City of Salisbury v. McCoy

Couch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Joseph L. McCoy, the appellee, was injured while working for the City of Salisbury, appellant, and he subsequently filed a claim for benefits under the Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1 After a hearing the Workmen’s Compensation Commission found that the appellee did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. An appeal was taken and the matter was ⁴⁹⁰ tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. A verdict favorable to the appellee was returned and thereafter the employer and insurer filed the instant appeal.

As we disagree with appellants’ position, we shall affirm. The facts in this case are largely uncontradicted. The City of Salisbury employed the appellee as a dump truck driver, generally hauling construction material to job sites or trash to a treatment plant. In late October or early November of 1977 a new dump body was installed on the City truck which McCoy had been assigned to drive.

Operation of the truck’s dumping mechanism required that the driver open the truck’s tailgate by pushing down on a lever located outside the driver’s compartment. To secure the tailgate after dumping, this lever was pulled back up. A dump truck driver could usually operate a tailgate lever with one hand, by reaching out of the driver’s window. After the new dump body was installed, the appellee inspected his truck and discovered that the new lever was under abnormal tension and thus was difficult to operate.

Pulling up on the lever was particularly hard, according to the appellee who had to leave his seat and use two hands to raise the new lever. Before driving the renovated truck, McCoy advised his employer’s maintenance supervisor of the lever’s tightness. The supervisor and three other mechanics examined the mechanism, operated it using two hands, and assured the appellee that the lever would eventually loosen. The appellee then drove the truck several times without apparent incident.

On November 29, 1977, McCoy used the truck to dump a load of waste material for his employer. On that occasion the tailgate opened without much difficulty. To close the tailgate, however, the appellee had to get out of the truck and stand on the truck’s running board. McCoy testified that: "With S-5 [the dump truck] I had to do it like that.

And I bent over like this, and gave a crank to pull the tailgate lever up, and only this time instead of ⁴⁹¹ going up and flipping back into place, it kicked back down on me. In other words, she pulled me down. I felt a terrific pain in my back that shot down my left leg. I gave a yell, and I cussed, and I told Walter Banks [McCoy’s co-worker].” In the afternoon of November 29, 1977, the appellee informed the maintenance supervisor of the problem with the tailgate lever and of the injury the appellee sustained.

The supervisor subsequently adjusted the lever, but it continued to be tight. The appellee sought medical attention for his injury. Initially his physician prescribed analgesics and bed rest. On March 3,1978, however, the appellee underwent surgery which included a hemilaminectomy and a bilateral-lateral fusion.

On January 24, 1980, a jury of the Circuit Court for Wicomico County found that McCoy sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment on November 29, 1977, thus allowing his claim for workmen’s compensation. I. Denial of Directed Verdict The City of Salisbury and the United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, appellants, contend that McCoy’s injury occurred while he was performing his regular work, without the existence of any unusual or extraordinary condition. Therefore, the employer and insurer argue, appellee’s injury does not constitute an "accidental injury” within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the circuit court erred in not granting the appellants’ motion for a directed verdict. We do not agree.

When the circuit court ruled on the appellants’ motion for a directed verdict, the court had to consider the evidence and its inferences in the light most favorable to the appellee. Montgomery Ward and Company v. McFarland, 21 Md. App. 501 , 319 A.2d 824 (1974). Before submitting the case to the jury, the court had to find that appellee’s evidence was ⁴⁹² legally relevant and competent, and a rational conclusion could be drawn which would be favorable to the appellee. Bullis School v. Justus, 37 Md. App. 423 , 377 A.2d 876 (1977).

The trial judge gave the appellee the "benefit of the evidence,” and ruled that the evidence and its fairly deducible inferences tended to support the appellee’s case. Specifically, the judge found in McCoy’s uncontradicted testimony, adequate justification to deny appellants’ motion for directed verdict and to allow the jury to weigh the evidence.

II

Accidental Injury To conclude that McCoy’s injury was compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Md. Code Art. 101, § 15, the jury would have to find that his injury was "accidental.” Holbrook v. GM Assembly Division, 15 Md. App. 425, 430 , 291 A.2d 171 (1972). The jury concluded that the appellee’s injury was accidental, but the appellants contend that this conclusion was premised upon evidence which "did not rise above speculation, hypothesis and conjecture.” We do not quarrel with the requirement that an employee’s injury must be accidental in order to be compensable. We disagree with the appellants, however, in their characterization of the appellee’s evidence, for we are persuaded that the jury could infer that McCoy suffered an accidental injury. Under Maryland law a compensable, accidental injury must result from an unusual exertion or strain or some unusual condition in the employment.

Commercial Transfer v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572 , 227 A.2d 20 (1967). Clarifying the use of the phrase in workmen’s compensation cases, the Court of Appeals said in State Roads Commission v. Reynolds, 164 Md. 539, 546 , 165 A. 475 (1933): " 'Accidental,’ so used, may mean any fortuitous, casual, and unexpected happening which causes personal disability or death which results from some unknown cause, or from the unexpected add ⁴⁹³ unusual operation of a known cause; and an accident may be said to arise 'out of an employment’ when it results from conditions and circumstances reasonably incident to it.” [Emphasis added. ] Applying this definition in various circumstances, the Court of Appeals has determined that an accidental injury did not occur when a worker died from chronic exposure to varnish fumes, Stancliff v. H. B. Davis Co., 208 Md. 191 , 117 A.2d 577 (1955), and when a mechanic suffered a hernia while forcing a stuck wheel onto a truck axle, Jackson v. Ferree, 173 Md. 400 , 196 A. 107 (1938). Citing the definition from Reynolds, supra, the Court of Appeals in Jackson, supra, noted that manual workers necessarily received jars to the body, but that consequent injuries would not be deemed "accidental injuries” in the absence of any undue strain or stress. Jackson, supra at 403 .

The Court of Appeals has refused to find an injury to be accidental when that injury results from "a normal incident” of an employee’s work. Thus, in Rieger v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 211 Md. 214, 216 , 126 A.2d 598 (1956), a pipefitter was denied compensation for back pain sustained while he performed the same procedure that he had used for two months prior to his injury. Similarly, a stevedore could not be compensated for a hernia