Abb v. Crossfield

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On July 16, 1963 Marguerite Cary Abb 1 on behalf of her infant daughter, Mara Abb, filed a Complaint for Initiation of Reciprocal Support Proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. She was a resident of the District, her “former husband, Irving V. M. Abb, a resident and member of the Bar of Maryland. They had been married on February 24, 1950 in Annapolis.

Mara was born on December 30,. 1953 and her parents were divorced December 20,1957 by decree awarded by the Second Judicial District Court of Nevada. The record indicates that copies of the decree and the separation agreement which had been incorporated therein, were admitted into evidence at the hearing on the complaint. On July 22, 1963, Judge Joseph C. Waddy found that the defendant had a duty to support his daughter and recommended support payments of $325 per month. He ordered that the necessary papers be forwarded to the responding State of Maryland for further proceedings under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, (URESA) Md. Code, Art. 89C.

Although the Complaint and affidavit of Mrs. Abb appear in our sparse and disordered record, the decree and separation agreement do not. Whether they were forwarded to Maryland with the other documents is uncertain. An evidentiary hearing was held on November 26, 1963 in what was then the Montgomery County People’s Court for Juvenile Causes, Judge Alfred D. Noyes presiding. Mr. Abb personally appeared, while Mrs. Abb was represented by private counsel.

The “formal record” of the hearing consists of the court reporter’s transcribed summary of the proceedings. Significantly, she wrote that: “Mr. Abb told the Court there is no question as to his duty to support the child . . . .” ²³⁴ . .. “They had a separation agreement which was kept for some years, but then she started changing her living arrangements so often. He is perfectly willing to keep up with this separation agreement.” According to the reporter, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Court: “ . . . advised that because there is no testimony regarding the needs of anything further than the separation agreement an order should be entered in that amount.” Contrary to his acknowledged responsibility, during the years which followed, Mr. Abb was regularly in arrears on his support payments despite his expressed intentions, and was frequently brought before the court on contempt proceedings. On January 19, 1973 Mrs. Abb petitioned the Circuit Court of Montgomery County — which had assumed jurisdiction for URESA actions on July 1, 1972 — for increase in child support.

Following a hearing on the petition at which evidence of Mara Abb’s expenses was introduced, Judge Joseph M. Mathias found that both Mara Abb’s needs and defendant’s ability to pay had increased. On May 25, 1973 he ordered Mr. Abb to pay $450 per month from February 1, 1973 onward and $500 for plaintiff’s legal fees. On June 4, 1973 Mr. Abb filed a suggestion of majority with the court pointing out that Chapter 651, Laws of Maryland 1973, effective July 1, 1973, changed the age of majority in this State from 21 to 18, and that the dependent Mara Abb was over 18. Mr. Abb then ceased support payments and was held in contempt by Judge Philip M. Fairbanks on December 21,1973.

ISSUES The Court of Appeals in Zouck v. Zouck, 204 Md. 285 , 300 alludes to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act as evidence of a Legislative policy favoring “liberality toward the enforcement in Maryland of the claims of ²³⁵ non-resident wives and children entitled to support.” Despite that policy of liberality appellant claims that Mrs. Abb, having chosen to introduce her Nevada decree and support agreement as evidence of a “duty to support” in a URESA action initiated in the District of Columbia, rather than directly instituting Maryland enforcement proceedings on her Nevada decree, cannot rely on the provisions of the incorporated support agreement requiring payments until her daughter’s 21st birthday to demonstrate the inapplicability of Maryland’s 18 year old majority law. Decree and Support Agreement As a preliminary hurdle, appellant suggests that the decree and separation agreement have “not been introduced into evidence at any hearing.” The record clearly indicates that the documents were introduced at the initiation phase of the proceeding in the District of Columbia. Although it is not certain that the documents themselves were forwarded to or introduced at the respondent phase of the proceeding in the Peoples’ Court, the reporter’s record explicitly relates appellant’s desire that the court order support in accordance with the agreement, and the court’s acquiescence in that request. Thus it is evident that Judge Noyes’ finding of Mr. Abb’s duty to support “imposed or imposable under the laws” of this State, Md. Code, Art. 89C, § 7, was predicated on evidence of the support agreement and Mr. Abb’s adherence to it.

The breadth of the language in the definitions included in the URESA makes clear that the act was intended to provide a convenient enforcement mechanism for a broad spectrum of “duties of support.” Md. Code, Article 89C, § 2 (g), explains: “ ‘Duty of Support’ includes any duty of support imposed or imposable by law,