Coster v. Department of Personnel

Moylan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by Bernard J. Coster from an order of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City dissolving a temporary injunction restraining the appellees from terminating his employment at Baltimore-Washington International Airport (BWI). The appellant was hired on or about September 17, 1975, under the Classified Service of the Maryland State Department of Personnel to work as an airport operations manager at BWI, a facility operated by the State Aviation Administration of the Maryland Department of Transportation. Pursuant to Md. Code, Art. 64A (Merit System), § 33, he was placed on probationary status for a period of six months.

On or about February 22, 1976, his immediate supervisor, Daniel W. Riordan, one of the appellees herein, submitted an unsatisfactory “Probation & Annual Efficiency Rating Report” on him, which resulted in an extension of his probationary status for an additional six months, up to and including September 17, 1976. On July 1, 1976, Mr. Riordan informed the appellant that his employment would be terminated on August 31, 1976. On July 30, 1976, the appellant filed a grievance under the grievance procedure specified by the Department of Personnel. On August 31, 1976, he filed a bill of complaint for an injunction restraining the appellees from terminating his employment pending a determination of the merits of the case.

In his bill, he stated that his grievance was then on the third step of the five-step grievance procedure. He further alleged that the actions of the appellees were “arbitrary,” “capricious” and “without cause” and that, unless an injunction was issued, he would “suffer ⁵²⁵ substantial, immediate and irreparable injury, for which he has no adequate remedy at law.” On the same day, pending a hearing on the matter, a temporary injunction was granted for ten days. The temporary injunction was subsequently extended on September 10, 1976, for an additional ten-day period. Meanwhile, on September 9, the appellees filed a motion to dissolve the ex parte injunction, contending that the bill did not contain facts to support appellant’s claim of substantial, immediate and irreparable injury for which there was no adequate remedy at law and that, as a probationary employee, the appellant’s employment could be terminated without cause.

On September 20,1976, following a hearing on the matter, the injunction was dissolved. The appellant argues that the lower court erred in dissolving the temporary injunction restraining the State Aviation Administration from terminating his employment because, even if he was still a probationary employee, the agency could not terminate his employment without cause. The appellees, on the other hand, argue that appellant was still a probationary employee and that, under Maryland Code, Art. 64A, § 33, a probationary employee may be terminated without cause. In deciding whether the temporary injunction was properly dissolved, however, it is unnecessary, in the posture of this case, for us to reach the questions whether the appellant was still a probationary employee and what rights a probationary versus a permanent employee under the Maryland State Classified Service enjoys.

The appellant sought the injunction on the ground that if his employment was terminated, he would “suffer substantial, immediate and irreparable injury, for which he has no adequate remedy at law.” In discussing irreparable injury as a grounds for injunctive relief, 42 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, § 48, states: “A court of equity reserves its injunctive process for the protection of property or other rights against actual or threatened injuries of a substantial character which cannot be adequately ⁵²⁶ remedied in a court of law. That is to say, the jurisdiction or power to grant injunctive relief should be exercised only when intervention is essential to effectually protect property or other rights, of which equity will take cognizance, against irreparable injuries. The very function of an injunction is to furnish preventive relief against irreparable mischief or injury, and the remedy will not be awarded where it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the injury complained of is not of such character. Suitors may not resort to a court of equity to restrain acts, actual or threatened, merely because they are illegal or transcend constitutional powers, unless it is apparent that irremediable injury will result.

The mere assertion that apprehended acts will inflict irreparable injury is not enough. The complaining party must allege and prove facts from which the court can reasonably infer that such would be the