Crawford v. State

Johnson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Garland Crawford was on September 28th, 1937, indicted by the grand jurors of the State of Maryland for the body of Baltimore City for the murder of Loretta Anderson on August 7th of the same year. To this indictment he filed a special plea, a demurrer to which was interposed by .the State and' sustained. He elected to be tried before the court sitting as a jury, by whose verdict he was found guilty of murder in the second degree, and, his motion, for a new trial having been heard and overruled by the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, the trial court gave judgment that he be confined in the Maryland penitentiary for five years.

Upon appeal from that judgment the principal question raised relates to ¹⁷⁷ the correctness of the trial court’s action in sustaining the demurrer to his special plea, which reads as follows: “Garland Crawford, the defendant in the above case, by Webster S. Blades, his attorney, for special plea to the indictment heretofore filed herein, says that on the 81st day of August, 1937, he was arraigned before Magistrate Harry H. Fine, the magistrate duly assigned to preside at the Northwestern Police Station in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, and charged with a crime in words following: “ ‘Assaulting and shooting Loretta Anderson (c), age nine months, with a pistol in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, on August 7, 1937.’ “That the aforesaid presiding magistrate had criminal jurisdiction to try said charge; that he, the defendant Garland Crawford, waived a jury trial and elected to be tried before said magistrate and pleaded ‘Not Guilty’ to said charge. That after a full and complete hearing upon said charge as aforesaid, he was found ‘Not Guilty’ of the matter whereof he stood thus, charged, whereupon he was, by said presiding magistrate, duly discharged and the charge was entered ‘Dismissed.’ “That he and the said Garland Crawford, defendant in the above recited charge, are one and the same person ; that the charge of ‘assaulting and shooting Loretta Anderson (c), age nine months, with a pistol in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, on August 7th, 1937,’ of which he was thus found not guilty is the same assaulting and shooting alleged to have later caused the death of the said Loretta Anderson for which he now stands charged in the pending indictment for murder.” Appellant, in support of his contention that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer, relies solely upon the doctrine of res judicata, asserting that the magistrate had jurisdiction to try the case, and there adjudged the defendant not guilty of the crime he was charged as having committed, viz., “Assaulting and shooting Loretta Anderson * * * with a pistol * * *”; and that these issues having been judicially determined in his favor, he ¹⁷⁸ cannot now be prosecuted for the murder of Loretta Anderson growing out of the previous charge as to which he was found not guilty, because the elements of assault and battery upon Loretta Anderson must necessarily be proved in his trial upon indictment for her murder; in short, that his acquittal by the magistrate effectively creates an estoppel by judgment which bars the State from prosecuting him upon a more serious charge growing out of his assault and. battery of Loretta Anderson with a pistol; it having once been determined in a proceeding between appellant and the State of Maryland that he did not assault her with a pistol. As against this, the State makes two contentions: (1) That the magistrate had no jurisdiction of the offense for which appellant was tried at the police station, hence his acquittal upon that charge is a mere nullity and affords him no protection whatever; (2) that his acquittal of assaulting Loretta Anderson with a pistol, being for a lesser offense than murder, does not estop the State from prosecuting him upon the murder charge. By section 42, article 4 of the Constitution of Maryland, it is provided that justices of the peace for the several counties, as well as for Baltimore City, “shall have such jurisdiction, duties and compensation” as theretofore exercised or subsequently prescribed by law.

This jurisdiction, so far as justices of the peace of the City of Baltimore are concerned, is defined by section 724 of the Baltimore City Charter (1988), and is specifically limited to the offenses of fortune telling, vagrancy, indecent exposure, preventing children from begging,