Conaway v. State

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. While a prisoner in the Maryland Division of Correction, Gregory Conaway was injured. Believing that the State’s treatment for his injuries was negligent, Conaway filed a claim for damages, pursuant to the Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The State denied Conaway’s claim on the grounds that the notice provided to it was defective.

This determination was upheld by both the Health Claims Arbitration Office (HCAO) and the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. During the pendency of the HCAO proceedings, Conaway learned that Frank Basil, Inc. had been the health care provider under a contract with the State when Conaway was injured. Conaway therefore amended his HCAO complaint to include Basil, but did not do so until after three ²³⁷ years had passed from his original claim with the State. Both the HCAO and the circuit court granted Basil’s motion to dismiss Conaway’s claim as barred by the statute of limitations.

In this appeal, Conaway contends that: — the circuit court erred in granting the State’s motion to dismiss because Conaway filed a claim with the State within the time period called for in the Maryland Tort Claims Act; and — the circuit court erred in granting Basil’s motion to dismiss because Conaway did not learn of his claim against Basil until December of 1989. As to Conaway’s claim against the State, we will reverse and remand the case to the circuit court. With respect to his claim against Basil, however, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. STATEMENT OF FACTS Conaway suffered a broken finger in May of 1986 while he was incarcerated in the Maryland Division of Correction Brockbridge facility at Jessup.

Although the State provided him treatment for his injury, Conaway was left with a permanently disfigured and painful ring finger on his right hand. In September of 1986, through an attorney, Conaway filed a claim against the State, allegedly pursuant to the MTCA. Conaway’s “claim” did not contain a demand for specific damages. Subsequently, over a two-year period, Conaway’s attorney endeavored, with little success, to obtain from the State the medical records necessary to substantiate Conaway’s claims.

Finally, in November of 1988, Conaway, now in possession of the medical records, attempted to engage the State in settlement discussions. Although its agents were in contact with Conaway’s attorney for over two years following the September 1986 letter, the State now denied Conaway’s claim, alleging that the September 1986 letter did not meet the requirements of the MTCA, as the claim did not demand specific damages. ²³⁸ Conaway then filed a claim with the HCAO. The State moved to dismiss, again contending that the September 1986 letter did not comply with the MTCA. Alternatively; the State alleged that Conaway had not exhausted his administrative remedies, as he did not file a claim with the Inmate Grievance Commission (IGC).

In investigating this assertion, Conaway’s attorney learned, for the first time, that the medical services provided to Conaway were not provided by state employees, but by a company with which the State contracted to provide medical care to inmates. As a result, Conaway could not have filed a claim with the IGC because the grievance was not with state employees, but with individuals under contract to the State. After learning this information, Conaway then amended his HCAO complaint to include PHP Healthcare Corporation (PHP), the State’s present service provider. While the State’s motion to dismiss was pending before the HCAO, Conaway’s attorney learned that, although PHP was the current health care provider for the State’s prisons, it did not begin its contract with the State until July 1,1986.

At the time Conaway was originally treated, therefore, it was not PHP, but Frank Basil, Inc., which was under contract with the State. For yet another time, Conaway amended his complaint, adding Basil as an additional defendant. On October 2, 1990, the HCAO granted the State’s and Basil’s motions to dismiss, ruling that Conaway’s September 1986 letter did not meet the requirements of the MTCA, and that Conaway’s claim against Basil was barred by the statute of limitations. The HCAO later granted summary judgment in favor of PHP.

Conaway then notified the HCAO of his rejection of the decision and filed his complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the State and Basil. The State and Basil filed motions in circuit court similar to those filed with the HCAO. Conaway filed answers to those motions. On January 30, 1991, the motions judge granted the motions of ²³⁹ the State and Basil after a short hearing.

Conaway then noted an appeal to this Court. THE MARYLAND TORT CLAIMS ACT —Substantial Compliance— Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in ruling that his September 1986 letter did not meet the requirements of the MTCA, specifically Md. State Gov’t Code Ann., §§ 12-106 — 107 (1984, 1991 Cum.Supp.). Section 12-106(b) states: “(b) Claim and denial required. — A claimant may not institute an action under this subtitle unless: “(1) the claimant submits a written claim to the Treasurer or a designee of the Treasurer within 180 days after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim; “(2) the Treasurer or designee denies the claim finally; and “(3) the action is filed within 1 year after the claim is denied finally or 3 years after the cause of action arises, whichever is later.” Section 12-107(a) sets forth the requirements for a “claim”: “(a) Form. — A claim under this subtitle shall: “(1) contain a concise statement of facts that sets forth the nature of the claim, including the date and place of the alleged tort; “(2) demand specific damages; “(3) state the name and address of each party; “(4) state the name, address, and telephone number of counsel for the claimant, if any; and “(5) be signed by the claimant, or the legal representative or counsel for the claimant.” Appellant argues that, although his September 1986 letter to the State Treasurer did not contain a demand for specific damages, as required by § 12-107(a)(2), the letter was a sufficient statement of a “claim” to meet the requirements ²⁴⁰ of § 12-106(b). Implicit in this argument is the notion of “substantial compliance” with the “claim” requirements of the MTCA.

The State, on the other hand, proffers several reasons to support its assertion that the September 1986 letter was not a sufficient statement of a claim for purposes of the MTCA. First, because the MTCA waives the State’s sovereign immunity, the State argues that such waiver should be construed strictly. Second, the State argues, cases interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) have, with virtual unanimity, concluded that the failure to demand specific damages is fatal to a claimant’s cause of action. For the reasons which follow, we reject the State’s arguments.

We will hold that appellant’s September 1986 letter substantially complied with the requirements of §§ 12-106 and 12-107. As a result, we hold that the circuit court erred in dismissing appellant’s claim against the State. The General Assembly has waived the State’s sovereign immunity for tort claimants who satisfy the requirements of the MTCA. A threshold requirement, per §§ 12-106 — 107, is the presentation of a claim to the State Treasurer within 180 days of the injury.

The Court of Appeals has recently held that this provision is a condition precedent to filing suit against the State. Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 225 , 592 A.2d 1090 (1991). The analysis of the Court of Appeals in Simpson provides the basis for our decision here. In that case, a police officer was killed in a helicopter accident while on duty in 1986.

Just short of three years later, the officer’s surviving spouse,. Simpson, filed an action for wrongful death and survivor’s benefits. In that action, Simpson alleged that the accident resulted from the negligence of two other officers, and that the State of Maryland should be liable for damages. Simpson had filed no claim of any kind with the State within 180 days.

The State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, contending that the filing of a claim with the State Treasurer within ²⁴¹ 180 days was a condition precedent to the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The trial court granted the State’s motion, and Simpson appealed. According to the legislative history, the 180-day rule in § 12-106 was derived from Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann., § 5-306 (1974, 1984 RepLVol.), 1 which set time limits for making claims against a county or municipal corporation. As a result, argued Simpson, the Legislature, in amending § 12-106, must have also intended to incorporate the “good cause” and “absence of prejudice” criteria, adopted as § 5-306(c) in 1972, for waiver of the notice requirement. 2 Section 12-106 itself, however, unlike § 5-306, makes no mention of any exceptions to the 180-day notice requirement.

The Court of Appeals rejected Simpson’s argument, holding that “[i]n adopting a 180-day requirement without also adopting any exception to that requirement, the legislature has imposed a condition precedent which carries with it the rigors of the pre-1972 law governing notice to municipalities.” Simpson, 323 Md. at 225 , 592 A.2d 1090 . Thus, because Simpson provided no notice at all to the State within the 180 days mandated by § 12-106(b), his claim was barred. While Simpson provided no notice to the State, appellant in this case provided written notice to the State within the 180-day period mandated by § 12-106(b). The question here, therefore, is whether that notice was sufficient.

Taking the requirements of § 12-107 literally, there is little question that appellant’s claim was insufficient; he did not include a demand for specific damages, as required by § 12-107(a)(2). The question remains, however, (1) whether substantial compliance with the condition precedent is appli ²⁴² cable; and (2) whether appellant’s September 1986 letter substantially complied with the requirements of the MTCA. We shall answer both questions in the affirmative. Simpson clearly directs that the 180-day limit in § 12-106(b) is to be interpreted similarly to the pre-1972 statute governing notice of claims for damages against counties and municipal corporations (then Art. 57, § 18).

Initially, therefore, we must look to the decisions of the Court of Appeals interpreting Art. 57, § 18. Although the Court of Appeals firmly held that the notice provision of § 18 was mandatory, see Note 2, supra, it also held that substantial compliance with the notice provisions could be sufficient, even where there was a failure to comply with the literal requirements of the statute. Grubbs v. Prince George’s County, 267 Md. 318, 324-325 , 297 A.2d 754 (1972); Loewinger v. Prince George’s County, 266 Md. 316, 318 , 292 A.2d 67 (1972); Jackson v. Board of County Commissioners of Anne Arundel County, 233 Md. 164, 168 , 195 A.2d 693 (1963). Based on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Simpson, 323 Md. at 225 , 592 A.2d 1090 , we hold that substantial compliance with the requirements of the MTCA is sufficient to satisfy the condition precedent to the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity. 3 The question remains, however, whether appellant’s September 1986 letter to the State Treasurer sufficiently complied with the requirements of § 12-107 so as to constitute substantial compliance.

In Jackson, 233 Md. at 168 , 195 A.2d 693 , the Court of Appeals held: ²⁴³ “If the purpose of the statute is fulfilled, the manner of the accomplishment of the fulfillment has not generally been tested too technically. In such cases substantial compliance generally is held to be enough.” The Court of Appeals therefore held that service of a claim by regular mail, rather than in person or by registered mail as called for by Art. 57, § 18, constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute. The appellate courts of this State have never, as far as we can tell, addressed the issue of substantial compliance in the context of a deviation from the required form or content of a notice, rather than deviation from the method of delivery, as in Jackson and Grubbs . There is a great deal of support, however, in the decisions of other states for the proposition that, where compliance with a statutory requirement is technically defective, but nevertheless accomplishes the purposes of the statute itself, the actions taken may be held sufficient as being in substantial compliance with the statutory requirements.

Morkunas v. Anchorage Telephone Utility, 754 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Alaska 1988) (conduct that falls short of strict compliance with statutory requirements, but which “affords the same protection that strict compliance would offer”); Opinion of the Justices, 275 A.2d 558, 562 (Del.1971) (“when there has been a partial compliance and it is reasonable to conclude that the objective sought ... has been as fully attained ... as though there had been a full and literal compliance”); Superior/Ideal, Inc. v. Board of Review of the City of Oskaloosa, 419 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa 1988) (compliance “in respect to essential matters necessary to assure the reasonable objectives of the statute”); City of Lenexa v. City of Olathe, 233 Kan. 159 , 660 P.2d 1368, 1373 (1983) (“compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to assure every reasonable objective of the statute”); Rogers v. Roberts, 300 Or. 687 , 717 P.2d 620, 622 (1986) (en banc) (“compliance in respect to the essential matters necessary to assure every reasonable objective of the statute”); Radtke v. City of Milwaukee, 116 Wis.2d 550 , 342 N.W.2d 435 , 438 ²⁴⁴ (1984) (compliance sufficient to “fulfill the objective of the statute”); Smith v. State, 364 So.2d 1, 9 (Ala.Crim.App. 1978) (“whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out [its] intent”); Coe v. Davidson, 43 Cal.App.3d 170 , 117 Cal.Rptr. 630, 633 (1974) (“actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute”); Indiana Dept. of Public Welfare v. Clark, 478 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind.App.1985), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1170 , 106 S.Ct. 2893 , 90 L.Ed.2d 980 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 , 108 S.Ct. 2302 , 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988) (“substantial compliance requires that the purpose of the statute be served”); Bernstein v. Board of Trustees of Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund, 151 NJ.Super. 71, 376 A.2d 563, 566 (1977) (“general compliance with the purpose of the statute”); Santos v. Guerra, 570 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex.Civ.App.1978) (“compliance with the essential requirements ... of a statute”); Application of Santore, 28 Wash.App. 319 , 623 P.2d 702, 707 (1981) (“actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute”). The common theme of these decisions is the focus on the intent, purpose or objective of the statute in question. In this respect, they are consistent with the Maryland Court of Appeals holding in Jackson, 233 Md. at 168 , 195 A.2d 693 , quoted supra. Furthermore, we have found no cases in Maryland or other jurisdictions which have entirely rejected the principle of substantial compliance in this context.

Two of the decisions cited above are particularly relevant here, in that they address substantial compliance with statutes similar to § 12-106. In Clark , the Indiana Court of Appeals held that substantial compliance with the notice provisions of the Indiana Tort Claims Act would be sufficient: “Substantial compliance requires that the purpose of the notice requirement be served and that the claimant comply with his affirmative duty of delivering some writing to the agency. ²⁴⁵ The purpose of the [notice] requirement is to inform the state agency of the circumstances surrounding the incident so that it can investigate, determine its possible liability and prepare a defense to the claim.” Clark, 478 N.E.2d at 702-703 . Although not found in that case, the Indiana Court clearly indicated that substantial compliance with the notice provisions of a state tort claims act could suffice. In Radtke , the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that substantial compliance with a statutory notice provision for claims against municipalities was sufficient: “To decide whether there was substantial compliance in this case, we must determine whether the notice of injury actually given contained sufficient elements of the notice requirements to fulfill the objective of the statute.

A notice of injury statute, such as sec. 81.15, seeks to provide the proper authorities with an opportunity to investigate a claim which is not stale. The investigatory objective can be best fulfilled if the proper authorities have requisite and timely notice of the facts and circumstances of the incident.” Radtke, 342 N.W.2d at 438 . Both Radtke and Clark focus on the actual steps taken to comply with the statute, and whether those steps effectuated the purpose behind the notice requirement of the statute. The intent of the MTCA is therefore of paramount importance to our analysis here.

Previous cases have held that the intent of the MTCA may be gleaned from the parallel provisions of the FTCA, where the two statutes are consistent. Gardner v. State, 77 Md.App. 237, 247 , 549 A.2d 1171 (1988). The federal courts have held that the notice requirements of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2675 (a) (1965, 1991 Cum.Supp.), from which the comparable MTCA provisions are drawn, are satisfied when the claimant “promptly informs the relevant agency of the accident so that it may investigate the claim and respond either by settlement or by defense.” Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir.), clarified, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980). This statutory purpose is consistent with the ²⁴⁶ analysis of the Indiana and Wisconsin