Cole v. Secretary of State

Singley, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Maryland Constitution, Art. IV, § 42 authorizes the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint such justices of the peace as may be prescribed by law and provides that those so appointed shall have such jurisdiction, duties and compensation as may be fixed by law. By constitutional amendment ratified in 1940, § 41 B of Art. IV vests in the Legislature power to establish a people’s court in any county and to fix the number, qualifications, tenure and method of selection of judges, their powers, duties and compensation; the jurisdiction of the court, and right of appeal therefrom; and the number, qualifications, tenure, method of selection, duties and compensation of the court’s clerks, constables, and employees. § 41 B also relieves the Governor of the necessity of appointing justices of the peace under § 42 when § 41 B is implemented in any county. The effect of the two sections, read together, is to accord a county, if so authorized by the Legislature, the option of substituting a people’s court for a system of justices of the peace, constables, and magistrates.

This Cecil County chose to do by causing to be introduced at the 1967 legislative session House ⁴²⁷ Bill 562 which was ultimately enacted as Chapter 256 (the Act) of the Laws of Maryland 1967. The Act amended seven sections of Art. 52 of Maryland Code (1964 Replacement Volume and 1966 Supplement), added two new sections to the same Article, and added 14 sections to the Code of Public Local Laws of Cecil County. The purpose of the legislation was to transfer the civil and criminal jurisdiction formerly conferred upon justices of the peace and trial magistrates to the People’s Court of Cecil County, which was created by the Act. The Act was approved by the Governor on 14 April 1967 and by its terms was to become effective 1 June 1967.

On 24 May 1967 there were filed with the appellee, C. Stanley Blair, Maryland’s Secretary of State, petitions to refer the Act to the people of Cecil County at the next election of members of the House of Representatives, as permitted by Art. XVI, § 2 of the Maryland Constitution. 1 It is conceded that the petitions were in proper form, were signed by qualified and registered voters, and bore the requisite affidavits and the number of signatures necessary to cause a referral of a public local law to the voters of a county, as provided by Constitution, Art. XVI, §3 (a). 2 ⁴²⁸ On 26 July 1967, the Secretary of State, relying on an opinion of the Attorney General, advised the appellants that he did not consider the Act a public local law, and that the number of signatures 3 on the petition, while sufficient to support the referral of a public local law, did not meet the requirement of Constitution, Art. XVI, § 3 respecting the referendum of a public general law. 4 On 7 August 1967, the appellants, residents of and taxpayers in Cecil County, filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County a petition for a writ of mandamus and for injunctive relief against the Secretary of State and the Governor to require the Act to be submitted to referendum and to enjoin the Governor from proceeding under the Act. In their answer and motion for summary judgment the defendants maintained that the Act was not a public local law and that the petitions failed to meet the constitutional requirement for the referendum of a public general law. From an order of 18 October 1967 granting the defendants’ motion and dismissing the petition, this appeal was taken. The sole question presented is whether the Act is a “Public Local Law for any one County” for the purposes of Constitution, Art. XVI, § 3 (a).

An examination of the legislative history of the Act, as reflected in the journals of the Senate and the House of Delegates, ■discloses that the Act was introduced in the House as House Bill 562 by the Cecil Cbunty delegation, and after the first reading, was referred to a select committee consisting of the ■county’s delegation and Delegate Winton B. Osborne of Harford County for consideration. The delegation reported favorably, and the bill was passed by the House. 5 In the Senate, the .Act was introduced by a senator from the legislative district in ⁴²⁹ which Cecil County is located; was referred to a select committee consisting of the two senators from that district and Senator Mary L. Nock and upon a favorable report of that committee, was passed by the Senate.® This, of course, is the manner in which public local laws are customarily routed through the legislature, and differs from the routine followed with respect to public general laws, which are referred to standing committees of the Senate and of the House. The rules of the Senate and the House recognize this distinction. 6 7 While the treatment accorded the Act by the Legislature may be indicative of legislative intent, it is by no means controlling. 8 Of more significance, however, is the fact that Chapter 894 of the Laws of 1963, which created the People’s Court of Anne Arundel County and is virtually identical to the Act before us, was the subject of referendum as a public local law. Laws of Maryland 1965 at 1717.

When Chapter 118 of the Laws of 1933 reduced the number of justices of the peace and deputy sheriffs in Howard County, the Attorney General ruled that the law should be the subject of a local referendum. 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 225 (1933). The same result was reached in 24 Op. Att’y Gen. 231 (1939), where the Attorney General concluded that Code (1924), Art. 10, § 18 A, which limited the right of Washington County trial magistrates to practice ⁴³⁰ law, was referable on a local basis, although it took the form of an amendment to the general law.

These examples should be contrasted with the manner in which Chapter 616 of the Laws of Maryland 1961 was treated. Chapter 616 implemented Constitution, Art. IV, § 41 C, which created the Municipal Court of Baltimore City and amended Code (1957) by adding §§ 107 through 128 to Art. 26; amending portions of Arts. 5, 27, 52, and 66)4; and making substantial changes in the public local laws. When referendum was sought by petitions, Chapter 616 was properly referred to the electorate of the State as a public general law, Laws of Maryland 1963 at 2241, since it affected the substantive rights of persons beyond the limits of Baltimore City and made significant changes in the judicial system: inter atice, Code Art. 27, §§ .558, 559, 589 as amended, extended the jurisdiction of the municipal court to offenses committed on transportation facilities bound to or from the city; and Art. 52 as amended, altered the •duties of the clerks of the Baltimore City Court and the Su•perior Court of Baltimore City. In two cases this Court has held that statutes similar to the .Act were public local laws.

Herbert v. Baltimore County, 97 Md. 639, 55 A. 376 (1903) involved the validity of Chapter 147 of the Laws of 1900, which re-enacted the Laws of Baltimore County relating to justices of the peace and constables. One of the bases for the attack was that the statute violated 'Constitution, Art. Ill, § 33 which provides “And the General Assembly shall pass no special law, for any case, for which provision has been made, by an existing General Law.” Our predecessors held that a “special” law as contemplated by the Constitution is a law which provides for an individual case and quoted from the opinion filed for the Court by Judge (later Chief Judge) Alvey in State ex rel. Webster v. Co. Commrs. of Balt. Co., 29 Md. 516, 520 (1868) : “The special laws contemplated by the Constitution, are those that provide for individual cases.

Local laws of the class to which the Act under consideration belongs, on the other hand, are applicable to all persons, and are distinguished from Public General Laws, ⁴³¹ only in this that they are confined in their operation to certain prescribed or defined territorial limits, and the violation of them must, in the nature of things, be local. It is not, therefore, by any means, necessary, in order to give a Statute the attributes of a public law, that it should be equally applicable to all parts of the State. All that is required to make it a public law of general obligation, is, that it shall apply to all persons within the territorial limits prescribed in the Act. That is the character of the Act before us, and of that large portion of the Statute law of our State, comprised in the codified division under the title of ‘Public Local Laws.’ ” See also, Quenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11 , 194 A. 354 (1937) where the Court struck down a statute providing for the appointment of a police justice for Prince George’s County for reasons other than that it was a public local law.

Cf., Funk v. Mullan Contracting Co., 197 Md. 192, 200-01 , 78 A. 2d 632 (1951). The Attorney General argues that the Act is not one of local significance only and relies on the fact that while the Act adds 14 sections to the Code of Local Laws of Cecil County (Code of Local Laws of Maryland, [1961] Art. 8, §§ 288B to 288-0, inclusive), the Act also repeals and re-enacts seven sections of the Public General Laws (Code, [1964 Replacement Volume, 1966 Supplement] Art. 52, §§ 6 (d), 18, 19 (1), 102, 108 (7), 119 (a), 120, and adds two new sections, 25 G and 125 C. 9 The strength of the Attorney General’s contention can be measured by an examination of the changes made in the general law. Code, Art. 52, deals generally with justices of the peace. Some of the sections, e.g., §§ 1-4 dealing with qualification, are uniformly applicable to the entire state; others, e.g., § 6, fixing monetary limits of civil jurisdiction, are designed to meet the needs or desires of the several counties.

Sections of the latter ⁴³² type were amended by the Act. These changes are of a purely mechanical nature and have no effect outside of Cecil County. 10 ⁴³³ Two new sections were added by the Act to Code, Art. 52: § 25 G transferred to the judges of the People’s Court of Cecil County the criminal jurisdiction theretofore conferred on trial magistrates. It should be noted parenthetically that §§ 25-25 F are substantially similar, and relate respectively to the People’s Courts of Montgomery, Harford, Prince George’s and Anne Arundel Counties; the Housing Court of Baltimore County; and the People’s Court of Wicomico County. § 25 H relates to the People’s Court of Dorchester County. § 125 C, also added to Code, Art. 52, provided that the words “trial magistrate of Cecil County” appearing in the Code and the public and local laws shall mean “judge of the People’s Court of Cecil County.” §§ 125, 125 A and 125 B contain similar provisions with