Cornias v. Bradley

Barnes, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal involves the correctness of the charge to the jury by the Superior Court of Baltimore City (Harris, J.) in a personal injury case arising out of an automobile collision at the intersection of Gay and Pratt Streets in Baltimore City. The trial court instructed the jury that the boulevard law was not applicable and this is the principal error alleged by the appellant, Michael Cornias, who was the plaintiff in the lower court. Pratt Street is approximately 95 feet wide at its intersection with Gay Street.

It is a multi-laned thoroughfare for traffic proceeding generally in an east-west direction. Gay Street, which begins at the northern side of Pratt Street and at this point runs in a northerly direction, is 36 feet wide. The records of the Department of Transit and Traffic of Baltimore City indicate that on the date of the collision, July 28, 1961, Pratt Street traffic was controlled by a series of traffic signal lights, consisting of two lights for leaving Gay Street, two lights for eastbound traffic and two lights for westbound traffic on Pratt Street; and two lights for traffic leaving Pier 3, which begins on the south side of Pratt Street and extends into the waters of the Patapsco River. The general sequence of these automatic signal lights is (1) green for eastbound and westbound traffic on Pratt Street, all others red; change to yellow for westbound traffic on Pratt Street, the lights remaining green for eastbound traffic on Pratt Street; (2) change to red for westbound traffic on Pratt Street, green for eastbound traffic on Pratt Street, with a left turn arrow for northbound traffic into Gay Street, and, at the ⁴⁸² same time, red for southbound traffic on Gay Street, but with a green arrow for southbound traffic on Gay Street turning to the west on Pratt Street; change to yellow for eastbound traffic on Pratt Street with the extinguishment of the left turn arrow for eastbound traffic on Pratt Street, all other lights remaining the same; (3) change to green for southbound traffic on Gay Street and a flashing red light for traffic leaving Pier 3; change to yellow for southbound Gay Street traffic and solid red for Pier 3; change to begin cycle again.

The traffic signals for Gay Street and for Pier 3 are activated by an overhead radar on Gay Street, 66 feet from the intersection of Gay and Pratt Streets, and by pedestrian pushbuttons at the corner and at the head of Pier 3. If there is no traffic on Gay Street to activate the radar, the signal for Pier 3 remains red until someone pushes the pedestrian button. Thus, traffic on Pratt Street has a continuous green light unless the radar is activated on Gay Street or the pushbuttons are operated. The time that the traffic light flashes red for traffic leaving Pier 3 varies, with a minimum time of 10 seconds.

The records of the Department of Transit and Traffic also indicated that there was nothing to change the traffic signal for Pier 3 from red to flashing red at the exit from Pier 3 except the pedestrian pushbutton. As we have seen there has never been a treadle or other device which would otherwise control this traffic light. The traffic light controlling the traffic at Pier 3 never changes to green and there is a sign facing the pier which bears the legend : “Move on flashing red after stop.” We now turn to what occurred at this rather complicated intersection on July 28, 1961. On that date, at approximately 1:00 p.m., the plaintiff and appellant, Michael Cornias, was operating an automobile in a westerly direction oh the north side of Pratt Street.

He had turned into Pratt Street at its intersection with Frederick Street, located one block east from Gay Street. As he approached the intersection of Pratt and Gay Streets, intending to turn right in order to go north on Gay Street, he stopped ⁴⁸³ in the extreme right-hand lane in obedience to the red light which was then facing him. When the light changed to green, Mr. Cornias testified that he looked to his left and noticed traffic moving westward, or what looked to be westward, on Pratt Street. He then drove forward to make his right turn into Gay Street.

He did not specifically remember seeing the truck which shortly thereafter struck his automobile but stated that it could have been there as the traffic he saw. Sam Bradley, Jr., one of the defendants below and one of the appellees here, was employed by Baltimore Transfer Company, the other defendant and appellee, to operate a “straight job truck” or “van,” a two and one-half ton 1955 “International”, which Mr. Bradley described as being 16 to 18 feet long at one point and 50 feet long at another point. He had gone to Pier 3, Old Bay Line, on the day of the collision to make a delivery. After leaving his freight, he drove the truck back to the head of Pier 3, “near 1:00 o’clock or after 12:00 o’clock,” when he was confronted with a solid red light.

In a split second or so after his arrival at the head of Pier 3, he “could see” that “traffic had stopped” or “was coming to a stop.” After traffic had come to a complete stop, he looked again at the red light, saw that it was flashing and then proceeded into the intersection. He stated that it was in his mind that he had run over a treadle on Pier 3 to change the red light to flashing red, but on cross-examination when asked “that is really not the case, is it?” replied “I don’t know. I am still thinking that is what made the light change.” The point of impact between the Cornias’ automobile and the truck was in or near the east-west crosswalk of Gay Street. Mr. Cornias testified that he had completed “about maybe two-thirds or three-fourths” of his turn, and was facing north by northwest at the moment of impact.

Mr. Bradley testified that he had “got all the way across” Pratt Street before he “felt this impact,” "and that the front of the truck was “all the way into the sidewalk” on the north side of Pratt Street. The sidewalk on ⁴⁸⁴ the north side of Pratt Street is 19 feet, 6 inches wide át Gay Street. Mr. Cornias testified that it was his recollection that the front bumper of the truck hit him first on the left front fender of his automobile and then the rear wheels of the truck hit his vehicle as the truck went past. The major damage was done by the rear wheels.

Mr. Bradley marked a photograph, introduced into evidence, to show that the impact occurred at the top of the center of the rear wheels of the truck, the photograph showing dark marks along the body of the truck which he did not recall being there when he began his trip. He testified on direct examination: “When I got out of my truck and walked around to the back, at, this point, this car that this gentleman [Cornias] was driving was over right up against the front of my truck, where you can see he must have tried to make this right turn and after he discovered I am here, he must have pulled to his right. But it actually hit on the right rear wheel of my truck that I was driving. “Q. Did you ever see that automobile that struck you before the impact happened? A. Never seen it.

Everything I seen was stopped and the only thing that — the way I felt the impact, it seemed as though one of the wheels had fell off or something, and in a second I looked and I saw this car and this man was leaning over into the left post of his car. So I merely got out and walked around.” On cross-examination Mr. Bradley testified: “Q. When you got out, you looked at the vehicles, was your truck up against his car? A. I don’t recall, but I think it was. I couldn’t swear to it. ■ • ⁴⁸⁵ “Q. What part of your truck was up against his car ?

A. At that particular time ? “Q. Yes sir. A. I don’t know, but I think it would be more or less parallel, but at the time —it seemed as though he was a little beyond me at that time, had made his complete — by that time he had made a complete turn, headed the same way I was, just a little beyond me. “Q. His car in front of your truck; is that your testimony? A. On the right side of it, just the front of it. As I looked out the window, this man was laying over the left, on the steering wheel.” As we have noted, Mr. Bradley testified that he never saw the Cornias’ automobile before the impact.

On cross-examination he testified that he was looking to the front but did not know why he did not see the Cornias vehicle., All he knows was that traffic had stopped. He had attained the speed of 6 or 7 miles per hour prior to the collision from the time he had left his stopped position at Pier 3. Harry Wright, a stevedore employed on July 28th by the Old Bay Line, was called as a witness for the defendants. He was seated near the head of Pier 3 on the left-hand side, on a crate during the lunch hour.

He testified: “Q. What did you see? A. See, they have a blinker started, he throwed up his hand. So he say ‘I’ll see you.’ Well, I still sitting there. After he got all the way across the street, he had a collusion [sic] in the last lane on the— “ (The Court) Collision is a better word. “A. He had a collusion [sic] over there, after he had done got on the last lane.

He was all the way across. “Q. All right. Now, was his truck stopped at the end of the pier at anytime before he started off? A. Yes, sir. He stopped after the blinker started.

Then he come out. ⁴⁸⁶ “ (The Court) Did you notice the color of the light when he first came up to the entrance of the pier ? “(The Witness) The blinker? “(The Court) Yes. “(The Witness) Yes. When it started blinking it was red. “(The Court) Was it red at first and then started to blink? “(The Witness) No, sir. When it started to blinking, then the trucks coming out from out of the piers supposed to come out.” Mr. Wright further stated that when the light started blinking, Mr. Bradley pulled off, said “I’ll see you” and threw up his hand. Mr. Bradley had to curve around (from a northerly direction to a northwesterly direction) to get from Pier 3 to Gay Street.

He traced a wide arc to show how the truck proceeded across Pratt Street. He stated that there was “right smart” of traffic on Pratt Street and that the Cornias vehicle was in the north curb lane. He saw the Cornias automobile moving a little before the impact after it had passed in front of the other automobiles waiting for the light on Pratt Street. He stated that the “blinker was still on” at the time of the collision, that all of traffic on Pratt Street was stopped, and that it was not until something like a second or two after the collision that the other cars on Pratt Street started moving.

There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Cornias offered any evidence to show specifically that Pratt Street was designated as a boulevard. After instructions by the trial court, which we will consider later in the opinion, the jury considered the case and found a verdict for the defendant. From a judgment for costs entered upon this verdict, the plaintiff Cornias filed a timely appeal. The appellant Cornias briefed and argued four questions before us, as follows: ⁴⁸⁷ 1.

The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury in regard to the application of the “boulevard law” to the facts of the case. 2. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that, as a matter of law, the sign “Move on flashing red after stop” under the circumstances of the case removed Pratt Street as a favored highway or boulevard and that Code (1957), Article 66%, §§ 196(1), 233(a) and (b) and 242(a) and (c) did not apply on the facts in the case. 3. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that Bradley was “lawfully in the intersection and that Cor-mas had an absolute duty not to enter the intersection on his green light until the truck had cleared the intersection. 4. The trial court erred in refusing to direct the verdict for the plaintiff Cornias on the question of liability.

We now consider the relevant portions of the instructions of the trial court. After general and correct instructions to the jury in regard to the binding effect of the court’s instructions on the law, but not on the facts, of which the jury is the sole judge, burden of proof, negligence and contributory negligence, and the general obligations of operators of motor vehicles to follow the Maryland law in regard to traffic signals, the trial court instructed the jury: “Under the facts of this case, I instruct you that the boulevard law is not applicable. This is due to the fact that there is no evidence that Pratt Street is a boulevard, at least at this intersection. The evidence shows that traffic on Pratt Street was controlled by the usual green and red traffic signals; that southbound traffic on Gay Street was controlled by lights on the south side of Pratt Street, which would show solid red or flashing red — I’m not certain what the evidence shows as to southbound Gay Street traffic; however, this traffic can make a turn either right or left into Pratt Street.

The im ⁴⁸⁸ portant signals, of course, are the traffic signals on the north side of Pratt Street to regulate traffic egressing from Pier 3 on the south side of Pratt Street. The evidence shows that these lights were either red, or that they would flash red to allow traffic to egress from Pier 3. The exhibits filed in the case show that there are two such lights parallel with each other and hanging above the north side of Pratt Street. In the middle of the two lights is a sign reading ‘Move on flashing red after stop.’ “I instruct you as a matter of law that this sign ‘Move on flashing red after stop’, when considered with the traffic signals on Pratt Street, remove Pratt Street as a favored highway or as a boulevard, and that both of these operators were under the obligation to obey the traffic signals which were facing them. “I instruct you that each party had the following right and following obligation: “The plaintiff, facing the red light for westbound traffic on Pratt Street, was under a legal obligation to wait until his traffic signal changed to green; and when it did change to green, he had a right to. move forward, subject to the further obligation that he must yield the right of way to all traffic legally within the intersection at that time.

In other words, when you face a red light and it changes to green, you do not have an absolute right of way to go forward immediately. If traffic is lawfully within the intersection coming from a different direction, the operator who gets the green light must still wait and yield the right of way to let such traffic lawfully within the intersection completely clear the the intersection. Mr. Bradley was under the obligation to stop his truck before entering Pratt Street from Pier 3 if you find that the traffic ⁴⁸⁹ signals showed solid red for traffic leaving Pier 3 at that time. He was under an obligation not to move forward to cross Pratt Street into Gay-Street until those lights changed to flashing red. “Those lights are somewhat unusual.

Quite often lights flash green or flash amber, but in this case they flash red. Red usually means stop, but when the red signals flashed in this case they meant go. Therefore, Mr. Bradley had a legal right at that time to proceed across Pratt Street, if you find that the traffic lights facing him changed from solid red to flashing red. He was under the same obligation, when he got the flashing red signals, to yield the right of way to all traffic then legally in the intersection.

Other than that obligation, he did have the right to cross Pratt Street and enter, or attempt to enter, Gay Street on a diagonal line, being sure that he did not collide with traffic already lawfully within the intersection. “Thus, the rights of both of the operators in this case were equal and each, subject to the rules that I have outlined to you, had the same obligation to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to avoid striking the other. It is your function to find which driver was negligent, or if both drivers were negligent, in the operation of their motor vehicles.” Counsel for the plaintiff Cornias duly excepted to the charge for refusal to grant the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that the case was a boulevard case and there should have been an instruction that Bradley was negligent as a matter of law; and further that: “* * * £ke court erred regarding the instructions of the sign because under the Court of Appeals case, Belle Isle Cab Company versus Pruitt, 187 Maryland 174 , at page 179 to 181, I ⁴⁹⁰ believe, 49 Atlantic'Second, 537, page 539, and also the case of Sonnenburg versus Monumental Motor Tours, Incorporated, 81 Atlantic Second, 617, 198 Maryland 227 , the Court of Appeals has held that a municipality does not or any other authority does not have the power to change the meaning of traffic signals as established by the annotated code of Public General Laws of Maryland. The meaning of those traffic laws is clearly established by the Annotated Laws of Maryland. Regardless of what signs were posted there, that the words ‘Go on flashing red’ do not change the law of Maryland, which the plaintiff contends is that on a flashing red light, Article 66%, Section 196, makes the boulevard law applicable.” (1) and (2) In our opinion, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that Pratt Street was a boulevard at the intersection of Pratt and Gay Street and of Pratt Street and Pier 3.

There was error in the instruction that the rights of both operators in the case were equal under the circumstances of this case. The trial court also erred in ruling that Article 66%, §§ 196(1), 233(a) and (b) and 242(a) and (c) did not apply on the facts in this case. The basic question is whether or not under the applicable statutory and case law, Pratt Street at the intersections mentioned is a “boulevard” so that Mr. Bradley’s