Churchfield v. State

RAYMOND G. THIEME, Jr., Judge, Ret’d, Specially Assigned. Appellant John M. Churchfield was convicted of child abuse, Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27 § 35C, by a jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. The court imposed a fifteen-year sentence, suspending all but seven and one-half years. Churchfield noted a timely appeal and asks: ⁶⁷³ 1.

Did the court below err when it restricted cross-examination by excluding certain information about the complainant’s sexual activities? 2. Did the court below err when it limited the defense’s cross-examination of the social worker who interviewed appellant to exclude certain statements he made shortly before he was arrested? 3. Did the court below err when it admitted into evidence statements made by appellant in reaction to his arrest? We answer “yes” to the first question and “no” to the second and third questions and explain.

Facts Christina Churchfield, age fifteen at the time of the trial, started living with appellant, her father, in December 1996, when her mother, a drug addict who had custody of Christina in Florida, surrendered parental rights. At the time, she was ten years of age. Christina’s two brothers, two sisters, and stepmother lived in the family home with Christina and appellant and, at times, other family members would stay there “long term.” During one of these times, Christina, who was twelve years of age, became pregnant with the child of her adult half-brother, William Churchfield. After appellant turned his son in, William pleaded guilty to second degree rape and incest, and he is now serving his sentence.

Christina gave birth to a daughter on December 2, 1998. She testified that she continued to live with her father after the baby was bom, and her parents forced her to place the child for adoption with a relative in a distant state. Christina testified that appellant’s behavior toward her became more and more sexual over time. Inappropriate contact between father and daughter began with wrestling, gradually became touching, and culminated, in January or February of 1999, with vaginal intercourse.

The first incident of intercourse occurred while Christina and her father were watching television in the parents’ upstairs bedroom while the other children were asleep and Mrs. Churchfield was working. ⁶⁷⁴ Christina testified that she and her father had intercourse on more than one occasion, but she could not say how many times it happened. She recalled that the last incident took place during the first week of January 2000. Christina ran away from home on February 4, 2000. A boy she was dating, Randy Van Hook, met Christina at a Food Lion near her home during the early morning hours and took her to his home.

Once she arrived, Christina told Randy’s mother that her father had been abusing her, and Mrs. Van Hook called the authorities. A detective and representative of the Department of Social Services interviewed Christina at the Van Hook home later that day. Jody Holland of the Department of Social Services investigated the allegations against appellant, and she was present when he was arrested on February 7. Ms. Holland testified that, when appellant was handcuffed, he said, referring to Christina, “I’ll take care of that bitch when this is over.” Ashley Churchfield, Christina’s twelve-year-old half-sister, testified that she was not aware of any unusual activities between her sister and her father.

Cora Webster, appellant’s mother-in-law, testified that she had lived in the Churchfield home from February 1999 until October 1999 and, likewise, was unaware of any unusual relationship between or inappropriate activities involving father and daughter. She also confirmed that Christina never complained to her about any inappropriate contact or play. Melissa Churchfield, Christina’s stepmother, testified that she had been married to appellant for thirteen years. She also averred that she had not observed any inappropriate contact between her husband and stepdaughter.

To the contrary, Mrs. Churchfield opined that Christina could be deceitful and manipulative: Sometimes she can tell you what she wants to tell you, you know, to get you to believe what she wants. Sometimes she’s truthful, sometimes she is not, you just got to know how she is and her personality to work your way around her sometimes. ⁶⁷⁵ On the evening before Christina left, Mrs. Churchfield testified, the girl asked her parents if she could spend the weekend with a friend named Nicky. The Churchfields refused to let her go, because they did not know Nicky or her parents. In fact, the Churchfields “had never heard Nicky’s name,” and Christina refused to offer an address or a phone number.

Mrs. Churchfield testified that Christina “got mad, slammed her bedroom door, and stayed in there the rest of the night.” At 4:00 a.m., she checked Christina’s room and found that the girl had left the house. She and appellant also found a note, stating, in part, “You won’t let me grow up so I am going to do it myself.” Appellant testified that he did not have sexual relations with his daughter. He denied ever touching her inappropriately. Appellant, moreover, testified to ongoing conflict with his daughter during the six months preceding the allegations, including clashes with Christina over boys and dating: Q: Did you have any type of conflicts, ongoing conflicts with her over any reason?

A: A lot. We had quite a few of them, I mean, the way she dresses and makeup. I didn’t believe in wearing makeup or fingernail polish or things like that, and we had big clashes over things like that.... Q: Did you have any other types of conflicts with Christina?

A: With the two boys, yes. Q: Could you tell the jury, please, what the nature of that conflict was? A: Well, she was—more or less both boys were more or less trying to see her and all. And we told her she could not see these boys anymore.

Q: Why did you tell her that? A: Because we felt the boys were playing her. Q: What exactly do you mean by that? A: Both the boys we figured was after one thing from her.

We were trying to protect her. ⁶⁷⁶ Q: Did you have any reason for thinking that? A: Well, she used to brag about having sexual intercourse— [PROSECUTOR]: Objection, Your Honor. [THE COURT]: Sustained. Q: Mr. Churchfield, what was Christina’s reaction when you made it clear to her that you didn’t want her to see these boys? A: She was upset about it.

Appellant also corroborated his wife’s testimony about the night before Christina ran away. As for his remarks to Jody Holland as he was being arrested, appellant explained as follows: Q: There’s been testimony that you when you were placed under arrest you said I’ll fix that bitch when this is over with? A: Yes, sir. Q: Did you say that?

A: Yes, sir, I was very upset for being arrested for something I hadn’t done. Q: What did you mean by that? A: It was just a phrase. I mean, she had done so many things in the past, it was just one more thing she had done, you know.

I was more majorly upset about it because I have never been arrested before. Additional facts will be supplied, as needed, in the discussion. Discussion I Evidence of the ongoing conflict between appellant and his daughter was pivotal to the defense strategy in the case sub judiee. Appellant contends that Christina falsely accused him of having sexual intercourse with her because, tired of his restrictions on her activities, she wanted him out of her way.

She found him to be overly protective, particularly concerning ⁶⁷⁷ her budding interest in young men and her desire to present herself as though she were an adult woman. Based upon her earlier experience with her half-brother, Christina knew that social workers and police officers take seriously accusations of sexual abuse. Thus, in order to rid herself of her meddling father—the defense hoped jurors would infer—Christina fabricated a story of abuse. Defense counsel managed to elicit at least some evidence to support his theory; however, when he sought to examine Christina and other witnesses regarding key areas of the family conflict, the State objected, and the court upheld those objections.

In finding that the desired testimony, which related to the nature of Christina’s relationships with her two boyfriends, was irrelevant and prejudicial, the court erred. A The conflict between father and daughter centered around whether Christina was sexually active with two male schoolmates, as her parents reasonably suspected. Before trial, the prosecution moved to limit Christina’s testimony regarding her prior sexual relationships pursuant to the Rape Shield Statute, 1 which applied for one of the original charges. 2 After ⁶⁷⁸ three of four original charges were nol prossed, and the State decided to try appellant on the child abuse charge alone, the court determined the admissibility of such evidence, and the following colloquy took place: DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, it’s my understanding from Mr. Churchfield that the argument about Christina’s contact with these two boys had been ongoing for at least a week prior to her running away. The running away occurred the morning Friday, February 4, 2000.

THE COURT: I’m sorry, Friday— DEFENSE COUNSEL: Friday, February 4, 2000. The complaint, as reflected in the Social Services records, the first complaint of sexual abuse occurred sometime during the day of Thursday, February 3, 2000. But I would proffer that the argument about her conduct with these two boys having sexual contact with them at the same time occurred for about a week prior to that. It is also my understanding that on the 4th, the 3rd or the 4th she wanted to go spend the night at the friend’s house, the parents, Mr. and Mrs. Churchfield, were not willing to let her.

So for that reason that appeared to be the catalyst that caused her to run away. Judge, I make that proffer again with the understanding that I don’t believe the Rape Shield Statute applies any longer. I just leave that with the Court. THE COURT: Okay.

PROSECUTOR: Well, Your Honor, as I stated before, even though the Rape Shield Statute doesn’t apply, the arguments of probative versus prejudicial always applies as does relevancy. And I think that saying they are arguing about her being sexually active with two boys, there’s no way for a father to know if that is true or not. It is highly prejudicial, it’s trying to make the victim look like some promiscuous ⁶⁷⁹ tramp, in light of the fact that it’s a sexual allegation that we have here. And so I think that even if it were true, I think it would be highly prejudicial.

But that’s even saying it’s true, which I don’t think there’s any basis for believing that it is. It’s a very convenient argument and I think it’s going to do nothing but sway the jury to look at the victim in a very unfavorable light. I don’t see there’s any reason why it couldn’t be said that he was arguing with Christina, I don’t know if there’s some way to qualify what they were arguing and I think she would admit that they had a very bad relationship from the beginning. But without bringing out the sexual aspects of it along those lines.

I think that would be—it really doesn’t matter what they were arguing over, it’s the fact that they were arguing is what their defense would be. She’s mad because they are arguing and she’s going to get him in trouble. So that would be my response. THE COURT: All right.

Why wouldn’t limiting testimony simply to the fact that there was an ongoing argument between them about her relationships with others? DEFENDANT: But the boys— DEFENSE COUNSEL: Shh. Judge, I think the jury needs to see the whole picture. I mean, obviously [the prosecutor] makes the argument prejudicial versus probative.

I think that is misplaced because typically the standard is whether it prejudices the defense. I guess [the prosecutor’s] argument is that it somehow prejudices her victim. The jury needs to see the whole picture of what’s going on here. The girl is aware of what happens when she says rape by prior experience.

She has an argument with her father about her conduct with boys, wants to spend the night out of the house, the father won’t let her so she runs away and makes this allegation. I think the jury needs to see the whole picture. ⁶⁸⁰ THE COURT: Well, assuming all that is true, what’s the father in a position to do rather than speculate as to the nature of her relationship with the boys? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I think the parents knew there was sexual activity. I mean, I don’t think there was any question about that.

I don’t believe there was speculation. THE COURT: What’s your proffer about it? DEFENSE COUNSEL: That the parents were aware. Is that accurate?

You were aware there was a sexual relationship going on? DEFENDANT: Yes, on the phone from the boys. DEFENSE COUNSEL: The parents have provided me with a letter from one of them in which the boy says that I know you’re also having sex with the other boy. PROSECUTOR: What does that have to do with the price of tea?

THE COURT: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, it makes the parents aware of what’s going on. It’s obviously a struggle that’s going on within the family at that point. The father says you can’t go out, and this is our theory, this is how the child reacts by making this allegation against the father.

There’s also testimony which I intended to introduce today that the girl made the statement to her sister saying once daddy’s arrested I’m going to go live with Garrett’s family, Garrett being one of the two boys. THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that you can get in everything that you want to get in in terms of the rocky nature of the relationship without, you know, the fact that maybe they got a copy of a letter from a boy to her. I don’t know why that would be admissible. If you want to show the nature of the relationship, the rocky nature of the relationship, and the fact that they are arguing about whether she can go stay at a boy’s house, all of that seems to be appropriate, but you really haven’t told ⁶⁸¹ me anything that would indicate that the father has any knowledge, other than based on inadmissible sources or speculation as to the true nature of her relationship with these other boys.

And consequently it seems to me that that would not be admissible based on what you have told me in our proffer. All right? Okay. Are you ready for the jury?

During Christina’s cross-examination, the defense sought to elicit testimony relevant to the conflict between the girl and her father, but the court suppressed it: Q: What was your relationship with Mr. Mancuso [one of Christina’s two alleged boyfriends]? [PROSECUTOR]: Objection, Your Honor. Relevance. THE COURT: Sustained. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, Judge, I think the jury is entitled to know how close they were. THE COURT: I think she said he was a close friend. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, may I, Your Honor, pursue this?

THE COURT: No, I sustained the objection. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did you, in fact, have a romantic relationship with Mr. Mancuso? [PROSECUTOR]: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. As his cross-examination of Christina ended, defense counsel again proffered: And also I’d like to ask her about the level of her involvement, her romantic involvement with Mr. Van Hook and Mr. Mancuso. And it’s my understanding that you have ordered me not to do so.

THE COURT: Correct. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you. By withholding from the jury Christina’s own testimony on these matters, and presumably the testimony of the two boys ⁶⁸² as well, the court denied jurors the opportunity to judge for themselves Christina’s credibility, especially about her sexual activities, and the extent to which she would go to evade parental restrictions in that area. Likewise, it denied jurors the chance to evaluate appellant’s credibility regarding his claims about his daughter’s motives.

B In reviewing the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, we recognize that the court has broad discretion in the conduct of trials, and we will not disturb that exercise of discretion unless the court has clearly abused it. State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 277 , 604 A.2d 489 (1992). “Generally speaking, the scope of examination of witnesses at trial is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge and no error will be recognized unless there is a clear abuse of such discretion.” Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 669 , 612 A.2d 258 (1992); see also White v. State, 324 Md. 626, 637 , 598 A.2d 187 (1991) (determinations on relevance will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion). Yet, the discretion we afford the trial court is hardly unlimited, and the most powerful delimiters of “the trial court’s discretion are the constitutional ones. In Marshall v. State, 346 Md. 186, 192-99 , 695 A.2d 184 (1997), the Court of Appeals examined at length the tension between the trial court’s discretion to limit cross-examination and the constitutional strictures guaranteeing a fair trial.

The right of the accused to impeach witnesses against him by cross-examination, the Court explained, has its roots in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 3 and likewise in Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 4 Id. at 192 , 695 A.2d 184 . The right to be faced by ⁶⁸³ one’s accusers exceeds the sparely worded guarantee expressed by the Confrontation Clause. Id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 , 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974)).

It encompasses, in addition, the right to attack that accuser’s credibility in court “ ‘by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.’ ” Id. (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316 , 94 S.Ct. at 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d at 354 ); see also Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578, 587 , 671 A.2d 974 (1996). Indeed, as the Supreme Court recognized in Davis and our colleagues reiterated in Marshall , “ ‘the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of cross-examination.’ ” Marshall, 346 Md. at 192-93 , 695 A.2d 184 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17 , 94 S.Ct. at 1110 , 39 L.Ed.2d at 354 ); see also Smallwood v. State, 320 Md. 300, 306 , 577 A.2d 356 (1990). In his treatise on Maryland’s law of evidence, the Chief Judge of this Court observed that such cross-examination of witnesses is “the most important impeachment technique because ‘even an untruthful man will not usually lie without a motive.’ ” Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook § 1302(E) (2d ed.1993) (quoting Gates v. Kelley, 15 N.D. 639 , 110 N.W. 770, 773 (1907)), quoted in Marshall, 346 Md. at 193 , 695 A.2d 184 .

To be sure, the right of cross-examination may be limited by the trial court. Marshall , 346 at 193, 695 A.2d 184 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683 (1986); Smallwood, 320 Md. at 307 , 577 A.2d 356 ). The trial court, for example, may “impose reasonable limits on cross-examination to protect witness safety or to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, or inquiry that is repetitive or marginally relevant,” id., especially as collateral matters are concerned. Smallwood, 320 Md. at 308 , 577 A.2d 356 .

Such limits, however, may not ⁶⁸⁴ trample the constitutional rights of the accused, and the trial court’s discretion begins only after “ ‘constitutionally required threshold level of inquiry has been afforded the defendant’ to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.” Marshall, 346 Md. at 193 , 695 A.2d 184 (citing cases including Smallwood, 320 Md. at 307 , 577 A.2d 356 ; Brown v. State, 74 Md.App. 414, 419 , 538 A.2d 317 (1988)). The Sixth Amendment requires that the defense be “ ‘permitted to expose the jury to the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and of credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ” Id. (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318 , 94 S.Ct. at 1111 , 39 L.Ed.2d at 355 ; United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.1993)). To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, “ ‘the test is whether the jury was already in possession of sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of the particular witness’s possible motives for testifying falsely in favor of the government.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 213 (6th Cir.1986)); see also Smallwood, 320 Md. at 307 , 577 A.2d 356 (“one should be allowed to cross-examine in order to determine the reasons for acts or statements referred to on direct examination”). Expounding upon the latter point, appellant points to Small-wood, in which the trial court refused to allow cross-examination of a -witness, defendant Smallwood’s former girlfriend, Lomax, as to the outcome of two separate assault charges that she had filed against him. Smallwood was convicted of robbery after Lomax testified that she had regularly loaned him her car, which was used during the crime, and that Smallwood had given her some of the stolen merchandise. Smallwood, 320 Md. at 302 , 577 A.2d 356 .

The trial court allowed questioning of Lomax regarding the assault charges, but prohibited testimony regarding Smallwood’s acquittal for those charges. The court reasoned that the disposition of charges was irrelevant to his guilt or innocence of the robbery charges and only the filing of charges went to the witness’s prejudice. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that Smallwood had successfully demonstrated that Lomax could have been “using ⁶⁸⁵ this opportunity to finally punish him for what she felt were unpunished wrongs committed against her in the past.” Id. at 309 , 577 A.2d 356 . Quoting from our opinion in Brown, 74 Md.App. at 420-21 , 538 A.2d 317 , Judge Cole wrote: For purposes of cross-examination of a prosecution witness in order to show bias or motive, [T]he crux of the inquiry insofar as its relevance is concerned, is the witness’s state of mind.

What is essential to the preservation of the right to cross-examine is that the interrogator be permitted to probe into whether the witness is acting under a hope or belief of leniency or reward. To the last sentence in the quote we would add “or out of spite or vindictiveness.” In addition, the form and nature of the questions asked by Petitioner were entirely proper. In [State v.] Cox[, 298 Md. 173 , [184,] 468 A.2d 319 (1983) ], we concluded that the inquiry had substantial probative force and there was no indication that defense counsel was harassing the witness by asking an unfounded question or seeking primarily to embarrass the witness. The same holds true for the questions in the instant case which went to the “very heart” of Ms. Lomax’s bias.

Smallwood, 320 Md. at 309-10 , 577 A.2d 356 (citations omitted) (second emphasis added). C Here, the State