Crowther, Inc. v. Johnson

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from the order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County sustaining the action of the County Board of Appeals for Baltimore County denying the petition of Crowther, Inc., a Maryland corporation, for a special exception to operate a trailer park upon land zoned M. L- (Manufacturing, Light). The property involved contains 12.7 acres and is located near Timonium, in the Eighth Election District of Baltimore County. It is bounded on the north by a drive-in theatre (a non-conforming use) fronting on Green Spring Drive, on the east by the southerly end of Green Spring Drive, on the south by a residential development, and on the west by a residential development.

The M. L. zone runs along both sides of Green Spring Drive and ends on the south and west boundaries of the subject property, Green Spring Drive forming a cul de sac after running along the Crowther property for a short distance. There are several industrial uses in this zone in the immediate vicinity to the north of the property in question. To the south and west of the Crowther property there is a residential zone. Crowther, Inc. filed a petition with the Zoning Commissioner of Baltimore County for a special exception as provided for in the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations (1955) § 253.5 and § 502.1 which set out the requisites to be complied with before a special exception is granted. § 502.1 provides as follows: “Before any Special Exception shall be granted, it must appear that the use for which the Special Exception is requested will not: a.

Be detrimental to the health, safety, or general welfare of the locality involved; b. Tend to create congestion in roads, streets or alleys therein; ³⁸² c. Create a potential hazard from fire, panic or other dangers; d. Tend to overcrowd land and cause undue concentration of population; e.

Interfere with adequate provisions for schools, parks, water, sewerage, transportation or other public requirements, conveniences, or improvements ; f. Interfere with adequate light and air.” A public hearing was held before the Zoning Commissioner, who subsequently passed an order granting the special exception upon the condition that a fence six feet in height and similar to an Anchor Link Fence be erected on the southern and southeastern boundaries of the property, and upon the further conditions that the complete plans for the trailer park meet the requirements of § 414 of the Zoning Regulations and be submitted for approval to the Baltimore County Office of Planning. The Commissioner held that the petitioner had proven the items in § 502.1, including the fact that the proposed use would in no way be “detrimental to the health, safety, or general welfare of the locality * * *.” An appeal was taken from this order to the County Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, which held a hearing de novo. Board members Spiro T. Agnew and Charles Steinback, Jr. filed a majority opinion and order pursuant thereto denying the special exception, holding that the use applied for “could easily constitute a hazard to the health of the locality” and would be detrimental to the general welfare of the neighborhood.

It did, however, find that the other requirements of § 502.1 had been met by the petitioner. Daniel W. Hubers, the third member of the board, filed a separate concurring opinion which stated that the proposed use would violate practically all the provisions of § 502.1. On appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County the trial court rejected the finding of the board that the granting of the special exception would be detrimental to the health of the locality but sustained the ruling of the board on the ground that the use would be detrimental to the general welfare of the locality because the trailer park would present, as found by the board, ³⁸³ (1) “an inexcusable departure from the comprehensive plan for the area, resulting in an irreparable rupture in the integrity of the industrial neighborhood”, and (2) would adversely affect the property values of both the industries and the residences within its environs. The appellant’s first contention is that the trial court erred when it held that the board is acting in a quasi-legislative capacity when it decides cases involving special exceptions, and hence the court confined itself to a too narrow scope of review in this case.

In this case we feel it makes no real difference whether the board’s action is considered as quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative for even under the broader scope of review claimed as to quasi-judicial action, we think that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the board’s conclusion. The general rule is that in reviewing the action of zoning boards a court will not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the board unless its action is shown to be arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Dorsey Enterprises, Inc. v. Shpak, 219 Md. 16