Collins v. State

Watts, J. " Voir dire " is Law French 1 for "to speak the truth[,]" and refers to "[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a [trial court] to decide whether [he or she] is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury." Voir Dire , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Voir dire is critical to implementing a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury. See Pearson v. State , 437 Md. 350 , 356, 86 A.3d 1232 , 1235 (2014).

"[I]n Maryland, the sole purpose of voir dire is to ensure a fair and impartial jury by determining the existence of specific cause for disqualification." Id. at 356 , 86 A.3d at 1235 (cleaned up). To that end, "[o]n request, a trial court must ask a voir dire question if and only if the voir dire question is reasonably likely to reveal specific cause for disqualification." Id. at 357 , 86 A.3d at 1236 (cleaned up). "There are two categories of specific cause for disqualification: (1) a statute disqualifies a prospective juror; or (2) a collateral matter is reasonably liable to have undue influence over a prospective juror." Id. at 357 , 86 A.3d at 1236 (cleaned up). "The latter category is comprised of biases [that are] directly related to the crime, the witnesses, or the defendant." Id. at 357 , 86 A.3d at 1236 (cleaned up).

One example of a question that is reasonably likely to reveal bias that is directly related to the crime is what is commonly called the "strong feelings" question- i.e. , " 'Do any of you have strong feelings about [the crime with which the defendant is charged]?' " Id. at 354 , 86 A.3d at 1234 (brackets in original). In Pearson , id. at 363 , 86 A.3d at 1239 , this Court held that, during voir dire , on request, a trial court must ask the "strong feelings" question in the form set forth above, and that it is improper for a trial court to ask the "strong feelings" question in compound form, such as: " 'Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings about [the charges in this case] that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts[?]' " (Cleaned up) (first set of brackets in original). We refer to such a question as "a compound 'strong feelings' question" because it essentially combines two questions: one regarding whether the prospective juror has strong feelings about the charges; and, if so, one regarding whether those strong feelings would make it difficult for the prospective juror to be fair and impartial. See id. at 362 , 86 A.3d at 1238 -39 .

This case requires us to decide whether a trial court abused its discretion where, during voir dire , the trial court violated this Court's holding in Pearson by asking compound "strong feelings" questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased- i.e. , non-compound-"strong feelings" questions. We must also determine whether other questions that the trial court asked during voir dire , such as whether any prospective jurors or any of their immediate relatives had been a victim of a crime or a member of a law enforcement agency, could substitute for properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions; and whether, after the jury was seated and heard opening statements, the trial court cured any abuse of discretion by asking properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions. In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, the State, Respondent, charged Gordon Collins, Petitioner, with first-degree burglary and theft of property with a value of less than $ 1,000. During voir dire , the circuit court asked the "victim" question and the "law enforcement agency" question, to each of which multiple prospective jurors responded.

The circuit court asked the following compound "strong feelings" questions: "Does anyone on this panel have any strong feelings about the offense of burglary to the point where you could not render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence?"; and "Does any member of this panel have strong feelings about the offense of theft to the extent that it would make you unable to be fair and impartial and base your decision only on the evidence in this case[?]" None of the prospective jurors responded to either of the compound "strong feelings" questions. Collins's counsel requested that the circuit court ask properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions, and the circuit court refused. The jury was seated and sworn, and heard preliminary jury instructions and opening statements. After a recess, the prosecutor advised the circuit court that the compound "strong feelings" questions were improper, and proposed that the circuit court ask the jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions.

Over Collins's counsel's objection, the circuit court did so. None of the jurors responded. Before us, Collins contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by asking compound "strong feelings" questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased ones during voir dire . Collins argues that other questions that the circuit court asked could not substitute for properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions.

Collins asserts that the circuit court did not cure its abuse of discretion by later asking the jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions. The State responds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because other questions that the circuit court asked during voir dire were designed to elicit any potential bias based on the nature of the charges of burglary and/or theft. The State contends that the circuit court cured any error by later asking the jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions. We reaffirm our holding in Pearson , 437 Md. at 354 , 86 A.3d at 1234 , that, on request, a trial court is required to ask a properly-phrased- i.e. , non-compound-"strong feelings" question.

In other words, under Pearson , during voir dire , on request, a trial court must ask: "Do any of you have strong feelings about [the crime with which the defendant is charged]?" We reiterate that, during voir dire , on request, a trial court must ask the "strong feelings" question in the form set forth above, and it is improper for a trial court to ask the "strong feelings" question in compound form, such as: "Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings about [the charges in this case] that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts?" We hold that, in this case, the circuit court abused its discretion by asking compound "strong feelings" questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions during voir dire . We decline the State's invitation to determine that other questions that the circuit court asked during voir dire could substitute for properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions, and we conclude that the circuit court did not cure its abuse of discretion by later asking the selected jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions, after the conclusion of voir dire and opening statements. BACKGROUND Voir Dire On November 2, 2017, Collins, his counsel, the prosecutor, and forty-five prospective jurors appeared before the circuit court. The courtroom clerk swore the prospective jurors, and the circuit court began to conduct voir dire .

The circuit court asked whether any prospective jurors knew Collins, his counsel, the prosecutor, the State's witnesses, certain law enforcement officers, or any of their fellow prospective jurors. Multiple prospective jurors responded. 2 The circuit court informed the prospective jurors that the State alleged that, "on or about March 17, 2017, [ ] Collins committed a first-degree burglary and theft of goods ... by breaking into the home of Juliette Tower at 801 Severn Avenue in Annapolis ... with the intent to steal her property." The circuit court asked whether any of the prospective jurors had "heard anything about the facts of this case[,]" whether Tower's address "mean[t] anything to anyone[,]" and whether another address in Annapolis "resonate[d] with anyone[.]" None of the prospective jurors responded. The circuit court asked more questions to which no prospective juror responded, stating: THE COURT: General question, has any member of this panel had something happen to you in the past that would prevent you from either returning a verdict of guilty or not guilty in a criminal case under any circumstances? Again, we are trying to make sure nobody has any preconceived feelings about any of these issues because, ultimately, I will instruct you that[,] when you render a verdict, it is going to based only on the evidence that you hear in this case and nothing else.

(No audible response.) THE COURT: Does any member of this panel have any political, religious, or philosophical beliefs about our system of criminal justice that would make you hesitate to sit as a juror in this case? (No audible response.) The circuit court asked whether any of the prospective jurors had "ever testified as a witness in a criminal case[.]" Multiple prospective jurors responded. The circuit court asked more questions to which no prospective juror responded, stating: THE COURT: Is there any member of this panel who would allow sympathy, pity, anger[,] or any other emotion to influence your verdict in any way in this case? The verdict should not be based on those feeling[s], they should be based on the evidence.

(No audible response.) THE COURT: The State is required to prove the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Is there any member of this panel who feels that the State must prove its case beyond all doubt? And I will give you an instruction later on what the actual term reasonable doubt means. (No audible response.) THE COURT: But, no response.

Is there any member of this panel who would allow the possible punishment of the Defendant to influence your verdict in this case? (No audible response.) The circuit court asked whether any of the prospective jurors, or any member of their "immediate family[, had] ever been accused of a crime, been the victim of a crime, or been a witness to a crime[.]" Multiple prospective jurors responded. The circuit court judge who presided over the trial asked whether any of the prospective jurors knew him or had had any prior dealings with him. One prospective juror responded.

The circuit court asked whether any prospective jurors, any members of their immediate families, or anyone else with whom a prospective juror was "closely acquainted [had] ever been employed by any law enforcement agency[.]" Multiple prospective jurors responded. The circuit court asked whether any of the prospective jurors had ever been a juror in a criminal case. Multiple prospective jurors responded. The circuit court asked whether any of the prospective jurors would "give either more or less weight to the testimony of a police officer simply because they are a police officer and treat it differently than any other witness[.]" None of the prospective jurors responded.

The circuit court asked whether any of the prospective jurors was "a member of the Maryland Crime Victim Resource Center, Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence, Neighborhood Watch, the Stephanie Roper Committee, House of Ruth, Sarah's [H]ouse, YWCA[,] or a similar victim advocacy group[.]" One prospective juror responded. The circuit court asked more questions to which no prospective juror responded, stating: THE COURT: Does any member of this panel hold any beliefs related to race, sex, color, religion, national origin, or other personal attributes of the accused or other witnesses that might affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based only on the evidence and the law[?] (No audible response.) THE COURT: Does anyone on this panel have any strong feelings about the offense of burglary to the point where you could not render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence? (No audible response.) THE COURT: Does any member of this panel have strong feelings about the offense of theft to the extent that it would make you unable to be fair and impartial and base your decision only on the evidence in this case[?] (No audible response.) (Emphasis added). Immediately afterward, counsel approached the bench, and the following exchange occurred regarding the compound "strong feelings" questions: THE COURT: Anything else? [COLLINS'S COUNSEL]: I would ask for the question[s] to be asked -- THE COURT: I am not asking [them] that way. [COLLINS'S COUNSEL]: Okay.

THE COURT: Nobody is going to have good feelings about any crimes. So, it is totally misleading. [COLLINS'S COUNSEL]: Okay. Can I just put something on the record? THE COURT: Sure. [COLLINS'S COUNSEL]: So, the question that I had asked for was[: "]Does any member of this jury panel have strong feelings about the offense of burglary?["] THE COURT: Right. [COLLINS'S COUNSEL]: And ... ["D]oes any member of this panel have strong feelings about the offense of theft?["] THE COURT: And I simply supplemented it. [COLLINS'S COUNSEL]: Okay.

Could we just note my objection? THE COURT: Okay[.] The circuit court asked the following "catchall" question: "Is there any other reason that we have not already explained or discussed why any member of this panel cannot be a fair and impartial juror in this case, anything that we have not covered?" None of the prospective jurors responded. The circuit court excused three prospective jurors whom it had stricken for cause on its own initiative. Collins's counsel exercised four peremptory strikes, 3 and the prosecutor did not exercise any.

Twelve jurors and two alternate jurors were seated. Start of Trial The courtroom clerk swore the jurors and alternate jurors, the circuit court gave preliminary jury instructions, counsel gave opening statements, and the circuit court recessed for lunch at 11:39 a.m. At 1:33 p.m., the trial court resumed. Outside the jury's presence, the prosecutor advised that there was an issue as to the compound "strong feelings" questions.

The prosecutor explained that, "where you basically allow the panel to sort of self-answer and make their own determination as to their fairness and impartiality, it is reversible." The prosecutor suggested that, instead of declaring a mistrial, the circuit court could ask the jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions. The circuit court asked Collins's counsel whether she believed that that would be an appropriate remedy. Collins's counsel responded in the negative. The circuit court asked Collins's counsel whether she thought that there was a remedy at all.

Collins's counsel responded: "I don't think [that] there is ... [b]ecause the ['strong feelings'] question[s] ha[ve] not been posed to the entire pool of [prospective] jurors." Collins's counsel explained that, even if the circuit court asked the jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions, she still would not know how the other prospective jurors would have responded to such questions. The circuit court stated that it would ask the jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions. Collins's counsel made a motion for a mistrial, which the circuit court denied. Collins's counsel stated: "[W]e already had opening[ statements], so that also might affect how these jurors respond versus how the [other prospective] jurors might have responded prior to opening[ statements.]" The circuit court responded: "[T]hat is too speculative[,] though.

I think [that] the question now is whether the jury [that] we have picked can be fair and impartial[.] But I will leave that part [ ] of it off. I will simply ask the ['strong feelings'] question[s] as you stated[.]" Collins's counsel stated: "[N]ot only am I moving for a mistrial, I object to the[ ] jurors being asked those two ['strong feelings'] questions." The jury returned to the courtroom, and the circuit court addressed it as follows: THE COURT: Members of the jury, before you hear the first witness, I am going to re-ask two questions that we covered earlier[,] but I am going to ask them [in] a slightly different manner. If either of these apply to you, please let me know, and we will take your response up here privately. Does any member of this panel have strong feelings about the offense of burglary, is the first question?

(No audible response.) THE COURT: I see no responses. The next question [is,] does any member of this panel have strong feelings about the offense of theft? (No audible response.) THE COURT: I see no responses. (Emphasis added).

The circuit court then allowed the State to call its first witness. Trial Testimony and Verdicts As a witness for the State, Tower testified that, on March 17, 2017, at approximately 11:20 p.m., she and her husband were in bed in their home at 801 Severn Avenue in Annapolis. Tower, who was awake, heard noises. Tower nudged her husband awake and said: "I think there's somebody downstairs." Tower's husband went downstairs.

Tower called 911, then went downstairs. Items were "scattered all over" the television room. Tower's Michael Kors jacket, her son's Xbox, a few of his Xbox games, and his headphones were missing. As a witness for the State, Sergeant Kenneth Brown of the Annapolis Police Department testified that, on March 17, 2017, at 11:21 p.m., he was informed of a report of a burglary at 801 Severn Avenue.

Sergeant Brown drove on Wells Avenue towards Adams Street. According to Sergeant Brown, the intersection of Wells Avenue and Adams Street is within five minutes' walking distance from 801 Severn Avenue. To his right, Sergeant Brown saw Collins walking in the opposite direction on the sidewalk on Wells Avenue with a garbage bag over his shoulder. Sergeant Brown reached the intersection of Wells Avenue and Adams Street, made a three-point turn, and started driving back on Wells Avenue.

Sergeant Brown saw Collins, who was no longer holding the garbage bag, walk back onto the sidewalk on the south side of Wells Avenue from 408 Adams Street, which is on the corner of Wells Avenue and Adams Street. Then, Collins resumed walking. Sergeant Brown exited his vehicle and spoke to Collins. After another officer arrived, Sergeant Brown checked the other side of a fence on one end of 408 Adams Street, and found a garbage bag that contained a Michael Kors jacket, an Xbox, two Xbox games, headphones, and an empty cell phone case.

Throughout his investigation, Sergeant Brown did not see anyone else in the area besides Collins and the other officer. After Sergeant Brown finished testifying, the State rested, and Collins rested without offering any evidence. The jury found Collins guilty of first-degree burglary and theft of property with a value of less than $ 1,000. Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals Collins appealed.

On August 30, 2018, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Collins's convictions. See Collins v. State , 238 Md. App. 545 , 561, 192 A.3d 920 , 929 (2018). The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did not err during voir dire , and, alternatively, that the circuit court cured any error after the jury was seated. See id. at 557-58 , 192 A.3d at 927 -28 .

Writing for the panel of the Court of Special Appeals, 4 Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. acknowledged that, "if the two originally posed compound questions inquiring about 'strong feelings' with respect to burglary and theft respectively were before us in a vacuum, [Collins] would be armed with a very viable contention." Collins , 238 Md. App. at 552 , 192 A.3d at 925 . Judge Moylan went on to state: "Those originally posed compound questions, however, did not long remain in a vacuum. They are, as we now look back upon the trial, but part of a larger and more significant totality." Id. at 553 , 192 A.3d at 925 . Judge Moylan observed that the circuit court asked whether any prospective jurors had "any preconceived feelings about [certain] issues[,]" whether they had "any other emotion to influence [their] verdict in any way in this case[,]" whether they had been the victim of a crime, and whether there was "any other reason" why they could not be fair and impartial.

See id. at 553-54 , 192 A.3d at 925 -26 . Judge Moylan addressed the significance of these questions-as well as this Court's holding in Pearson , 437 Md. at 363 , 86 A.3d at 1239 , that compound "strong feelings" questions are improper-as follows: We are not suggesting that any one of these questions individually passed muster pursuant to Pearson , but only that, under the circumstances of this case, the sheer accumulation of the inquiries in their totality would have brought out anything significant that a direct question about "strong feelings" could have brought out. We cannot conceive of what ground for disqualification might have been unearthed by a simple, non-compound "strong feelings" question that was not unearthed by the totality of questions that actually were asked in this case. Whatever the compound questions about "strong feelings" may have failed to uncover directly was fully uncovered by the totality of questions that were asked.

Everything was explored that reasonably should have been explored, even if by alternative interrogative avenues. That, of course, is the bottom-line goal of the voir-dire examination and not a preference for the simple over the compound question simply as an academic abstraction. We do not foreclose the possibility of some diabolical law-school hypothetical, but, as a practical matter, everything that should have been brought out was brought out. As for the law-school hypothetical, we will not anguish over whether Plato might have been disqualified as a juror based upon some arcane factor other than his own or familial life experiences.

We are not administering the voir-dire process as a drill, or as a precise rubric, just for the sake of the drill. Id. at 554-55, 192 A.3d at 926 (underlining in original). Addressing the issue of whether the "victim" question could substitute for the "strong feelings" question, Judge Moylan stated: [A] properly framed question about "strong feelings" is at least the equivalent of, and therefore an adequate substitute for, a missing question about personal or familial involvement with the crime. But is the converse also true?

Is a question about personal or familial involvement the equivalent of, and an adequate substitute for, a missing or improperly[-]phrased question about "strong feelings"? Equivalency can be a tricky thing. Is the more general question broader and the more specific question narrower? Might it be that a broader question could substitute for a missing narrower question, but that a narrower question would not substitute for a missing broader question?

Or are we slicing the analysis too thinly, and should simply accept equivalency as a general truth? Pearson , of course, had no occasion to deal with its converse, and, therefore, does not answer our question. In our reading of Pearson , however, we find nothing to foreclose the acceptance of the converse. As a practical matter, a prospective juror with "strong feelings" and a prospective juror with some personal or familial experience with a similar crime would both have been called to the bench.

They would both have been probed, by court and counsel, about the source of their "strong feelings" or their involvement with the crime. Both lines of inquiry would have led to the same place. It seems to us almost inevitable that both inquiries would have revealed the same underlying circumstances, whichever way the initial question, which triggered the further examination at the bench, had been put. Looking at the totality of this voir-dire examination, we conclude that no critical or dispositive fact was left undiscovered.

Collins , 238 Md. App. at 557 , 192 A.3d at 927 (underlining in original). Judge Moylan reasoned that, given that the circuit court asked the seated jurors whether they had strong feelings about burglary and/or theft, Collins had "received, perhaps an hour and one-half later, precisely what he had sought one hour and one-half earlier, a jury competent to return a fair and impartial verdict. Nothing of any critical significance had occurred in that intervening hour and one-half." Id. at 558 , 192 A.3d at 928 . Finally, Judge Moylan rejected Collins's contention that the circuit court's failure to ask properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions during voir dire impaired his purported right to intelligently exercise peremptory strikes, stating: Unfortunately for [Collins], he mounts his argument in the wrong [S]tate.

Although the law in many jurisdictions might be receptive to [Collins]'s contention, the law of Maryland is not and never has been. The voir-dire examination in Maryland does not exist, even partially, for the purpose of supplying information to trial counsel that may guide them in the strategic use of their peremptory challenges.... Thus, the "right" asserted by [Collins] does not exist in Maryland. Id. at 559-60 , 192 A.3d at 928-29 (underlining in original).

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari On September 26, 2018, Collins petitioned for a writ of certiorari , raising the following three issues: 1. .... Did the Court of Special Appeals err in this case when it held that the [circuit] court's failure to ask the [prospective jurors] properly[-]phrased "strong feelings" questions was not reversible error in light of the fact that the [circuit] court asked the [prospective jurors] whether [they or] anyone ... in their immediate family had been the victim of a crime? 2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in this case when it held that the [circuit] court's failure to ask the [prospective jurors] properly[-]phrased "strong feelings" questions was not reversible error in light of the fact that the [circuit] court asked the [ ] jury properly[-]phrased "strong feelings" questions after the jury had been sworn and had heard opening statements? 3. Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it held that the [circuit] court's failure to ask the [prospective jurors] properly[-]phrased "strong feelings" questions was not reversible error in light of the fact that the [circuit] court asked a number of other generic questions?

On November 7, 2018, this Court granted the petition. See Collins v. State , 461 Md. 612 , 196 A.3d 904 (2018). DISCUSSION The Parties' Contentions Collins contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by asking during voir dire compound "strong feelings" questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased ones. Collins argues that, under Pearson , 437 Md. at 363 , 86 A.3d at 1239 , the compound "strong feelings" questions were improper because they shifted to the prospective jurors the responsibility to determine whether any strong feelings would render them unable to be fair and impartial.

Collins asserts that the "victim" question could not substitute for properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions because some prospective jurors may have had strong feelings about burglary and/or theft, even though neither they nor any of their immediate relatives had been victims of crimes. Collins maintains that the "catchall" question-as well as the "something in the past" question and the "sympathy, pity, anger, or any other emotion" question-were compound questions, and thus shifted to the prospective jurors the burden to determine whether they could be fair and impartial. Collins contends that the circuit court did not cure its abuse of discretion by asking the jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions. Collins argues that, when the circuit court asked the selected jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions, the jurors-none of whom had responded earlier to the compound "strong feelings" questions-may have been reluctant to respond because they would appear to have changed their answer, or because they would have been embarrassed to respond during the trial, as opposed to during voir dire .

Collins also asserts that the jurors may have already become invested in this case, and may have formed ideas about the case as a result of the opening statements. Alternatively, despite this Court's case law establishing that voir dire does not exist to facilitate the use of peremptory strikes, Collins maintains that the circuit court's failure to ask properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions during voir dire impaired his purported right to intelligently exercise peremptory strikes. The State responds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because the questions that the circuit court asked during voir dire elicited any potential bias based on the nature of the charges of burglary and/or theft, and made clear which prospective jurors would have responded to properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions. The State contends that the prospective jurors who were most likely to have had strong feelings about burglary and/or theft, yet believed that they could still be fair and impartial, were the prospective jurors who responded to the "victim" question.

The State argues that the "victim" question, the "sympathy, pity, anger, or any other emotion" question, and the "something in the past" question ensured that any of the prospective jurors who had experiences with crime were brought to the attention of the circuit court and counsel. The State asserts that, by stating "we are trying to make sure nobody has any preconceived feelings about any of these issues" immediately after asking the "something in the past" question, the circuit court helped ensure that any potential bias would be elicited. The State maintains that this Court should not interpret Pearson , 437 Md. at 363 , 86 A.3d at 1239 , to require trial courts to follow a precise rubric for voir dire questions. The State contends that, in Pearson , the compound "strong feelings" question was improper not necessarily because a trial court must ask the "strong feelings" question in non-compound form, but instead because, in Pearson , the trial court did not ask any other questions that would have elicited the information that a properly-phrased "strong feelings" question would have.

The State argues that the circuit court cured any error by asking the jury properly-phrased "strong feelings" questions later. Standard of Review An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court's "rulings on the record of the voir dire process as a whole[.]" Pearson , 437 Md. at 356 , 86 A.3d at 1235 (citation omitted). Law In Dingle v. State , 361 Md. 1 , 8-9, 5-6, 759 A.2d 819 , 823, 821 (2000), this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion by asking during voir dire compound questions, such as: "[H]ave you or any family member or a friend been the victim of a crime, and[,] if the answer to that part of the question is yes, would that fact interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?" This Court observed that a trial court "must decide whether, and when, cause for disqualification exists for any particular [prospective juror]. That is not a position occupied, or a decision to be made, by ... the individual [prospective juror]s." Id. at 14-15 , 759 A.2d at 826 .

This Court determined that, in Dingle , the trial court "avoid[ed] examination of each affected [prospective juror] as to the admittedly relevant matters[,] and allow[ed] each such person to make his or her own call as to his or her qualification to serve." Id. at 14 , 759 A.2d at 826 . In other words, this Court concluded that the compound questions "usurped the [trial] court's responsibility" to "determine, in the final analysis, the fitness of the individual" prospective jurors. Id. at 8-9 , 759 A.2d at 823 . This Court explained that the compound questions also "deprived [the defendant] of the ability to challenge ... for cause" any prospective jurors who did not respond to the compound questions because the defendant lacked "information bearing on the relevant experiences or associations of" those prospective jurors.

Id. at 21 , 759 A.2d at 830 . This Court reiterated that the compound questions interfered with both the trial court's ability to determine whether prospective jurors were biased and the defendant's ability to move to strike prospective jurors for cause, stating: Because [the trial court] did not require an answer to be given to the question as to the existence of the status or experience unless accompanied by a statement of partiality, the trial [court] was precluded from discharging [its] responsibility, i.e. exercising discretion, and, at the same time, the [defendant] was denied the opportunity to discover and challenge [prospective juror]s who might be biased. Id. at 17 , 759 A.2d at 828 . Despite having expressly disapproved of compound questions in Dingle , in three subsequent cases, this Court held that trial courts abused their discretion by refusing to ask compound "strong feelings" questions.

In State v. Thomas , 369 Md. 202 , 204-05, 798 A.2d 566 , 567-68 (2002), this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask: "Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings regarding violations of the narcotics laws that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts at a trial where narcotics violations have been alleged?" (Footnote omitted). In Sweet v. State , 371 Md. 1 , 9-10, 806 A.2d 265 , 270-71 (2002), this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask: "Do the charges stir up strong emotional feelings in you that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?" And, in State v. Shim , 418 Md. 37 , 40, 42, 12 A.3d 671 , 672-73, 674 (2011), this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask: "Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings concerning the violent death of another human being that you would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented?" Notably, "although Thomas , Sweet , and Shim postdate Dingle , in none of the three cases did this Court supersede Dingle ; in Thomas , Sweet , and Shim , this Court did not address any issue regarding the 'strong feelings' [ ] questions' phrasings." Pearson , 437 Md. at 363 -64 , 86 A.3d at 1240 . In Thomas , 369 Md. at 204 n.1, 798 A.2d at 567 n.1, in a footnote in the background section of this Court's opinion, this Court commented, in dicta : "When the inquiry is into the state of mind or attitude of the [prospective jurors] with regard to a particular crime or category of crimes, it is appropriate to phrase the question as was done in this case." This Court did not explain how a compound "strong feelings" question could be permissible under Dingle , or otherwise provide any reasoning for its dicta . See Thomas , 369 Md. at 204 n.1, 798 A.2d at 567 n.1.

In any event, in Thomas , no issue as to the phrasing of the "strong feelings" question was before this Court, as the defendant specifically requested that the trial court ask the "strong feelings" question in compound form, and the trial court refused; thus, the question was whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask the "strong feelings" question, not whether the "strong feelings" question was phrased properly. See id. at 204 , 798 A.2d at 567 . In Pearson , 437 Md. at 363 , 86 A.3d at 1239 , this Court overruled Thomas, Sweet , and Shim to the extent that they required a trial court, on request, to ask the "strong feelings" question in compound form, and held "that, on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire : 'Do any of you have strong feelings about [the crime with which the defendant is charged]?' " (Brackets in original). This Court "reaffirm[ed] this Court's essential holding in Shim that, on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire whether any prospective juror has 'strong feelings' about the crime with which the defendant is charged." Pearson , 437 Md. at 363 , 86 A.3d at 1239 .

This Court "simply recognize[d] that, in Shim and its parent cases, the 'strong feelings' [ ] questions' phrasings were at odds with Dingle , 361 Md. at 21 , 759 A.2d at 830 ." Pearson , 437 Md. at 363 , 86 A.3d at 1239 (citations omitted). This Court explained why compound "strong feelings" questions are inconsistent with Dingle , stating: Just like the phrasing of the [compound] questions in Dingle , [361 Md.] at 5, 759 A.2d at 821 , the phrasing of the "strong feelings" [ ] question in Shim "shifts from the trial [court] to