Coffey v. Department of Social Services

Liss, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. It has been said, “This world is a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel.” 1 The feelings of the protagonists in this controversy are ample proof of the truth of that observation. This case arose out of a petition filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City by the Department of Social Services of Baltimore City, one of the appellees, by which it sought the guardianship with the right of consent to adoption of Lloyd Freeman, Jr., an infant and other appellee in this case. A petition was filed in the same forum, on behalf of the infant, in which the appointment of an attorney to represent the minor child’s best interest was requested.

The mother of the minor child, Mary M. Coffey, appellant, represented by the Legal Aid Bureau, filed an answer in which she refused to consent to the child’s adoption and complained that she had been denied her child visitation rights. After a hearing on preliminary motions, the two petitions were merged into one case and counsel for the child was permitted to intervene in the original proceedings. The case came on for trial after full and complete investigation by the Supreme Bench Medical Office and the Department of Social Services, and in the voluminous testimony of numerous witnesses at the trial the following facts were developed: Lloyd Freeman, Jr. was an illegitimate child born to the appellant on January 8,1969. The mother had a history of mental retardation, having been tested as having an I.Q. of 58, and both before and after the birth of the child she was confined to Spring Grove State Hospital for varying periods of time.

Within two months of the child’s birth, she was committed to Spring Grove State Hospital, and by an order of the Juvenile Court of Baltimore City, the child was found to be a dependent and neglected ³⁴³ child and was remanded to' the custody of the Department of Social Services. The Department placed the child in the foster home of Howard and Anna Kuhn where he has remained since that date. During the period the child has been in the Kuhn home, the mother was permitted visitation on several occasions, the first of these occasions having occurred when the child was twenty months old. These visits were suspended in December of 1970 because of the “upset of [the] child.” The visits were resumed in September of 1973, and the mother was permitted to visit the child on four other occasions before the “upset of [the] child” warranted another suspension of visitation rights by order of the Department.

A formal hearing was subsequently held before the State Hearing Officer of the Department, and he reversed the Department’s order suspending visitation. On January 17, 1975, the appellee (Department) filed its petition for guardianship with the right to consent to adoption pursuant to Article 16, Section 72 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.) which states, in part- ía) A petition for adoption, ... may be preceded by a petition for guardianship with the right to consent to adoption, and such guardianship decree, which the courts having jurisdiction of adoption matters may require and shall have power to grant after such hearing and investigation as the court may deem appropriate, shall terminate natural parental rights, duties and obligations and the duly appointed guardian’s consent to an adoption, for ■ which the petition may be filed in the same proceeding, shall eliminate the necessity of further notice to the natural parent or parents. Article 16, Section 74, provides with regard to consent: Every petition for adoption shall be accompanied by written statements of consent, subscribed and sworn to before a person authorized by law to administer an oath, as specified in this section, except that the court may in its discretion permit any petition to be filed without a necessary consent if ³⁴⁴ such consent is added to the petition before the time set for hearings.

However, the court may grant a petition for adoption without any of the consents hereinafter specified, if, after a hearing the court finds that such consent or consents are withheld contrary to the best interests of the child. At the trial, it was stated that the Department proposed to consent to the adoption of the minor child of the appellant by the Kuhns, the foster parents, who had had custody of the child for nine years. Testimony by doctors who appeared as witnesses on behalf of the Department stated the child suffered from minimal brain dysfunction, was disturbed both psychologically and physically, was severely depressed, had problems with perceptual and conceptual learning, and suffered from nightmares and bed wetting. They indicated the enforced visitation rights were at least partially to blame for the child’s problems, and that whenever the child was forced to visit with the mother, the child’s physical and psychological problems were exacerbated.

Dr. Gregory F. Pulle, the child’s treating psychiatrist, stated “that the child’s symptoms get worse when he goes to those supervised visits.” Dr. Alfred Lucco, a human development and clinical psychology expert, testified that “the visits by Mrs. Coffey not be continued at this point because the association with his natural mother reinforces for Lloyd the threat of being removed from the Kuhn home.” Dr. Scovill, a board psychiatrist, concluded, “Those visits must have been very frightening experiences for him because he seemed frightened of me,” and “Lloyd knew his visits with me related to the issue of whether he would be adopted or not.” Nicholas Conti, social worker for the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, concluded that no visitation should take place now or in the near future. He testified Lloyd was the first child in his experience that “has not openly and frankly discussed issues with me. Rather Lloyd ... tightened himself up .... [Hie leaned back. . . and froze and remained frozen for twenty-five minutes.” Mr. Conti further testified “the best interest of the child would be for him to remain in the Kuhn family.” ³⁴⁵ The sole witness who disagreed with these conclusions was Dr. Sharon Duffey, a board certified psychiatrist who testified as an expert on behalf of Mrs. Coffey. She stated that Lloyd’s visits with his mother should continue as she (Dr. Duffey) felt it would be harmful for Lloyd to be completely cut off from all further contact with his natural mother.

It is noteworthy, we believe, that the natural mother was, as expressed by the chancellor, “fighting for visitation which takes place a few times a year in which she sees the child in the presence of a social worker.” Pitted against her were the Department of Social Services of Baltimore City, the foster parents, and the court designated counsel for Lloyd, all of whom sought not only to deny visitation rights but to terminate all relations between the mother and the child by granting adoption to the foster parents. The chancellor concluded it would be in the best interest of the child to grant guardianship of Lloyd Freeman, Jr. to the Department of Social Services of Baltimore City with the right to consent to adoption or to consent to long-time care short of adoption in accordance with Code Article 16, Section 72 with the further right to change the name of the minor. The chancellor made it clear that he proposed to grant adoption to the Kuhns and suggested that the order granting guardianship with the right to consent to adoption and the adoption decree be presented at the same time in order that both be signed chronologically. The trial judge signed an order granting guardianship as we have indicated but refrained from signing the final adoption order when he was advised an immediate appeal to this Court was contemplated.

It is from the order granting guardianship with the right to consent to adoption that this appeal was filed. Appellant raises four issues to be decided by this appeal: 1. Did the lower court commit reversible error by excluding as irrelevant proffered evidence of alleged agency misconduct which resulted in the illegal commitment of her infant child, deprived her of her rights of visitation with the child, and contributed to the chancellor’s conclusion that the mother was unreasonably withholding consent to adoption contrary to the best interests of the child? ³⁴⁶ 2. Did the lower court err in applying an incorrect best interests standard, excluded testimony as to the meaning of “best interests” and ruled that appellant unjustifiably withheld consent? 3.

Did the lower court err in applying the “preponderance of evidence” standard rather than the “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof in reaching its conclusion that the natural mother unreasonably withheld consent to adoption? 4. Did the lower court arbitrarily refuse to apply the constitutional doctrine of the “state’s least restrictive intrusion” into the mother’s right to family integrity? 1. The scope of review of a trial court’s decision in adoption proceedings is generally limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion or whether the findings of fact by the trial court were clearly erroneous. Maryland Rule 1086; Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119 , 372 A. 2d 231 , cert. denied, 434 U. S. 939 , 98 S. Ct. 430 , reh. denied, 434.

U. S. 1025, 98 S. Ct. 754 (1977); Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172 , 372 A. 2d 582 (1977); Bernhardt v. Lutheran Social Services, 39 Md. App. 334 , 385 A. 2d 1197 (1978). In Davis, supra, the Court of Appeals said: When the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous standard of Rules 886 and 1086 applies. If it appears that the chancellor erred as to matters of law, further proceedings in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless. Finally, when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion of the chancellor founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, the chancellor’s decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 280 Md. at 125-26.

These standards of appellate scrutiny are equally applicable in custody and adoption cases. Bernhardt, supra. ³⁴⁷ In Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280 , 157 A. 2d 273 (1960), the Court of Appeals said: As in custody cases, “the welfare and best interests of the child are the primary considerations in all adoption proceedings.” [Citations omitted]. Unlike awards of custody, however, adoption decrees cut the child off from the natural parent, who is made a legal stranger to his offspring. The consequences of this drastic and permanent severing of the strongest and basic natural ties and relationships had led the Legislature and this Court to make sure, as far as possible, that adoption shall not be granted over parental objection unless that course clearly is justified.

The welfare and best interests of the child must be weighed with great care against every just claim of an objecting parent. 221 Md. at 284 . Accord, Hicks v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 93 , 375 A. 2d 558 (1977). The determination whether parental conseht is being withheld contrary to the best interests of the child necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. See Goodyear v. Cecil County Department of Social Services, 11 Md. App. 280 , 273 A. 2d 644 , rev’d, 263 Md. 611 , 284 A. 2d 426 (1971) (on ground that record supported conclusions reached by trial judge).

Appellant proffered evidence below to prove that the Department of Social Services acting under color of law, systematically, wrongfully, and arbitrarily undermined the appellant’s parent-child relationship in this case by arranging the commitment of Lloyd without giving the mother notice or the opportunity to contest the commitment. That, further, the agency systematically denied to the mother her reasonable visitation rights while Lloyd was in the Kuhns’ foster care. The chancellor refused to receive such evidence on the ground that it was irrelevant to the issue before the trial court. We cannot find his ruling on the admissibility of this evidence to be clearly erroneous.

The determination ³⁴⁸ required to be made by the chancellor in the case sub judice was what was in the best interests of the child at the time the case was presented to him for decision. To rehash and reopen factual controversies dating back a period of nine years would have served no useful purpose. We find it significant that while counsel for the Legal Aid represented the appellant from the beginning of the continuing controversy over the best interests of Lloyd and the claims of his m'pther, that the issue of the alleged defective commitment was never raised or decided in the several administrative hearings in this case. At the time of the commitment, appellant was confined to a mental hospital.

No one in any way connected to the appellant, whether by blood or marriage, was prepared to offer a home to the then two-month-old infant, and we think that it was fortuitous circumstances which produced the Kuhns, who were prepared to provide, and have provided over the last nine years, a loving home for this child. Appellant attempts for the first time to raise the constitutional issue of the failure to provide due process to the mother at the time the child was determined by the Juvenile Court to be a dependent and neglected child. We believe the proffer as to the facts surrounding the original commitment was properly refused, and that the evidence was irrelevant to the principal issue before the chancellor of what was in the best interests of the child. In fairness, however, we must agree that the appellant had a justifiable complaint when she contended that the Department of Social Services had been less than cooperative in helping her to maintain her parent-child relationship with Lloyd.

The record discloses that Lloyd was sent to a Dr. Risemberg at Baltimore City Hospitals in 1974 and 1975 for psychological evaluation. Dr. Risemberg recommended that counseling be instituted with both the foster mother and the natural mother in order to improve the situation insofar as visitation was concerned. At the time of the hearing, Dr. Risemberg, in consultation with Dr. Duffey, reaffirmed that recommendation. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the agency made any effort to implement that recommendation.

However, these facts were before the ³⁴⁹ chancellor and were included in the voluminous exhibits filed in the case. It is clear that the chancellor weighed with great care the conduct of the agency in balancing the respective rights of the mother and the best interests of the child. We find no basis for concluding that there was error on the part of the chancellor in his rulings on the proffered evidence on these issues. 2. Article 16, Section 72 of the Annotated Code of Maryland specifies that guardianship, with the right to consent to adoption, is to be treated in the same manner as adoption.

As we have previously noted, the Court of Appeals in Walker v. Gardner, supra, stated that adoption [guardianship with right to consent to adoption] is a drastic permanent action since it destroys a parent’s inherent natural right (see Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a Child May Be Adopted Without the Consent of his Parent, 39 U. Det. L.J. 347, 352-54 (1962)) and makes a parent a legal stranger to his own offspring, Beltran v. Heim, 248 Md. 397 , 236 A. 2d 723 (1968); White v. Seward, 187 Md. 43 , 48 A. 2d 335 (1946). Due to the extreme nature of the relief, the Court should refrain from granting adoption except in exceedingly strong cases, Strahorn, Adoption in Maryland, 7 Md. L. Rev. 275 (1943); Lloyd v. Schutes, 24 Md. App. 515 , 332 A. 2d 338 (1975); Schwartz v. Hudgins, 12 Md. App. 419 , 278 A. 2d 652 (1971) where it is clearly justified, Walker, supra; Beltran, supra; and where there is clear and sufficient legal reason requiring such harsh relief, Logan v. Coup, 238 Md. 253 , 208 A. 2d 694 (1965). Appellant complains bitterly that Maryland is among the small minority of states which provide statutory authority for adoption without consent where it is in the best interest of the child.

She suggests that the standard defies judicial definition, and because it is prone to subjective determination, it is likely to be abused and to result in judicial confusion. We find no difficulty in applying that standard whatsoever. We agree with the ruling of the trial court that the appellant’s ³⁵⁰ proffer of testimony as to the appellant’s interpretation of the phrase “best interests of the child” should have been denied. The decisions of our Court of Appeals as well as our own rulings gave the chancellor ample guidance in determining the meaning of the phrase.

There was, however, one other source of guidance available to the chancellor. The Legislature of Maryland, in Article 16, Section 75 created a presumption as to a child who remained in foster care for more than two consecutive years. That section provides: (a) After a child has been under continuous foster care for a period of two consecutive years under the custody of an agency authorized by law to make placements, it shall be presumed by the court that it is in the best interests of the child to award to that agency a decree granting guardianship with the right to consent to adoption or long term care short of adoption, without the consent of the natural parent or parents; provided that notice otherwise required by law has been given. (b) The court in considering evidence to rebut this presumption, among other factors, shall consider the following: (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his natural and foster parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interests; (2) The child’s adjustment to his home, school, and community; and (3) The mental and physical health of all individuals referred to in subparagraph (1).

(c) Additionally, in order to rebut the presumption, the court shall require substantial proof that: (1) The natural parent will be able to resume his or her parental duties within a reasonable period of time; or ³⁵¹ (2) The natural parent has played a constructive role in the child’s welfare during the time he has been in foster care. In evaluating the parent’s role, the court may consider, among other factors, (1) the frequency and regularity of personal contact with the child, (2) demonstrated love and affection, (3) parental arrangement for the child’s future education and financial support, both in relation to the parent’s means. (d) Nothing herein shall prevent a child under foster care from being adopted pursuant to Section 74 even if the period of continuous foster care is less than two consecutive years, (emphasis supplied) The effect of this