Citizens' Bank v. Grafflin

Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Grafflin & Son, the plaintiffs below, held the draft of J. P. McQuillen on John Currier, Jr.,of Newburyport, Massachusetts, bearing date May 81st, 1867, and payable ninety days after date,, at the Shawmut Bank, Boston, to their order, which was endorsed by them, and discounted for them by the Citizens’ National Bank of Baltimore, the defendant below. Before its maturity, it was presented for acceptance, and not being accepted was protested for non-acceptance. When the draft matured it was protested for non-payment.

The bank informed the Grafflins, on the 4th of September, after the maturity of the draft, that it had not been paid, and requested them to make it good, which was done by a deposit of funds for that pui'pose. On the next day, the Bank sent down the draft with the protests, for nonacceptance and non-payment, and the Grafflins gave their check on the bank for the amount. These advances of money were made by the Grafflins, as alleged by them, in utter ignorance that the draft, before its maturity, had been protested in July, for nonacceptance, of which fact they had not been informed. So soon as they ascertained such had been the case, they promptly informed the bank that they had advanced the ⁵¹⁷ money, to make good the draft, in ignorance of the facts, and demanded the return of the money they had so paid.

The bank refused to return the money. This action was brought to recover back the money, paid under such circumstances, and the verdict and judgment being against the bank, it has brought up this appeal. Exceptions were taken by both parties to the rulings of the Court. The plaintiffs below excepted to the refusal of the Court to grant their first and second prayers, and to the Court’s instruction on the subject of usage.

The defendant excepted to the refusal of the Court to grant its five prayers, and to the second instruction given by the Court. The first prayer of the plaintiffs below was properly refused, because it asserted that the fact of the ignorance of the plaintiffs of the non-acceptance and protest of the draft in question, was sufficient to entitle them to recover. Upon the non-acceptance and protest of the draft in July, when it was presented, before its maturity, if due notice of tbe fact had been placed in the post-office, addressed to them, such notice would have been sufficient. Whether the plaintiffs actually received the same or not was immaterial, because the holder of the draft would have discharged its duty by giving notice in the manner aforesaid.

The second prayer of the plaintiffs was properly rejected. Because the plaintiffs had been constant customers of the bank, which had discounted for them many like drafts, and immediately sent them on for acceptance, when the law did not require it, was no just reason to compel the bank, at the risk of being held liable for negligence, to pursue a similar course in the future. The concession of such a favor, although repeated in sundry instances, ought not to be construed to operate as imposing upon the bank the imperative duty of its con ⁵¹⁸ stant repetition, and as conferring upon the plaintiffs the absolute right to demand, and insist upon its’ continuance. However much the plaintiffs might be disappointed in their expectations upon the subject, the legal relations of the parties were not changed thereby.

If such transactions between parties could be interpreted as changing or modifying the well-established rules of law, the necessary effect of such a theory would be to make the business habits of the parties, however unreasonable or preposterous, the standard to govern their contracts, in the place of the provisions of the law. Under such a state of things, questions might constantly arise as to the number of the repeated acts, between the parties, necessary and competent to establish usage sufficient to waive or suspend the uniform rules of law, otherwise applicable to their dealings. Courts of justice, in place of expounding the law, would be continually occupied and perplexed in the ascertainment of the special law the parties had adopted to be applied to their transactions. Is it not infinitely better that the law should be established and recognized as the guide, and have its uniform, application, and that parties in their diversified dealings should be regulated and governed by its wise and exact operation ?

The defendant’s first and third- prayers were properly rejected, because they asserted that no evidence had been given of the want of due notice to the plaintiffs of the