Consolidated Rail Corp. v. State

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge. Consolidated Rail Corporation, appellant, appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granting summary judgment in favor of the State of Maryland, appellee, (hereinafter “the State”), for the costs incurred by the State in connection with appellant’s performance of work at a railroad grade crossing. It presents two questions for our resolution: 1. Do the provisions of § 8-640 and § 8-642 of the •Transportation Article of the Annotated Code of Mary ²⁹⁰ land apply to the case at bar thus limiting the State’s recovery to 25% of the cost of its detour and repair work? 2.

Does the State’s claim, which sounds in negligence, entitle it to recover the costs of its detour work which was undertaken prior to Conrail’s alleged negligent action? We resolve the first issue against appellant, but hold in its favor as to the second. Therefore, we will affirm in part and reverse in part. This appeal had its genesis when appellant performed work on its tracks and the adjacent roadway at a railroad grade crossing located on U.S. Route 301, south of Maryland Route 4, in Upper Marlboro, Maryland.

Although the work was done with its knowledge, the State contended that it was negligently and improperly done, thus creating an unsafe condition for motorists 1 and necessitating it, the State, to perform emergency repairs. When appellant did not respond to the State’s demand that it be reimbursed for the expenses it incurred in correcting appellant’s work, the State filed this action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. That court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment as to liability and determined, from the undisputed facts, that the total possible damages amounted to $31,082.67. It denied the State’s motion for summary judgment as to damages, however.

As to that, the court “ordered that this matter be scheduled on the basis of possible apportionment of payment____” Following discovery and a further hearing, the court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment in the full amount of the damages previously determined. It ruled “that the [apportionment] statute doesn’t apply, so, therefore, there is ²⁹¹ no apportionment.” It is from this aspect of the judgment, i.e., that the apportionment statute does not apply, that appellant has appealed. 1. Appellant first argues that, pursuant to §§ 8-640(e) 2 and 8-642 3 of the Maryland Transportation Code Ann., it is obligated to pay, and the State may only recover, 25 percent of the cost of the repair work it performed at the grade crossing. This result is mandated, it says, by the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes, the application of which would not result in an illogical or unfair result.

Not surprisingly, the State takes the opposite position. It argues that “[t]he intent of the apportionment statute ... is to require railroads to pay only 25% of project costs, if, but only if, the State is either the cause or beneficiary of the work.” Thus, it maintains that, because it is required, pursuant to subtitle 6 of Title 8 of the Transportation Code Ann., and, in particular, § 8-601, to “construct, reconstruct, and repair State highways as necessary and [to] maintain them in good condition,” the legislature authorized the State to reimburse the railroad for 75 percent of the cost of ²⁹² any work performed by the railroad which directly or incidentally carries out the State’s mandate, that is, that it helps it to meet its statutory responsibilities. Like appellant, the State relies upon statutory construction to support the position it espouses. We approach the interpretation of a statute with the goal of determining its legislative purpose, “the general aim or policy, ‘the ends to be accomplished ... ’ by the statute construed.” Norris v. United Cerebral Palsy of Central, Maryland, et al., 86 Md.App. 508, 516 , 587 A.2d 557 (1991), quoting Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 603-04 , 573 A.2d 1346 (1990).

See also Department of Environment v. Showell, 316 Md. 259, 270 , 558 A.2d 391 (1989); ANA Towing, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 314 Md. 711, 715 , 552 A.2d 1295 (1989). Since “what the legislature has written in an effort to achieve a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal,” Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987), the language of the statute is the logical starting place for the process. Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92, 98 , 570 A.2d 1235 (1990). Nevertheless, the “meaning of the plainest language” is affected by its context, Matter of Diane M., 317 Md. 652, 658 , 566 A.2d 108 (1989), and, therefore, even though it may not be necessary to go beyond a review of the statutory language when that language sufficiently expresses the legislative purpose, Davis v. State, 319 Md. 56, 61 , 570 A.2d 855 (1990), the court is always free to consider the statutory language in the context in which it appears.

State v. Runge, 317 Md. 613, 618 , 566 A.2d 88 (1989); Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 499-500 , 554 A.2d 1238 (1989). Moreover, a court should neither resort to subtle or forced interpretations for the purpose of extending or limiting the operation of the statute, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Hackley, 300 Md. 277, 283 , 477 A.2d 1174 (1984); Schweitzer v. Brewer, 280 Md. 430, 438 , 374 A.2d 347 (1977); Board of Trustees v. Kielczewski, 77 Md.App. 581, 587-88 , 551 A.2d ²⁹³ 485, cert. denied, 315 Md. 692 , 556 A.2d 673 (1989); Department of Health v. Congoleum Corp., 51 Md.App. 257, 264 , 443 A.2d 130 (1982), nor adopt a construction leading to results which are unreasonable, illogical, and inconsistent with common sense. State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92 , 581 A.2d 9 (1990); Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513 , 525 A.2d 628 quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986). Finally, where the statute is a part of a statutory scheme, it should be interpreted so as to harmonize the various statutory provisions.

See Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 481 , 578 A.2d 761 (1990); Harford County v. University, 318 Md. 525, 529 , 569 A.2d 649 (1990). The applicable provisions to be interpreted are found within Title 8. That title governs the State’s highways and the various subtitles within the title address different aspects of that subject: subtitle 2 concerns the State Highway Administration; subtitle 3, acquisition and disposition of property for highway purposes; subtitle 4 involves highway users revenues; subtitle 5 addresses the federal highway programs; subtitle 6, construction and maintenance of the State’s highways; subtitle 7 regulates outdoor advertising; and subtitle 8 involves junk and scrap yards. Within subtitle 6 are §§ 8-640 and 8-642, both of which relate to the allocation of responsibility for work performed, or required to be performed, at railroad crossings.

Section 8-642, in particular, specifies how the costs of that work are to be allocated. The meaning of §§ 8-640 and 8-642 must be ascertained by reference to the entire statutory scheme, i.e., by reference to the relevant provisions of Title 8. Section 8-642 addresses the allocation of the costs “of any railroad grade crossing or railroad grade separation project or maintenance.” Three of the terms used in that section are defined in § 8-101 4 and two of them have ²⁹⁴ relevance to the resolution of the issue sub judice. 5 Section 8-101(Z) defines “project” as “the construction, reconstruction, or relocation of one or more sections or parts of the State highway system.” “Maintenance” is defined ¿s “the upkeep and repair by which a highway ... is kept in an ordinarily efficient operating condition,” § 8 — 101(j)(l), but “does not include construction, reconstruction, or relocation.” § 8 — 101(j)(2). Thus, in context, when § 8-642(a) refers to “project” or “maintenance,” it is necessarily referring to a project of, or maintenance by, the State highway system, rather than of, or by, a railroad or other private entity.

Read in light of the entire statutory scheme, then, § 8-642 has reference to work within the statutory responsibility of the State Highway Administration, work initiated by the State and, if not initiated by the State, work that inures to the benefit of the State, in the sense that, when complete, it will have fulfilled the State’s obligations as to highway construction and/or maintenance. So read, it is logical that the State should be required to pay the bulk of the cost of construction or maintenance. On the other hand, when the work is neither initiated by the State, nor fulfills the State’s obligation to construct and maintain its highways, logic would not dictate that the State should shoulder such an obligation. In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that, although it was aware that appellant intended to perform work on its tracks and the railroad bed at the railroad grade crossing in issue, the State did not initiate the grade crossing work.

On the contrary, the record reflects that the work was initiated by appellant and, because the record further reflects that when it initiated the work, the railroad grade crossing was not in need of repair, it follows that it was done for appellant’s benefit, and not the benefit of the State. Moreover, the record also reflects that, having initi ²⁹⁵ ated the work, appellant performed it improperly and negligently, necessitating that additional work be done to render the railroad grade crossing safe once again. We hold that under these circumstances, that the provisions of § 8-642(a) simply do not apply; the work originally done by appellant was not a project of the State Highway Administration, nor was its maintenance required to keep the railroad grade crossing “in an ordinarily efficient operating condition.” The costs incurred by the State as a result of the negligent performance of the railroad grade crossing work is, therefore, attributable solely to appellant, 6 which must bear the entire burden. Appellant’s argument that § 8-640 is relevant to the resolution of this issue is, we believe, without merit.

Subsection (a) does place the responsibility on a