Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Warren

Collins, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer at law and granting a motion to quash. In August, 1953, the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Wicomico County received a petition entitled “Com ⁴⁶⁹ plaint for Support, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Ex rel. Beulah Warren, Complainant, vs. George Warren, Defendant,” under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, “Support of Dependents”, Code (1951), Article 89C, as amended by Chapter 498 of the Acts of 1953.

Attached was a certificate of the Judge of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia stating that the said Judge had found “that the allegations contained in the Complaint set forth facts sufficient to establish that the defendant [George Warren] owes a duty of support to the dependents [his wife and two minor children] named in the Complaint and that the Defendant should be compelled to answer such Complaint and be dealt with according to law.” There was also filed an affidavit of inability to pay the filing fee or other costs, an authenicated copy of the Uniform Support Law of Pennsylvania, and exemplifications in usual form in which the Clerk of Court in Pennsylvania and the Judge of the aforesaid Municipal Court certified as to each other. The case was docketed as a law case on the law docket of the Circuit Court for Wicomico County and a summons issued in standard form, as in civil cases on the law side of that Court. On December 7, 1953, after the defendant was returned as summoned, a demurrer and a so-called motion to quash was filed. Both the demurrer and the motion alleged that such proceedings are unknown to the common law, that there is no valid statute in Maryland authorizing such proceedings, and that the statute is unconstitutional.

After argument, a docket entry was made on December 9, 1953, “Demurrer sustained and Motion to Quash granted,” from which the appellant appeals here. There is no indication in the record before us that a judgment was entered in this case. The single contention made by the appellee, George Warren, to sustain the order below is that the Support of Dependents Act, supra, is unconstitutional because it does not specifically provide for trial by jury. ⁴⁷⁰ The only case to which we have been referred and which we have been able to locate, passing upon the constitutionality of the Uniform Support of Dependents Act, is Duncan v. Smith, (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1958), 262 S. W. 2d 373 . In that case the constitutionality of the statute was upheld.

Appearing in the case amici curiae were the Attorneys General of Florida, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Colorado, Indiana, West Virginia, New Jersey, New Mexico, Idaho, Alabama, and Delaware. Although in that case the constitutionality of the Act was attacked on eight grounds, no objection was made that a right to a jury trial was denied. No contention is here made that this is a criminal proceeding. It was said in a memorandum prepared and presented to the 1953 Annual Meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General: “Confusions Regarding Civil and Criminal Remedies.

The basic purpose of the reciprocal laws is to provide an alternative to criminal extradition, which in the past has proven to be ineffective as a method for enforcing support. It is true that the Uniform Act contains two sections (5 & 6) [Code (1951), Art. 89C, supra, Secs. 5 & 6] relating to extradition. It was not the intention, however, of the drafters that this should be an invitation to more extensive use of extradition. The .extradition sections were put in to bring up to date the provisions of criminal extradition which relate to support duties.

In addition, Section 6 of the Uniform Act provides that an obligor who submits to the court and makes payment in accordance with its order shall be relieved of extradition for non-support.” This memorandum also says: “The basic method of operation under the reciprocal acts is quite simple. An obligee (person to whom duty of support is owed) petitions the designated court in her home community; that court verifies the petition, attaches its certificate, and transmits the case to a court in the responding state where the obligor (person owing support) is now pres ⁴⁷¹ ent; the responding state court takes jurisdiction over the obligor, ascertains whether a duty of support is owed, and enters the necessary support order. Interrogatories and depositions are used if the obligor denies that he is liable. The proceeding is civil in nature and confrontation is not necessary.

As might well be expected, such a novel approach to the interstate enforcement of support duties is bound to run into certain difficulties caused by varying interpretations, lack of understanding, and occasional lack of cooperation. On balance, however, it appears that the reciprocal support laws have been remarkably effective and are bringing in many hundreds of thousands of dollars in support payments that would otherwise have to be paid in public relief costs.” It appears from the series of Hand Books of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws that the Commission was not concerned with the form of proceedings to be used or whether the action was to be legal or equitable. In the thirty-seven states which have adopted the Act, the titling of the proceedings differ. In twenty states the titling is “Petition”; in ten states “Action”; and in seven states “Complaint”.

The types of courts specifically provided with jurisdiction vary greatly. Various statutes vest jurisdiction in District Courts, Equity Courts, Juvenile Courts, Probate Courts, Domestic Relations Courts, Municipal Courts, and in Ohio in “Any Courts of Record”. Alabama, Arkansas and Michigan are the only states according to our determination which specifically indicate that the matter is one of equity rather than of law. Provisions in the following states give some indication that the proceedings are to be handled as equity cases.

Louisiana vests jurisdiction in Juvenile Courts; Massachusetts in Probate Courts; Rhode Island in Juvenile Courts, if children are involved; Virginia in Juvenile, Domestic Relations, Circuit or Corporation Courts; New Jersey in Juvenile or Domestic Courts; and Oklahoma in District or Family Relations Courts. Although no ⁴⁷² light is shed on the question before us, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act is interestingly discussed in “Pennsylvania’s Uniform Support Law” by M. Louise Rutherford, Deputy Attorney