County Commissioners v. Gantt

Robinson, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action of assumpsit brought by the plaintiff to recover money alleged to be due to him by the defendants, the County Commissioners of Calvert County. Charles G. Spicknell was, it appears, appointed collector of taxes for the third district of Calvert County for the years 1886 and 1887, and having been elected County Commissioner, the plaintiff was appointed by the Circuit Court trustee to complete his collections. The plaintiff was also appointed by the Commissioners collector of taxes for the years 1888 and 1889, and upon his being elected a member of the Legislature in 1889, John F. Ireland was appointed by the Circuit Court trustee to complete his collections, and to complete the collection of taxes in his hands as trustee of Spicknell.

The plaintiff testified that, at the time of the appointment of Ireland trustee, he, the plaintiff, was owing to the County Commissioners, on account of uncollected taxes, the following sums: — for the year 1886 the sum of $1,765.70, for the year 1887 the sum of $2,826.44, for the year 1888 the sum of $2,832.66, and for the year 1889 the sum of $5,266.06. He further testified that he turned over to Ireland, trustee, the following uncollected balances: $674.70 for the year 1886, and $1,407.86 for the year 1887, and $2,772.47 for the year 1888, and $6,868.63 for the year 1889. He then proved sundry other credits, to which he claimed to be entitled, and these credits, and the uncollected taxes turned over to Ireland, trustee, it is claimed, exceeded the amount due by the plaintiff to the defendants on account of taxes in his hands as collector, and as trustee of Spicknell. And this suit is brought to recover this alleged excess in over-payments by the plaintiff to the defendants.

Now the defendants having proved by Ireland, trustee, that he had settled in full with the defendants for all ²⁸⁹ taxes in his hands for collection, and had their receipt for the same, proposed to ask the witness, Ireland, the following question: “Mr. Gantt, the plaintiff, has stated that he turned over to you for the year 1886 the sum of $694.70, for the year 1887, the sum of $1,407.86, for the year 1888, the sum of $2,772.47, for the year 1889, the sum of $6,868.63, as balances in his hands for collection. State if collectible tax bills for said amounts were turned over to you.” And upon objection being made by the plaintiff, the Court refused to allow the witness to answer the question. The question is, it seems to us, a proper and pertinent question, and we do not sée on what grounds the objection to it can be sustained. The plaintiff himself bad testified that as collector and as trustee of Spicknell, he had turned over to the witness, as trustee, uncollected taxes for those years amounting in the aggregate to a sum exceeding, say twelve thousand dollars, and it was for these uncollected taxes thus turned over to the witness, that the plaintiff sought to charge the defendants.

And, such being the case, the defendants had the right beyond all question to prove by the witness that the plaintiff had not, in fact, turned over to him collectible tax bills — that is to say, tax bills which the witness could collect, amounting to the sum testified to by the plaintiff. It may have been that some of the tax bills which were turned over to the witness had, in fact, been paid to the plaintiff, or that some of them were against insolvents, the payment of which could not be enforced, or that some of them were barred by the Statute of Limitations, and that the persons against whom they were charged had plead the Statute as a bar to the collection. Be that as it may, it was competent for the witness to prove that part of the taxes turned over to him, and for which the plaintiff sought to charge the defendants, were not, in fact, tax bills which the witness could collect. This is not an action to recover taxes ²⁹⁰ against persons as charged upon the tax books, and the evidence was offered merely for the purpose of proving that part of the taxes turned over to the witness, and for which the plaintiff claimed as credits against the defendants, were taxes which could not be collected.

And for this purpose the evidence was, we think, admissible. But then it is argued that if there was error in not allowing the witness to answer, the judgment ought not to be reversed, because the defendants did not state the object for which the evidence was offered, nor does it appear from the record what would have been the answer of the witness, Now, if the question was in itself proper and pertinent it was quite unnecessary for the defendants to state the purpose for which it vras offered. The record does not, it is true, show what would have been the answer to the question, and this the record could not show, for the reason that the witness was not allowed to answer the question. In Lawson vs. Price, 45 Md., 123 ; Baltimore and Yorktown Turnpike Road vs. Crowther, 63 Md., 558 ; Baltimore and Yorktown Turnpike Road vs. State, 63 Md., 518 , and other like cases relied on by the appellee, the Court, against the objection of the other side, allowed the witness to answer the question, but the exception taken to the ruling of the Court did not contain or set out the answer or evidence of the witness, and it was held that the Court could not reverse the judgment, unless it appeared that some injury had been done to the party excepting to the ruling of the Court. “Eor aught that appears,” said the Court in these cases, “the answer of the witness may have been wholly unimportant or immaterial.” But in this case the exception is to the ruling of the Court in refusing to allow the witness to answer the question.

And as the