Coastwise Shipbuilding Co. v. Tolson

Constable, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Howard E. Tolson, the appellee herein, was in the employ of the Coastwise Shipbuilding Company as a laborer at its yards in Baltimore City. On the 22nd day of July, 1916, he was assisting in removing old piling for a foundation. While engaged in this work he attempted to remove an old broken piece of piling, five or six feet in length and a foot square, which was almost completely covered with barnacles and imbedded in the sand. In order to do this he put his hand under it and received a wound upon the inside of his fourth, or little, finger, the sensation from which resembled that produced by the sting of an insect, or such as would be occasioned by any sharp substance piercing the flesh and ²⁰⁵ being withdrawn.

There was no swelling of the finger until two days after the injury, when it began to swell and developed into blood poisoning. He was removed to the University Hospital, where he was confined for about six weeks. Within proper time he filed a claim for compensation with the State Accident Industrial Commission. The Commission, after complying with all of the formalities required by the provisions of Chapter 800 of the Acts of Assembly of 1911 and the amendments thereto, the Act creating and defining the powers and duties of the Commission, held that the blood poisoning and the subsequent results were the natural results of an accidental personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, and passed an order by which his employer and the insurer were to pay him compensation at the rate of six dollars a week during the continuance of his disability, according to the provision of section 35 of the Act. • Erom that order an appeal was taken, to the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore City.

The case was there heard before the Court sitting as a jury, and the decision of the Commission was, confirmed, and it is from the judgment therein entered that this appeal has been taken. There is but one exception in the record, and that relates to the ruling upon the prayers. The two prayers offered by the appellee were, refused. The first prayer of the appellant was refused as offered, but was granted as amended by the Court.

As offered, it sought to have the Court rule that, in cases arising under the Compensation Act, the burden of proof is upon the employee to show that he sustained an accidental personal injury, arising out of and in the course of his employment, and unless the employee so proves, compensation can not be awarded him. The Court amended this prayer by adding thereto the following: “But in Court proceedings, upon an appeal from a decision of the Oommisr sion, the decision is to he held prima facie correct, and the burden of proof is upon the party attacking it.” ²⁰⁶ The prayer as offered is entirely silent as to whether the placing of the burden of proof referred to the trial before the Commission or to that before the Court on appeal. It is only natural that it should have been intended to refer to the proceeding then before the Court. If, however, it was intended to refer to the hearing- before the Commission, it was misleading in the extreme, for it could have been taken as referring to both trials.

If that was the object sought to be effected, then it would have been an erroneous instruction, for by section 55 of the Act it is expressly provided that “on appeal the decision of the Commission shall be prima facie correct, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same.” This provision has been passed upon and held to be literally taken as expressed, in three cases in this Court—Frazier v. Leas, 127 Md. 573 ; American Ice Company v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 382 , and Jewel Tea Company v. Weber, ante, page 178. It must, upon these decisions, be held that the Court was correct in refusing the first prayer as offered, and the amended prayer correctly stated the law. The second and third