse—the proceeding was subject to a statute of limitations.

Colao v. County Council of Prince George’s County, 346 Md. 342, 362-64 , 697 A.2d 96, 106-07 (1997); see also Kim v. Comptroller of Treasury, 350 Md. 527, 536 , 714 A.2d 176, 180 (1998). 13 When the petitions were challenged, the trial court was required to dismiss them. A. Statutory Construction Our first step in resolving the conflict between the parties is to determine whether' the Legislature intended that the term ⁷⁹ “service,” as used in § 2-215(d)(l) of the Insurance Article, requires actual receipt of the order by the affected party or whether the mailing of the order accomplishes service. Our resolution of this issue requires an examination of the statutes involved in the case sub judice. We recently discussed the canons of statutory construction in Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006): “The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.

See Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688 , 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004). Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology. Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 , 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004). “In construing the plain language, ‘[a] court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.’ Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387 , 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003); County Council v. Dutcher, 365 Md. 399, 416-417 , 780 A.2d 1137, 1147 (2001). Statutory text ‘ “should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.” ’ Collins, 383 Md. at 691 , 861 A.2d at 732 (quoting James v. Butler, 378 Md. 683, 696 , 838 A.2d 1180, 1187 (2003)).

The plain language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation. Rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect. Deville, 383 Md. at 223 , 858 A.2d at 487 ; Navarro-Monzo v. Washington Adventist, 380 Md. 195, 204 , 844 A.2d 406, 411 (2004). “If statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give effect to the statute as it is written. Collins, 383 Md. at 688-89 , 861 A.2d at 730 . ‘If there is no ambiguity in that language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant ⁸⁰ laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends; we do not need to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsistent, external rules of construction, for “the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.” ’ Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502 , 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004) (quoting Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 525 , 801 A.2d 160, 165 (2002)).” Chow, 393 Md. at 443-44 , 903 A.2d at 395 (some quotations omitted) (quoting Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-77 , 870 A.2d 186, 193-94 (2005)); see also City of Baltimore Dev.

Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assoc., 395 Md. 299 , 910 A.2d 406 (2006). Additionally, we have expounded upon the importance of resolving ambiguity within a statute, stating: “ ‘In some cases, the statutory text reveals ambiguity, and then the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. However, before judges may look to other sources for interpretation, first there must exist an ambiguity within the statute, i.e., two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. Where the statutory language is free from such ambiguity, courts will neither look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent nor add to or delete words from the statute.

Only when faced with ambiguity will courts consider both the literal or usual meaning of the words as well as their meaning in light of the objectives and purposes of the enactment. As our predecessors noted, “We cannot assume authority to read into the Act what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out. Judicial construction should only be resorted to when an ambiguity exists.” Therefore, the strongly preferred norm of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the plain language of the statutory text.’ Price , at 387-88, 835 A.2d at 1226 (citations omitted); Goff v. State, 387 Md. 327, 342 , 875 A.2d 132, 141 (2005); Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57-58 , 862 A.2d 419, 425 (2004).” ⁸¹ Chow, 393 Md. at 444 , 903 A.2d at 395 . It is also clear that “[w]e avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.” Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224 , 909 A.2d 1020, 1026 (2006) (citing Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462 , 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005)); see Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137 , 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994).

We analyze the contested provisions of Maryland’s Insurance Article in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole and construe the plain language so that the various sections of the article do not conflict with one another. Chow, 393 Md. at 443 , 903 A.2d at 395 ; Deville, 383 Md. at 223 , 858 A.2d at 487 ; Navarro-Monzo, 380 Md. at 204 , 844 A.2d at 411 . Furthermore, the Court recently emphasized in Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563 , 911 A.2d 427 (2006): “In addition, ‘ “the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears.” ’ State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133 , 669 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1996) (citations omitted). As this Court has stated, [bjecause it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered.

Thus, not only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. Gordon Family P’ship v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138 , 702 A.2d 753, 757 (1997) (citations omitted).” Walzer, 395 Md. at 573 , 911 A.2d at 432 . B. “Service” in the Context of Title 2 of Maryland’s Insurance Article The Circuit Court, in both cases, dismissed the petitions for judicial review because they were filed in an untimely manner. Section 2-215 of the Insurance Article provides the statutory framework under which such petitions for judicial review are governed. ⁸² The plain language of the statute reads in relevant part: “To take an appeal, a person shall file a petition for judicial review with the appropriate circuit court within 30 days after: (1) the order resulting from the hearing was served on the persons entitled to receive it----” § 2—215(d) of the Insurance Article (emphasis added).

J.T.W. contends that the term “service,” as utilized in § 2-215(d)(l), means actual receipt by the involved party. Under that definition, the 30-day time limit for filing a petition for judicial review, pursuant to the Insurance Article, would begin to run on the date that an individual receives an order resulting from an administrative hearing. Consequently, in the particular circumstances of the case sub judice, under the J.T.W.’s interpretation of § 2-215(d)(1), he would have timely filed both of his petitions for judicial review -with the Circuit Court. We disagree with this interpretation.

In support of his argument, J.T.W. cites to Maryland Rule 7-203(a), which states in relevant part: “Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by statute, a petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days after the latest of: (1) the date of the order or action of which review is sought; (2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action to the petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or (3) the date the petitioner received notice of the agency’s order or action, if notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner.” J.T.W. asserts that the determinative factor under Rule 7-203(a) is that a petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days of the latest of the enumerated dates—i.e., in the present circumstances, the date on which J.T.W. received notice. Md. Rule 7-203(a)(3). J.T.W., however, fails to acknowledge that Rule 7-203(a) specifically provides qualifications to this requirement, stating: (1) “Except as otherwise provided ... by statute ...,” (emphasis added) and (2) “... if ⁸³ notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner.” We find that the Legislature has so otherwise provided by statute (specifically § 2-204(c) of the Insurance Article) and, accordingly, notice was not required by law to be received by J.T.W. under the statutory scheme of the relevant sections of the Insurance Article. Additionally, J.T.W. fails to recognize that this Court, albeit in a slightly different procedural context, has previously ruled on the timeliness of an appeal from an order issued under the Insurance Article.

In Nuger v. State Insurance Commissioner, 231 Md. 543 , 191 A.2d 222 (1963), the Court addressed the time for filing an appeal from an order of the Insurance Commissioner in the context of Maryland Rule B4, the predecessor rule to Rule 7-203. In that case, the Court was concerned with whether the 30-day period began with the filing of an order rather than the mailing of the order. Id. at 544 , 191 A.2d at 223 . The Court concluded